JUDGMENT H.N. Tilhari, J. - This is a revision filed by defendant-revisionists challenging the order dated 30-5-92, passed by Shri S.C. Dixit, I Additional District Judge, Bahraich, whereby the learned Additional District Judge has dismissed the appeal filed by the revisionist. By appeal under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendant had challenged the order dated 22-2-92 passed by Munsif Bahraich, whereby the learned Munsif Bahraich has allowed the application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code in Regular Suit No. 189 of 92 Chand Khan and others v. Mumtaz Khan and others. 2. I have heard Shri S.M. Nasir, Advocate learned counsel for the revisionists on the question of maintainability of the revision and put a query how the revision is maintainable against the appellate order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. The learned counsel for the revisionist placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Qamaruddin v. Rasul Baksh and another reported in (1989 LCD 534). The learned counsel placing reliance on this judgment and in particular making reference to the following observation contended that the revision is maintainable. The observations were made in the context of the matter of petition under Article 226 for issue of writ of certiorari and mandamus. The observations are : "When a suit is filed before a Civil Court having jurisdiction to entertain the same it may issue interim injunction and the party aggrieved may pursue its remedy before the Appellate Court and if it is further aggrieved it may invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Ordinarily an interlocutory order passed in a Civil Suit is not amenable to extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. More so, when the aggrieved party has not exhausted the remedy available to it under the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court in the instant case failed to realise that the defendant respondents had not approached the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 3. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionists and have gone through the above decision and observations. The High Court in the instant case failed to realise that the defendant respondents had not approached the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 3. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionists and have gone through the above decision and observations. Per se, in this judgment it appears that no reference had been made by the learned counsel before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, of U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Acts where under limits have been provided in respect of matters of orders passed in the suits, by reference to the valuation as earlier had been rupees twenty thousand and more but after amendment of 1991 the value of the suit should be rupees one lac or more. 4. The above mentioned observations made in the case of Qamaruddin v. Rasul Baksh and another (supra) in the above context raise an important question if these above observations can be said to declare the law relating to jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code, whereas to the State of U.P. in the context of the various Civil Laws Amendment Act amending Section 11 5 of the Code, within the frame work of expression law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India or it is liable to be taken as per incuriam, and, as, such, can be ignored and to find out a reply to this question reference may be made to some of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and another (1991) 4 SCC 139 ). Hon'ble R.M. Sahai, J, in paragraph 40 has observed :- "Incuriam literally means 'carelessness'. In practise per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority'. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of procedure as a matter of law." Hon'ble Mr. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority'. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of procedure as a matter of law." Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.M, Sahai, in the above noted case has further been pleased to observe :- "Law declared is not that can be culled out but that which is stated as law to be accepted and applied. A conclusion without reference to relevant provision of law is weaker than even casual observation. In the order of Brother Thom men the extracts from the judgment of the Constitution Bench quoted in extenso demonstrate that the question of validity of levy of sales and purchase tax was neither in issue nor was it raised nor is there any discussion in the judgment except of course the stray argument advanced by the learned Attorney General to the following effect : SCC p. 139 para 43). "But alcohol not fit for human consumption are not luxuries and as such the State legislatures, according to Attorney General, will have no power to levy tax on such alcohol." Sales tax or purchase tax under Entry 54 is levied on the sale or purchase of goods. It does not contemplate any distinction between luxury and necessity. Luxuries are separately taxable under Entry 62. But that has nothing to do with Entry 54. What prompted this submission is not clear. Neither there was any occasion nor there is any constitutional inhibition or statutory restriction under the legislative entry nor does the taxing statute make any distinction between luxuries and necessities for levying tax. In any case the bench did not examine it nor did it base its conclusions on it. It absence of any discussion or any argument the order was founded on a mistake of fact, and, therefore, it could not be held to be law declared. The bench further was not apprised of earlier Constitution Bench decisions in Hoechst Chemicals v. State of Bihar & Ganga Sugar Mill v. State of U.P. which specifically dealt with the legislative competence of levying sales tax in respect of any industry which had been declared to be of public importance. The bench further was not apprised of earlier Constitution Bench decisions in Hoechst Chemicals v. State of Bihar & Ganga Sugar Mill v. State of U.P. which specifically dealt with the legislative competence of levying sales tax in respect of any industry which had been declared to be of public importance. Therefore, the conclusion of law by the Constitution Bench that no sales or purchase tax could be levied on industrial alcohol with utmost respect fell in both the exceptions, namely, rule of sub-silentio and being in per incuriam, to be binding authority of the precedents." 