This revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.5.91 passed by the District Judge, Goalpara in Title Appeal No. 27 of 1988 dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 23.8.88 passed by the Munsiff No. 1, Goalpara, in Title Suit No. 9 of 1986 decreeing the suit. 2. The first to third opposite party are the plaintiffs in the suit. The suit premises originally belonged to Baneswar Nath, the husband of the first opposite party and father of the second and third opposite party. The petitioner was a tenant under Baneswar Nath. Baneswar Nath died on 31.7.85 leaving behind the first to third opposite party as his heirs. After the death of the original landlord - Baneswar Nath, the petitioner attorned first to third opposite party as his landlord. The opposite party, thereafter, instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsiff for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was a defaulter and the suit premises was required by them for their own use. 3. The petitioner as defendant entered appearance and filed written statement. In the written statement, he denied the averments made in the plaint that the rent was payable in the first week of every succeeding-month. He also denied that the tenancy was according to English calendar month. His contention was that the tenancy was according to Bengali calendar month, and the rent was to be paid by him whenever the plaintiffs would come for collection. On the pleadings, issues were framed. After recording the evidence of the witnesses for the parties, Munsiff decreed the suit holding that the petitioner was a defaulter inasmuch as he failed to pay the rent due. The Munsiff also held that the suit premises was required by the plaintiffs-opposite party for starting their business. 4. Against the judgment and decree passed by the Munsiff, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge. The appellate Court also by its judgment dated 23.5.91, dismissed the appeal affirming the judgment and decree of the Munsiff. The first appellate Court also held that the petitioner was a defaulter and the suit premises was required by the opposite party for their own use. Hence the present petition. 5. The appellate Court also by its judgment dated 23.5.91, dismissed the appeal affirming the judgment and decree of the Munsiff. The first appellate Court also held that the petitioner was a defaulter and the suit premises was required by the opposite party for their own use. Hence the present petition. 5. The contention of the petitioner, inter alia, was that the petitioner paid rent to late Baneswar Nath, up to May 1985 and thereafter deposited rent in Court from the month of June 1985. The petitioner produced receipts as well as books of accounts in evidence 6f payment of rent. However, the Court held that there was no evidence to show the payment of rent upto May 1985. The petitioner has further submitted that the books of accounts Exhibit-A was not considered, and therefore, the finding arrived at is perverse. As regards bonafide requirement, the petitioner has stated that the opposite party failed to adduce any evidence. The petitioner specifically stated that the house was in good condition and is not required by the opposite party for their own use after repairing and rebuilding the same, as claimed. However the Court below affirmed the judgment of the Munsiff by dismissing the appeal. 6. I have heard both sides. Mr. NM Lahiri learned counsel for the petiti­oner has submitted that in the suit, the defendant challenged the averments regarding the default in payment of rent. According to Mr. Lahiri, the mode of payment was not as claimed by the opposite party. There was no such arrangement for payment of rent in the first week of every month as alleged. The petitioner's case is that the rent was payable only when the plaintiff would come for collection of rent. Besides, it was also specifically denied in the pleadings as well as in the evidence that the tenancy was according to English calendar march. The defendant claimed that the tenancy was according to the Bengali calendar month. The appellate Court without considering the points raised by the petitioner decreed the suit by dismissing the appeal. Mr. Lahiri has further submitted that before granting decree for ejectment, the Court must first determine the due date of payment of rent. The Court has no jurisdiction to grant a decree without first determining the due date. Mr. The appellate Court without considering the points raised by the petitioner decreed the suit by dismissing the appeal. Mr. Lahiri has further submitted that before granting decree for ejectment, the Court must first determine the due date of payment of rent. The Court has no jurisdiction to grant a decree without first determining the due date. Mr. Lahiri has drawn my attention to the relevant portion of the appellate judgment and on going through the judgment, I do not find any discussion of the witnesses in regard to the points urged by the petitioner. 7. Regarding the bonafide requirement also the Court without discussing any evidence simply affirmed the judgment of the trial Court by holding that the suit premises was required by the plaintiff for their own use. The learned counsel has further submitted that the appellate judgment cannot be said to be an appellate judgment as contemplated under the law. He has also drawn my attention to the provision of Order 41 Rule 31 of Code of Civil Procedure. According to him, there should be substantial compliance of the said Rule. 8. Mr. SN Sarma, learned counsel for the opposite party has supported the judgments. He has straneously argued that there had been substantial compliance of the provision of Rule 31 of Order 41, and there was nothing wrong in the decisions of the Courts below in the manner it was done. He has-further submitted that the first appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial Court holding that the defendant failed to pay rent lawfully due by him in respect of the suit. Therefore, according to Mr. Sarma, the appellate judgment needs no interference. 9. On the rival contentions of the parties, it is to be seen whether the judgment of the appellate Court can be sustained in law. It is necessary for the appellate Court to formulate the point for determination and give decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. While giving a decision, it is the duty of the appellate Court to discuss the evidence of the witness to come to a just finding. It is necessary for the appellate Court to formulate the point for determination and give decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. While giving a decision, it is the duty of the appellate Court to discuss the evidence of the witness to come to a just finding. The object of requiring an appellate Court to record in its judgment those particulars is two fold, namely (a) to afford the parties an opportunity of knowing and understanding the grounds of the decision with a view to enable them to exercise, if they see fit and are so advised, the right to move the higher Court, and (b) to enable the High Court in second appeal/revision to see whether the lower appellate Court has properly appreciated the case and has decided it after applying its mind to it and cons­idering the evidence on record. The judgment of the appellate Court should be self contained. Even when affirming a decision of the Court below, the appellate Court which is the final Court of facts must independently weigh the evidence and consider the relevant points which arises for adjudication. The object of the Rule is to clear up the pleadings, and focus the attention of the Court and of the parties on the specific and rival contentions of the parties. 10. This Court on various occasions held that there must be substantial compliance of Rule 31 of Order 41. After going through the judgment, I find that the District Judge without discussing the evidence on record and without giving a definite finding as to when the rent become due and without deter­mining the mode of payment of rent, came to the conclusion that the defen­dant failed to pay rent on due date and dismissed the appeal and decreed the suit. Similarly, the appellate Court without discussing any evidence on record, held that the suit premises was required by the plaintiffs for their own use. 11. In view of the above, I find that there is sufficient force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, and, therefore, in my opinion, the appeal is required to be remanded to the Court of District Judge, Goalpara, for giving fresh decision after considering all the evidence on record and in accordance with the provisions of law. In view of the above, I find that there is sufficient force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, and, therefore, in my opinion, the appeal is required to be remanded to the Court of District Judge, Goalpara, for giving fresh decision after considering all the evidence on record and in accordance with the provisions of law. In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the District Judge for disposing the case afresh. No order as to costs. The parties to appear before the District Judge. Goalpara on 15th June, 1992 for taking a date for hearing of the appeal. Send down the case records immediately.