JUDGMENT 1. - This is civil miscellaneous appeal against the judgment of Judge, Family Court, Jaipur, dated 6th April, 1988 in a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act which was dismissed by the trial court. An application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed by the appellant in the trial court for dissolution of the marriage between him and respondent Malti which marriage was solemnized on 16th May, 1978 according to Hindu rites and customs of the caste to which they belong. The application had been filed in typical circumstances. After solemnization of the marriage respondent Malti gave birth to a daughter named as Lovina on 20th March, 1980. Relations between husband and wife strained in December, 1982 as according to the appellant she was not living as an ideal wife and used to go to her parent's place despite refusal by the appellant and without any reasonable cause used to withdraw from discharging marital obligations. Compelled by the circumstances the appellant served a notice on her on 21st July, 1983 and then on 26th February, 1985. It was also alleged in the petition that respondent used to keep her entire salary with herself. On 7th November, 1985 without informing the appellant she took away her clothes, utensils and ornaments and went to her parent's house, as a result of which appellant filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the court of District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur which was later on transferred to Family Court on 1st January, 1986. Respondent took a defence that appellant was living in adultery as he had illicit relations with another lady. Her case was that she had given birth to a son also besides a daughter. The appellant moved an application for withdrawal of the application filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 30th May, 1986 on the ground that since the respondent has levelled falls (false) charge against him about his character and repeated the same before the Presiding Officer which has hurt his self-respect and has caused great mental torture to him, resulting in cruelty as he was neither having any relations with any other lady nor was of bad character. He therefore, after withdrawing the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, filed this application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the ground of mental cruelty and further that his wife has given birth to a son whom he disowns. 2. On filing this petition the notice was issued to the respondent who submitted that the facts mentioned in the petition are not wholly correct. She stated that she has always given the salary to her husband appellant but she insisted in her reply that the appellant used to visit the house of one neighbour Snehlata Bhargava who was an employee of Public Works Department and since he intended to marry her he used to harass the respondent in several manner, in as much as he gave her breathing and turned out of the house on 7th September, 1985 despite the fact that she was pregnant and since after that he had not even bothered to come and see her even when she delivered a child. She denied the fact that she had taken away her clothes and other goods including ornaments from his place. She admitted the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was filed wherein she had taken the defence which was valid defence and instead of getting the judgment in that case the appellant has used the pleadings as a ground for divorce in this case which should not be accepted. She stated that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 3. Learned trial court framed the issued about mental cruelty and recorded the evidence of the parties. Three witnesses were examined by the appellant and four by the respondent. The trial court after discussing the entire evidence dismissed the application, hence this appeal. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial court has erred in appreciating the evidence in right perspective and this has happened because laywers are not allowed in the Family Court and the case could not be properly appreciated by the learned Judge. It is also submitted that the litigants appearing before the Family Court are not conversant with the matrimonial law and therefore, the parameters within which law regarding mental cruelty is to be appreciated, could not be properly placed before the learned Judge with the result that it has prejudiced the case of the appellant. It is also submitted that the litigants appearing before the Family Court are not conversant with the matrimonial law and therefore, the parameters within which law regarding mental cruelty is to be appreciated, could not be properly placed before the learned Judge with the result that it has prejudiced the case of the appellant. It is submitted that appellant has proved his case beyond any manner of doubt, inasmuch as he has established that the respondent deserted him as early as 7.9.1985. She left his house with an intention to leave it permanently. It is also submitted that there is overwhelming evidence to substantiate the case of the appellant that the respondent has acted in a manner which has resulted in mental torture to the appellant resulting in mental cruelty in as much as she made false allegations against him regarding his illicit relations with a lady. A word of mouth by the respondent without any supporting evidence could not have been sufficient to come to conclusion