JUDGMENT : G.B. Pattnaik, J. - The two Criminal Revisions and the two Criminal Misc. Cases had been placed before our learned brother Pasayat, J. Because of the importance of the questions involved and the impact of certain decisions of this Court with which brother Pasayat, J. did not prima facie agree, he has referred these cases to a Division Bench. The learned Single Judge has formulated four questions: (1) Whether an excise official investigating into an offence under the Act is a Police Officer empowered to file a charge sheet or he is required to file a complaint u/s 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'the Code')? (2) In a case where the prosecution report is not submitted within fifteen days, which Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter, in the absence of establishment of a Special Court constituted u/s 36 of the Act. (3) Whether a remind beyond the aforesaid period is permissible by the Magistrate? In case such a remand is not permissible does the accused get bail automatically? In this context, reliance is made to a decision of this Court in Sauti Jena and Another Vs. State of Orissa. A learned single Judge of this Court observed that all considerations which apply in law to the question of enlargement on bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code become applicable to a person forwarded under the Act to the Magistrate after expiry of fifteen days or seven days from the date of remand, as the case may be. (4) In the absence of any specific provision to show that the Court of Session shall be the Special Court for alt purposes, whether a person can be forwarded to it by a Magistrate in terms of Section 36-A(1)(c). All these questions involve interpretation of the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short 'the Act'). Before examining the questions posed, it would be appropriate for us to notice that the Parliament enacted the legislation to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operation relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. All these questions involve interpretation of the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short 'the Act'). Before examining the questions posed, it would be appropriate for us to notice that the Parliament enacted the legislation to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operation relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Being cognisant with the large scale illicit drugs traffic and drug abuse at national and international level and finding several deficiencies in the law that was in force which was not sufficiently deterrent to meet the challenge of well organised gangs of drug traffics, the Parliament has enacted the legislation. The said legislation has provided deterrent punishment for drug trafficking offences. After the enactment of the legislation in the year 1985 when the legislature found that the offenders are being released on bail on technical grounds they felt the need to amend the law to further strengthen it and accordingly it was amended by Act 2 of 1989. The main objects of the amending Act are (i) to bring certain controlled substances which are used for manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under the ambit of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and to provide deterrent punishment for violation thereof, (ii) to provide that no sentence awarded under the Act shall be suspended remitted or commuted, (iii) to provide for pre-trial disposal of seized drugs, (iv) to provide death penalty and second conviction in respect of specified offences involving specified quantities of certain drugs, (v) to provide for forfeiture of property and a detailed procedure relating to the same, (vi) to provide that the offences shall be cognizable and non-bailable. It is a cardinal principle of construction that the preamble of an Act contains in it the mischief which the Act seeks to be remedied and broadly describes the scope of the Act and consequently it is permissible to have recourse to it as an aid in construing the enacting provisions. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in the case of Girdhari Lal and Sons Vs. Balbir Nath Mathur and Others, observed : "The primary and foremost task of a Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, the Court must then strive to se interpret the statute as to promote/advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Balbir Nath Mathur and Others, observed : "The primary and foremost task of a Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, the Court must then strive to se interpret the statute as to promote/advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anomaly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the Court would be well justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing the written word, if necessary." With the aforesaid background, we would now examine the points posed for our consideration by our learned brother Pasayat, J. But before that, it would be appropriate to notice the facts of each of the four cases. 2. Criminal Revision No. 432/91 has been filed by the accused invoking the jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the prayer that the Criminal Proceedings be quashed on the ground that the commitment made by the S. D. J. M., Jharsuguda without complying with the provisions of Section 202(2), proviso being null and void, the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. 