JUDGMENT (ORAL) I.G. Shah, J. - The Petitioners have filed this criminal application and sought that (a) the order/ direction of respondent No.5. Inspector of Police, Kalamboli Police Station be struck down and quashed and respondent No. 5 be directed not to interfere with the export of the goods, viz. sewing machines which were to be exported on 2.2.1992, (b) pending the hearing and final disposal of the petition the order/direction of respondent NO.5 seizing the consignment of the goods be stayed, and (c) the said consignment be allowed to be exported on such terms and conditions as this Court may deem fit and proper. The circulation of the said application was sought on 29.1.1992 and the same was ordered to be circulated on 30.1.1992 at 2.45 p.m. On 30.1.1992 the matter was adjourned to 31.1.1992 and on that day this Court passed the following order: “Rule. Returnable forthwith Police officer who is directed to make an inquiry by the J.M.F.C., Panvel into the complaint filed by the Respondent No.1, if he finds it necessary to open the consignments which are lying in the customs shed at Port Nhava Sheva shall open the same for the purposes of taking samples at the said customs shed. The customs authorities shall allow the opening of the said consignments and offer two samples are taken they shall allow the same to be repacked and cleared for customes after due verification. All the operations to be carried out expeditiously so that the consignments can be sent by the ship on 2.2.1992 as scheduled. The petitioner shall produce before the police the non-negotiable copies of the bills of lading. Rule made absolute. c.c. be given immediately." 2. On 3 .2.1992 Mr. Rane, advocate for respondent No.1 appeared and prayed for staying the order passed on 31.1.1992. Upon hearing Mr. Rane the following order was passed: "Heard Shri Rane for Respondent No. 1 Mr. M.B. Sabnis holding for Mr. Thakkar for petitioner is present who though is present does not desire to argue at this stage. If the goods are not shipped as yet, the order passed on 31.1.1992 is modified and it is ordered that the goods be not shipped until further orders. Fix for hearing on 5.2.1992. Writ be issued forthwith." 3. Mr. Thakkar for petitioner is present who though is present does not desire to argue at this stage. If the goods are not shipped as yet, the order passed on 31.1.1992 is modified and it is ordered that the goods be not shipped until further orders. Fix for hearing on 5.2.1992. Writ be issued forthwith." 3. Mr. Rane had pointed out at that stage that the petitioners had obtained the order without serving any notice on the respondent No.1, and as the order adversely affects the respondent No. 1 if he stayed, the matter be heard. 4. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present controversy are as under: It appears that the petitioners and respondent No. 1 are manufacturers of sewing machines and they both bail from Ludhiana. 4. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present controversy are as under: It appears that the petitioners and respondent No. 1 are manufacturers of sewing machines and they both bail from Ludhiana. The respondent No.1, it appears, filed Criminal Case in the Court of J.M.F.C., Panvel and contended that he is the constituted attorney of Rita Mechanical Works and that his company and its predecessors in title have been doing an old established business as manufacturers and traders of sewing machines and parts thereof and the goods manufactured and sold by the company being of superior quality have acquired reputation amongst the consumers and traders; that his company and its predecessors in title have been exporting the said goods to foreign countries and have earned a name in the foreign market; that since 1973 his company and its predecessors have been openly and extensively using the trade marks (i) Mercedes and (ii) Butterfly depicted on the background of a distinctive artistic work and layout upon and in respect of sewing machines and parts thereof, their manufacture and origin and t-hey have sold the said goods bearing the said trade marks worth several lakhs of rupees every year for all these years and have also taken efforts to popularise their said trade marks and have spent sizeable sums of money on publicity and advertisements and consequently the said trade marks have come to be associated with the complainant's company's sewing machines and parts thereof and indicate to the members of the trade and public the goods of his company and that his company is the proprietor of the said trade marks; that the trade mark Mercedes has been registered in the name of the company's predecessors under the provisions of the Trade Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 under No. 322633 in Class 7 in respect of sewing machines and parts thereof for export as of 2.2. 1977, and the said registration of the said trade mark has been renewed and is valid and subsisting; that the present partners of his company have also made an application for recording their names as subsequent proprietors of the said trade mark and the same is pending; that his company's predecessors have also obtained registration of copyright of their artistic work Butterfly under the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 under No. A-21799/78 and therefore in the circumstances his company has exclusive right under the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 and the Copyright Act, 1957 to use the said trade marks Mercedes and Butterfly and the said artistic work and layout registered under the Copyright Act, 1957 under No. A-21799/78 upon and in connection with sewing machines and parts thereof. The respondent No.1 further contended in the complaint that recently his company has learnt that accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are manufacturing and/or exporting sewing machines and parts thereof under the aforesaid two trade marks, viz. Mercedes and/or Butterfly and the artistic background and layout of the trade mark Butterfly has also been copied by them. He also claimed that accused Nos. 3 and 5 are the clearing agents who are knowingly assisting accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 in exporting the said goods bearing the false trade marks and consequently his company's business and reputation was being seriously affected and the company was suffering heavy losses. He further contended that the acts of accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 amount to offences of falsification of trade marks under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 and infringement of copyright under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and that accused Nos. 3 and 5 have abated in the commission of the said offences. 