5. The above quoted observations of their Lordship's of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) with full force applies and gives a reply to the problem whether the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Qamaruddin v. Rasul Bakhs (supra) can be held to be the law declared by the Supreme Court with reference to revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code in the context of the various U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Acts amending Section 115 of the Code or this falls within the exceptions provided for the relaxation of the rule of stare decisis by the English Courts and in fact with utmost respect it may be held that the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case (supra) that civil revision lies under Section 115 of the Code from the appellate and revisional order of the District Judge in the matters under Order 39 Rule 1 & 3 of the Code has got no binding authority us law made under Article 141 of the Constitution and it falls within both the exceptions of rule sub-silentio and being in per incuriam as mentioned earlier. Before the Supreme Court in that case as per that judgment there is not the least discussion or consideration of the various Civil Laws Amendment Acts amending Section 115 of the Code nor has there been made any reference nor the court appears to have been apprised of its earlier Supreme Court decisions reported in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad ( AIR 1980 SC 872 ) and Vishnu Awatar etc. v. Shiv Awtar & others ( AIR 1980 SC 1575 ). 6. v. Shiv Awtar & others ( AIR 1980 SC 1575 ). 6. According to the, amendment the revisional jurisdiction was again bifurcated and High Court's revisional jurisdiction confined to cases decided and arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of rupees one lac or more. In the context of these civil law amendment Acts this question had arisen in this court before the Full Bench reported in M/s Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal & others (AIR 1979 Alld 218). The Full Bench of this court considered the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Acts including the U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1978. Section 115 of the Code as amended by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1978 reads as under :- "115. The High Court in the cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above, including such, suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug. 1, 1978 and the District Court in any other case, including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted before such date, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court or District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears: (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to nave failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested ; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity ;/ the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. "Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section. "Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section. Provided further that the High Court or the District Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where :- (i) the order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings ; or (ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Explanation - In this section, the expression 'any case which has been decided' includes any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceedings." 7. The Full Bench of this court laid down law in paragraph 33 & 34 thereof i.e. of judgment in Jupiter Chit Fund case as under :- "33. With effect from 1st April, 1978, the revisional jurisdiction was again bifurcated. The High Court was confined to cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of Rupees 20,000/- or above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before 1st August, 1978. The jurisdiction of the District Court was in respect of any other case including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceeding instituted before that date. The legislature has continued to use the phrase "cases arising out of original suit". The interpretation placed upon this phrase by the Full Bench in Har Prasad Singh's case ( AIR 1973 All. 390 ) will apply. The revisional jurisdiction would hence not extend to cases arising out of the disposal of appeals or revisions by the District Court. The proviso is also in the same terms as the proviso added in 1973 namely, it uses the phrase "cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings." As already seen, it will not cover cases arising out of disposal of appeals or revisions. 34. The words "or other proceedings" in the phrase "cases arising 4 out of original suits or other proceedings" refer to proceedings of final nature. 