Judgment : The accused in S.C.No.1 of 1987 on the file of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Pondicherry, is the petitioner. He was charged for offences punishable under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and also under Sec.306, I.P.C. The Inspector of Police, Grand Bazaar Circle, Pondicherry filed the charge sheet against the petitioner alleging that between January, 1985 and 16thJanuary, 1986 at Pondicherry the accused who having married Ilavarasi at Chidambaram on 14.2.1977 demanded from the parents c f the said Ilavarasi a dowry of Rs.25,000 in cash or one third property of her parents by ill-treating the said Ilavarasi and compelling her to go to her parents house and fetch the said dowry from them and that between 20.30 hours on 16.1.1986 and 4 30 hours on 17.1.1986 in the first floor of the house bearing Door No.33, Morrisan Street, Pondicherry, the said Ilavarasi committed suicide by consuming Organe Halogeneated Insecticide/pesticide type endrine D.D.T. etc., and the petitioner abetted the commission of suicide by ill-treating the said Ilavarasi and compelling her to go to her parents house and obtain a dowry of Rs.25,000 in cash from them for over a period of one year prior to 16.1.1986 and thereby committed the offences aforementioned. 2. The prosecution has examined twenty witnesses on their side and marked Exs.P-1 to P-29 and the accused marked Exs.D-1 to D-3. The trial court found the accused guilty under Sec.306, I.P.C. and under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, convicted him under Sec.306, I.P.C, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the trial court convicted and sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000 in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The trial court directed the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently excepting the default sentences. The petitioner filed an appeal before the learned First Additional Sessions Judge at Pondicherry in C.A.No.64 of 1987 and the lower appellate court confirmed the convictions under both the offences; but reduced the period of sentence under Sec.306, I.P.C. to a period of three years and retained the fine amount.‘The lower appellate court confirmed both the conviction and sentence under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Subject to the above reduction in sentence, the appeal was dismissed. The petitioner has challenged the legality of the judgment of the courts below in this revision. 3. The case of the prosecution is that the marriage between the accused and the deceased Illavarasi was celebrated on 14.2.1977 and that the marriage subsisted till Ilavarasi breathed her last by committing suicide between 20.30 hours on 16.1.1986 and 04.30 hours on 17.1.1986 in the first floor of ths house bearing Door No.33, Morrisan Street, Pondicherry. There are three children born after the wedlock. The accused and the deceased were residing at the abovesaid premises. The accused was working as a Sarishtadar in Pondicherry Court. The deceased was working as a Telephone Operator in Jipmer Hospital at Pondicherry. P.Ws.1 and 3 are father and mother respectively of the deceased. P.Ws.4 and 6 are the sister and brother respectively of the deceased. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused used to torture the deceased claiming dowry for the past two years and that the deceased reported this matter to her father P.W.1. P.Ws.1,3,4and 6 have spoken about the demand of dowry by the accused. P.W.5 is the former M.L.A. of Pondicherry and his evidence is that he had mediated the dispute between them and an assurance given by P.W.5 and the accused, P.W.1 sent the deceased along with the accused. There is evidence that there were quarrels between the accused and the deceased on account of demand of dowry by the accused. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused used to ill-treat the deceased and demand dowry or l/3rd share in the property or in the alternative to give in marriage P. W.4 Inbarasi the sister of the deceased as his second wife as spoken to by P.W.1 and also P.Ws.3,4 and 6. The evidence of P.W.6 is that the deceased came back to his house and told her father that the deceased had been demanding dowry of Rs.25,000and l/3rd share in the property and the same was not possible, the accused asked her to commit suicide. According to prosecution, P.Ws.1 and 6 have spoken about the ill-treatment by the accused to the extent of forcing her to commit suicide if she was not able, to fulfil the demand of dowry. Both the courts below have found the accused guilty under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. According to prosecution, P.Ws.1 and 6 have spoken about the ill-treatment by the accused to the extent of forcing her to commit suicide if she was not able, to fulfil the demand of dowry. Both the courts below have found the accused guilty under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 4. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Central Act 28 of 1961) was enacted by t he Parliament with an object to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry and to punish it as a social offence. Sec.2 of the Act gives the definition of dowry as follows: "In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-- (a) by one party to a mar image to the other pa rty to the marriage; or (b) by the parents or either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person at or before or after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shanat) applies. Explanation II: The expession ‘valuable security’ as the same meaning as in Sec.30 of the I.P.C. (45 of 1860)." Central Act 43 of 1986 received the assent of the President of India on 8th September, 1986 and it came into force after that date. Sec.2 as per the amended Act runs as follows: "2. Definition of ‘dowry’: In this Act, ‘Dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given cither directly or indirectly-- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. Explanation II: The expression "Valuable Security" has the same meaning as in Sec.30 of the I.P.C. (45 of I860)." Sec.3 as per the amended Act runs as follows: "Penalty for giving or taking dowry: (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and wich fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more; Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. (2) Nothing in sub-sec.(1) shall apply to, or in relation to,--. (a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act: Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given." As extracted above, Sec.3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 deals with penalty for giving or taking dowry. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the charge against the petitioner is that between January, 1985 and 16th January, 1986 at Pondicherry, the accused who had married Illavarasi at Chidambaram on 14.2.1977 demanded from the parents of the said Ilavarasi, a dowry of Rs.25,000 in cash or l/3rd property of her parents by ill-treating her and compelling her to go to her parents house and fetch dowry amount from them.-The charges as framed by the court below read as follows: "Between January, 1985 and 16th day January, 1986 at Pondicherry you being the lawfully wedded husband of one Ilavarasi, d/o. Ramamur-thy of Kathirimedu, South Arcot District, Tamil Nadu, after marryingher on 14.12.1977 at Chidambaram, demanded from Ramamurthy, father of the said Ilavarasi and also forced her to bring a sum of Rs.25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) as dowry and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and within the cognizance of the Court of Session......Between 20.30 hours on 16th January, 1986 and 04.30 hours on 17th January, 986 in the first floor of the house situated in No.3, Morisan Street, Pondicherry Ilavarasi committed suicide by consuming pesticide of the type endrine, D.D.T. etc. and that you being the lawfully wedded husband of her, abetted its commission by compelling her to bring Rs.25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand only) as dowry from her father and also ill-treating her over a period of one year from 16th.January,1986and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec.306 of the I.P.C. and within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions." To bring home the guilt under Sec.4 of 1961, Dowry Prohibition Act, the prosecul ion has to establish, (1) any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or’ indirectly, (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage, or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case ofj persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. In Sec.2 of the Act, the word.s ‘or at any time after the marriage’ were inserved by the Amending Act 43 of 1986. In Sec.2 of the Act, the word.s ‘or at any time after the marriage’ were inserved by the Amending Act 43 of 1986. In Sec.2 of the Act, the words ‘in connection with the marriage of the said parties but does not include’ were inserted by the Amending Act 63 of 1984 instead of ‘as consideration for the marriage of the said parties’ which came into force on 2.10.1985. Therefore, in the original Sec.2 of the Act 1961 the demand dowry should be at or before or after the marriage in question and not at any time after the marriage. The marriage had taken place on 14.2.1977. Therefore, the case of the prosecution that the accused demanded dowry between January, 1985 and 16th January, 1986 at Pondicherry would not attract the provisions of Scc.2 of the Act since, even according to the case of the prosecution, the demand was at or before or after the marriage. The Amending Act 43 of 1986 to the main Act, 1961 got the assent of President of India on 8th September, 1986 longafter the date of the marriage i.e 14.2.1977. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the allegation that the accused demanded dowry between January, 1985 and 16th January, 1986 even assuming without admitting, would not come within the purview of Sec.2 of the Act and therefore, the charge itself is illegal and the conviction and sentence based on that charge, cannot be sustained. This aspect of the case, even though had been raised before the lower appellate court, has not been considered properly in the light of the provisions of the Act. 6. Under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 proviso to Sec.4 of the Act reads that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under this section except with the previous sanction of the State Government or of such officer as the State Government may, by General or special order, specify in this behalf and the pre-requisite sanction for prosecution has been deleted by the amending Act LX11I of 1984 which came into force with effect from 2.10.1985. The first charge is that the accused demanded dowry between January, 1985 and 16th day of January, 1986 at Pondicherry i.e., according to the prosecution, the demand was from January, 1985 upto 16.1.1986. The Act LXIII of 1984 came into force on 2.10.1985. The first charge is that the accused demanded dowry between January, 1985 and 16th day of January, 1986 at Pondicherry i.e., according to the prosecution, the demand was from January, 1985 upto 16.1.1986. The Act LXIII of 1984 came into force on 2.10.1985. That means, sanction is required for prosecution of an offence that had taken place prior to 2.10.1985. In this case, the demand had commenced even from January, 1985 and it continued till 16.1.1986. Admittedly, there is no sanction obtained for prosecution so far as the charge No.1 is concerned. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that the Criminal case was initiated only after the occurrence of suicide i.e., after 17.1.1986 and according to him, no sanction is required for prosecution on that date. So far as the charge No. 1 is concerned, 1 am of the view that sanction is necessary since the demand cannot be split up and the prosecution cannot be taken to mean for an offence after 2.10.1985. There is no sanction at all in this case so far as charge No.1 is concerned and the proviso to Sec.4 of the Original Act has now been deleted and the Amending Act 63 of 1984 has no retrospective effect and the penal provisions of a statute are not given retrospective effect also. Therefore, the conviction and sentence under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is unsustainable. Therefore, I set aside the conviction and sentence with regard to Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as the evidence of the prosecution witnesses 1,3,4,5,6 and 7 and Ex.P-1 to 3,6, 7 and 11 are not convincing. 7. Coming to the charge under Sec.306,I.P.C. the evidence of prosecution witnesses 1 to 6 and also Exs.P-1 to P-3, P-6, P-7 and P-11 are important. P.W.1 is the father and P.W.3 is the mother respectively of the deceased Ilavarasi. P.W.4 Inbarasi and P.W.6 Ilangovan are the sister and brother respectively of the deceased Ilavarasi. The accused belongs to Otrampalayam village and the parents of Ilavarasi belong to Kaihirimedu village. The marriage between the accused and the deceased was celebrated in 1977 at Chidambaram. P.W.1 is the father and P.W.3 is the mother respectively of the deceased Ilavarasi. P.W.4 Inbarasi and P.W.6 Ilangovan are the sister and brother respectively of the deceased Ilavarasi. The accused belongs to Otrampalayam village and the parents of Ilavarasi belong to Kaihirimedu village. The marriage between the accused and the deceased was celebrated in 1977 at Chidambaram. The second charge against the accused is under Sec.306,I.P.C. Sec.306,I.P.C. reads as follows: "If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and /shall also be liable to fine." Abetment is defined in Sec.107,I.P.C. as follows: "107. A person abets the doing of a thing, Firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly, engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly, intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission the doing of that thing. Explanation 1: A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2: Whoever: either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that Act, and thereby facilitates the commission there of, is said to aid the doing of that act." The three ingredients of abetment are: (a) instigation to commit an offence; (b) engaging in conspiracy to commit an offence and (c) Aiding commission of offence. Abetment thus necessarily means some active suggestion or support to the commission of the offence. Abetment is by itself made substantive offence and is made punishable as such whether the offence abetted is committed or not, the object being, to deter and prevent the commission of offence which is often the result and consequence of abetment. In other to constitute the offence of abetment there must be mens rea, i.e., guilty intention or knowledge. Abetment is by itself made substantive offence and is made punishable as such whether the offence abetted is committed or not, the object being, to deter and prevent the commission of offence which is often the result and consequence of abetment. In other to constitute the offence of abetment there must be mens rea, i.e., guilty intention or knowledge. In order to convict a person of abetting the commission of a crime, it is not only necessary to prove that he has taken part in those steps of the transaction which are innocent, but in some way or other it is absolutely necessary to connect him with those steps of the transaction which are criminal. The word instigate literally means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite, or encourage to do an act. We have to find out whether the accused has abetted the offence, namely, the deceased to commit suicide. P.Ws.1, 3, 4 and 5 have deposed that the accused had demanded a sum of Rs.25,000 prior to the date of occurrence. The marriage had taken place in the year 1977. The alleged demand of Rs.25,000 is between January, 1985 and 16th January, 1986 i.e. nearly eight years after the marriage. The accused is employed as Sarishiadar in Pondicherry Court and the deceased was employed as a Telephone operator in Jipmer Hospital. It is in evidence that the father of the deceased was having property worth about Rs.6,000 only. There is no evidence in the handwriting of the accused that he demanded a sum of Rs.25,000 from the deceased by way of dowry. The accused himself gave a police complaint at the first instance soon after the occurrence under Ex.P-28 and the Station House Officer, Odian Salai Police Station registered a case: in Crl.No.11 of 1986 under Sec. 174, Crl.I.P.C. and subsequently, P.W.1, father of the deceased gave a report to the police stating that thedeceased died in suspicious circumstances and it appears that he had sent copies of report to higher authorities. On receipt of Ex.P-28 given by