ORDER Radhey Krishna Agrawal, J. - The landlord Mahabir Prasad has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order passed by the appellate court and for restoring the order passed by the Prescribed Authority allowing the application moved by the landlord under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter called the Act. 2. The landlord had in 1980 moved an application under Section 21 of the Act for evicting the opposite parties tenants from the shop in question situate in mohalla Thatheri Bazar, District Gonda. The said shop was originally let out to Suraj Lal, who died leaving respondents 2 to 6 as his heirs and therefore, those respondents innerited the tenancy rights. The landlord petitioner has alleged that originally he was having a contract of running canteen in Civil Courts, Gonda, but for the last several years the could not get the said contract, and, therefore, he as well as his sons wanted to carry on canteen business in the shop in question. His three sons Rajendra Prasad, Ravindra Prakash and Ravi Prakash are also of grown up age and they would also join the petitioner-landlord for carrying on business in the said shop. The eldest son of the petitioner-landlord is living on the back side of the shop in question. The tenant-respondents have several shops where they can shift their business and they have absolutely no need to retain the shop in question. 3. The application was resisted by Jamuna Prasad respondent No. 2 alone (one of the sons of deceased Suraj Lal), the other heirs of Suraj Lal did not contest the application. In the objection it is alleged that the landlord had no bona fide need for the shop in question. The eldest son of the landlord is carrying on business in a shop just adjoining the shop in question and the landlord is also looking after the said business. The other two sons of the landlord were students. The landlord got the adjoining shop vacated from one Gaya Prasad and thereafter his son has started the business. A partition took place amongst the heirs of Suraj Lal and that the shop in question has come under his (Jamuna Prasad's) tenancy who alone is carrying on brass wares and utensils business. The landlord got the adjoining shop vacated from one Gaya Prasad and thereafter his son has started the business. A partition took place amongst the heirs of Suraj Lal and that the shop in question has come under his (Jamuna Prasad's) tenancy who alone is carrying on brass wares and utensils business. The other heirs of Suraj Lal had no concern with the said shop. He (Jamuna Prasad) (hereinafter called 'tenant') has no other shop in his possession. It is further alleged that the tenant has earned goodwill in his business as he is doing the same there since long. 4. In support of their respective contentions both the parties had filed affidavits and documents. The learned prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the shop in question was bona fide required by the landlord for carrying on business and in case the permissions is not granted under Section 21 of the Act the landlord would suffer greater hardships as compared to that of the tenant. The tenant preferred an appeal against the said order of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court allowed the appeal and rejected the application moved under Section 21 of the Act. Hence the petitioner has filed this writ petition for quashing the appellant order. 5. Sri Umesh Chandra, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the finding of the learned appellate court is a finding of fact and this Court in its writ jurisdiction would not interfere in the said finding of fact. It is true that in writ jurisdiction this Court would be reluctant to interfere in the finding of fact given by the appellate court but if the lower court has arrived at such a finding on wrong legal assumption or approach the said finding would not be called a conclusive finding of fact. 6. The landlord had moved application under Section 21 of the Act alleging that he had his sons would carry on business in the shop in question. At the time when the, application was moved in 1980 the two sons of the landlord were students. Subsequently the second son had to seek employment as daily wager in the Public Works Department and the third son could not pursue his studies after class IX as is evident from the supplementary affidavit filed by the landlond in this Court. 7. Subsequently the second son had to seek employment as daily wager in the Public Works Department and the third son could not pursue his studies after class IX as is evident from the supplementary affidavit filed by the landlond in this Court. 7. Sri R. C. Gupta, learned counsel for the landlord has contended that the landlord's other two sons who have now grown up in age would also require the shop in question for carrying the business. Learned counsel for the respondents on the contrary contended that subsequent events could not be taken into consideration and the application under Section 21 of the Act would be disposed of and considered on the allegations made earlier at the time when it was moved in 1980. I am absolutely unable to accept this contention raised by the learned counsel for the tenant. The Court would be fully justified in taking into consideration the subsequent events at the time of hering. If any accommodation was bona fide required by the landlord at the time when the application was moved, but if by the invent of subsequent facts and circumstances the requirement of the landlord at the time of hearing was not found to be genuine, he would be non-suited and the application under Section 21 of the Act would be rejected. I an supported in this view by the case reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 , Hashmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad. In that case the land-lord subsequently during pendency of the second appeal acquired major portion of the building in a vacant state where he could start his business. The Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the said subsequent event and held that the landlord did not required the accommodation in dispute. 