3. Criminal Revision No. 245/91 has also been filed by an accused invoking the jurisdiction u/s 482, Cr. P. C., for the selfsame relief, namely, to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground that the commitment made by the Magistrate being null and void for non-compliance of proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 202 Cr. P. C., the Sessions Judge does not retain any jurisdiction for trial. 4. Criminal Misc. Case No. 954/91 was also by an accused for quashing the order of cognizance taken by the Sessions Judge and for quashing of the proceeding on the ground that the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to take cognizance on a report submitted by the Excise officials. 5. Criminal Misc. 4. Criminal Misc. Case No. 954/91 was also by an accused for quashing the order of cognizance taken by the Sessions Judge and for quashing of the proceeding on the ground that the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to take cognizance on a report submitted by the Excise officials. 5. Criminal Misc. Case No. 955/91 is by the accused for similar relief, namely, to quash the order of cognizance passed by the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to take cognizance on a report submitted by the Excise officials which has to be treated as a complaint and has to be filed before a Magistrate who after following the procedure contained in Section 202(2) proviso can take cognizance and commit the matter to the Court of Session for trial. 6. In none of these cases the question of remand by a Magistrate beyond permissible period really arises for consideration but possibly the learned Single Judge having faced with the application for bail and being faced with the judgment of this Court in the case of Sauti Jena and Another Vs. State of Orissa, wherein the question of enlargement of bail under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 Cr. P. C. has been discussed, the said question has also been referred. 7. The first question passed by our learned brother is whether an Excise Official investigating into an offence under the Act can be said to be a Police Officer empowered to file charge sheet or his report can be treated as a complaint enabling a Magistrate to take cognizance u/s 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the Act, all offences are triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed. Section 36-A starts with a non-obstante clause to the effect that "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973". Thus the procedure provided under the Act would prevail and has to be adhered to. u/s 36-A(d), the Special Court upon a perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act or upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in this behalf can take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. u/s 36-A(d), the Special Court upon a perusal of police report of the facts constituting an offence under this Act or upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in this behalf can take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. Thus it contemplates submission of a report by the police or a complaint by an officer of the Central Government or State Government authorised in this behalf on the basis of which the Special Court can take cognizance and then proceed with the trial. Therefore, an Excise Official investigating into an offence under the Act cannot be held to be a police officer nor the report submitted by him can be equated with a report submitted u/s 173 Cr. P. C. The question whether an Excise Officer having invested with the power of an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station by virtue of Section 53 of the Act can be equated with a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar Karwal Vs. Union of India and others, and it was held that the investigation made by an officer would necessitate filing of a formal complaint before the Special Court who would take cognizance of the offence and the complaint in question would have to be u/s 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This answers the first question posed by the learned single Judge. 8. The second question posed by the learned Judge is where a report is not submitted within fifteen days, which Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter in the absence of establishment of a Special Court constituted u/s 36 of the Act and the third question posed is whether a remand beyond the aforesaid period of fifteen days is permissible by the Magistrate. In fact, both these questions are interlinked. In view of Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person cannot be detained in custody for a longer period than is reasonable and the said period in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate u/s 167 of the Code shall not exceed twenty four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court. u/s 56 of the Code, a person arrested has to be produced before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case without unnecessary delay. Under Article 21 of the Constitution no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Under the scheme of the Act, as would appear from the provisions of Section 36-A(1)(b) when a person is accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under the Act has to be forwarded to a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure and then the Magistrate in exercise of his power under Sub-section (2-A) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can authorise the detention of such person in such custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days