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1992 DIGILAW 914 (RAJ)

Asu Singh Rajput v. Gehlot Enterprises Ltd.

1992-11-20

I.S.ISRANI

body1992
JUDGMENT 1. - This winding up petition has been filed under sections 433 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956. It is submitted by Mr Paras Kuhad, learned counsel, that respondent company through Shri Kishore Singh, Managing Director, on behalf of the National Motors Company for Gehlot Enterprises Ltd., took a loan of Rs. 1,50,000 on 26 October, 1989, and executed a promissory note in favour of the petitioner, photostat copy of which is Annexure 1 and, thereafter, original promissory note has also been placed on record. The interest to be paid was at the rate of 18% per annum. The above mentioned amount alongwith interest remains unpaid, inspite of several requests made for payment of the same. Statutory notice dated 18 December, 1991 (Annexure 2), under section 434 of the Companies Act, was served on the respondent, calling upon it to pay the above mentioned amount alongwith interest at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum. This amount comes to Rs. 2,08,500 upto 25 December, 1991. However, inspite of the receipt of the said notice, the respondent company has failed to pay the said amount. The respondent company desired to have a photostat copy of the promissory note executed by Shri Kishore Singh, which was sent by the petitioner's Advocate, vide letter dated 23 January, 1992 (Annexure 3). Thereafter, the respondent company, vide its reply dated 10 February, 1992 (Annexure 4), sent through its Advocate, denied the execution of the said promissory note. Thus, the respondent company has become commercially insolvent and is unable to pay the debts within the meaning of section 434 of the Companies Act. 2. It is submitted by Mr. S.N. Kumawat, learned counsel, that the so-called promissory note dated 26 October, 1989, is not a promissory note, but a mere forged document and on the basis of the forged document, no debt can be recovered and the winding up petition is, therefore, not maintainable. It is further submitted that on the same document, the rate of interest and name of Asu Singh have been written subsequently. It is also submitted that neither the respondent company borrowed Rs. 1,50,000 from the petitioner, nor executed any promissory note in his favour. It is pointed that the petitioner does not have any money-lending licence under the Money Lending Act. It is also submitted that neither the respondent company borrowed Rs. 1,50,000 from the petitioner, nor executed any promissory note in his favour. It is pointed that the petitioner does not have any money-lending licence under the Money Lending Act. Therefore, he cannot legally lend any money to anyone and the petition is not maintainable since the petitioner is not entitled to file this petition. For the sake of argument, even if the document is treated to be a promissory note, it does not bear sufficient stamps and is, therefore, inadmissible in evidence and no company petition can be filed on the basis of such document. It is further pointed out that the alleged promissory note (Annexure 1) is a blank receipt, which was given by Kishore Singh to Mr Purushottam Modani, who is a broker and deals with money-lending business. This blank document was lost from the office of Mr Modani, when there was a raid from Income-tax Department in his office on 13 August, 1990. An FIR regarding the same was filed against the petitioner, Asu Singh Rajput, by Mr Modani, on 20 February, 1992, by registered post, which was received at Shastri Nagar Police Station, on 6 March, 1992. A photostat copy of the said report is Annexure R/1. The FIR, chalked out on 4 May, 1992, is marked as Annexure R/2. This matter is under investigation by the police. It is also pointed out that the petitioner never demanded any amount or interest earlier than the notice dated 18 December, 1991 (Annexure 1), sent through his counsel. The respondent was shocked to receive the said notice and, therefore, obtained photostat copy of the so-called promissory note and, thereafter, sent the reply through his Advocate. It is contended that Annexure 1 is a forged document and there is bona fide dispute between the parties. The respondent is not liable to pay any amount, on the basis of false and disputed document. The petitioner has, in fact, avoided filing of regular civil suit, where he will have to come in the box and produce the evidence to prove the forged document (Annexure 1) and fully knowing that it will not be possible for him to do so, he has filed this winding up petition, where necessity of any oral evidence is not required. Thus, a via media has been found to avoid scrutiny of the document. Thus, a via media has been found to avoid scrutiny of the document. It is further contended that a mere look with naked eye at the alleged promissory note shows that three persons have written the document, which goes to prove that a forgery has been committed. There is also deference of ink. 3. It is submitted by Mr Kuhad, learned counsel, that, even if document is not treated to be a promissory note, it is a receipt, on the basis of which, these proceedings have been appropriately filed. The learned counsel has vehemently denied the allegations of forgery and submitted that there is no bona fide dispute, as claimed on behalf of the respondent. 