DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE effect of making an application for adjournment to file a written statement for the purpose of Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (the act for brief) has been settled by the Supreme Court in its various judgments and yet this very question has been raised before me in this Appeal from Order directed against the reasoned order passed by the learned Civil judge (S. D.) at Porbandar on 11/04/1983 below the application at exh. 19 in Special Civil Suit No. 19 of 1979. Thereupon the learned Trial judge was pleased to reject the present appellants application for stay of the suit under Sec. 34 of the Act. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this Appeal from Order move in a narrow compass. The respondents filed one suit in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) at Porbandar for a decree in the sum of Rs. 92,540 and in the alternative for possession of one fishing boat bearing the name "gomti" and bearing call No. 245 on the strength of one agreement produced by the plaintiff at mark 4/2 on the record of the Trial Court. It came to be registered as Special civil Suit No. 19 of 1979. The agreement in question contained one clause for resolution of the dispute between the parties through arbitration. The appellant herein, thereupon, moved one application for stay of the suit as provided in Sec. 34 of the Act. It was taken on record at Exh. 19 by the trial Court. The present respondents filed their written reply at Exh. 20 on the record of the Trial Court and resisted the present appellants application for stay of the suit under Sec. 34 of the Act on various grounds. The present respondents inter alia contended in their reply at Exh. 20 on the record of the Trial Court that the present appellant had sought adjournment twice by means of his applications at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court for the purpose of filing his written statement to the suit, and as such he could be said to have forfeited his right of claiming the benefit under Sec. 34 of the Act. It appears that the said contention urged on behalf of the present respondents found favour with the learned Trial Judge. It appears that the said contention urged on behalf of the present respondents found favour with the learned Trial Judge. By his reasoned order passed on 11/04/1983 below the application at Exh. 19 in Special civil Suit No. 19 of 1979, the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) at Porbandar was pleased to reject the present appellants application for stay of the suit under sec. 34 of the Act. The aggrieved appellant has thereupon invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the code for brief ). ( 3 ) THE effect of filing an application for adjournment for filing a written statement in the suit for the purpose of Sec. 34 of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Uttar pradesh and Anr. v. M/s. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra and Anr. , reported in AIR 1973 SC 2071 . In that case the opposite party had moved an application for adjournment for filing the written statement to the suit before filing an application for stay of the suit proceedings under Sec. 34 of the Act. After reviewing the case law the Supreme Court held that an application for adjournment for filing a written statement would amount to taking a step in the proceedings, and would therefore prove fatal to an application for stay under Sec. 34 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of M/s. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra (supra) has come to be reiterated by the Apex Court in its recent ruling in the case of Rachappa guruddappa, Bijapur v. Gurusiddappa Nuraniappa and Ors. , reported in AIR 1989 SC 635 . After review of the case law in that case, the Supreme Court has held :"from the Order-sheet in this case and as noted by the learned Trial Judge, it appears that the Counsel appearing for the petitioner had sought adjournment "specifically for filing written statement" and obtained time for more than one occasion for such purpose. It was not only the time taken to consider whether written statement should be filed as a defence to the plaint to enter into an area of controversy, but it was time taken to have the matter decided by the suit. It was not only the time taken to consider whether written statement should be filed as a defence to the plaint to enter into an area of controversy, but it was time taken to have the matter decided by the suit. The party evinced an intention to have the matter adjudicated by the Court. If that is the position, then in our opinion, in view of the principle enunciated hereinbefore, the party has disentitled itself to ask for stay of the said suit. " ( 5 ) IN view of the aforesaid two rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of M/s. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra (supra) and Rachappa Guruddappa (supra), the question raised in this Appeal from Order should have been held concluded against the present appellant. The learned Advocate for the appellant has, however, presumably with a view to wriggling out of the situation arising from the aforesaid two binding rulings urged before me that the present appellant did not seek adjournment for the purpose of filing his written statement in the suit proceedings. It has been urged before me that, what the present appellant applied for was an adjournment for the purpose of filing his reply to the application for interim relief made by and on behalf of the present respondents in the suit proceedings. In that view of the matter, runs the submission made on behalf of the present appellant, the aforesaid two rulings of the Supreme court in the cases of Mis. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra (supra) and Rachappa guruddappa (supra) cannot come in the way of the plaintiff in seeking the stay of the suit as provided in Sec. 34 of the Act. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid submission urged before me by the learned Advocate for the appellant it would be quite proper to look at the two applications for adjournment at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial court to understand what was prayed for by and on behalf of the appellants before moving an application at Exh. 19 on the record of the Trial Court for stay of the suit under Sec. 34 of the Act. The first application at Exh. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial court to understand what was prayed for by and on behalf of the appellants before moving an application at Exh. 19 on the record of the Trial Court for stay of the suit under Sec. 34 of the Act. The first application at Exh. 15 on the record of the Trial Court is made by the learned Advocate for the appellant in the Trial Court declaring that he has filed his appearance on the date of his application and, since he has to submit his written statement in the suit, one adjournment should be granted. The second application at Exh. 18 on the record of the Trial Court was also submitted by the learned Advocate for the present appellant in the Trial Court for adjournment on the ground that the written statement could not be prepared on the date of the application, and as such some adjournment was prayed for. It has been urged before me, on behalf of the present appellant, that the word used in both the applications at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court was "jawab" (jawab) and its English translation could be "reply" and not necessarily "written statement". Relying on this use of the word "jawab" in Vernacular in both these applications at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court, it has been urged before me on behalf of the appellant that what was contemplated by seeking adjournment on behalf of the present appellant was for filing the present appellants reply to the application for interim relief made in the Trial court. ( 7 ) IT is not in dispute that the respondents herein had made some application for interim relief and notice was ordered to be issued to the present appellant for filing his reply thereto. The pendency of the application for interim relief by itself cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of finding out what the learned Advocate for the appellant in the Court meant when he sought time by means of his applications for adjournment at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court. It is not in dispute that the Gujarati word "jawab" is used in the mofussil pleadings in the context of "reply" as well as "written statement". 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court. It is not in dispute that the Gujarati word "jawab" is used in the mofussil pleadings in the context of "reply" as well as "written statement". If what the learned Advocate for the present appellant in the Trial court meant was "reply" by use of the Gujarati word "jawab" in his abovereferred applications, that position could have been clarified by or on behalf of the present appellant by filing his rejoinder affidavit to the reply at Exh. 20 on the record of the Trial Court submitted by and on behalf of the respondents to the present appellants application at Exh. 19 on the record of the Trial Court. As aforesaid, in the reply at Exh. 20 on the record of the Trial Court, the present respondents did specifically contend that the present appellant had applied for adjournment to file his written statement in the suit proceedings. In view of this specific contention, it was the duty of the present appellant through his learned Advocate in the Trial Court, to have clarified the position as to what was meant by the use of the vernacular word jawab in his two applications for adjournment at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court. The Trial Court has understood the word jawab to mean "written statement". No fault therefore can be found with the learned Trial judge for coming to the conclusion that the present appellant did pray for adjournment on two occasions by means of the applications at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court for the purpose of filing his written statement in the suit proceedings. I therefore find no substance or merit in the submission urged before me by and on behalf of the present appellant to the effect that the learned Trial Judge has erred in coming to the conclusion that the applications for adjournment at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial court were for the purpose of filing the written statement by and on behalf of the present appellant in the suit proceedings. ( 8 ) MY attention has been invited to yet another ruling of the Supreme court in the case of M/s. Sadhu Singh