that appellant has any illicit relations with another lady. The evidence was merely hearsay evidence which has no value in the eye of law. It is submitted that the respondent had defamed the appellant in his office as well as among his relations and this is admitted by herself. In this view of the matter no further evidence was required to substantiate the appellant s pleading about mental cruelty. The very fact the the respondent took the defence that appellant is having illicit relations with a lady in reply to his application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, is enough to give a finding of mental cruelty. Coupled with that even in reply to the present petition the respondent has reiterated the allegations which remain unsubstantiated. It is submitted that similar allegations have been levelled in the application made under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is also submitted that inconsistent pleas have been taken by the respondent and it can be inferred without any manner of doubt that the marriage has broken irretrievably and for this count also the appellant is entitled to obtain a decree of dissolution of marriage. Learned counsel has relied on Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 , Smt. Sumanbai v. Anandrao Onkar Panpatil, AIR 1976 Bombay 212 , Dr. Keshaorao Krishnaji Londhe v. Mrs. Learned counsel has relied on Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 , Smt. Sumanbai v. Anandrao Onkar Panpatil, AIR 1976 Bombay 212 , Dr. Keshaorao Krishnaji Londhe v. Mrs. Nisha Londhe,AIR 1984 Bombay 413 , Smt. Rita v. Sh. Brij Kishore, Gandhi AIR 1984 Delhi 291 , Nemai Kumar v. Smt. Meeta Ghosh, AIR 1986 Cal. 150 , Harbhajan Singh Monha v. Amarjeet Kaur, AIR 1986 MP 41 , Smt. Shanti Devi v. Raghav Prakash, 1985 RLR 536 , Harendra Nath Burman v. Smt. Suprova Burman and another : AIR 1989 Cal. 120 , and Smt. Santana Banerjee v. Sachindra Nath Banerjee : AIR 1990 Cal. 367 . 5. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no case of mental cruelty has been made out as respondent did not allege any false allegation against the appellant. She was and is always ready and willing to stay with the appellant provided that he stops visiting another lady. It is submitted that the conduct of the appellant has on the contrary caused mental torture and mental cruelty to the respondent but she has been tolerating it as a hindu wife is destined to it. It is submitted that it was the appellant who filed an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the respondent was obliged to file a reply. Her reply in that petition could not be taken as a ground of mental cruelty in the present proceedings. If this is permitted then no person will ever be in a position to contest a case. It is submitted that the very fact the appellant withdrew the application for restitution of conjugal rights, was sufficient to show that he had no case and consequently no case for dissolution of marriage also. 6. We have given our earnest consideration to the rival contentions and have perused the entire recored. 7. For appreciating the arguments in this case and also for assessing the evidence in right perspective it is essential to chronological mention few important dates leading to filing of the application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The parties got married in 1978 and in March, 1980 the first daughter was born. There was no problem upto December, 1982. The parties got married in 1978 and in March, 1980 the first daughter was born. There was no problem upto December, 1982. It was on 21st July, 1983 that the appellant through an advocate served a notice on the respondent wherein it was stated that since last two years she was giving a cold treatment to him and often used to pick up quarrel which has resulted in mental and physical cruelty to him. He also levelled the charge that she had taken Rs. 800/- cash and ornaments worth Rs. 25,000/- to her parents. Despite this notice served husband and wife lived together till another notice was served by the husband through another advocate on 26.2.1985. This notice was served regarding a piece of land which was purchased in Malviya Nagar, Jaipur by which he demanded a sum of Rs. 18,428.10 which is alleged to have been advanced by him to the respondent and her elder sister Shanti for purchasing a piece of plot. Even after this notice, according to the appellant, they continued to stay together till the respondent is alleged to have left the matrimonial home on 7.9.1985. It is the case of both the parties that there was no separate living prior to this date. It is also relevant to mention here that she had left the matrimonial home on 7.9.1985 she was carrying an advance state of pregnancy because she delivered the child in the same year. It was on 24th September that appellant filed the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights where a reply was filed by the respondent in April, 1986. It is in this reply for the first time that she had come out with the defence that her husband did not, want to keep her with him because he was having illicit relations with some other lady. Reply was filed on 14th April, 1986 and according to the appellant himself the respondent had gone to Bank on 9th May, 1986 to protest with her husband and where she is alleged to have assassinated his character. It is after this that he withdrew the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and basing his case on the