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1992 DIGILAW 94 (ORI)

SRIMATI CHATI DEI v. HEMANTA KUMAR SAHU

1992-03-19

B.K.BEHERA

body1992
JUDGMENT : B.K. Behera, J. - Loved by the opposite party and made to conceive for his sexual lust and then subjected by him to a forced abortion on the false pretext that she would be cured of the bysteric fits she was suffering from by the application of tablets and the forlorn by him, having fixed his eyes on another lady but ultimately married to the opposite party on February 1, 1979, the Shripanchami Day, according to law and customs governing the parties and deserted about a fortnight thereafter and left alone in the house of her husband who, with his father, left the house with the belongings and stayed elsewhere for which the Petitioner, unable to maintain herself, took shelter in the house of her parents, the Petitioner has now come to this Court for relief against the judicial order passed by the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Angul, dismissing her claim for maintenance u/s 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') as the married and deserted wife having no means to maintain herself on the ground of lack of legal and technical proof of marriage and the ceremonies thereto required by Hindu Law and in particular, for failure to prove the rites and ceremonies including Saptapathi as required by the proviso (2) to Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act. While Mr. B.B. Ratha, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has urged that strict proof of the marriage, which had been established on the evidence, was not to be, but had been insisted upon in a summary proceeding of this nature, Mr. P.K. Misra, the learned Counsel for the opposite party, has submitted that in the absence of proof of marriage with the ceremonies thereto and desertion the learned Magistrate was not legally wrong in dismissing the claim. 2. Sitting as I do in a Court of revision, normally the jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu and Ors. 47 (1979) C.L.T 624 (S.C.), referring to and relying on the principles laid down in two earlier decisions in the case of Amar Chand Agarwalla Vs. Shanti Bose and Another, etc., and Akalu Ahir and Ors. v. Kamdeo Ram 1973 S.C.D. 639, but having heard the learned Counsel for both the sides and perused the evidence, oral and documentary, on which reliance had been placed by the parties to the proceeding, I find, for the reasons to follow, that it would be just, legal, reasonable and proper to interfere with the impugned order based on technicalities and founded on inconsequential discrepancies in the testimony of the Petitioner and her witnesses including the priest, the barber and the drummer, besides the relations, as according to me, to maintain the order in the face of the clear and consistent evidence from the side of the Petitioner regarding her marriage to and desertion and neglect by the opposite party would amount to failure of justice. 3. Examining herself as P.W. 7, the Petitioner had testified vividly as to how the opposite party, having impregnated her and subjected her to a forced abortion by the application of tablets, left her and diverted his attention towards another lady with a proposal to marry her and as to how she brought this matter to the notice at the respectable persons of the locality, by presenting an application (Ext. 1), before whom the opposite party refused to marry her and the persons intervened and as to how she reported the matter at the Jarpada Police Station for which the opposite party and his father were called to the police station where they agreed that the opposite party would marry her. She had also deposed about the marriage which took place at about 8 p.m. on the Shripanchami Day with the performance of the ceremonies to the marriage including Saptapadi and about her being taken to the house of the opposite party where the 'Chauthi' ceremony was performed. She had also deposed about the marriage which took place at about 8 p.m. on the Shripanchami Day with the performance of the ceremonies to the marriage including Saptapadi and about her being taken to the house of the opposite party where the 'Chauthi' ceremony was performed. According to this lady, after she and the opposite party pulled on well for about 15 days, her parents-in-law started beating her and then the opposite party and his father took away the belongings of the house in carts, despite the objection of the Petitioner and the was left alone in one room, the other rooms having been locked and instead of maintaining her, the opposite party instituted a criminal case alleging theft by her father and others. The opposite party, according to the Petitioner, was a man of means having got about 5 acres of lands and in addition, he had been selling spices in different markets and earning about Rs. 400 to 500 per month, out he deserted and refused to maintain her. She was subjected to lengthy and searching cross-examination by being put questions even as to where and how many times the opposite party had sexual intercourse with her prior to her marriage, but nothing substantial had been brought out to discredit her testimony. Ext. 1 was the application made by her to the President and members of the Village Committee and Ext. 2 was the decision taken by the members of the Committee that the Petitioner's case of pregnancy and abortion was correct. Ext. 3 was the undertaking given by the father of the opposite party agreeing that his son (opposite party) would marry the Petitioner on or before 23-1-1979 and the evidence would show that as this undertaking was not given effect to and another proposal of marriage of the opposite party with another lady was pushed through, the Petitioner went and lodged a report at the police station at Jarpada on the basis of which a station diary entry (Ext. 4) was made. 4. The Petitioner's case that she is the legally married wife of the opposite party had been supported by P.W. 2, the priest, who had testified about the ceremonies to the marriage including Saptapadi and he had not only performed the marriage, but also the Chauthi ceremony. 