1, 2 and 4 amount to offences of falsification of trade marks under Sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958 and infringement of copyright under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and that accused Nos. 3 and 5 have abated in the commission of the said offences. He further contended that the company has recently learnt that the accused were trying to import the infringed goods from the port of Nhava Sheva and the goods are lying in the docks at Kalamboli within the jurisdiction of Kalamboli Police Station for shipment and are likely to be shipped in 2/3 days time and despite his best efforts he has not been able to collect more information and/or documents to prove the commission of the offences committed by the accused, and that the entire evidence relating to the said offences is in the hands of the accused and therefore in the circumstances it is necessary to refer the matter to the police of Kalamboli Police Station for investigation under Section 202 or 156 of the Cr.P.C. with directions and powers to search and seize the sewing machines and parts thereof bearing the infringing trade marks Mercedes or Butterfly from whatever place or places and to investigate into the matter further and to collect the necessary evidence and submit his report to the Court. 5. On the basis of the said complaint, the learned J.M.F.C., Panvel passed an order directing an inquiry under Section 202 of Cr.P.C. 6. The Petitioners therefore have filed the present application and sought the abovesaid prayers. The respondent No.6 - State was served and upon hearing the advocates appearing for the Petitioners and respondent No.6 as stated earlier, a final order came to be passed which is reproduced above. 7. On behalf of the respondent No.1, it is contended that the said order was obtained by the petitioners behind the back of the respondent No. 1 as no notice was served on the respondent No.1, though the petitioners knew that the respondent No.1 was represented through an advocate in the ease filed before J.M.F.C. Panvel and even if the respondent No.1 has office at Ludhiana, the notice could have at least been served on the advocates of the respondent No. 1. On behalf of the respondent No.1, it is further contended that though in the complaint that is filed, the respondent No.1 has stated that the trade mark Mercedes also has been used, it appears on the basis of the panchanama that has been effected by the police while taking out two sample machines in pursuance of the order passed by this court the trade mark Mercedes probably has not been used. However, trade mark Butterfly has been used and the artistic design has been also used and therefore the offence has been committed by the petitioners and therefore under the Copyright Act if there is an infringement of the copyright the respondent No.1 would be entitled to receive the articles causing infringement. First it is necessary to consider as to whether a final, order which has been passed by this Court could be reviewed. Reliance is placed on the ruling reported in AH. Satranjiwala v. State of Maharashtra1 wherein it is held that where a criminal appeal has been disposed of on merits by a Bench of the High Court having jurisdiction to do so and there is no violation of principles of natural justice, the judgment and order disposing of the appeal is final and is not liable to be reviewed or interfered with by the High Court under Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, although the same might have been pronounced without the accused or his advocate being present either at the hearing of the appeal or at the time of the judgment and sentence and that under Section 561A of the Code or otherwise, there is no inherent power in the High Court to review or reconsider a previous judgment of the High Court in a criminal matter except where the previous judgment was pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or, possibly, in a case where it was obtained by an abuse of the process of the Court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction. The petitioners though have not seriously contended before me that this Court has no jurisdiction to review its order it is necessary to consider as to whether this Court would have powers to review a final order which came to be passed on 31.1.1992. The petitioners though have not seriously contended before me that this Court has no jurisdiction to review its order it is necessary to consider as to whether this Court would have powers to review a final order which came to be passed on 31.1.1992. Even if it is assumed that the said order was erroneous, normally it would not be open to this Court to review the same order. But in the present case, it does appear that the order was obtained by the petitioners without serving the respondent No.1 who definitely is the most interested person and it was only stated before this Court while obtaining the order that as respondent No.1 resides at Ludhiana it is not possible to serve him prior to 2.2.1992, the date on which the ship through which the machines were to be sent was scheduled to leave the port of Nhava Sheva. That time it was not disclosed to this Court that the respondent No.1 had filed the said complaint through advocate and that the said advocates have office at Bombay. In view of this, notice could definitely have been served on the advocate of the respondent No.1 so as to apprise him of the application in which the petitioners were trying to get an order which would affect the respondent No.1. In view of this, one can definitely come to a conclusion that the principles of natural justice have been violated by not giving an opportunity to the respondent No.1 for being heard before passing the final order on 31.1.1992. One could also go to the extent of saying that there is an abuse of the process of the Court as a statement has made before this Court that it is not possible to serve the respondent No.1 as the respondent No.1 is from Ludhiana. In view of this the circumstances which are envisaged in the above said ruling of this Court do exist which would empower this Court to review the order passed by this Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. which is similar to the provisions under Section 561 A of the old Cr.P.C. 9. In view of this the circumstances which are envisaged in the above said ruling of this Court do exist which would empower this Court to review the order passed by this Court under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. which is similar to the provisions under Section 561 A of the old Cr.P.C. 9. Now therefore it is necessary to embark on further inquiry as to whether one could come to a conclusion prima facie that there is some infringement of the provisions of Sections 78 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Act and Section 63 of the Copyright Act. If there is prima facie infringement of the said provisions then no doubt the respondent No.1 has rightly sought for selling aside of the order passed by this Court. Prior to this, it is also necessary to consider as to whether it would be proper to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and interfere with the investigation which is ordered to be carried out by the police. The principles, in this respect, have been laid down in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 16682. Keeping in mind the ratio of said ruling, now I will consider the facts. 