Ghuman v. Food Corporation of India and Ors. , reported in AIR 1990 SC 893 . ( 8 ) MY attention has been invited to yet another ruling of the Supreme court in the case of M/s. Sadhu Singh Ghuman v. Food Corporation of India and Ors. , reported in AIR 1990 SC 893 . In that case the defendants to a suit had made an application seeking direction to the litigating party (the plaintiff) to produce the original agreement and other relevant documents so that they may file their written statement in the suit proceedings. In that context, the supreme Court has held that such an application cannot be said to be a step in the proceedings. Relying on this ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mis. Sadhu Singh Ghuman (supra), it has been urged before me on behalf of the appellant that applications for adjournment in the instant case should have been construed as applications for enabling the present appellant to file his written statement. I think this submission has to be stated only to be rejected. The reason therefor is quite simple. The relevant observations of the supreme Court in the case of M/s. Sadhu Singh Ghuman (supra) are found in para 7 at page 895. They read :"in the application filed by the defendants in this case. they only sought a direction to the plaintiff to produce the original agreement and other documents so that they may file written statement. It was not slated that they would file the written statement. They never took any other step submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the case on merits. " (Emphasis supplied) it was found by the Supreme Court in that case that the application indicated that the defendants might file their written statement and not that they would file their written statement. This ruling of the Supreme Court in the M/s. Sadhu singh Ghuman (supra) is of no assistance to the learned Advocate for the present appellant for the simple reason that the applications for adjournment at Exhs. 15 and 18 on the record of the Trial Court do indicate that the present appellant wanted to file his written statement in the suit proceedings. ( 9 ) ON the same ground and reasoning is distinguishable yet another ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India and Anr. v. Yadav Engineer and Contractor, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1302 . ( 9 ) ON the same ground and reasoning is distinguishable yet another ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India and Anr. v. Yadav Engineer and Contractor, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1302 . It is not necessary to deal with it or dilate upon it extensively in view of the settled legal position in that regard. ( 10 ) MY attention has been invited to the amendment introduced by the State of Uttar Pradesh in Sec. 34 of the Act by the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 (the u. P. Amendment Act for brief ). Thereby two Explanations have been inserted below Sec. 34 of the Act. In Explanation 2 it has inter alia been provided that a mere application for time to file a written statement shall not amount to taking any step in the proceedings. It has been urged that the State of Uttar Pradesh has, with a view to overcoming the difficulty created by the law as declared by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of M/s. Janki Saran Kailash chandra (supra), amended Sec. 34 of the Act and inserted the necessary explanations therebelow. I think this submission cannot be read to mean that the effect of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mis. Janki Saran Kailash Chandra (supra) has come to be erased in the State of Gujarat as well. It is for the legislature to amend the law. The Court has only to administer the law as it is. It will be open to the appellant herein to persuade the legislature to amend Sec. 34 of the Act as done by the State of Uttar Pradesh. ( 11 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Judge below the application at exh. 19 on the record of the Trial Court in Special Civil Suit No. 19 of 1979 rejecting the present appellants application for stay of the suit under sec. 34 of the Act is quite legal and valid and calls for no interference by this Court in this Appeal from Order. ( 12 ) IN the result, this Appeal from Order fails. It is hereby dismissed. 34 of the Act is quite legal and valid and calls for no interference by this Court in this Appeal from Order. ( 12 ) IN the result, this Appeal from Order fails. It is hereby dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. ( 13 ) THE Civil Application is made for the purpose of staying the proceedings of Special Civil Suit No. 19 of 1979 in the Court of the Civil Judge (S. D.) at Porbandar pending the hearing and final disposal of this Appeal from order by this Court. This Appeal from Order has however come to be dismissed today. The accompanying Civil Application therefore does not survive and it also deserves to be rejected. Rule issued therein is discharged however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. At the oral request of the learned Advocate for the appellant, the interim stay as prayed for granted in the accompanying Civil Application is continued for a period of eight weeks from today to enable the present appellant to espouse his grievances against this judgment before the higher forum by means of some appropriate proceedings. .