8. In 1984 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases page 485 : (1985 All LJ 24); Ved Prakash v. II Addl. District Judge, this Court has observed : "It is well known by now that subsequent event can be taken into account which have come into existence during the pendency of the writ petition in this Hon'ble Court. In the present case it has not been disputed that during the pendency of the writ petition the landlady opposite party has got possession over the shop in possession of one Baij Nath." 9. In the present case it has not been disputed that during the pendency of the writ petition the landlady opposite party has got possession over the shop in possession of one Baij Nath." 9. In another case reported in AIR 1985 SC 207 ; M/ s. Variety Emporium v. V. R. M. Mohd, Ibrahim, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed : "No authority is needed for the proposition that, in appropriate cases, the Court must have regard to events as they present themselves at the time when it is hearing the proceedings before it and mould the relief in the light of those events." 10. It is, therefore, clear that this Court can very well take into consideration the subsequent events which have occurred during pendency of the writ petition. In the instant case, however, the landlord in his application under S. 21 of the Act had clearly mentioned that he bona fide needed the accommodation in dispute for carrying on business as his three sons are coming up of the age. It cannot, therefore, be said that the landlord at this stage wants to add any new facts. He had already stated that his sons were also to be set up in business in the shop in question. 11. It is not in dispute that the shop in question was originally let out to Suraj Lal, who was carrying on brass-wares and utensils business there. He died leaving respondents 2 to 6 as heirs and, therefore, they inherited tenancy rights and all of them became the cotenants. It is also not in dispute that in the shop in question only Jamuna Prasad, respondent No. 2 is carrying on business and other heirs of Suraj Lal have no concern with the said shop though, of course, they would be deemed to be co-tenants of the shop in ques:ion. Under these circumstances, therefore, we have to consider the requirement and the hardship of Jamuna Prasad alone and not regarding other cotenants as they are not in possession of the said shop. 12. Admittedly, the landlord Mahabir Prasad was earlier having canteen Theka in Civil Courts Gonda. He was, however, not successful in getting the said Theka in subsequent years and as such he was compelled to move the application under S. 21 of the Act for getting the shop in question vacated since he became out of business thereafter. 12. Admittedly, the landlord Mahabir Prasad was earlier having canteen Theka in Civil Courts Gonda. He was, however, not successful in getting the said Theka in subsequent years and as such he was compelled to move the application under S. 21 of the Act for getting the shop in question vacated since he became out of business thereafter. His eldest son Rajendra Prasad, however, subsequently started business of `Jhari' rassi etc. in the passage, adjacent to the shop in question. According to the landlord his eldest son Rajendra Prasad is living on the back side of the shop in question and the land just adjacent to the shop in question is only a passage for entering to the back portion where Rajendra Prasad has started residing. It is true that such passage was earlier in the tenancy of one Gaya Prasad and the landlord Mahabir got the same vacated. A site-plan of the entire premises including the shop in question, adjacent passage and the back portion is on record. The said site-plan goes to indicate that the land adjacent to the shop in question is hardly 3 to 4 feet wide. It would therefore, be preposterous to call the said passage a shop. The mere fact that Gaya Prasad was in possession of the said portion (so-called shop) would not be enough to say that the said passage was a shop. The said portion was in fact used by Gaya Prasad when probably the eldest son of Mahabir Prasad was not residing on the back side. In view of this, if Rajendra Prasad the eldest son of the landlord, after the Theka in the Civil Courts was not renewed in favour of the landlord Mahabir Prasad, had started sanction family from starvation an alternative business in the said passage that would itself go to establish the bona fide requirement of the landlord for the shop in question for carrying on a regular business for livelihood as the landlord does not own any other property whatsoever. The landlord and his two other sons are living in a rented house in another mohalla. The learned appellate Court has overlooked these facts and had drawn a conclusion which is not at all supported by any evidence on record and the said conclusion would not therefore, amount to a finding of fact but in fact it would be an illegality in its approach. The learned appellate Court has overlooked these facts and had drawn a conclusion which is not at all supported by any evidence on record and the said conclusion would not therefore, amount to a finding of fact but in fact it would be an illegality in its approach. The finding of the appellate Court appears to be manifestly unjust. 