JUDGMENT 1. - The present writ has been filed by the petitioner with the allegations that vide order dated 11.7.1978, she was promoted as Reader, in the Pathology Department and at present is working as Associated Professor (Reader), in the said Department at S.M.S. Medical College, Jaipur. For two posts of Professors in the Pathology Department for the year 1992-93, D.P.C. was met on 3.10.1992. Out of these two posts, one is to be filled by Seniority-cum-merit and another by merit. Dr. Mrs. Neelama Dhar is senior to the petitioner and as such the D.P.C. which met on 3.10.1992, recommended her name for promotion in the quota of seniority-cum-merit, whereas the name of the respondent No. 3 has been recommended in the merit quota, though the respondent No. 3 is junior to the petitioner. It has been further alleged that the respondent No. 3 is not even eligible for promotion for the said post as she did not received `outstanding' or 'very good' C. Rs. atleast for five years out of seven years preceding the year for which the D.P.C. was held, whereas the petitioner has 'outstanding' or 'very good' record in atleast four out of seven years preceding the year for which the D.P.C. was held. It has been further alleged that in case both the candidates are not eligible for promotion on the basis of merit quota, then the petitioner being senior, has to be recommended for the post. The petitioner alleged that the respondent No. 4, Dr. M.L.Sharma, who was the Head of Department, had enmity with the petitioner since 1988. The reason being that the petitioner's son Dilip Ramrakhyani in M.B.B.S. Examination-Part I, secured 115 marks in Biochemistry, whereas the son of the respondent No. 4 secured only 114 marks and as such the petitioner's son was entitled for the gold medal on account of securing the highest marks in Biochemistry in the M.B.B.S. Part I Examination in the year 1987-88. Respondent No. 4, in order to give undue advantage to his son by misusing his official position got the name of his son Punit Sharma ambossed on the gold medal instead of the name of petitioner's son. When this fact was revealed, the petitioner as well as her son Dilip Ramrakhyani protested in writing to the respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 4, in order to give undue advantage to his son by misusing his official position got the name of his son Punit Sharma ambossed on the gold medal instead of the name of petitioner's son. When this fact was revealed, the petitioner as well as her son Dilip Ramrakhyani protested in writing to the respondent No. 2. After enquiry, the truth was revealed and on the embossed name of Punit Sharma on the Gold Medal, a plate was pasted and then the gold medal was given to Dr. Dilip Ramrakhyani and since then the respondent No. 4, Dr. M.L. Sharma started enemity with the petitioner and in the planned way he started to supersede the petitioner and deliberately and maliciously written the A. C. Rs. favouring resp. No. 3. The petitioner further alleged that respondent No. 4, Dr. Sharma, retired from service on 31.8.1992. The A.C.Rs. for the year 1991- 1992, were not filled and sent by him before retirement to the respondent No. 2, but were sent after 18.9.1992, and as such the A.C.Rs. for the year 1991-92, given by Dr. Sharma, respondent No. 4 should not have been taken into consideration by the D.P.C. on these grounds, the petitioner filed this writ petition and prayed that proceedings of D.P.C. dated 3.10.1992, including its recommendations ^.:ith regard to promotion on the post of Professor in the department of Pathology be quashed and set-aside and in the alternative, in case the respondent No. 3 is promoted, the same may also be set-aside. 2. On 20.10.1992, notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents to show cause as to why the writ be not admitted. After service, respondent No. 1 and 2 filed a joint reply in which they specifically denied that Dr. M. L.Sharma, respondent No. 4 submitted A.C.Rs. of the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 for the year 1991-92, after his retirement. They specifically mentioned that Dr. Sharma sent A.C.Rs. to the reviewing officer i.e. the respondent No. 2, on 20.8.1992, before his retirement. They further mentioned that it was not obligatory under any rule to despatch the A.C.Rs. by entering them in the despatch register. The letter written by the petitioner on 14.8.1992 (marked Annexure 4) to Dr. Kumud Gangwal is a forged letter and on the basis of that letter, it can not be presumed that respondent No. 4 sent the A.C.Rs. They further mentioned that it was not obligatory under any rule to despatch the A.C.Rs. by entering them in the despatch register. The letter written by the petitioner on 14.8.1992 (marked Annexure 4) to Dr. Kumud Gangwal is a forged letter and on the basis of that letter, it can not be presumed that respondent No. 4 sent the A.C.Rs. after his retirement. In para No. 16 of their reply, they denied the charge of malafide against the respondent No. 4 and further stated that the respondent No. 4 had given remark of `very good' to the petitioner for the year 1991-92. They further alleged that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The recommendations of the D.P.C. cannot be reviewed by this Court as the same are not final and conclusive and further that the writ petition is premature. 