10. As far as Mercedes is concerned, there does not appear to be prima facie any infringement. However as far as Butterfly is concerned, the contention of the respondent No.1 in the complaint is that the respondent No.1' s company has been using the said trade mark since 1978 and in support of this he has also produced several bills of lading which show that he has exported sewing machines under the said trade mark Butterfly. Now it is true that there is no registration of trade mark of Butterfly. However in view of the ruling reported in A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2323, it is not necessary for infringement of the trade mark that there must be registration of the same. If the trade mark is being used for several years, that is sufficient. In the present case, there is sufficient material on record to show that the said trade mark Butterfly at least prima facie has been used by the respondent No. 1 since several years, at least from 1978 or 1979. Under these circumstances, as far as the trade mark Butterfly is concerned, as it has been used by the petitioners, there is an infringement of the said provision. Under these circumstances, as far as the trade mark Butterfly is concerned, as it has been used by the petitioners, there is an infringement of the said provision. Similarly as far as the copyright infringement is concerned, the design or the motif is registered under the Copyright Act since 1978. The artistic design of the motif which is used by the petitioners is having great similarity with the artistic design of the motif which is registered under the Copyright Act by the respondent No.1. An attempt was tried to be made on behalf of the petitioners to contend that under Section 13 of the Copyright Act the artistic work in respect of which the copyright is claimed to have been registered must be "original artistic work" and it is contended that the respondent No.1 in the complaint filed before the J.M.F.C. has nowhere stated that it is the original artistic work. The said contention is fallacious as along with the complaint the respondent No.1 has filed the registration certificate issued by the Deputy Registrar of Copyrights, New Delhi. Now one has to see also the form which is required to be filled in while applying for the said copyright. The form shows that the person who applies for the copyright has to state as to whether it is an original artistic work. The said question in the questionaire in the form definitely is with a view to ascertain as to whether under the provisions of Section 13 of the Trade and Merchandise Act it could he registered or not. In the present case, the fact that the design has been registered with the title Butterfly, it must be assumed at least prima facie that the respondent No.1 must have complied with the requirements for the registration of the said copyright and therefore unless the petitioners are able to prove otherwise, prima facie it will have to be assumed that it is the original aritistic work and therefore it has been accepted for registration under the Copyright Act. In view of this, the contention tried to be raised on behalf of the petitioners has no substance. 11. In view of this, the contention tried to be raised on behalf of the petitioners has no substance. 11. On behalf of the petitioners, it was tried to be contended that in a similar case arising in Criminal Application No. 426 of 1977, a Division Bench of this Court had taken a view that when the goods are being exported and foreign exchange is being earned for the country, it is not necessary to seize the articles, which were to be exported. It appears that in that case the infringement was only under the Trade Marks Act and not under the Copyright Act. Under the Trade Marks Act no doubt the confiscation of the articles which infringe the provisions of the Trade Marks Act are to be confiscated to the State and therefore if the State has no objection for allowing the export, the view taken by this Court in the said application was properly taken. But in the present case, when there is an infringement of copyright also, the right is of the respondent No.1 also. He has a right to get the infringed copies and he has to be handed over infringing copies under the provisions of Section 66 of the Copyright Act and therefore if there is an infringement of the copyright and the goods are allowed to be exported, the right of the respondent No. 1, in case he succeeds, ultimately, would be affected. 12. On behalf of the petitioners, it was also tried to be contended that the respondent No. l's right has been sufficiently protected by putting a condition that the petitioners shall give copies of the bills of lading so that if ultimately the respondent No. 1 succeeds he could be compensated. The said condition cannot take care of the provisions of section 66 of the Copyright Act. Under these circumstances, there is a force in the contention of the respondent No.1 that it would be necessary to allow the investigation to be carried out by the police as directed by the J.M.F.C., Panvel and till then the consignment should not he allowed to be shipped, as if the investigating authorities come to a conclusion that the respondent No. 1 has made out a case of offence under the Copyright Act against the present petitioner, the police authorities may be required to seize all those articles. 13. 13. Under these circumstances, the order passed by this Court on 31.1.1992 which is the final order, is reviewed and the petitioners must be held to be not entitled to an order as prayed for in prayers (a), (b) and (c) of their petition. However in order to see that the investigation is carried out expeditiously, the police authorities are directed to complete the investigation within a period of 3 weeks and on completion of the same if they conclude that an offence is committed under the provisions of Trade Mark and/or Copyright Act, they may take action as envisaged under the said Act. Rule discharged in above terms. Petition dismissed. 1. 74 B.L.R. 742. 2. A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1668. 3. A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 232.