13. Much has been said by Sri Umesh Chandra, learned counsel for the respondents that the fact that the eldest son of the landlord had started doing business of Jharu, Rassi etc. and not of canteen would itself go to indicate that the landlord did not need the accommodation in dispute for carrying on business of canteen. I fail to understand the reasoning behind this argument. Canteen or sweatmeat business could not be carried on in a space having width of 3-4 feet. The landlord's son had therefore, no option but to carry on that Jharu Rassi business in the said passage and upon a land lying in front of it. This itself indicates the bona fide need of the landlord for a suitable accommodation. In a case reported in 1990 (1) All RC 20 : (1989 All LJ 1225) Prem Prakash Dhawan v. Special Judge, the landlord was forced to carry on business in his drawing room because of shortage of space. It was, therefore, held that the need of the landlord for the accommodation in dispute was quite genuine and bona fide. 14. In the present case the landlord in fact wanted to settle himself as well as his sons in the business. It is not in dispute that the landlord does not own any other building where he can carry on his business. He has three sons, one of them is of course a daily wages worker in the Public Works Department getting about Rs. 20/- per day. It has been alleged on behalf of the landlord that since he had no accommodation for carrying on business the said son was forced to work as daily wages worker. It cannot at all be disputed that it would always be a genuine endeavour of father to see that during the life time his sons are duly settled according to their education, qualification and capability. It is in fact a moral duty of a father to see that the sons are settled in his life. It cannot at all be disputed that it would always be a genuine endeavour of father to see that during the life time his sons are duly settled according to their education, qualification and capability. It is in fact a moral duty of a father to see that the sons are settled in his life. The landlord has no accommodation where he can settle his three sons in business. All his three sons did not have such education and qualification to enable them to seek any job in any Govt. department or in private concern. The landlord is a business man and was having canteen Theka in Civil Courts. He would, therefore, certainly think on the lines of settling his sons in business. The space available to him at present is only 3-4 feet wide accommodation where it would be quite impossible for him to settle himself and his three sons. 15. Learned counsel for the tenant, however, contended that since the eldest son of the landlord is carrying on business of `Jharu Rassi' etc. in that adjacent shop (passage) the other two sons can also be absorbed in that business and that no additional accommodation would be needed for the landlord and his two other sons. I do not agree with contention. The need of the landlord on this account cannot at all be dismissed. Similar matter had come up before this Court in the case reported in 1980 ARC 479 : (1980 All LJ 1146), M/s. Deep Chand Nem Chand Jain v. Prescribed Authority, in which it was observed : "In my view, each adult ought to legitimately entitled to work for own independent existence and sustenance. He is entitled to choose a vocation or profession suiting his individual aptitude, education or qualification, capabilities and so forth. The need of such an unemployed member cannot, in my judgment, be dismissed by telling him that he must follow the line or profession of the other members of the family or try to get absorbed in the business already carried on by the family." 16. The learned appellate Court was in fact led away to hold that the need of the landlord was not bona fide on the ground that his eldest son Rajendra Prasad was carrying on `Rassi Jharu' business instead of carrying canteen or sweetmeat business in the aforesaid passage (adjacent to the shop in dispute). The learned appellate Court was in fact led away to hold that the need of the landlord was not bona fide on the ground that his eldest son Rajendra Prasad was carrying on `Rassi Jharu' business instead of carrying canteen or sweetmeat business in the aforesaid passage (adjacent to the shop in dispute). According to the learned appellate Court, since Rajendra Prasad has not adopted his father's old business of canteen, that would go to indicate that the allegation of the landlord that he needed the shop in dispute for canteen business was incorrect. It was also observed by the learned appellate Court that if the sons of the landlord, as alleged by him, were keen to start canteen business and sweetmeat `business as they have acquired efficiency in that business, they would have started that very business in the adjacent passage (shop) and Rajendra Prasad would not have started 'Rassi Jharu' business. I am afraid the aforesaid reasoning adopted by the learned appellate Court cannot be accepted and it is not only perverse but unwarranted and is an indication of wrong legal approach. 17. The stand taken by the landlord was that his son Rajendra Prasad was doing `Rassi Jharu' business on the `Patri' infront of the passage and that his son Rajendra Prasad was living on the back side of the said portion and that he (landlord) is living in rented house. The learned appellate Court observed that the allegation of the landlord that his son Rajendra Prasad was doing 'Jharu Rassi' business on the `Patri' in front of the said passage and not in the passage and that his son Rajendra Prasad was living on the back portion of the said shop, were incorrect and as such it must be assumed that all the allegations and evidence led by the landlord would also be false on the principle that if a person can speak lie on one matter he would not speak the truth on other matters. This approach of the learned appellate Court is also against the principle of law. 18. The mere fact that the statement of a person on a particular point is incorrect and unbelievable though this is not the case here that would not mean