4) was made. 4. The Petitioner's case that she is the legally married wife of the opposite party had been supported by P.W. 2, the priest, who had testified about the ceremonies to the marriage including Saptapadi and he had not only performed the marriage, but also the Chauthi ceremony. P.W. 3 was the barber and P.W. 1 was the drummer at the marriage who had also deposed about the ceremonies to the marriage. Nothing had been brought out as to how and why these witnesses should be hands-in-glove with the Petitioner and support a false cause against the opposite party. P.W. 4, the Secretary of the Village Committee, had proved Exts. 1 to 3 and had testified about the complaint of the Petitioner, the decision of the Committee and the undertaking by the father of the opposite party to which reference has already been made. He had also witnessed the marriage and had deposed about the ceremonies of Homa, Hastaganthi and had also testified that the bride and the bride-groom had moved round the alter. P.Ws. 5 and 6 had testified about the undertaking given by the father of the opposite party that his son would marry the Petitioner. P.W. 6 had also spoken about the marriage ceremony. P.W. 8 was the scribe of Ext. 1 and had accompanied the Petitioner to the police station at Jarpada when she made the report. He had also testified about the marriage of the Petitioner with the opposite party. P.W. 9 had deposed about the meeting of the village committee styled by this witness as Panchayat where the opposite party had been asked to marry the Petitioner having earlier fallen in love with her. P.W. 10 had proved the station diary entry (Ext. 4) recorded on the basis of the report of the Petitioner at the Jarpada Police Station. 5. The opposite party had examined himself as D.W. 2 and according to him, he could not have married the Petitioner belonging as they did to the same Gotra and he had no relationship with her and he had asserted that he was not the author of her pregnancy. Reliance had been placed by the opposite party on the evidence of D.W. 1, a co-villager of his, that the opposite party had not married the Petitioner. 6. Reliance had been placed by the opposite party on the evidence of D.W. 1, a co-villager of his, that the opposite party had not married the Petitioner. 6. The learned Counsel for both the sides have taken me through the relevant portions of the evidence and the findings recorded by the learned Magistrate and there could be no doubt that the evidence of the Petitioner and her witnesses. Besides being consistent and reliable, far outweighed the evidence from the side of the opposite party denying the marriage. The learned Magistrate, as rightly submitted on behalf of the Petitioner, did not give due weight to the clinching evidence from the side of the Petitioner and dismissed her case on the ground that the marriage had not been solemnised with proper ceremonies and due form which had to be but had not been established by the Petitioner by observing that there must be strict proof of marriage before maintenance could be granted u/s 125 of the Code, particularly when she alleges that she lived only for a week with the opposite party. Cataloguing some immaterial discrepancies and unnecessary details as to the marriage ceremony, as deposed to by the Petitioner and her witnesses, the learned Magistrate observed in paragraph 14 of the order thus: Everyone says that there was Homo. But where was the Homo, and where it was put and by whom nobody says. Regarding Saptapadi each witness is giving a different version. All the witnesses are saying the parrots that there was Homo, Hata Ganthi and Saptapadi. They were tutored to say like this. The Petitioner in her petition says that their marriage took place according to law and custom. As per Section 7 of Hindu Marriage Act, the marriage must be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto. No evidence is produced by the Petitioner regarding the customary rites. Proviso (2) of Section 7 of Hindu Marriage Act speaks of ceremonies of Hindu marriage. The rites and ceremonies include the Saptapadi i.e., taking seven steps by the bridegroom and bride jointly before the sacred fire and the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken. But in this case all the witnesses spoke about the parties moving round the Badi. He once had stated that the parties took seven steps before sacred fire. The evidence of P.Ws. But in this case all the witnesses spoke about the parties moving round the Badi. He once had stated that the parties took seven steps before sacred fire. The evidence of P.Ws. are discrepant in this