Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. This application is directed against the judgment dated 26-9-1987 passed by Sri Sohailu Rahman, Additional District and Sessions Judge XI, Patna in Misc. Appeal No. 90 of 1984, whereby and whereunder the said learned Court of Appeal below reversed the order dated 21-7-1984 passed by Sri Kalidayal Mishra, Additional Munsif, Patna, in Title suit No. 66/79 / 84/81. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. On 30th of April, 1979, the opposite party filed Title Suit No. 66/79 for a decree for declaration of title and removal of encroachment allegedly made by defendants petitioners. The said suit was valued at Rs. 111. Tae petitioners in the written statement, inter alia, contended that the valuation of the suit property being not less than Rs. 20, 000 the same would be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the said Court. By a Judgment dated 21-7-1984 the learned trial Court held that the valuation of the suit is more than 5500, directed return of the plaint for its presentation before a proper court. Plaintiff preferred appeal as against the said order, as noticed hereinbefore. By reason of the impugned order the learned Court of Appeal below has allowed the said appeal. 3. It is admitted at the Bar that in view of the pendency of the Civil Revision application herein, the hearing suit before the Court of Munsif has not yet been concluded. It is also admitted that by reason of Bengal, Agra, and Assam Civil Courts Amendment Ordinance, 1987 promulgated on 26th May, 1987 the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif has been raised to Rs. 25, 000 . However, by reason of the subsequent legislative Act, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif has been raised to Us. 30, 000. 4. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhim Singh V/s. Mohan Lal Agarwala 1991 (2) PUR 325, as also a Special Bench of this Court in the case of Gobardhan Lal Soneja V/s. Binod Kumar Sinha and Ors. 1991 (2) PL JR. 783, have held that the crucial point of time when the matter of pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court in terms of the provisions of said amended Act would be taken into consideration is the date when the matter is heard. 5. 1991 (2) PL JR. 783, have held that the crucial point of time when the matter of pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court in terms of the provisions of said amended Act would be taken into consideration is the date when the matter is heard. 5. In Bhim Singhs case, the Division Bench, inter alia held that all appeals, whose value was up to Rs. 50, 000 and which had been filed in this Court and but not admitted shall be returned for filing before the District Judge concerned. It appears that this Court in the aforementioned decision did not notice a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Narain V/s. First Additional District Judge, Allahabad and Ors. -- , wherein it has been held as follows: With all respect, the High Court has completely misdirected itself in interpreting the provisions of Sec. 3(1) of the Act, which must govern this case. That section run as under: Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any release or discharge of or from any debt decree, liability or any jurisdiction already exercised and any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continued to be heard and decided by such court. The High Court has not given effect to the words any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commmencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continued to be heard and decided by such Court. Now, giving full effect to the words just quoted of Sec. 3(1) of the Act, the High Court and the High Court alone would be competent to hear and decide the appeal pending before it. in other words, the. District Courts were not competent hear such appeals, and, therefore, the High Court could not have transferred those appeal to be heard by the District Judge or Additional District Judge, inasmuch as Sec. 24 postulates that the Court to which the suit or appeal or other proceeding is transferred should be competent to try or dispose of the same. District Courts were not competent hear such appeals, and, therefore, the High Court could not have transferred those appeal to be heard by the District Judge or Additional District Judge, inasmuch as Sec. 24 postulates that the Court to which the suit or appeal or other proceeding is transferred should be competent to try or dispose of the same. On the date the appeal in question was preferred in the High Court, the District Courts were not competent to hear such a case. The competency of those Courts to hear such cases arises by virtue of the amendment of Sec. 21 of the Civil Courts Act, aforesaid. We are here not concerned with the question whether in the absence of a saving Clause like the one introduced by Sec. 3 (1), the High Court would have been right in taking recourse to Sec. 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But in the face of Sec. 3 (1) of the Act it is impossible to hold that the District Courts were competent to hear appeals of the valuation of ten thousand rupees or less in suits decided before the Act came into force, and appeals from which were pending before the High Court. 6 Unfortunately the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court has also not been noticed by the Special Bench in Gobardhan Lal Soneja case (supra). However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the law appears to be very clear that as on 21-7-1984 when the learned Munsif inter alia, held that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit, the said order cannot be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. The learned Court of Appeal below has not considered the merits of the case, but, merely took into consideration the subsequent changes in law and applied the same purported to be on the basis that the said amendment would have application therein in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narains case (supra). There cannot be doubt whatsoever that the impugned order passed by the learned Court of Appeal below is vitiated in law. From a persusal of the aforementioned judgment of the Special Beach, it is evident that it proceeded on the basis that on the date when the suit was transferred to the Court of Munsif it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. From a persusal of the aforementioned judgment of the Special Beach, it is evident that it proceeded on the basis that on the date when the suit was transferred to the Court of Munsif it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It further held that the crucial test for deciding whether the Court has pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the suit would be whether on the date the hearing of the suit is taken up it has jurisdiction to take up the suit of not. In this case, the hearing of the suit was taken up in the year 19 "4. The learned trial Court passed his order dated 21-7-1984 after considering the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties on all issues including the issues with regard to the valuation of the suit property. But he did not decide the over issues except the issue with regard to the valuation of the suit as ha found that in view of his findings he would have no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. For the reasons aforementioned the judgment of the appellate Court cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, this civil revision application is allowed. The order of Appellate Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Court of Appeal below for fresh decision on merit of the matter. In the facts and circumstance of the case, there will be no order as to cost.