JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the order dated January 3, 1992, passed by the Additional District Judge No. 2, Sri Ganganagar, by which the learned Additional District Judge allowed the application dated September 4, 1991, filed by the plaintiff" and ordered for the striking of the defence under Section 13(5) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (for short, 'the Act'). 2. Plaintiff Prem Kumar filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against the defendant in respect of the shop No. 7 situated in Patel Market, Sri Ganganagar. The learned trial Court, by its order dated May 9, 1991, determined the provisional rent and directed the defendant-tenant to pay an amount of Rs. 16,800/- as arrears of rent for a period from 22.7.89 to 21.4.91, alongwith interest @ 6% per annum amounting to Rs. 840/-. The defendant deposited the provisional rent determined by the trial Court but did not deposit the monthly rent by 15th of each subsequent month. The amount of rent for the period from 22.4.91 to 21.5.91 was deposited on 10.6.91 and for the period from 22.5.91 to 21.6.91 was deposited on 13.7.91. As the rent was not deposited by 15th of these two subsequent months and, therefore, an application under Section 13(5) of the Act was moved by the plaintiff for striking out of the defence of the defendant. This application was opposed by the defendant. The learned trial Court, by his order dated 3.1.92, allowed the application filed by the plaintiff and struck out the defence under Section 13(5) of the Act. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed by the defendant-appellants. 3. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the learned lower Court while passing the order has not considered the fact whether the defence under Section 13(5) of the Act should be struck-out or not. His further submission is that Section 13(4) of the Act nowhere requires that the rent should be deposited within 15 days of the expiry of the month of tenancy but that 15 days means the 15th day of the succeeding month, namely, the calendar month and within that period, the amount of the rent was deposited and as such no defence could be struckout. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that striking out of the defence is a question of discretion and not of jurisdiction and, therefore, the learned lower Court should have considered that aspect of the case, also, and should not have struck-out the defence. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that he has moved an application for the extension of the time and the time may be extended for depositing the amount and the amount to be deposited may be treated within the time/limitation. The learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has supported the order passed by the Court below. 4. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 5. Sub-section (5) of Section 13 of the Act provides that if a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the Court shall order for striking out of the defence and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. Sub-section (5) casts a duty on the tenant to make payment of the provisional rent determined by the Court and, also, to make payment of the rent by 15th of next month. It is the statutory obligation of the tenant and the protection under the Act is given only if the, tenant fulfils his obligation. The tenant, in the present case, neither deposited the amount of provisional rent within the time nor he made any application for the extension of the time and, therefore, the learned lower Court was justified in striking out the defence. If any application would have been moved and a case for the extension of time would have been made by the defendant before the learned trial Court, the trial Court would have considered that aspect of the matter, but in the absence of any such application or a request for the same, the learned lower Court has not committed any illegality in passing the order dated January 3, 1992, striking out the defence. 6. The next point, which requires consideration in the present case is what is the implication of the words "by the 15th of each succeeding month", appearing in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act? 6. The next point, which requires consideration in the present case is what is the implication of the words "by the 15th of each succeeding month", appearing in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act? Sub-section (4) of Section 13 casts a duty upon the tenant to continue to deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord month by month the monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which the determination of the rent has been made, by the 15th of each succeeding month. The 'succeeding month' means the month for which the rent is due and not a calendar month as per the Gragorian calendar or the Hindi months as per Vikram Samvat or Shaka Samvat. The rent became due or payable on the day of next succeeding month, i.e. of the month of the tenancy and not from the next succeeding month. The words "within IS days of the succeeding month" mean that the payment of monthly rent should be made or the rent may be deposited in the Court on or before the expiry of 15 days of the succeeding month of the tenancy. This is a statutory period provided under the law, but this can be extended by the Court on showing a sufficient cause for the delay, but in the present case, neither any request for the extension of the time was made nor was any application for the same moved and admittedly the amount of month rent was not deposited within the prescribed period of 15 days and, therefore, the learned lower Court was justified in striking out the defence. 7. Lastly it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the appellants moved an application for the extension of time in this appeal before this Court and that application may be considered and the time may be extended as the appellate Court has the same power as that of the trial Court. It is, no doubt, true that the appellate Court while deciding the appeal, enjoys the same powers as are vested in the trial Court and it can extend the time, but whether a case for the extension of the time has been made-out or not, that has to be seen while considering the application moved by the defendants. It is, no doubt, true that the appellate Court while deciding the appeal, enjoys the same powers as are vested in the trial Court and it can extend the time, but whether a case for the extension of the time has been made-out or not, that has to be seen while considering the application moved by the defendants. The appellants, in the application, have only stated that they had no intention to commit any default in the payment of rent and were vigilant in depositing the rent in the time, but in view of the bonafide belief that the rent was to be deposited within 15th day of every succeeding calendar month, the rent was deposited within 15th day of the next calendar month. He has, also, mentioned in the application that this was done on the advice of their counsel Mr. Subhash Narain, Advocate, practising at Sri Ganganagar. No such affidavit of Mr. Subhash Narain, Advocate, has been filed in support of this application whether he gave such advice. The defence taken by the appellants does not appear to be a bonafide and has been taken in order to make-out a case for the condonation of the delay. The tenancy in the present case starts from 22nd of each month and completes on 21st of the next month and the succeeding month starts from 22nd of that month and not from the calendar month. The appellants have failed to prove this bonafide belief. In my view, the delay in depositing the rent under this alleged bonafide belief that the succeeding month starts from 1st of the calendar month, does not appear to be genuine. 8. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this miscellaneous appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. *******