3. The respondent No. 3 filed a separate written statement. In para No. 7, she has given a chart regarding academic record of the petitioner and herself to show that she is more meritorious in comparison to the petitioner. She further alleged in the reply that the petitioner did not disclose the name and source from where she obtained the information as mentioned in the writ petition. She denied the allegations regarding not proper consideration by the D.P.C.. She also took pleas similar to the pleas taken by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in their reply. It was prayed that the writ petition be dismissed with costs. 4. The petitioner lateron submitted a rejoinder to the reply. In para No. 6 of the rejoinder, the petitioner mentioned that it was wrong to say that respondent No. 4 sent A.C.Rs. of the petitioner and of the respondent No. 3 to the reviewing officer on 20.8.1992. The respondent No. 4, under his signatures vide letter dated 14.8.1992, sent form of A.P.P. for the year 1991-92 to all the concerned officers including the petitioner and the respondent No. 3 had asked them to return the same by 22.8.92, and under these circumstances, it can not be said that A.C.Rs. were sent by Dr. Sharma to the Reviewing Officer on 20.8.1992. The petitioner further alleged that she sent her A.P.P. form to the respondent No. 4 on 22-23.8.92, and thus it was not possible in any case for Dr. Sharma to submit the A.C.Rs. were sent by Dr. Sharma to the Reviewing Officer on 20.8.1992. The petitioner further alleged that she sent her A.P.P. form to the respondent No. 4 on 22-23.8.92, and thus it was not possible in any case for Dr. Sharma to submit the A.C.Rs. to the reviewing officer on 20.8.1992. 5. I have heard counsel for the parties and gone through the record and rulings cited by them. 6. Shri Rastogi, counsel for the petitioner argued that admittedly, respondent No. 4, retired on 31.8.1992. He did not sent A.P.A. reports of the petitioner and respondent No. 3, before his retirement to the respondent No. 2, which is apparent from the report of Sint. Kumud Gangwal, Head of Department, dated 15.10.92 and as such the Annual Performance Appraisal reports initiated by respondent No. 4 should not have been taken into consideration by the D.P.C., met on 3.10.1992. As the D.P.C. considered the A.P.A. reports initiated by Dr. Sharma after his retirement as such proceedings of D.P.C. held on 3-10-92, including its recommendations deserves to be set-aside. 7. He further argued that respondent No. 4 had enmity with the petitioner since 1988 as alleged in the writ petition. He argued that the petitioner is more meritorious in comparison to the respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 is not even eligible for consideration for promotion as she did not receive 'outstanding' or 'very good' A.C. Rs. in five years out of seven years preceding the year for which D.P.C. was held on 3.10.1992, whereas the petitioner obtained `outstanding' or 'very good' remarks atleast for four years out of seven years preceding 1992-93. He argued that even if the A.C.Rs. of the parties are similar, the petitioner being senior to respondent No. 3 is entitled to be promoted on the post of Professor and for that this Court should direct the respondent No.1 to produce the record of D.P.C. before this Court. He prayed that the writ be accepted, proceedings of D.P.C. held on 3.10.1992, including its recommendations be quashed and set-aside. In support of his arguments, Mr. Rastogi placed reliance on the following judgments: (1) 1988 (l) R.L.R. 613 Sukhraj Singh (Bajwa) v. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan and Ors. (2) Order given in D.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 3273/1987, Randhir Singh v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. In support of his arguments, Mr. Rastogi placed reliance on the following judgments: (1) 1988 (l) R.L.R. 613 Sukhraj Singh (Bajwa) v. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan and Ors. (2) Order given in D.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 3273/1987, Randhir Singh v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. decided on 9.4.1990 , and (3) Order given in D.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 2173/90 O.P. Srivastava and others v. State of Raj. and Ors. decided on 31.10.1990. 