aforesaid facts filed the present application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage on the ground of curelty and desertion. It is after this that he withdrew the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and basing his case on the aforesaid facts filed the present application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage on the ground of curelty and desertion. Therefore, two things require serious consideration, as to whether it is a case of desertion with animus deserendi and secondly as to whether it is a case where cruelty muchless mental cruelty is established. So far as the first point regarding desertion is concerned we can at once hold that there is not an iota of evidence suggestive of the fact that the respondent had any intention to leave the matrimonial home with an intention to leave it permanently. The law requires that there should be strict proof about animus deserendi, i.e., the intention to leave the house permanently. In the instant case despite service of the two notices in July, 1983 and February, 1985 the respondent had not chosen to live separately and had stayed with the appellant till 7th September, 1985 when she is alleged to have left the house permanently. The allegation of leaving with ornaments and cash was also levelled in the notice, dated 21st July, 1983 and again repeated in the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act in September, 1985 which is a charge in stock against the wife by the husband in the case. It cannot be lost sight of in this case that respondent wife herself is a nurse and earning her livelihood. On the contrary husband's grievance was that she was not parting with her salary to him and it was one of the grievances which, in our opinion was ill-founded as she had absolute right on her money and was not under any obligation to. pass it over to her husband. Therefore, even if she had taken her money with herself that does not show her animus deserendi. The appellant himself has given different versions. In his examination-in-chief he stated that in February, 1981 she had left him and stated that he should divorce her. This was stated in Udaipur. It was thereafter that with the persuation of the appellant she returned to his home. He stated that she often used to go after quarrelling and would return on her own will. She would not follow his command. This was stated in Udaipur. It was thereafter that with the persuation of the appellant she returned to his home. He stated that she often used to go after quarrelling and would return on her own will. She would not follow his command. He then came out with a case that his in-laws had given him beating on 27th May, 1983, but there is not a word of beating by in-laws in the notice he served on 21.7.1983. He stated that he got a notice served on 7th September, 1985 when she left his house with all the material and when he went to his in-laws' house next day she did not talk and stated, 'consider for one year'. He then moved an application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights. He also in cross examination stated that they lived as husband and wife even after February, 1981 and that respondent had given birth to a son, but he stated that they lived together as her parents had tendered apology. He stated that he is not prepared to keep her now even if she wants to stay with him. He denied to have any knowledge as to whether she was pregnant with four months' pregnancy when she went to her father's house. Even his landlord PW.2 Daya Shanker Yadav has stated that they use to quarrel on trifling matters. As against this the respondent had clearly stated that she was always ready and willing to stay with her husband but since he had illicit relations with Snehlata Bhargava, she was always objecting to it and he used to manhandle her. She in her statement has, categorically stated that she has not deserted her husband. The evidence is suggestive of the fact that respondent did not leave the matrimonial home with an intention to desert her husband. As and when she had been assured of proper treatment as wife she has always gone and stayed with the appellant. 8. We are thus of the opinion that no case of desertion is at all made out. 9. Coming to the question of cruelty, before coming to the evidence we would like to deal with the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 10. In Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. 8. We are thus of the opinion that no case of desertion is at all made out. 9. Coming to the question of cruelty, before coming to the evidence we would like to deal with the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 10. In Dr. N.G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down the standard of proof to be applied regarding proof of cruelty in cases of judicial separation. Their Lordships held as under: "The brief regarding the existence of a fact may be founded on a balance of probabilities. A prudent man faced with conflicting probabilities concerning a fact-situation will act on the supposition that the fact exists, if on weighing the various probabilities he finds that the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the particular fact. As a prudent man, so the court applies this test for finding whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved. The first step in this process is to fix the probabilities, the second to weigh them, though the two may often intermingle. The impossible is weeded out at the first stage, the improbable at the second". "Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof by a higher standard which generally governs criminal trials or trials involving inquiry into issues of a quasi-criminal nature. A criminal trial involves the liberty of the subject which may not be taken away on a mere preponderance of probabilities. It is wrong to import such considerations in trials of a purely civil nature". 