the accused, inquest was held and post mortem was conducted. On receipt of Ex.P-28 given by the accused, inquest was held and post mortem was conducted. P. W.20 Inspector of Police, took up further investigation and on receipt of post mortem certificate, he suspected some foul play in the death of Ilavarasi and since there was abrasion over the body of Ilavarasi at the time of inquest, suspicion was reinforced and further investigation revealed that the accused had abetted Ilavarasi to commit suicide. The charge sheet was filed after nearly eight months from the date of occurrence. P.W.20, the investigating officer would say that the investigation was delayed on account of duty assigned to him by his superiors at the election work. Exs.P-1 to P-3 are the alleged letters written by the deceased. It is argued on the side of the prosecution that Exs.P-6, P-7 and P-11 also are letters written by the deceased. The handwriting expert P.W.14 speaks about the disputed signatures in Exs.P-6, P-7 and P-11 that they are similar to the admitted signatures of the deceased _as found in Exs.P-1 to P-3. These Exs.P-1 to P-3,P-6, P-7 and P-11 were produced by P.W. 3 . In Ex.P-7 there is the date as 27.5.1985. In other exhibits Ex.P-2 and P-3, there are no dates. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Exs.P-1 to P-3, P-6, P-7 and P-11 are all created with the connivance of P.Ws.1 to 4 so to enable the deceased to get divorce from the accused subsequent to Ex.P-2 lawyer’s notice issued by the deceased through her advocate to the accused. In Exs.P-6, P-7 and P-11 there is no sign the of the deceased and so, they are not admissible in evidence. It is submitted that the proscution has suppressed the complaint given by P.W.1, the father of the deceased. It is admitted by P.W.1 that he was having a copy of the report with him and the prosecution has not given any explnation for not producing the report given by P.W. to P.W.20 and higher officials. According to P.W 1, he sent a copy of the report to P.W.20 also. P.W.20 also has not produced the original of that report having accepted the receipt of the same from P.W.1. According to P.W 1, he sent a copy of the report to P.W.20 also. P.W.20 also has not produced the original of that report having accepted the receipt of the same from P.W.1. It is therefore contended that the prosecution has wilfully suppressed the relevant and materia document, which according to the prosecution would reveal that the accused has abetted the offence and so, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that adverse inference has to be drawn as against the prosecution. P. W.5 Ex.M.L.A. would depose that there was a mediation at his instance after the issue of lawyer’s notice to the accused and on the assurance given by P. W.5 P.W. 1 sent the deceased along with the accused to the house of the accused. P.W.7 is the landlady of the house where the accused and the deceased were living and her evidence is that there used to be quarrel between them and P.W.7 pacified them on two or three occasions. The trial court observed in its judgment that Exs.P-6, P-7 and P-11 are letters admittedly written by the deceased. This observation is wrong since the accused did not accept that Exs.P-6, P-7 and P-11 are the letters written by the deceased. According to P.W.14, the handwriting expert, Exs. P-6, P-7 and P-11 are in the handwriting of the deceased as could be seen from the comparison of the admitted handwriting of the deceased. The defence set up by the accused even before the trial court was that the deceased was a psychopathic and schizophrenic patient and so that she had the tendency of committing suicide for each trivial matter and according to the accused the deceased used to be sometime depressed even for a small family quarrel not connected with the alleged demand of dowry. But the lower courts had not accepted that part of the defence of the accused since it was not supported by any medical evidence. There is evidence in this case that the deceased wanted to go to the house of her parents for Pongal festival that was to follow the subsequent ill-fated day and it is the case of the defence that the accused could not give money to the deceased for going to her parents house for Pongal festival and so that the deceased out of her mental ailment could have committed suicide without any abetment on the part of the accused. The accused himself noted the death of the deceased only in the early hours on 17.1.1987 and immediately he went to the policestation and gave a report. The police had not investigated the case immediately; but they appeared to have waited till 29,8.1986 when P.W.20 took up further investigation and altered the section of law. As I have already pointed out, that even the report given by P.W.1 to the police on 29.8.1986 was not produced before court. After Ex.P-2 lawyer’s notice issued by the deceased to the accused, she did not file any application or petition for divorce and it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Exs.P-6, P-7 and P-11 were created at the instance of P. Ws. 1,3,4 and 6 and the deceased Dossibly to file a case of divorce subsequently asgainst the accused and so that Exs.P-6, P-7 and P.1 did not contain the signature of the deceased, this appears to be reasonable also as otherwise, he deceased would have affixed her signatures in those exhibits. Even though the handwriting expert is of the opinion that Exs.P-6, P-7 and P-11 should have been written by one and the same person who wrote Exs.P-1 to P-3, but from the opinion in Ex.P-21 it cannot be conclusively proved that Exs.P-6, P-7, P-11, P-13 and P-16 were in the handwriting of the deceased in the absence of any other corroboration to the sime. Lower courts have placed much reliance on the evidence of P.Ws.1, 3,5, and 6 forgetting the fact that P.Ws.1 and 3 are the parents of the deceased and P.Ws.4 and 5 are the sister and brother of the deceased and that their evidence is interested. The immediate cause for the suicide was not explained by the prosecution by any cogent and convincing evidence. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment reported in Chanchal Kumari v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1986 Crl.L.J. 816: A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 752. In that decision, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "We have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. We find that there is no legal evidence at all to support the conviction of the appellants. In that decision, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "We have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. We find that there is no legal evidence at all to support the conviction of the appellants. The incident took place on 20.7.1981, but the F.I.R. was lodged three days later at 5.10 p.m. This was because the brother of the deceased who lodged the F.I.R. was staying at a differe it place. Counsel for the respondent was unable to satisfy us that there was any dependable evidence in regard to the actual abetment, by any of the accused, for the deceased to commit suicide. On the other hand, there are certain important and innate circumstances which completely destroy the theory of abetment to commt suicide. In the first place it appears that the brother of the deceased (P.W.1) stated that when the deceased visited him sometimess in May he was told by her that the accused were demanding money in order to build a house for her and her husband. This by itself does no t at all prove any intention to abet her to commit suicide by any of the accused. Even if we regatd it as a demand for providing money to build the house this is completely offset by letter dated 21.6.1981, Ex.D-1, where the deceased wrote almost a love letter to her husband and in that letter there is no trace, that she was being harassed, or teased by her in-laws or her husbands. The evidenceofGulshanRai (P.W.2),on which the prosecution relied, was that he had visited his sister Usha, C.W.1, and saw appellant Chan-chal and Draupadi beating the deceased and heard her cries at 9.30 p.m. But Gulshan Rai did not give this information to police or anybody and spoke regarding this incident for the first time only one and a half month after the occurrence. In these circumstances, we have serious doubt about the truth of his statement. This is the only main evidence against the appellants and we are convinced that the evidence is not sufficient to prove the charges against the appellants. Suspicion, however, strong cannot take the place of proof." In the decision reported in Emperor v. Amiruddin Salebhoy Tyabjee, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. This is the only main evidence against the appellants and we are convinced that the evidence is not sufficient to prove the charges against the appellants. Suspicion, however, strong cannot take the place of proof." In the decision reported in Emperor v. Amiruddin Salebhoy Tyabjee, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 44, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court observed thus: "A person is said to instigate another to an act when he actively suggests or stimulates him to an act by any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation or hints, insinuation or encouragement." In the instant case, there is no direct or indirect evidence that the accused has instigated the deceased to commit suicide either by any means or language, direct or indirect as pointed out in the abovesaid judgment. In the decision reported in Sri Ram v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 175:1975 Crl.L.J. 240:1975 S.C.C. (Crl.) 87: (1975)3 S.C.C. 485 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows: "In order to constitute abetment, the abetter must be shown to have intentionally aided the commission of the crime. Mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition of the alleged abettor is not enough compliance with the requirements of Sec.107. A person may, for example, invite another casually or for a friendly purpose and that may facilitate the murder of the invitee. But unless the invitation was extended with intent to facilitate the commission of the murder, the person inviting cannot be said to have abetted the murder. It is not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor happens to facilitate the commission of the crime. Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment under the third paragraph of Sec.107." In the decision reported in Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar, 1967 M.L.J. (Crl) 606: A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 553:1967 Crl.L.J. 541: (1967)2 S.C.J. 175: (1967)1 S.C.R. 469 , the Supreme Court observed as follows: "It cannot be held in law that a person cannot be convicted of abetting a certain offence when the person alleged to have committed that offence in consequence of the abetment has been acquitted. The question of the abettor’s guilt depends on the nature of the act abetted and the manner in which the abetment was made. The question of the abettor’s guilt depends on the nature of the act abetted and the manner in which the abetment was made. Under Sec.107, I.P.C., a person abets the doing of an