regard. Ultimately the petition was dismissed with the following observation: In view of my finding that the Petitioner is not the legally married wife of opposite party it is not necessary for me to find out if the Petitioner is enable to maintain herself and if opposite party refused and neglected the Petitioner to maintain her and if the opposite party got sufficient means to maintain the Petitioner. The findings recorded by the learned Magistrate and the requirements asked for to establish the marriage in accordance with the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act are in flagrant violation of the provisions of Section 125 of the Code and the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court and this Court from time to time to the effect that in summary proceedings of this nature, the ceremonies required by law for a marriage are not strictly to be established and insisted upon as this section provides a swift and cheap remedy against any person who, despite means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife and the primary object of this section is to prevent destitution, starvation and vagrancy. Section 125 of the Code prescribes a simple procedure and the findings are not final and the parties can agitate their rights in a Civil Court. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhupinder Singh Vs. Daljit Kaur, this is a provision to protect the weaker of the two parties, namely, the neglected wife. 7. I have had the benefit of reading two recent decisions of this Court in the cases of Basanta Kumari Mohanty Vs. Sarat Kumar Mohanty, and Saudamini Dei Vs. Bhagirathi Raj wherein my learned brother. R.C. Patnaik. J., has laid down, in clear and lucid terms, referring to and relying on the principles laid down in a number of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, that in the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code, Section 125 provides a swift and summary remedy for providing maintenance to neglected wives, parents and children by compelling the man to perform his moral obligation and in such a summary proceeding, it is not necessary to go into the intricacies of law. Where the man and the woman lived together as husband and wife and were treated as such by the community and the man treated the woman as his wife, for the limited purpose of Section 125, it may be inferred that there was marriage. According to the learned Judge an order u/s 125 can be passed if a person, having sufficient means, neglects or refuses to maintain his wife child, parents etc. and the expression 'means' occurring in Section 125 does not signify only visible means, such as, real property or definite employment and if a man is healthy and able-bodied, he must be held to be possessed of means to support his wife, child etc. The husband may be insolvent or a professional beggar or a minor or a monk, but he must support his wife so long as he is able-bodied, and can eke out his livelihood. 8. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Bhagwan Dutt Vs. Smt. Kamla Devi and Another Section 125 provides a machinery for summary enforcement of the moral obligation of a man towards his wife and children so that they may not, out of sheer destitution become a hazard to the well-being of an orderly society. Dealing with a case of maintenance provided in Section 488 of the Code (corresponding to Section 125 of the present Code), their Lordships held: Sections 488, 489 and 490 constitute one family. They have been grouped together in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of 1898 under the caption of the maintenance of wives and children. This Chapter, in the words of Sir Jones Fitz Stephen, provides a mode of preventing vagrancy, or at least of preventing its consequences. These provisions are intended to fulfil a special purpose. Their object is to compel a man to perform the moral obligations which he owes to society in respect of his wife and children. By providing a simple, speedy but limited relief they seek to ensure that the neglected wife and children are not left beggared and destituted on the scrap-heap of society and thereby driven to a life, of vagrancy; immorality and crime for their subsistence. Thus, Section 488 is not intended to provide for a full and final determination of the status and personal rights of the parties. Thus, Section 488 is not intended to provide for a full and final determination of the status and personal rights of the parties. The jurisdiction conferred by the section on the Magistrate is more in the nature of a prevention, rather than a remedial jurisdiction; it is certainly not punitive. As pointed out in Thompson's case NWP 205 the scope of the Chapter XXXVI is limited and the Magistrate cannot, except as thereunder provided, usurp the jurisdiction in matrimonial disputes possessed by the Civil Courts. Sub-section (2) of Section 489 expressly makes orders passed under Chapter XXXVI of the Code subject to any final adjudication that may be made by a Civil Court between the parties regarding their status and civil rights. It has been held by this Court, in the case of K.J.B. David v. Nilamoni Devi 19 (953) C.L.T. 34, thus: One may reasonably infer that for proof of marriage in a proceeding u/s 488, Code of Criminal Procedure the standard of proof need not be so high as required either in a proceeding under the Indian Divorce Act or in prosecution