that his statement or evidence on other points would also be necessarily incorrect or unbelievable. This approach of the learned appellate Court is also against the principle of law. 18. The mere fact that the statement of a person on a particular point is incorrect and unbelievable though this is not the case here that would not mean that his statement or evidence on other points would also be necessarily incorrect or unbelievable. In this particular case in fact it is admitted by the tenant that the landlord is living in another rented house. The stand of the landlord that he is living in another rented house would not be falsified merely by the fact that he has given his postal address of his son Rajendra Prasad who is living on the back side of the shop in question and is also carrying on `Jharu Rassi' business in the said passage and also on the `Patri' in front of the said passage. 19. Learned counsel for the tenant has vehemently argued that since Rajendra Prasad was carrying on `Jharu Rassi' business in the adjoining passage (shop), the need of the landlord for the shop in question would not at all be called a bona fide one. 20. Bona fide requirement for a landlord for a shop would not mean that the landlord must be on the street before applying for vacation of the accommodation under S. 21 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a case reported in AIR 1979 SC 272 , Mst. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, has observed (at page 276) :-- "If the plaintiffs had proved that their necessity was both genuine and reasonable, that the present premises which belonged to them were required for augmenting their income as the income so far received by them was not sufficient for them to make the two ends meet, there could be no question of a mere desire, but it is a case of real requirement or genuine need." That was a case under J & K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act in which the words `reasonable requirement' were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the U.P. Act the word 'Bona fide' has been used. In my opinion, there can be no difference between the `reasonable requirement' and the `bona fide requirement' of the landlord for the accommodation which he seeks to get vacated. 21. In the U.P. Act the word 'Bona fide' has been used. In my opinion, there can be no difference between the `reasonable requirement' and the `bona fide requirement' of the landlord for the accommodation which he seeks to get vacated. 21. In the instant case before us, as has been observed above, the landlord has come with a clear allegation that he wants to settle himself and his three sons in the business. All his sons do not possess sufficient education and qualification and that they cannot settle themselves in any vocation except to carry on business, may it be a canteen, sweet-meat business or any other business. The mere fact that one of the sons of the landlord is carrying on `Rassi Jharu' business in the passage adjacent to the shop in question would not at all by any stretch of imagination be said that the landlord does not need the shop in question bona fide for settling himself and his sons. He cannot also acquire any other shop as he appears to be a man of little means since he possesses no other building and is living even in a rented house. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, this Court is of the view that the approach of the learned appellate Court regarding the bona fide requirement of the landlord is unwarranted by law and is based on wrong assumptions and illegal approach. The landlord has been able to establish that he did bona fide require the shop in question for carrying on business and for settling his sons. 23. On the question of comparative hardship also the approach of the learned appellate Court was illegal. The learned appellate Court has observed that the landlord has not been able to establish that the tenant owns any shop in that area. The fact that the tenant does not own any shop or building in that area would be absolutely to ground to hold that the tenant would suffer greater hardship if he is evicted. It cannot be insisted that the tenant must have alternative accommodation in the same very area. The tenant appears to be a man of means. He and his other brothers own about 10 or 11 buildings in the city of Gonda. It cannot be insisted that the tenant must have alternative accommodation in the same very area. The tenant appears to be a man of means. He and his other brothers own about 10 or 11 buildings in the city of Gonda. The tenant himself has acquired two buildings, one in the name of his wife and the other in the name of his son. This clearly indicates that the tenant can afford to acquire alternative accommodation either on rent or by purchase. There is absolutely no allegation on behalf of the tenant that he did make any effort whatsoever since 1980 when the application under S. 21 of the Act was moved for finding out any alternative accommodation. It would be quite unfair to hold that the landlord himself could acquire alternative accommodation on rent for carrying on business. If a person owns his building it would not at all be proper or fair to ask him to acquire a building on rent. It is quite natural that a person owning his own building would like to live or start business in his own building instead of in any rented accommodation. It has already been noted that the landlord was not a man of sufficient means as he does not own any other building and is living in a rented house. On the contrary, the tenant has acquired two buildings by purchase in the name of his wife and son and has also ancestral property left by his father. This fact would also be a relevant consideration for determining the relative hardship. I am fortified in this view by a case reported in 1982 ARC 24, Sanwal Das