act in either of three ways which can be instigating any person to do an act; or engaging with one or more person in any conspiracy for the doing of that act; or intentionally aiding the doing of that act. If a person instigates another or engages with another in a conspiracy for the doing of an act which is an offence, he abets such an offence and would be guilty of abetment under Sec.115 or Sec. 116, I.P.C., even if the offence abetted is not committed in consequence of the abetment. It is only in the case of a person abetting an offence by intentionally aiding another to commit that offence that the charge of abetment against him would be expected to fail when the person alleged to have committed the offences is acquitted of that offence." In the decision reported in Trilok Chand v. State of Delhi, 1977 Crl.L.J. 254, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Intention to aid the commission of the crime, is the gist of the offence of abetment by an Such intention, on the part of the appellant was lacking in this case. Moreover, Gupta, the Principal, has been acquitted and exonerated of committing the offending act, the commission of which is alleged to have been aided by the small fry, the appellant." In order to constitute an offence of abetment, there must be mens rea or community of intention or knowledge. Without knowledge or intention, there can be no abetment and the knowledge and intention must relate to the crime and the assistance must be something proximate and something more than a mere passive acquiescence. These are all the tests to find out whether the prosecution has established any one of the ingredients in order to bring home the guilt of abetment as against the accused. There is no evidence as to what had happened on the night of 16.1.1986 when the deceased was found dead by the accused by act of suicide. The medical evidence shows that it was only suicide and it was not homicide. But there is the evidence of P.W.1 that the deceased died under suspicious circumstances. There is no evidence as to what had happened on the night of 16.1.1986 when the deceased was found dead by the accused by act of suicide. The medical evidence shows that it was only suicide and it was not homicide. But there is the evidence of P.W.1 that the deceased died under suspicious circumstances. Unfortunately, the report given by P.W.1 to the police has not been filed by the prosecution in this case. According to defence, that it is the only F.I.R. based on which this prosecution has been lodged. The prosecution has filed to prove that the accused had mens rea, that he had, with knowledge and intention instigated the deceased to do a thing, namely suicide as in this case and as such the alleged assistance of the accused had been the proximate to the cause of suicide. 9. In one of the letters written by the deceased she herself has stated that she would not commit suicide. The defence is that the deceased,was suffering from psychopathic and schizophrenic and according to the accused, he was not responsible for her end. There is evidence of P.W.5 that P.W.4 wanted to marry the accused, that her parents were willing for it that the accused refused to accept their demands and that on that ground P.W.4 took poison and she was admitted in the hospital for treatment. The defence is that the accused has been falsely implicated because of this. The medical evidence shows that the death was due to suicide by consuming Organe Halogeneated Insecticide/Pesticide type Endrinc D.D.T. etc. and that the viscera of the deceased was found containing Organic Cholorcne. The theory that the accused demanded a sum of Rs.25,000 from the deceased especially after a period of eight years of their married life, cannot be relied upon. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws.1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and 7 does not establish the intention, aiding and active complicity of the accused in the act of suicide. Even Exs.P-1 to P-3.P-6, P-7 and P-11 and P13 also do not show that there was active assistance on the part of the accused or intention or aid to the commission of the offence. Even Exs.P-1 to P-3.P-6, P-7 and P-11 and P13 also do not show that there was active assistance on the part of the accused or intention or aid to the commission of the offence. Apart from that, there is no satisfactory explanation by the prosecution for not producing the report given by P.W.1 about the allcged suspicious dcath of ‘the dcceased even though copy of the said report was found ‘available with P.W.1 and P.W.20 investigating officer. The explanation for the delay in initiating prosecution cannot be accepted and there is considerable doubt about the prosecution case. In these circumstances, the offences of abetting under Sec. 107,I.P.C. has not been established at all by the prosecution and if the offence of abetting is not established, consequently, the inference is that the accused has not abetted the commission of offence under Sec.306, I.P.C. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the ingredients both under Secs. 107 and 305, I.P.C. and the findings of the courts below cannot be sustained and both the charges against the accused are false and therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused/petitioner herein under Sec.306, I.P.C. are also set aside. 10. In the result, the criminal revision is allowed and the accused is acquitted of the charges levelled against him under Sec.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Sec.306, I.P.C. The fine amount, if collected, is directed to be refunded to the accused/petitioner herein.