where the Magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and seven days where the Magistrate is an Executive Magistrate. Proviso to Section 36-A(1)(b) further indicates that even if the Magistrate considers the detention of the person concerned unnecessary, whenever such person is forwarded to him or any time before the expiry of the period of detention authorised by him, still he has no jurisdiction to release the person and he can only order such person to be forwarded to the Special Court having jurisdiction. The said Special Court can exercise in relation to a person forwarded to it under Clause (b) of Section 36-A(1) the power of remand of a Magistrate u/s 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus in case of an accused where no report is submitted to the Special Court for taking cognizance under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36-A, yet the said Special Court can exercise the power of remand exercisable by a Magistrate u/s 167 of the Code. In view of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36-A, once the accused is forwarded to the Special Court by the Magistrate under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36-A. there would be no difficulty in dealing with an accused under the Act. The difficulty, however, arises where Special Courts have not been constituted u/s 36 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the object of constituting Special Court is to provide a speedy trial of the offence under the Act. The difficulty, however, arises where Special Courts have not been constituted u/s 36 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the object of constituting Special Court is to provide a speedy trial of the offence under the Act. At this stage it would be appropriate to notice some of the decisions of the learned Single Judges on the question of enlargement of bail under the provision of Section 167(2) of the Code which has made it necessary for our brother Pasayat, J. to make a reference to a larger Bench. 9. The first case is that of Sauti Jena and Another Vs. State of Orissa, disposed of on 16th April, 1991, whereunder an application for bail was before the learned Judge. The accused in that case was arrested for having contravened the provisions of Section 20 of the Act. He was arrested on 6-3-1991 and the Magistrate remanded him to custody. When he moved the application for bail, the Magistrate as well as the learned Sessions Judge refused the prayer for bail in view of the provisions contained in Section 37 of the Act as they were not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while on bail. When he moved this Court our brother Rath, J., took the view that since fifteen days period contained in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36-A has expired, the accused is entitled to be released on bail as of right. According to the learned Judge, the period of detention authorised under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. has been abridged so far as the NDPS Act is concerned. The same learned Judge again decided the case of Bidyadhar Dolai Vs. The State, where application for bail had been filed. Being of the view that mandatory requirement of Sections 42, 43 and 44 had not been followed, the detention had become illegal not only the learned Judge granted the prayer for bail but also quashed the criminal proceedings itself. While holding the detention to be unauthorised, for non compliance of Sections 42, 43 and 44, the learned Judge relied upon the unreported decision of Hon'ble Justice K. C. Jagadeb Roy, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 1196/91 (Satyabrata v. State) disposed of on 4-10-1991. 10. While holding the detention to be unauthorised, for non compliance of Sections 42, 43 and 44, the learned Judge relied upon the unreported decision of Hon'ble Justice K. C. Jagadeb Roy, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 1196/91 (Satyabrata v. State) disposed of on 4-10-1991. 10. In Satyabrata's case our learned brother Jagadeb Roy, J. while considering applications for bail of accused persons, who had been arrested on the allegation of having committed offences under Sections 18 and 21 of the Act, came to the conclusion that the provisions contained in Sections 50, 62 and 57 were mandatory in nature and were to be strictly followed. On considering the facts of the case, the learned Judge further came to hold that the provisions of Section 50(1) of the Act had not been followed and such non-compliance was a clear violation of the statutory safeguard allowed to the accused under the Act. Thereafter the learned Judge came to the conclusion that where the procedural safeguards are not followed and a person has been arrested, it would be a vital ground for the accused to be enlarged on bail. According to the learned Judge while dealing with an application for bail of an accused alleged to have committed offence under the NDPS Act, though the Court is expected to keep the object of the Act and the provisions contained in Section 37 but the guarantee afforded to a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be by-passed. The learned Judge ultimately held that in view of the violation of the statutory safeguards contained in Section 50(1) of the Act and in the absence of any other independent material to show that these petitioners were in conscious possession of the incriminating substance since the scooter which they were using was a borrowed one and belonged to someone else which is borne out from the Registration