11. In Smt. Sumanbai v. Anandrao Onkar Panpatil the situation was reversed in an application filed by the husband for restitution of conjugal rights. The wife had taken the defence that husband treated her with cruelty and, therefore, his application for restitution of conjugal rights deserves to be dismissed. The trial court dismissed the application against which an appeal was filed which was allowed. High Court setting aside the appellate Court's order in 2nd appeal held that there could be no more insulting injury to the wife than her own husband doubting her chestity. It must be held that if such allegations are lightly made and persisted in filing the petition the husband is not entitled to get any relief under Section 9 of the Act. It must be held that if such allegations are lightly made and persisted in filing the petition the husband is not entitled to get any relief under Section 9 of the Act. The position in that case was reverse than the position in this case, but the appellant had not chosen to persue his application under Section 9 and take a finding of the court therein. He has only chosen the pleadings as a ground of offence in these petitions. 12. In Dr. Kashaorao Krishnaji Londhe v. Mrs. Nisha Londhe the Full Bench onsidering the term 'cruelty' and concluded that cruelty contemplated under Section 13(1)(1a) of the Act neither attracts the old English Doctrine of danger nor the statutory limits embodied in old Section 100)(b). 13. In Smt. Rita v. Sh. Brij Kishore Gandhi the court considered as to whether drunkenness amounts to cruelty or not ? It has been held as under: "No doubt drinking is a constituent of culture all over the world, and is almost a cult in certain societies. Yet a habit of excessive drinking is a vice and cannot be considered a reasonable wear and tear of married life. No reasonable person marries to bargain to endure habitual drunkenness, a disgusting conduct. And yet it is not an independent ground of any matrimonial relief in India. But it may constitute treatment with cruelty, if indulged in by a spouse and continued in spite of remonstrances by the other. It may cause great anguish and distress to the wife who never suspected what she was bargaining for and may sooner or later find living together not only miserable but unbearable. If it was so, she may leave him and may, apart from cruelty, even complain of constructive desertiort,or wilful neglect by the husband". 14. In Nemi Kumar Ghosh v. Sm. Meeta Ghosh it has been held as under: "If any imputations against the character of any spouse is alleged either by the wife or by the husband without any foundation and the same is based on mere suspicion, even in such cases such baseless allegations of illicit relationship amount to mental cruelty and it will be a valid ground for passing a decree of divorce under the provision of Section 13(ia) of the Act". 15. 15. In Harbhajan Singh Monha v. Amarjeet Kaur it has been held as under: "What is termed as trifling, at times in matrimonial life takes a serious turn. It is not as much a question of disobedience as shown in the record of the husband, asking husband to dean the dining table and wash the dishes in presence of his friends, showing dis-respect to the family members, to the extent of slapping the husband. They cannot be brushed aside as mere trifles. The totality is so-called trifles, constitute cruelty to the husband". 16. In Smt. Shanti Devi v. Raghav Prakash it has been held as under: "Contrary to it, Shanti Devi in the court has stated that Raghav Prakash developed illegitimate relations with Mohani Sharma and wants to marry her. It may be mentioned here that earlier the allegation was made in writing and the issue was framed but on the request of Shanti Devi's counsel this issue was deleted. The trial court has taken the view that merely because issue No. 3 has been deleted, they cannot be treated as concocted and false and cannot be ignored and, it also tantamounts to cruelty. In my view, when Shanti Devi has insisted upon this allegation against her husband and it has been proved that it certainly caused a great mental agony resulting in cruelty to the husband, the mere fact that the allegation has been withdrawn in writing, is not sufficient because even after the allegation has been withdrawn in pleadings it has been repeated in evidence, by persisting and insisting upon by Shanti Devi". 