8. On the other hand Shri O.P.Garg, counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 argued that the petitioner did not mention in the writ petition as to when respondent No. 4 sent Annual performance appraisal form to her and when she returned the same to respondent No. 4 after filling the same. When the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 specifically mentioned in the reply that the respondent No. 4 sent the A.C.Rs. to the reviewing officer on 20.8.1992, the petitioner in rejoinder took a plea that she sent the annual performance appraisal form to respondent No. 4 on 22.8.92, and as such it was not possible for respondent No. 4 to sent the same to reviewing officer on 20.8.1992. He argued that this is afterthought allegation of the petitioner without any basis and as such deserves to be rejected. He argued that simply on the basis of letter dated 11.9.1992, written by respondent No. 2, it can not be presumed that respondent No. 4 sent A.C.Rs. after 16.9.1992. He argued that there is no reference in the letter regarding not sending A.C.Rs. of the pet. and resp. No. 3. The letter has been written to All Heads of the Department and is irrelevant document. Simply on the basis of report of Sint. Kumud Gangwal, Head of Pathology Department, dated 15.10.92, it can not be presumed that respondent No. 4 sent the A.C.Rs. after retirement. He argued that the respondent No. 4 has given remarks of `very good' to the petitioner in A.C.Rs. for the year 1991-92, and as such it can not be said that the petitioner is in any way prejudiced on account of A.C.Rs. given by respondent No. 4 to her for the year 1991-92. He argued that the allegations of the Writ Petition are not based on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. for the year 1991-92, and as such it can not be said that the petitioner is in any way prejudiced on account of A.C.Rs. given by respondent No. 4 to her for the year 1991-92. He argued that the allegations of the Writ Petition are not based on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. The source of information has not been disclosed by the petitioner either in the writ petition or in the affidavit. The verification of affidavits submitted by the petitioner in support of writ petition and rejoinder including the affidavit of Dr. Gangwal are different. It is not specifically mentioned as to which para is based on personal knowledge and which para is based on belief and as such no reliance can be placed on them. He argued that the question as to whether respondent No. 4 initiated the A.C.Rs. of the parties before or after his retirement is a disputed question of fact and as such can not be gone into the writ petition. He also contended as to who is meritorious can be decided only by D.P.C. and this Court has no jurisdiction to play the role of D.P.C. which is a statutory body. The recommendations of the D.P.C. are not final and are subject to the decision of the Government. In case the respondent No. 3 is promoted, the petitioner has a right of appeal before the Service Tribunal and as such the writ is prematurre. In support of his arguments, Mr. Garg placed reliance on the following judgments: (1) AIR 1976 S.C. 2428 , (2) AIR 1962 S.C. 1704 , (3) 1980 S.C. 881, (4) AIR 1978 S.C. 1132 , (5) 1989 (V) S.L.R. 63 9. He further argued that there is no allegation in the writ petition that the reviewing officer was also in collusion with the respondent No. 3 and 4. He argued that even for the sake of arguments it be presumed that the petitioner sent her A.P.Rs. form to the respondent No. 4, on 22.8.1992, there was no reason for the respondent No. 4, for not sending the A.C.Rs. of the petitioner to the respondent No. 2, before his retirement. 10. Mr. Dilip Singh and Mr. Ranjan, counsel for the respondent No. 3, supported the arguments of Mr. Garg. form to the respondent No. 4, on 22.8.1992, there was no reason for the respondent No. 4, for not sending the A.C.Rs. of the petitioner to the respondent No. 2, before his retirement. 10. Mr. Dilip Singh and Mr. Ranjan, counsel for the respondent No. 3, supported the arguments of Mr. Garg. In addition to that, they argued that the petitioner has forged the document marked Annexure 4 and as such the writ petition deserves to be dismissed only on this ground. 11. I considered the arguments advanced by counsel for the parties and gone through the record and rulings cited by them. 12. I agree with the arguments of Mr. O.P.Garg, counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that verification of all affidavits filed by the petitioner is defective. It has not been mentioned' in them as to which part of affidavit or writ or rejoinder is true to personal knowledge of the deponent and which part is based on belief. The relevant allegations in the writ and rejoinder are also vague and are not definite. Further more, there is nothing on the record to hold that respondent No. 4 sent A.C.Rs. to the reviewing officer after his retirement, particularly when petitioner's case is that she sent the A.P.A. form to the respondent No. 4 on 22.8.92. 