Book of the vehicle, the xerox copy of which is submitted to the Court and in view of the fact that the Magistrate to whom they were referred, has kept the petitioners in custody for more than fifteen days in contravention of Section 36-A(1)(b) of the Act and there is no material to hold that they may likely to cause such offence while on bail, released the petitioners on bail of Rs. 20,000/- each with two sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Addl. 20,000/- each with two sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar. Thus bearing in mind the provisions contained in Section 37 of the Act, with regard to the limitations for grant of bail and prima facie being satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused persons are not guilty of offences and that they are not likely to commit any such offence while on bail, the learned Judge released the petitioners on bail. 11. So far as the decision of brother Rath, J. in Sauti Jena's case is concerned, the conclusions that all considerations which apply in law to the question of enlargement of bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. become applicable to a person forwarded under the NDPS Act to the Magistrate after expiry of fifteen days or seven days from the date of remand, as the case may be, is undoubtedly erroneous and such observation has been made without noticing the opening sentence of Section 36-A(I) to the effect : "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." While interpreting Section 36-A(1)(b), as there has been a reference to Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (2-A) of Section 167 Cr.P.C. brother Rath, J. came to the conclusion that provision of Section 167 Cr.P.C. would apply fully and would authorise the Magistrate to exercise the power under the proviso to the said section alter expiry of the period of detention to which the Magistrate is entitled to authorise under Sub-section (1)(b) of Section 36-A. But in our considered opinion, this conclusion is wholly erroneous. Section 167 of the Code has not been made applicable in full. Sub-section (1)(P) of Section 36-A merely states that when an accused suspected of the commission of an offence under the NDPS Act is forwarded to a Magistrate then such Magistrate can authorise detention of such person in custody for a period not exceeding fifteen days where the Magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and not exceeding seven days where the Magistrate is an Executive Magistrate. Excepting providing the period for which the Magistrate can authorise detention of an accused who is produced before him on the allegation that he has committed an offence under the N. D. P. S. Act, the said provision does not confer all the powers of a Magistrate u/s 167 Cr. Excepting providing the period for which the Magistrate can authorise detention of an accused who is produced before him on the allegation that he has committed an offence under the N. D. P. S. Act, the said provision does not confer all the powers of a Magistrate u/s 167 Cr. P. C. including the power to release the accused on bail under the proviso to Section 167 Cr. P. C. This is apparent from the proviso to Section 36-A(1)(b) of the Act inasmuch as even if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the detention of the person concerned forwarded to him is wholly unnecessary yet he has no jurisdiction to release him on bail but he can merely order that such person be forwarded to the Special Court having jurisdiction. This being the legislative intent, it is difficult to comprehend that a Magistrate would be entitled to release the accused on bail by invoking his power under the proviso to Section 167 Cr. P. C. In our considered opinion, therefore, the case of Sauti Jena holding that all considerations applied in law to the question of enlargement of bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr. P. C. become applicable to a person forwarded under the N. D. P. S. Act to the Magistrate after expiry of fifteen days or seven days from the date of remand, as the case may be, has not been correctly decided. 12. Coming to the case of Satyabrata ' Sarat Mallia and Anr. v. State in Crl. Misc. Case No. 1196/91 disposed of on 4-10-1991, the learned Judge has invoked his power u/s 439 Cr. P. C. The special power of the High Court regarding bail u/s 439 Cr. P. C. has been kept in tact under the N. P. P. S. Act as would appear from Sub-section (3) of Section 36-A of the Act. While exercising that power, the High Court also has to consider the limitations of granting of bail specified in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the Act, namely, the public Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail and if the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, then the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Though the learned Judge has not recorded a positive conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence but he has borne in mind the requirements of Clause (b)(ii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 37 and has further recorded a finding that there is no material to hold that the accused may likely cause any such offence while on bail. We are not concerned with the propriety of such a conclusion in the said case but would like to clarify that the power of the High Court regarding grant of bail u/s 439 Cr. P. C. even though has been kept alive under the provisions of the N. D. P. S. Act but the High Court also would be governed by the limitations contained