ORDER S. N. Sahay, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated October 4, 1990, Annexure-8 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri in Civil Revision No. 22 of 1990. The facts of the case are that the election of the petitioner Basudeo Tripathi as Pradhan of Gaon Sabha, Kumhana was challenged by Mahabir opposite party No. 2 under Section 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The election of the petitioner was challenged on the ground that the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2 was improperly rejected by the Returning Officer and the result of the election was materially affected thereby. It was pointed out that the nomination paper was rejected by the Returning Officer in view of the fact that the name of proposer was mentioned as Bhulan Das in the nomination paper and it did not tally with the name printed in the electoral roll. The application under S. 12(C) of the Act was dismissed by the learned S.D.O. who disposed of the same as the Prescribed Authority under the Act. He took the view that it is open to a voter to apply for correction of any entry made in an electoral roll after its publication and since no attempt was made on behalf of opposite party No. 2 for correcting the entry made in the electoral roll in relation to the proposer and for challenging the order of the Returning Officer, there was no justification to hold that the nomination paper was wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer. 2. The opposite party No. 2 filed a revision against the aforesaid order. It was urged before the learned Additional District Judge who heard the revision, that according to rules no proposer was required for a valid nomination and so even if the name of the proposer mentioned in the nomination paper, did not tally with the entry in the electoral roll, the nomination paper could not be rejected. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on certain circulars issued by the Nirvachan Nideshak under the Act for the conduct of the election of Pradhan. It was also urged that the result of the election was materially affected by the wrongful rejection of the nomination paper. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on certain circulars issued by the Nirvachan Nideshak under the Act for the conduct of the election of Pradhan. It was also urged that the result of the election was materially affected by the wrongful rejection of the nomination paper. Both these contentions were upheld by the learned Additional District Judge. He held that the circular of Nirvachan Nideshak dated May 25, 1988 did not require any proposer for nomination and when such was the position, even if the name of proposer was not correct according to voter's list and he had not put his signature according to law, the nomination should not be rejected. He further held that in view of 1978 All LJ 390 and AIR 1966 SC 824 , it must be held that the result of election was materially affected by wrongful rejection of nomination paper. It was also held that it was not open to opposite party No. 2 to file a writ petition against the rejection of the nomination paper, as held in 1983 All LJ 67 and 1967 All LJ 64 (sic) and he had no remedy in respect of the same, except as provided in Section 12C of the Act. In view of these findings the revision was allowed and the election of the petitioner was declared void and a fresh election was directed to be held according to law. 3. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in holding that the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2 was wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer and the result of the election has been materially affected thereby. Section 11B(1) of the Act provides that the Pradhan shall be elected by members of the Gaon Sabha from among themselves in such manner as may be prescribed. The provisions relating to the election of members of Gaon Panchayat are contained in Chapter 1D and there is no provision corresponding to Rule 16(1)(i) is contained in Chapter 1 E and the expression "specified form" has not 'been defined, it is provided by necessary implication that in the case of election of Pradhan also, the nomination paper shall be duly completed in the form specified by the Nirvachan Nideshak and in case of non-compliance with this provision, the nomination paper may be rejected by the Nirvachan Adhikari. 4. 4. For ascertaining whether it is a condition of valid nomination that the name of proposer shall find place in the nomination paper and it should tally with the relevant entry in the electoral roll, it will be necessary to refer to the form specified by the Nirvachan Nideshak. Such a condition is not prescribed in terms either by the Act or Rule 20F. In case of election of members of Gaon Panchayat, a requirement to that effect may be inferred by implication from the provisions of Rule 18 which says that the nomination paper may be delivered to the Nirvachan Adhikari by the candidate himself or his proposer. If the correct name of the proposer is not mentioned in the nomination paper, it will not be possible for the Nirvachan Adhikari to verify and endorse whether the nomination paper has been delivered by the proposer. It may, therefore, be taken to be correct that Rule 18 itself impliedly provides that the nomination paper shall contain the correct name of the proposer. But there is no such requirement in the case of election of Pradhan, because the nomination paper may be delivered under Rule 20F(1) to the Nirvachan Adhikari by the candidate personally, or by his Nirvachan Adhikarta (Election Agent). The learned Additional District Judge has observed that the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2 was wrongfully rejected on the ground that the name of the proposer was not coinciding and was not in conformity with his name mentioned in the voters' list. He has referred to a circular of the Nirvachan Nideshak dated May 25, 1988 and has recorded the finding that no proposer was required for nomination. He has accordingly held that when such was the position, even if the name of the proposer was not correct according to voters' list and he had not put his signature according to law, the nomination could not be rejected. It has not been shown that the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge with regard to the existence or contents or effect of the circular of the Nirvachan Nideshak is dated May 25, 1988 is wrong. It appears, that correction was made in the specified form by