13. I am also in agreement with the counsel for the respondents that this Court should not adjudge as to who is more meritorious as the work has been assigned to D.F.C. which is a statutory body. The case is directly covered by the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1980 S.C. 881 (Mrs. Kunda S. Kadam and others v. Dr. K.K. Soman and others). In that case, facts were that the appellant in that case applied for the post of Deputy Municipal Commissioner. Her name was recommended for appointment. While her name was under consideration by Municipal Corporation which was the appointing authority, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in that case filed the writ petition in Bombay High Court challenging the recommendations of the P.S.C., on the ground that the appellant did not fulfil the required qualifications. He also took some other grounds in the writ petition. While her name was under consideration by Municipal Corporation which was the appointing authority, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in that case filed the writ petition in Bombay High Court challenging the recommendations of the P.S.C., on the ground that the appellant did not fulfil the required qualifications. He also took some other grounds in the writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed in limine by learned Single Judge, but on appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the appellant did not possess ten years experience which was mandatory and quashed the recommendations. On appeal, the Apex-Court held as under: "We consider that the time has not arrived for the court to adjudicate upon the merits and that the Writ Petition itself was premature. The normal procedure should have been for the recommendation of the Public Service Commission to be considered by the Corporation. It was open to the Municipal Corporation to accept the recommendation or not to accept the recommendation." 14. In AIR 1984 S.C. 898 (Bishnu Ram Borah and another v. Parag Saikia and others) , the question was regarding grant of liquor licence by Board of Revenue. In that case, the Apex Court held that it was impermissible for the High Court to have embarked upon an inquiry into the facts to adjudge the suitability or otherwise of the rival pairs of claimants. 15. The judgment of this Court in Randhir Singh's case (supra), instead of helping the petitioner is against her. In that case the Advocate General places chart of all the rival candidates before this Court and on the basis of the Chart, this Court held that the Non-Petitioner Nos. 2 to 10 could not have been selected on the basis of merit. When the respondents who themselves placed the record of D.P.C. before the Court, raised an objection that this Court should not go into the record. This Court at Page No. 11 of its judgment observed as under: "Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents that this Court cannot and should not go into the facts and look at the record with a view to find out whether the explanation attached to sub-rule 11 has .been violated or not, is without substance. This Court at Page No. 11 of its judgment observed as under: "Arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents that this Court cannot and should not go into the facts and look at the record with a view to find out whether the explanation attached to sub-rule 11 has .been violated or not, is without substance. Things would have been different if the record was not available but once having gone through the record and fording that the Tribunal was not right in making the observations quoted above, we feel it our duty to correct the mistake to avoid any injustice to the persons which has occured by not following the rule of law and explanation strictly. We can not shut our eyes merely on account of technical submission that in the matter of writ of certiorari, this Court should not go into the questions of fact." 16. The other cases of Sukhraj Singh (Bajwa) and O.P. Srivastava and others (supra), cited by the counsel for the petitioner are distinguishable and are not relevant to the facts of the present case. Further more, according to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the respondent No. 4 gave remark of 'very good' to the petitioner in A.C.Rs. for the year 1991-92, and as such the petitioner can not be said to be prejudiced on account of A.C.Rs. given to the petitioner by the respondent No. 4 for the year 1991-92. 17. Looking to all these facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed, without any order as to costs.Writ Petition Dismissed *******