in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the said Act, which limitations are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that view of the matter, even the High Court will not be entitled to release an accused on bail unless the Public Prosecutor is given an opportunity to oppose the bail and when the said Public Prosecutor opposes then unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. These two positive conclusions must be arrived at only after which the Court would be entitled to release an accused suspected to have committed an offence under the N. D. P.S. Act on bail. We are clarifying this position as the decision of our brother Jagdeb Ray J. may create any confusion in the minds of the Special Courts in exercise of their powers while considering an application for bail u/s 37 of the Act. At this stage, it would be appropriate for us to notice the provision-contained in Section 50 of the Act, which provides conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted. At this stage, it would be appropriate for us to notice the provision-contained in Section 50 of the Act, which provides conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted. On examining Section 50 of the Act, it transpires that when an officer duly authorised u/s 42 intends to search any person u/s 41, 42 or 43 of the Act, then if the person to be searched requires to be taken to any Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to any nearest Magistrate, then without conducting any search the concerned officer would detain the person until he can bring the person concerned before the Gazetted Officer on the Magistrate concerned as mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 50. Then the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate if sees no reasonable ground for search, then he can discharge the person to be searched or else he can direct that search be made. Undoubtedly, this provision confers certain right on the person to be searched before he is searched, if he so requires. But we do not agree with the conclusion of our brother Jagdeb Ray, J., that the officer who intends to search an accused is bound to inform the person concerned of his right to be taken to the nearest Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate as provided in Section 50(1) of the Act. The language of Section 10 does not cast any obligation on the officer who is about to search any person to inform the person to be searched that whether he would like to be produced before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer before the search is conducted. In our opinion, the requirement of taking the person to be searched to the nearest Gazetted Officer or to a Magistrate would arise only when the person to be searched so requires and if he has not so required and the search is conducted without taking him to the Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, then there would be no infraction of Section 50 of the Act. We are, indeed, unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the reasonings advanced by our brother Jagadeb Ray, J. that Section 50(1) of the Act casts an obligation on the designate officer to inform the person who is to be searched that if he so desires he can be taken to a Gazetted Officer or a nearest Magistrate. We are, indeed, unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the reasonings advanced by our brother Jagadeb Ray, J. that Section 50(1) of the Act casts an obligation on the designate officer to inform the person who is to be searched that if he so desires he can be taken to a Gazetted Officer or a nearest Magistrate. In our considered opinion, such a requirement as indicated in Satyabrata's case is beyond the statute. One of the reasonings which has found favour with in the aforesaid judgment is that the seizure of the incriminating materials was made in violation of the procedure mandatorily required under the Act to be followed at the time of saizure as contained in Section 50 of the Act which resulted in making a seizure illegal and which is fatal to the prosecution and would be itself a ground for acquittal. Section 50 only provides conditions under which a person suspected of commission of an offence can be searched. It does not provide the power of seizure and the power of seizure is provided in Section 43 of the Act. Any irregularity or infirmity of a search or seizure does not ipso facto render a conviction invalid unless the said irregularity or infirmity has caused real prejudice to an accused but we do not intend to examine that aspect any further at the moment, since only an application for bail had been placed before our brother Jagadeb Roy, J. in Satyabrata's case. While considering an application for bail an irregularity and infirmity of the provisions relating to search and seizure cannot be a ground for enlargement of bail. More so, in view of the stringent provisions in the NDPS Act, where the Parliament has been trying its best to eradicate the evil which has been found to be cancerous and is spreading throughout the country. Coming to the other decision of our brother Rath, J. in the case of Ghanashyam Behera v. State of Orissa 1992 (5) OCR 31 (Bidyadhar Dalai v. State of Orissa), also reported in Bidyadhar Dolai Vs. Coming to the other decision of our brother Rath, J. in the case of Ghanashyam Behera v. State of Orissa 1992 (5) OCR 31 (Bidyadhar Dalai v. State of Orissa), also reported in Bidyadhar Dolai Vs. The State, it transpires that though the accused persons have moved this Court for bail