the circular dated May 25, 1988, which provided that it was not necessary to mention the name of the proposer. It appears, that correction was made in the specified form by the circular dated May 25, 1988, which provided that it was not necessary to mention the name of the proposer. Even if the name of the proposer was required to be mentioned in the form, there is nothing to show that the entry in the electoral roll pertaining to the proposer was also required to be mentioned. It may be observed that where any such provision was intended by the Legislature to be made, it was specifically incorporated in the Statute. For instance, Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which relates to presentation of nomination paper and requirements of a valid nomination in case of election of Lok Sabha, Vidhan Sabha etc. provides in sub-section (1) thereof that each candidate shall, either in person or by his proposer, deliver to the Returning Officer a nomination paper completed in the prescribed form and signed by the candidate and by an elector of the constituency as a proposer. Section 33(4) provides that on the presentation of a nomination paper, the Returning Officer shall satisfy himself that the names and the electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer, as entered in the nomination paper, are the same as those entered in the electoral roll. Section 36 of the above mentioned Act provides that the Returning Officer may reject any nomination on the ground that there has been a failure to complement, with the provisions of Section 33 or that the signature of the candidate or proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine. Thus, in the absence of any such specific provision having been made in the Act or the Rules, it cannot be held that the law requires that the nomination paper in the case of election of Pradhan shall contain the name of the proposer and shall also be signed by him and that it shall tally with the name of the proposer as entered in the electoral roll. 5. In Lakshmana Sami Gounder v. Commissioner, Income-tax, (1992) 1 SCC 91 : (1992 AIR SCW 551), the provisions of Section 36 of the Indian Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 and Forms 7 and 7-A were considered. Section 36 inter alia provided that the date and place of sale shall be published in the Gazette. 5. In Lakshmana Sami Gounder v. Commissioner, Income-tax, (1992) 1 SCC 91 : (1992 AIR SCW 551), the provisions of Section 36 of the Indian Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 and Forms 7 and 7-A were considered. Section 36 inter alia provided that the date and place of sale shall be published in the Gazette. It was held that the provisions of Section 36 are mandatory and the Forms either 7 or 7-A are only procedural and they should be in conformity with Section 36. It was further held that the Form cannot prevail over the Statute and the omission of specification of the date of sale in the Form renders the same not merely irregular but also invalid. If a Form prescribed under an enactment is only procedural and cannot prevail over the Statute, then there can be no doubt that in the absence of a specific statutory provision contained in the Act or the Rules, it cannot be held that the law requires on the basis of the contents of the Form of nomination paper specified by the Nirvachan Nideshak that it shall be signed by the proposer and that the name of the proposer given therein must be the same as the name given in the electoral roll. In the absence of a specific statutory provision to that effect contained in the Act or the Rules, it cannot be regarded as a requirement of valid nomination so that the nomination paper could be rejected on account of non-compliance thereof. 6. Moreover, the nomination paper was liable to be rejected in the instant case on that account only under Rule 18B(2)(c) read with Rule 20G of the Rules. The second part of Rule 18B(2) provides that the Nirvachan Adhikari shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of anrtechnical defect or other error which is not of a substantial character and may for the purposes of removing any such defect or error allow any entry to be corrected in the nomination paper. Rule 18(B)(3) lays down that the Nirvachan Adhikari shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same, if the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing a brief statement of his reasons for such rejection. Rule 18(B)(3) lays down that the Nirvachan Adhikari shall endorse on each nomination paper his decision accepting or rejecting the same, if the nomination paper is rejected, shall record in writing a brief statement of his reasons for such rejection. Therefore, where the Nirvachan Adhikari proceeds to reject nomination paper on the ground that there had been a non-compliance of Rule 18 inasmuch as the nomination paper has not been signed by the proposer or the name of the proposer as entered in the nomination paper is not same as entered in the electoral roll, the order of the Nirvachan Adhikari must indicate that he had applied his mind to the provisions of the second part of R. 1 8B(2) also, which is an integral part of the provisions of said rules. In other words, the nomination paper should not be rejected on the ground of any technical defect or other error which is not of a substantial character and the Nirvachan Adhikari must be satisfied that in the circumstances of the case it was not at all possible to allow the entry in the nomination paper to be corrected for the purposes of removing any such defect or error. It has not been shown in the present case that the Nirvachan Adhikari was (sic) to the provisions of the second part of Rule 18B(2) at the time of rejecting the nomination paper and in his opinion the difference in the entry in the nomination paper and in the electoral roll with respect to the name of the proposer was a technical defect or error of substantial character. The difference in Bhulan Das and Malan Das, as indicated by the judgment of the learned S.D.O. cannot possibly be regarded as a defect or error of substantial character. I have accordingly come to the conclusion that the learned Additional District Judge has taken a correct view that it was not required by law that the name of the proposer should be mentioned in the nomination paper or that it should be signed by the proposer or that the name of the proposer should tally with the entry in the electoral roll and so the nomination paper could be validly rejected on any such ground. 