4. I have heard both the parties and gone through the documents on record. It is evident that the said document is not a promissory note, but can be said to be a receipt. Even in the reply, sent by respondent to the notice, it has been mentioned that it is a forged document. The FIR was lodged and investigation was conducted by the police authorities. It was submitted by Mr Kuhad, learned counsel, that FIR has been given in the investigation. Thereupon, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the FIR has not yet been filed in the court and has not been accepted. However, this is regarding criminal liability of the matter. So far as the civil aspect is concerned, prima facie, it seems that there is force in the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that there is bona fide dispute regarding genuineness of the document (Annexure 1). It is claimed that it was signed and given to a broker, who had to obtain loan and fill up the rest of the contents and hand over the money of loan to the respondent. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that there is bona fide dispute between the parties and this dispute can be resolved only after taking evidence by a civil court. The machinery of winding up cannot be allowed to be utilised as a means for realising debts from the company, which are denied by the company, on the basis of fraud and forgery. The machinery of winding up cannot be allowed to be utilised as a means for realising debts from the company, which are denied by the company, on the basis of fraud and forgery. The creditor can seek assistance of the company court to compel the payment of money due to him, but, where there is bona fide dispute regarding the debt, and the claim appears to the court to be not just, the court can refuse a request for winding up and refer the parties to a competent civil court, having jurisdiction to get their claims adjudicated. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Pundlik Krishna Ji v. Trimbak Bhikaji Patil, (1992) 3 JT SC 110 : AIR 1992 SC 1338 , in which, it was held by the Apex Court that the High Court has erred in holding that the lease deed dated 30 April, 1951, was a genuine document. No enquiry was held at any stage, regarding genuineness of the lease deed. In the petition under consideration also, the enquiry regarding genuineness of Annexure 1 has to be held to establish its genuineness. I am fortified in my opinion by the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Malhotra Steel Syndicate v. Punjab Chemi Plants Ltd, (1989) 2 Comp LJ 261 (P&H) : (1989) (1989) 65 Comp Cas 547 (P&H) in which it was held that, in a winding up petition, if the company court comes to its conclusion that the debt is bona fide disputed by the company against whom winding up petition has been filed, the winding up petition will not be appropriate remedy and the petitioner has to be relegated to the civil suit. Anand Steels v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd, (1987) 3 Comp LJ 175 (Karn) : (1989) 65 Comp Cas 777 (Karn) was a case, in which, winding up petition was filed for non-payment of the goods supplied to respondent company. The respondent company alleged non-delivery of goods and fraud by the petitioner in collusion with employees of the company. It was held that winding up petition was not a remedy to enforce a debt, which is no doubt a debt created by commission of a fraud, though yet to be established. The Karnataka High Court, therefore, dismissed the winding I up petition. It was held that winding up petition was not a remedy to enforce a debt, which is no doubt a debt created by commission of a fraud, though yet to be established. The Karnataka High Court, therefore, dismissed the winding I up petition. In T Srinivasa v. Flemming (India) Apotheke (P.) Ltd., (1990) 68 Comp Cas 506 (Karn) , it was held by the Karnataka High Court that it is not for the court hearing a petition for winding up under section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956, to assess evidence and refuse a decree or to draw up a decree in favour of the petitioner and then proceed to wind up the company. In the summary procedure which the company court must follow, if the court is satisfied, prima facie, that the defence raised in the circumstances of the case is bona fide and is likely to succeed in a civil court, that would constitute sufficient reason for the court to reject the petition, relegating the parties to the civil court. 5. The petitioner has to prove the genuineness of the document (Annexure 1) by leading positive evidence and this could be done only in a civil suit. The respondent company has, prima facie, established that the debt is bona fide disputed by it. 6. I, therefore, dismiss the company petition and relegate the petitioner to a civil suit. The petitioner will, however, be entitled to invoke the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, in the civil litigation. There will be no order as to costs. *******