invoking the jurisdiction u/s 439 Cr.P.C. the learned Judge not only released the accused persons on bail but also set aside arrest of the accused persons and their detention by invoking his power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. The course adopted by the learned single Judge appears to us to be wholly inappropriate and in our considered opinion, while the learned Judge has emphasized the question of personal liberty and guarantee to a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution, has failed to appreciate the anxiety with which the Parliament enacted the legislation to put a curb on the cancerous growth of the use of such narcotics and its evil impact in the society right from a child in the school. By saying so, we have no intention to undermine in any manner the rights, guaranteed to every citizen under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Article 21 undoubtedly stipulates that a person may be deprived of his liberty only according to the procedure established by law and it follows, therefore, that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law. If the detention is unauthorised certainly the person concerned can move the High Court in a proceeding for habeas corpus and in that case the High Court will be entitled to set the prisoner at liberty if it is satisfied that the detention is unauthorised. But when an accused being arrested of an offence under the NDPS Act moves an application for bail to the High Court, the High Court would certainly be entitled to consider the said question and decide the same bearing in mind the principles and limitations contained in Section 37 of the Act. At that stage, if the Court exercises his suo motu power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and quashes the arrest and the seizure made and consequently quashes the criminal proceeding, then it would be transgressing its limit. At that stage, if the Court exercises his suo motu power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and quashes the arrest and the seizure made and consequently quashes the criminal proceeding, then it would be transgressing its limit. In our considered opinion, therefore, the learned single Judge was not entitled to quash the arrest and detention by invoking his jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code. We are of the considered opinion that the learned Judge was not right in his observation that u/s 37 (1)(b), the Court while considering an application for bail was not called upon to record the finding of not guilty with reference to the accused. Section 37 lays down the limitations of granting bait of an accused alleged to have committed an offence under the NDPS Act. Those limitations being that the Public Prosecutor must have an opportunity to oppose the bail and if the public Prosecutor opposes then the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while on bail. Unless the Court is satisfied on these two aspects and records his conclusion on these two aspects, the Court will not be entitled to release an accused on bail, howsoever wide the power of a High Court u/s 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be. The limitations contained in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) would undoubtedly apply even when the High Court exercises power u/s 439 of the Code considering an application for bail of an accused alleged to have committed offence under the NDPS Act. The learned single Judge in paragraph 13 of the judgment has held that the Court is only to develop a belief and not to make a finding on that score. We do not think that it is the correct proposition of law. For believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence, reasonable grounds must exist and on those reasonable grounds, the Court must be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of offence. The belief of the Court u/s 37(1)(b)(ii) must, therefore, be indicated in the order as to what were the reasonable grounds for entertaining the said belief on which the Court was satisfied. The belief of the Court u/s 37(1)(b)(ii) must, therefore, be indicated in the order as to what were the reasonable grounds for entertaining the said belief on which the Court was satisfied. A belief cannot be ethereal one Further the Court must, also be satisfied that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Failure on the part of the Court to notice either of the requirements would make an order releasing an accused on bail vulnerable. Though the learned single Judge has noticed several decisions of the Supreme Court indicating that the conviction of an accused is not necessarily vitiated if there is any invalidity in the investigation or search and seizure yet having held the detention to be illegal, he has not only released the accused on bail but also quashed the arrest and detention which he was certainty not entitled to while considering an application for bail. Though several decisions of different High Courts had been noticed wherein the Courts have held that the conviction of the accused under the N. D. P. S. Act cannot be said to have been vitiated for non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 41 and 50 of the Act but the learned single Judge has by-passed those decisions on the ground that those are applicable to the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases and cannot be the decisions of universal application. We do not consider those decisions in detail at present as in our view, the stage for consideration of those grounds had never reached and at the initial stage for consideration of application for bail of an accused it would not be appropriate for the Court to consider those alleged invalidities. We are of the considered opinion that an irregularity and infirmity in following the provisions of Section 50 or any such provision does not entitle an accused to be released on bail and, therefore, the decision of brother Rath, J. as well as our brother Jagadeb Ray, J. to the contrary must be held to have been not correctly decided. 