34. The words "or other proceedings" in the phrase "cases arising 4 out of original suits or other proceedings" refer to proceedings of final nature. These words have been added in order to bring within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction orders passed in proceedings of an original nature, which are not of the nature of suits, like arbitration proceedings. This phrase cannot include decisions of appeals or revisions, because then the legislature will be deemed to have contradicted itself. The words "or other proceedings" have to be read ejusdem generis with the words "original suit." They will not include appeals or revision." 8. It may be pertinent to point out that an argument had been raised before the Full Bench as has been raised by Shri S.M. Nasir, the expression other proceedings or case used in the phrase "cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings" refers to proceedings not only of final nature, the expression "other proceedings" it was contended included the orders passed in appeal or revision. The Full Bench repelled that contention and observed the phrase "other proceedings arising of original suits or other proceedings" refer to the proceedings of final nature. These words were added in order to bring within the purview of the revisional jurisdiction orders passed in proceedings of an original nature which are not of the nature of suits like arbitration proceedings. "This phrase does not include decision of appeals or revisions, because then the legislature mid be deemed to have contradicted itself." 9. This question again cropped up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the two cases, namely, Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad ( AIR 1980 SC 892 ) and Vishnu Awatar etc. v. Shiv Awtar and others ( AIR 1980 SC 1575 ). After referring to various amendments made in the Code of Civil Procedure upto that time and after having made reference to the observations of the Full Bench in the case of M/s Jupiter Chit Fund (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh Dayal & others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 10 has very clearly laid down - "Schematically, we are satisfied that decisions of District Courts rendered in appeal or revision are beyond revision by the High Court, if the suit is less than Rs. 20,000)-." 10. 20,000)-." 10. Here it may be pointed out that by Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1991 pecuniary jurisdiction and pecuniary limit has been changed from Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000/- and the position, therefore, comes out that no revision is entertain able by this court under Section 115 of the Code from orders passed by the subordinate court where the value of the suit is less than Rs. 1,00,000/-, the revisions are also not maintainable from the order passed by the subordinate court i.e. District Judge or Additional District Judge in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction Where the value of the claim in the suit is less than Rs. 1,00,000/-. 11. After decision reported in Qamaruddin v. Rasul Baksh and others (supra) the matter was referred before the Full Bench of this court for consideration of this question in the case of Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge Hapur, Ghaziabad & others reported in (1991 LCD 149). After considering the catena of cases including Qamaruddin's case the Full Bench of this Court has observed while dealing with Qamaruddin's case :- "In such a situation it cannot be held that the case of Qamaruddin (supra) lays down the law accurately. Further it also cannot be held that the decision of Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case overruled the decision of a Full Bench of this Court which as noticed already, has been specifically affirmed in two decisions of the Supreme Court. It would not be reasonable to say that even though Qamaruddin's case does not notice U.P. Amendment Act & the earlier decision of Supreme Court approving the Full Bench, it must be deemed to have dissented or departed from earlier decisions or that it was overruled the Full Bench decision of this Court. It goes without saying that even that decision of the Supreme Court must be understood reasonably. It would not be reasonable to say that the Supreme Court would depart or dissent from its earlier decisions without referring to them or without referring to the relevant provisions of law." 12. For the above reasons it must be held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case to the extent it leads to that revision against the appellate or revisional order passed by the District Court is maintainable under Section 115 of the Code as amended by U.P. Act no. For the above reasons it must be held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case to the extent it leads to that revision against the appellate or revisional order passed by the District Court is maintainable under Section 115 of the Code as amended by U.P. Act no. 31 of 78, to the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not purport to declare law precisely or overrule the decision of Full Bench of this court in M/s Jupiter Chit Fund's case (supra) particularly when it has specifically been approved by the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. 13. In view of this Full Bench decision the position of law remains as it has been and it is this that no revision is entertain able from an order passed by the District Judge or Additional District Judge in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The order impugned in the present civil revision is the order passed by the Additional District Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Order 43 of the Code from the judgment of trial court under Order 39 of the Code and so no revision does lie under Section 115 of the Code, to the court. 14. Thus, considering the matter I find that there is no force in this revision. The revision is dismissed as not maintainable.