G. S. N. TRIPATHI, J. ( 1 ) THESE two writ petitions have been filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus directing the respondents to set the petitioners at liberty, be issued. ( 2 ) THE petitioners have been detained under Section 3 (2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short N. S. A.) The grounds given to the petitioners are as under :- (1) On 13-10-1991 at about 9 p. m. the petitioners and others were cutting wire of transformer and putting the same inside to a bag. The police party arrived. The said persons tried to escape. Two of them succeeded in escaping. However, the petitioners were arrested on the spot. First Information Report under Section 379/411, I. P. C. was registered at police station Makhnupur, district Firozabad (vide Annexure 2 to the writ petition ). In that case the petitioners were not named. ( 3 ) WHILE the petitioners were in jail, the disputed order was served upon them. They made a representation which has been rejected. It has been alleged in the petitions that no statement of any person of electricity department was recorded to confirm the allegations made in the disputed First Information Report. It has been wrongly mentioned therein that at any time the petitioners confessed their guilt of having committed similar crimes within the jurisdiction of police station Makhnupur, district Firozabad. It is stated that no "public order" has been disturbed. The alleged confessional statement which was relied upon by the District Magistrate was never recorded nor any such record was produced before the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate passed a mechanical order which shows that he did not apply his mind before passing the detention order. In the First Information Reports the petitioner have not been named, therefore, their participation has not been established even prima facie. So this incident would not have weighed with the District Magistrate. At the worst, it may be a case of "of "of "disturbance of law and order" as distinct from "disturbance of public order" and, therefore, the detention of the petitioners is illegal. ( 4 ) FROM the side of the State, two counter-affidavits have been filed. So this incident would not have weighed with the District Magistrate. At the worst, it may be a case of "of "of "disturbance of law and order" as distinct from "disturbance of public order" and, therefore, the detention of the petitioners is illegal. ( 4 ) FROM the side of the State, two counter-affidavits have been filed. Sri Bajeev Kumar, District Magistrate, Firozabad in his counter-affidavit has stated that after going through the entire evidence available to him and after applying his mind, he was subjectively satisfied about the grounds existing against the petitioners and he passed the disputed order accordingly. No doubt, wire cutting was done at a solitary place, but due to its effect, chaos was created in the locality densely populated and the people affected were society at large and not counted few individuals. As a result of wire cutting committed by the petitioners and their companions, the entire area was plunged into darkness. Water supply to the public at large was badly disconnected as well as the irrigational activities of the local agriculturists were completely stopped creating chaos in the agricultural community. It is wrong to say that the satisfaction was arrived at in a mechanical manner. In the First Information Report No. 1359 of 1991, no doubt the petitioners were not named but they subsequently admitted their guilt before the police. Hence this circumstance could be legitimately taken into account. Therefore, the detention of the petitioners is just, proper as well as legal and has been made in order to maintain "public order" which was seriously disturbed by the activities of the petitioners and ever since their detention has been made, no recurrence of such wire cutting activity has taken place. ( 5 ) SRI S. N. Yadav, posted as Upper Division Assistant in the Confidential Section 8, U. P. Civil Secretariat, Lucknow has averred in his counter-affidavit that after receipt of the representation by the State Government on 28-11-1991, it was sent to the Government of India by the State Government on 31-12-1991. One copy of it was examined by the State of Uttar Pradesh also in the Home Department on 2-1-1992. The State Government rejected the representations of the petitioners on 7-1-1992 which was communicated by order dated 9-1-1992. The Union Government also rejected the representations and the same was communicated through the Superintendent, District Jail, Firozabad by wireless message dated 13-1-1992. One copy of it was examined by the State of Uttar Pradesh also in the Home Department on 2-1-1992. The State Government rejected the representations of the petitioners on 7-1-1992 which was communicated by order dated 9-1-1992. The Union Government also rejected the representations and the same was communicated through the Superintendent, District Jail, Firozabad by wireless message dated 13-1-1992. It is stated that the period of detention is not specified by the District Magistrate but it is specified at the stage of Section 12, N. S. A. while confirming the order of detention. Despite repeated opportunities being made available to the learned A. G. A. he could not file the counter-affidavit in writ petition No. 12267 of 1992, Kali Charan v. State of U. P. and others. ( 6 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties at stretch and considered the record. We find that these writ petitions deserve to be allowed as they are based on same grounds. ( 7 ) THE solitary ground, which has been stressed with vehemence before us, is that the District Magistrate has not confined his satisfaction on the point that the alleged activity was "prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community", rather he has enlarged the scope of his satisfaction by observing that it was even essential to preserve the State property while in fact he has recorded three reasons for his satisfaction :- (a) Disturbance of public order, (b) maintenance of supplies and services, and 1993 Ajaya Mahakud v. State (c) protection of State property. ( 8 ) WE do not want to lay down the law that the solitary act of disruption of electricity supply may not amount to act prejudicial to maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community but we want to clearly lay down a law that extraneous considerations should not weight with the authority passing the detention order, namely, the District Magistrate in this case. The objective may be laudable, but the satisfaction cannot be arrived at or based on considerations which Section 3 of the Act does not permit. We do not know the degree of satisfaction caused to the District Magistrate by these three averments made in the disputed order individually. The objective may be laudable, but the satisfaction cannot be arrived at or based on considerations which Section 3 of the Act does not permit. We do not know the degree of satisfaction caused to the District Magistrate by these three averments made in the disputed order individually. It is quite legal that he may have thought that safe-guarding the property of the State was of paramount importance and, therefore, he deemed it essential to pass the order of detention against the petitioners. But extraneous considerations should have not weighed with the District Magistrate as it vitiates the very foundation of satisfaction. ( 9 ) IT has been clearly alleged that the so called confessional statement of the petitioners was never recorded in the case diary under Section 161, Cr. P. C. It was simply alleged before the District Magistrate. Copy of the case diary containing the confessional statement was never produced before him. So he should not have relied upon it, but he did rely upon it. It means that the application of mind was made in the most mechanical manner and it cannot be permitted to be termed as a case of subjective satisfaction. It is said to have been passed upon a document which did not exist. Under these circumstances, it is another reason to hold that the ground for detention was not legal and the satisfaction was based on extraneous considerations. ( 10 ) WE need not go into other aspects of the allegations made by the petitioners as we find that the very satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate is vitiated under law. He transgressed his jurisdiction in passing the detention order and, therefore, the detention order of the petitioners is to be held illegal. The petitioners are entitled to be set free. ( 11 ) THE writ petitions are allowed. It is directed that the respondents shall set-free the petitioners forthwith after receipt of a copy of the order of this Court unless they, are required in any other case. Petition allowed. .