13. 13. We have already indicated that even though the question of remand and power of release of an accused on bail did not arise in the cases in hard, yet the reasons for the learned single Judge to make the reference had the consequential trouble taken by us in discussing the case laws and to record our conclusion, so that the excused charged with commission of offence under the N. D. P. S. Act cannot claim to be released on bail as of right and the Magistrate will not release them on bail after expiry of the period provided in Section 36-A(1)(b) of the Act, 14. Then the question comes as to whether in the absence of any specific provision to show that the Court of Session shall be the Special Court for all purposes where an accused can be forwarded to it by a Magistrate u/s 36-A(1)(c) in view of the transitional provisions contained in Section 36-D. The aforesaid provision may be quoted herein below in extenso : "36-D. Transitional provisions-- (1) Any offence committed under this Act on or after the commencement of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 19S8 until a Special Court is constituted u/s 36, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 73 (2 of 1974) be tried by a Court of Session : Provided that offences punishable under Sections 26, 27 and 32 may be tried summarily. (2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall be construed to require the transfer to a Special Court of any proceedings in relation to an offence taken cognizance of by a Court of Session under the said Sub-section (1) and the same shall be heard and disposed of by the Court of Session." Construing the aforesaid provisions, a Bench of this Court presided over by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, in the case of Bhagwan Singh and etc. v. State of Orissa and Ors. (1992)(5) OCR 107) has taken the view that a Court of Session can merely try a case under the N. D. P. S. Act on being committed to it by a Magistrate but cannot take cognizance of an offence as a Special Court under Sub-section (1)(d) of Section 36-A of the Act. In coming to the conclusion, their Lordships have been persuaded to accept that Section 193 Cr. In coming to the conclusion, their Lordships have been persuaded to accept that Section 193 Cr. P. C. prohibits a Sessions Judge from taking cognizance of an offence unless committed to it. The Division Bench has given literal meaning to the provisions contained in Section 36-D of the Act and in the process the purposes of the stringent provision made by the legislature is going to be frustrated. If an accused having committed an offence under the Act is produced before a Magistrate, then the Magistrate has only the power to authorise the detention in custody for a period not exceeding fifteen days. Within such period of fifteen days not only the investigation must be completed but also the Magistrate must commit the accused to the Court of Session so that the Court of Session can exercise the further powers of remand as well as proceed with the trial. We do not think that by the transitional provisions contained in Section 36-D the Parliament really intended to confer the power of trial on the Court of Session and do not intend to treat the Court of Session as a Special Court, until such Special Court is constituted u/s 36. A learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court had the occasion to deal with the aforesaid provision in the case of Suryakant Ramdas More and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1939 Cri.LJ 2422) and considering the provisions of the Act, the learned Judge held that in the absence of a clear definition defining the connotation of the words 'be tried', a restricted meaning cannot be given to the expression and since the power is to be exercised by the Court of Session when a Special Court is not constituted, evidently the intention of the Legislation could not have been to leave a void but to invest the Court of Session with the same powers which the Special Court will have under the provisions of the Act. We are persuaded to accept the reasonings advanced by the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid case to hold that until notification constituting Special Court is issued by the Government u/s 36 of the Act, the Court of Session will have the powers of Special Court under the provisions of the Special statute and in such a case not only the Court of Session can try but also can exercise the powers u/s 36-A(1)(d) as well as (c) and such an interpretation would subserve the ends of justice. But in view of the Bench decision of this Court in Bhagwan Singh's case referred to (supra), which decision would be binding on us, this Bench being of two learned Judges, we think it appropriate to refer this matter to a larger Bench as prima facie, we do not agree with the views expressed by this Court in Bhagwan Singh's case. We accordingly direct that the matter may be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench to deside the points in issue. D.M. Patnaik, J. I agree.