u/s 494, 495, 497 or 498 of the Indian Penal Code.... My learned brother R.C. Patnaik, J., in the case of Saudamini Dei Vs. Bhagirathi Raj observed and held: ...Taking into consideration the evidence of the witnesses, the admission of the opposite party in Ext. 2 and the circumstances, the learned Magistrate held that the Petitioner was the wife of the opposite party. The learned Sessions Judge upset the decision of the Magistrate testing the evidence analytically against the provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned Sessions Judge found that the evidence did not satisfy the requirements of marriage as contained in Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 125 provides a swift and summary remedy for providing maintenance to neglected wives, parents and children by compelling the man to perform his moral obligation. In such a summary proceeding, it is not necessary to go into intricacies of law. The facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the man and the woman lives together as husband and wife and were treated as such by the community and the man treated the woman as his wife. The Panchayati Patra is his unequivocal declaration. In such a summary proceeding, it is not necessary to go into intricacies of law. The facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the man and the woman lives together as husband and wife and were treated as such by the community and the man treated the woman as his wife. The Panchayati Patra is his unequivocal declaration. For the limited purpose of Section 125, it may be inferred that there was marriage. I am emboldened to so hold on the authorities cited above and other authorities, e.g. Kunhiraman Nair v. Annokutty 1972 K.L.R. 747. In the former case, it has been held: Under this section it is sufficient if the wife proves that she has been treated as wife by the person from whom maintenance is claimed. It is not material how the marriage was solemnised. In the latter case, it has been observed: The nature of evidence in a proceeding u/s 488, Code of Criminal Procedure regarding proof of marriage need not be so strong or conclusive as in the case u/s 494, Indian Penal Code. It has also been said that in maintenance proceedings the Magistrate is not expected to go into complicated questions relating to validity of the marriage. Living as husband and wife and being treated by the public as such, is quite sufficient for the award of maintenance." I would respectfully adopt the views recorded by R.C. Patnaik, J. extracted above. Considering the evidence adduced by both the sides already referred to in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court in the aforesaid cases, I would hold, in disagreement with the learned Magistrate, that the Petitioner had proved that the opposite party married her, on the Shripanchami day and that after staying together for about a fortnight,deserted the Petitioner who had no means to maintain herself and failed to maintain her. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bai Tahira Vs. Ali Hussain Fidaalli Chothia and Another Section 125 of the Code requires, as a sine qua non for its application neglect by husband and in the instant case, this element has clearly been established. The Petitioner is therefore, entitled to maintenance u/s 125 of the Code. 9. The opposite party is and an able-bodied young man having about five acres of land and has an income of about Rs. The Petitioner is therefore, entitled to maintenance u/s 125 of the Code. 9. The opposite party is and an able-bodied young man having about five acres of land and has an income of about Rs. 400 to 500 per month by having business as testified by the Petitioner (P.W. 7) whose evidence found support in that of P.Ws. 4 and 6 and has a moral and legal obligation to maintain the Petitioner. The Petitioner's claim of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month would, however, appear to be excessive regard being had to the status of the parties and the requirements of the Petitioner to maintain herself. The Petitioner and the opposite party are residents of villages and they are not city or town dwellers. As has been observed by this Court in Basanta Kumari's cases (supra), the object of the provisions being to prevent vagrancy and destitution, it has to be found out as to what is required by the wife to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious, but is modestly consistent with the status of the family. The needs and requirements of the wife for a moderate living, the earnings of the husband, his capacity to earn and his commitments are relevant factors while determining the quantum of maintenance. The opposite party has stated in his evidence that one can manage with 30 Manas of paddy and Rs. 60/- per months Considering the status of the parties, the earnings of the opposite party and his capacity to earn and the requirements of the Petitioner to have a modest living, I feel that a grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month with effect from the date of presentation of the application. i.e. March 28, 1979, would be reasonable and equitable. 10. In the result, I would allow the application in revision, set aside the impugned order and direct payment of maintenance by the opposite party to the Petitioner at the rate of Rs. 75/- (seventy-five) per month with effect from March 28, 1979. Final Result : Allowed