7. The next question is whether the result of the election was materially affected by the rejection of the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2. 7. The next question is whether the result of the election was materially affected by the rejection of the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2. The learned Additional District Judge has observed that opposite party No. 2 was illegally prevented from participating in the election and if his nomination had not been improperly rejected the result of the election would have naturally altered. He has accordingly held that the result of the election was materially affected. In support of this view, he has referred to Surendra Nath Khosli v. Dalip Singh, AIR 1957 SC 242 and Mahadeo v. Udai Pratap Singh, AIR 1966 SC 824 . These cases arose under S. 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The provisions of S. 100(1)(c) formerly were that if the Tribunal is of opinion that the result of the election has been materially affected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nomination, the Tribunal shall declare the election to be wholly void. By the Amending Act of 1956, Section 100(1)(c) was amended and it was provided that the election of a returned candidate shall be declared void if it is shown that the nomination has been improperly rejected. After pointing out the distinctive features of the two class of cases, namely, improper acceptance and rejection of nomination paper, the view was upheld in Surendra Nath Khosla's case that there is a presumption in the case of improper rejection of a nomination paper that it has materially affected the result of the election. As pointed out in Mahadeo's case, this view was confirmed by the Legislature by amending Section 100(1)(c) and providing that the improper rejection itself renders the election void without any further proof about the material effect of this improper rejection. 8. In Ram Autar v. S.D.O., 1978 All LJ 390, it has been held that in a case under Section 12(1)(b)(i) of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, it is incumbent on the authority to determine whether a nomination paper has been improperly rejected, that is some one entitled to contest was not permitted to seek election and that the election had been materially affected. The contention of the petitioner is that the total number of electors was 2010. The contention of the petitioner is that the total number of electors was 2010. The contest was held between petitioner and Sabir Ali opposite party No. 3 as the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2 had been rejected and Ashiq Ali opposite party No. 4 had withdrawn from the election. In the election so held 1679 votes were cast. When the counting took place, it was found that the petitioner has got 914 votes and Sabir Ali got 701 votes and 64 votes were declared invalid. The petitioner was as such duly declked elected as Pradlian. The contention of the petitioner is that the majority of votes, were cast in favour of the petitioner and even if the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2 had not been ejected and he had contested the election he would not have expected more than 331 votes, which is the balance of the total number of electors minus 1679 votes. The petitioner has submitted that there must be evidence to prove the allegation that had the nomination paper not been rejected, the opposite party No. 2 would have got more votes than the petitioner and it would have altered the election materially. This contention cannot be accepted as sound as it proceeds on the hypothesis that the voters who had cast their votes in favour of the petitioner would have necessarily exercised their right of franchise in the same manner even if opposite party No. 2 had been allowed to contest and was actually in the arena. This hypothesis is not correct, because it cannot be predicated as to in what manner the voters would have cast their votes. In case they knew that the contest was not only between the petitioner and opposite party No. 3 but also between the petitioner and opposite party No. 2. Therefore, the principle of law laid down in the case of Surendra Nath Khosla would be squarely applicable and it will be presumed without any evidence that the result of the election was materially affected by the improper rejection of the nomination paper of opposite party No. 2. This presumption will not be deemed to have been rebutted by the hypothesis on which the contention of the petitioner has been raised. I find myself to be in agreement with the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge, as indicated above. 9. This presumption will not be deemed to have been rebutted by the hypothesis on which the contention of the petitioner has been raised. I find myself to be in agreement with the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge, as indicated above. 9. The last contention of the petitioner is that the election petition filed by opposite party No. 2 was barred by res judicata. This contention is based on the fact that the election of the petitioner was also challenged by Ashik Ali, opposite party No. 4. That election petition was partly allowed by the learned S.D.O., who directed that the result of the election may be declared after recounting of votes. The order of the learned S.D.O. was set aside by the learned I Additional District Judge in Civil Revision Nos. 6 and 7 of 1990 and in the election petition filed by the opposite party No. 4 was dismissed toto. It will appear that opposite party No. 2 was also impleaded as a party in the election petition filed by opposite party No. 4 and the revisions arising therefrom. It is said that the revision filed by opposite party No. 2 was also pending at that time. The best course would have been to decide all the election petitions together but that was not done and as a matter of fact no decision was given in respect of the election petition filed by opposite party No. 2 while deciding the election petition of opposite party No. 4. Since the matter in issue was not actually decided the question of res judicata would not arise. 10. In view of the above conclusions, it must be held that the conditions laid down in Section 12C(1)(b)(i) of the Act having been fully satisfied, the election of the petitioner was rightly set aside. The impugned order passed by the learned Additional District Judge is perfectly valid and the writ petition has no force. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.