17. In Harendra Nath Burman v. Smt. Suprova Burman and another it has been held as under: "The trial judge also held the allegation of cruelty against the wife-respondent not to have been satisfactorily proved; but we are afraid that there the trial judge is not correct and has not determined the issue with proper advertence to the materials on record. In para 10 of the petition the petitioner-husband has categorically alleged that in an earlier application filed by the wife-respondent, under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., she has asserted that "the petitioner had an illegal and illicit connection with one Shipra Burman, who is the sister's daughter of the respondent herself whom she brought from Bangladesh to her residence". In para 10 of the petition the petitioner-husband has categorically alleged that in an earlier application filed by the wife-respondent, under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., she has asserted that "the petitioner had an illegal and illicit connection with one Shipra Burman, who is the sister's daughter of the respondent herself whom she brought from Bangladesh to her residence". The wife-respondent far from denying the same in para 11 of her written statement has, on the contrary, reiterated that allegation in para 12(11) and (iii) of the written statement and has asserted such allegation made in her earlier application to be true. In her deposition in cross-examination at the trial, she has also stated that she found "both of them lying on the same bed" "in a naked condition on the bed in night". She has also asserted that on protest being made by her on the following morning she was assaulted and that she also in her turn assaulted Sipra. But strangely enough, no such case was put to the petitioner-husband while he deposed in this case. From the wife's own admission that she never told anybody about this, from the total absence of any corroborative evidence, direct or indirect, and in particular, from the series of letters-Ext. 1 series-written by Sipra to the petitioner and also the respondent and also letters written by Sipra's husband to the petitioner, we are satisfied that this allegation made by the wife about her husband's adulterous relation with Stpra is unfounded and baseless. And once we hold so, we must then hold further that the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty by hurling those ugly allegations in the earlier application for maintenance and then again in the written statement and then again in her deposition. There is no doubt that unfounded or baseless allegation of adultery by one spouse against the other constitutes mental cruelty of the gravest character to warrant divorce. In this case, such allegation was admittedly made by the wife prior to this proceeding in her application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. But even if there was no such allegation made prior to the initiation of this proceeding itself and in the deposition can and should be taken note of in matrimonial proceedings without driving the petitioner to another proceeding on the ground of such cruelty. While ordinarily a lis is to be determined on the cause of action accruing on the date of the initiation of the Lis. It is nevertheless well-settled that it is open to a court, including court of appeal, to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties where it is necessary to do in order to shorten litigation or to do complete Justice between the parties. If any authority is needed in support of this proposition reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shikharchand v. Digambar Jain, AIR 1974 SC 1178 at p. 1182 , where the leading decision of this court on the point of Sir Ashuthos in Rai Charan v. Biswanath, (AIR 1915 Cal. 103) has been referred to with approval. It should be so done all the more in matrimonial proceedings where multiplicity of proceedings should always be discouraged and the dispute should be disposed of as early as possible in the interest of the parties as well as in the interest of the society at large. In fact such courses appear to have been adopted in a series of decisions to which our attention has been drawn by Mr. Dutta and reference inter alia may be made to the decisions of the Delhi High Court in Savitri v. Mulchand, AIR 1987 Delhi 52 , in Ashok v. Santosh, AIR 1987 Delhi 63 and in a Bombay decision in Jaishree v. Mohan, AIR 1987 Bom. 220 ". 18. In Sm. Santana Banarjee v. Sachindra Nath Banerjee it.has been held as under: "The law is well settled that cohabitation at times and or living together in an attempt to repair the fissures in the relationship of husband and wife by themselves may not amount to condonation. To constitute condonation, the offended spouse must accept the offending partner with a spirit of forgiveness and by wiping off the unpleasant memories, start the conjugal life as if on a clean slate. In the instant case, it does not appear to us that the husband accepted the wife with a spirit of forgiveness and started the conjugal life as if on a dean slate by wiping off all unpleasant memories. With an offended soul he made attempts of repair of the marital home but to no effect. In the instant case, it does not appear to us that the husband accepted the wife with a spirit of forgiveness and started the conjugal life as if on a dean slate by wiping off all unpleasant memories. With an offended soul he made attempts of repair of the marital home but to no effect. That apart, the wife even after the institution of the suit indulged in making reckless, false and motivated allegations against the husband and his close relations not only in her written statement but also in her deposition as indicated earlier. Such facts undoubtedly constitute cruelty of a very grave nature. In our view, the court not only can take into consideration of the subsequent events after the institution of the suit but also should take note of such subsequent events if the same have a bearing on the lis between the parties and consideration of such facts may lead to proper Justice in the case and shorten the course of litigation. It may be noted here that on the aforesaid false allegations of the wife constituting cruelty of a grave nature, the husband will be entitled to bring a fresh proceeding for divorce and it will be only unjust and un proper and opposed to salutory principle of shortening the course of litigation to shut out the husband from relying on the subsequent events proved and established in this proceeding on the ground that such subsequent events were not the foundation of the pleading of the husband on the basis of which the proceeding in question was initiated". 19. We have carefully studied all the cases quoted above and we are of the same view as has been held in the aforesaid cases, namely, that character assassination by one spouse or the other amounts to mental cruelty and can be considered as a ground for judicial separation of dissolution of the marriage. But it is a question of fact to be determined in facts and circumstances of each case where the fact alleged may be founded on the balance of probabilities as held in Dastane's case. But it is a question of fact to be determined in facts and circumstances of each case where the fact alleged may be founded on the balance of probabilities as held in Dastane's case. Their Lordships have sounded a note of caution and advised the court to apply proper test for finding out whether a fact in issue can be said to be proved and answered with the first step in this process, is to fix the probabilities, the sound to weigh them and then to weed out at the first stage the impossible and improbable at the second stage. In applying this test the evidence in this case has to be looked into. Starting from the notice dated 21.7.83 there is not a word to show that respondent-wife ever assassinated the character of the appellant-husband. Even in notice dated 26.2.85 there is no mention about it and in petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act also there is no allegation that she assassinated the character of the appellant any time before filing the reply to his application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is only after that she came out with a defence in the aforesaid application that the appellant made out a case of mental cruelty. A very important question therefore, in this case to be determined in the facts and circumstances of this case is as to whether wife should keep mum and silence even in defence to a petition filed against her. The petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act has been filed on 24.9.1985 and according to his own statement she came and publicly protested about his illicit relations with Snehlata Bhargava on 9th May, 1986, i.e. much after her filing reply to the application under Section 9 of the H.M. Act. Even to the relations she is alleged to have protested subsequently. Thus, there is nothing to indicate that respondent ever assassinated the character of her husband in any court or before any outsider prior to his filing the petition in the court. She came out with a defence which in her assessment was the only correct defence available to her as she was bound to come out with a reason as to why she had left the matrimonial home. She came out with a defence which in her assessment was the only correct defence available to her as she was bound to come out with a reason as to why she had left the matrimonial home. If she would not have come out with the defence which in her opinion was true, then it would have been very easy for the appellant to have obtained the decree of restitution of conjugal rights and then taking it as a shield for his further activities. The only question therefore, to be seen is whether the defence taken by her in application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was totally frivolous and baseless and was calculated to assassinate the character of the appellant-husband or to raise that defence in own's lot on her and on this back ground the evidence is discussed, then PW.1 Mohan Lal appellant himself has stated that she levelled allegations against him in reply to application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and then came to the Bank on 9th May, 1986 and quarelled with him, then again to his brother Ratan Lal. According to him the allegations were baseless and false. In cross examination he admitted that he knows Snehlata Bhargava who is living in his neighbour but stated that he never visits her. He also denied the suggestion that Snehlata Bhargave used to tease the respondent. He further denied the case of the respondent that he had gone to Movie alongwith Snehlata on 6th July, 1985, i.e. the night previous to respondent's leaving the matrimonial home. He has denied all the questions which had been put to him in connection with Snehlata Bhargava including that he wants to marry her by divorcing his wife. His own landlord PW.2 Daya Shanker Yadav in cross-examination has admitted that Malti (respondent) never told him that appellant has illicit relations with Snehlata Bhargava, but he had to admit that he never permitted Snehlata Bhargava to enter his house which does indicate that he would not like her entry in his house for reasons best known. Ratan Lal cousin of the appellant Mohanlal stated that Malti had told him that Mohan Lal has relation with another girl and, therefore, fights with her. Ratan Lal cousin of the appellant Mohanlal stated that Malti had told him that Mohan Lal has relation with another girl and, therefore, fights with her. On this he had gone to Mohanlal who stated that that lady is personally known to the respondent and he has met her in presence of his wife only. As against this Malti-respondent has categorically stated that her husband is known to Snehlata Bhargava and he wants to compel her to divorce him. In cross-examination a suggestion has been put to her by the appellant that Snehlata Bhargava is her friend and not his friend, to which she denied. She stated that she did not go to Bank for the purpose of scandalising her husband. She had never gone for getting information about the joint account. The appellant put several questions to her suggesting that she herself is bad character to which she emphatically denied. 20. We have gone through the aforesaid evidence, are clearly of the opinion that there is nothing to suggest that appellant's character has been assassinated with a view to scandalise the character or for the purpose that he may suffer mental cruelty. On the contrary because the entire evidence show that it is the husband who had been finding faults and frantically searching grounds for getting rid of his wife and possibly he filed the application under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act only with a view that she should come out with the defence which he can take as an offensive for another application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Truth would have been conveniently out had he not withdrawn the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and permitted her to establish her as a defence. In statement elucitated from a person with a view to harm in future cannot be permitted to be raised as a ground for divorcing the wife else it would be impossible for either of the spouse to contest any application only in a court of law. We, therefore, hold that the appellant has failed to make out a case of mental cruelty. We, therefore, hold that the appellant has failed to make out a case of mental cruelty. On the contrary it is he who has been cruel to his wife by trying to assassinate her character in cross examination for which he absolutely had no basis and no foundation, muchless against the wife's allegation of his intimacy with Snehlata Bhargava of which she could have legitimate doubt as can be inferred from suggestive questions made by the appellant himself and further from the fact that his own landlord would not permit her to enter his house. We are thus in full agreement with the finding of the trial court though on additional reasons mentioned above also. 21. An argument has also been advanced that it is an irretrievable marriage and, therefore, decree of dissolution should be granted as it has become impossible for husband and wife to stay together. We are unable to accept this preposition as in totality the circumstances of the case do not indicate such a situation because the only thing between the two is the presence of a third person, namely, Snehlata Bhargava for which relationship the husband has categorically denied that he is not having any relations with Snehlata and she is in fact a friend of his wife Malti. Malti has refused her friendship with Snehlata and there is no other cause which has been given for strained relations between husband and wife. If the appellant can assure total severance of his relationship by his conduct shows the dedication towards wife, Malti is always ready and willing to stay with him. In cases like this by granting a decree of dissolution of marriage a party cannot be permitted to have its game played of getting the dissolution and then marrying another girl at the cost of the first which otherwise is also to be depricated rather than encouraged. The appellant who is Bank employee obviously cannot have two wives while continuing in service and, therefore, he must be given an opportunity to have yet another round of calm thinking of reconciliation rather than granting the decree of dissolution of marriage of which he has invented a ground from the defence of the respondent taken in appellant's petition for restitution of conjugal rights till then there was no allegation worth the name of mental cruelty against the respondent-wife. In the facts and circumstances of this case therefore, we are of the opinion that appellant cannot be granted a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable marriage. 22. Considering all the aspects of the appeal we are unable to persuade to accept the same on any of the grounds raised by the appellant. The result is that the findings arrived at by the trial court are confirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs which we assess at Rs. 2000/-. 23. Before concluding, it would be appropriate to mention here that maintenance was also granted to both the children by the trial court under Section 125 Cr.P.C., an appeal against which is also pending. Besides this interim maintenance had also been granted in these proceedings. An order for consolidating the amount had also been passed. The appeal about maintenance is being disposed of by a separate judgment. It is also pertinent to mention here that this court had made several efforts for reconciliation and several opportunities were granted. The parties were present in person and at that time it appeared that parties would come close but then again on 7.9.1992 the efforts failed and, therefore, we proceeded to hear the arguments and decided both the cases.Appeal dismissed. *******