Banka v. III Addl. District Judge. In that case it was observed by this Court that the financial means of the tenant is also relevant, and if he was in a position to take another house on rent or purchase, then he cannot complain of hardship. It was further observed that the tenant could not show that he had tried to secure other accommodation but was unsuccessful. Similar view was taken in 1984 (2) ARC 480, Brij Bhushan v. A.D.J. 24. It was further observed that the tenant could not show that he had tried to secure other accommodation but was unsuccessful. Similar view was taken in 1984 (2) ARC 480, Brij Bhushan v. A.D.J. 24. It cannot of course be doubted that grant of an application under S. 21 of the Act would necessarily entail inconvenience and an element of hardship to the tenant as he is to be evicted from the accommodation in dispute, but that would not at all be a valid consideration for rejecting the application under S. 21 of the Act. If that consideration is kept in mind, then no application under S. 21 of the Act would be allowed. The Court has, however, to see the comparative hardship while disposing of the application under S. 21 of the Act. The learned appellate Court has observed that in case the tenant is evicted from the shop in question, his business would be ruined as he does not possess or own any other shop in the vicinity. This approach of the learned appellate Court is absolutely illegal and unfounded. 25. In this context reference may be made to Smt. Bega Begum's case (supra) where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed : "It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when S. 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be a valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs a decree for eviction." It was further observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case : "Being the owners of the houses they cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to live below poverty line merely to enable the respondents to carry on their flourishing hotel business at the cost of the appellants." In that case the respondents were the tenants and the appellants were the landlord. 26. As observed earlier, the landlord does not possess any other building where he can settle himself and his sons in the business. The passage (shop) where his eldest son is carrying on `Rassi Jharu' business cannot at all be said to be sufficient for the landlord to settle himself and his sons in the business. 26. As observed earlier, the landlord does not possess any other building where he can settle himself and his sons in the business. The passage (shop) where his eldest son is carrying on `Rassi Jharu' business cannot at all be said to be sufficient for the landlord to settle himself and his sons in the business. Looking to the comparative need of the parties this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the landlord would suffer greater hardship in case the application under Section 21 of the Act is disallowed. The tenant, on the contrary, who is a man of means, can find out alternative accommodation for carrying on business, but he slept over the matter and made absolutely no effort for the last 12 years. 27. In the end, learned Counsel for the tenant has contended that the tenant has earned goodwill in the shop in question, and in case he is evicted from the shop, he would suffer irreparable loss as he is carrying on business in that shop since long. For this reliance has been placed on Rule 16(2) of the Rules framed under the Act. The tenant is carrying on retail business. The goodwill of such business is in fact based on a personal dealings, attitude, behaviour and conduct of the shop-keeper with his customers. Goodwill in such type of business is not attached to a particular premises but is attached to the person who is carrying on the business. If the shop-keeper has good and fair dealings with the customers, he thereby earns goodwill and this goodwill he would carry even if the business is shifted from one place to another. In my opinion, therefore, the mere fact that the tenant is carrying on business in the said shop since long, would not be a ground to hold that in case his business is shifted to another shop, he will lose his goodwill. Apart from this, looking to the bona fide requirement of the landlord and also the comparative hardship of the parties this factor of good-will would be of little consequence. 28. Apart from this, looking to the bona fide requirement of the landlord and also the comparative hardship of the parties this factor of good-will would be of little consequence. 28. All said and considered, therefore, this Court is of the view that the learned appellate Court has committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that the landlord's need for the shop in question was not bona fide and that the tenant would suffer greater hardship as he does not own any building in the said vicinity and that he has earned good will by carrying on business in the said shop for a long period. The finding of the court below is vitiated as it is based on irrelevant considerations and wrong legal assumptions. The Prescribed Authority was fully justified in granting the application moved by the landlord under Section 21 of the Act. The order of the appellate Court allowing the appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority is, therefore, liable to be quashed. 29. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. The order dated 25-10-82 passed by the appellate Court as contained in Annexure-13 is quashed and the cider of the Prescribed Authority dated 21-5-82 as contained in Annexure-12 is restored. The respondents are granted time up to 10-8-1992 to vacate the premises in dispute and hand over possession of the same to the landlord. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout