JUDGMENT 1. - By this order I am disposing of two amendment applications filed by the appellant on 12.5.92 seeking leave to amend the written statement filed by the appellant in the trial court in Civil Suit No. 94/83 as well as the memo of appeal filed before this Court. 2. For the purpose of deciding these amendment applications it is necessary to give few facts. 3. Plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for rent and ejectment on 19.7.83 in the court of District Judge, Ajmer, against the defendant appellant. In the plaint the plaintiff-respondent alleged that defendant-appellant is its tenant in respect of the premises specified in para-1 of the plaint on a monthly rent of Rs. 350/-. The date of tenancy commenced on the first day of the English month. The plaintiff-respondent alleged that the defendant-appellant has been very irregular in the payment of rent. He has paid rent only upto February 1980 and thus defaulted in the payment of rent for a period of more than six months and is, therefore, liable to be evicted under section 13(1) (a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The plaintiff respondent claimed that he was entitled to rent for 40 months and 15 days. He however, claimed only a sum of Rs. 12,950/-. The defendant appellant in his written statement stated that the contents of para-1 of the plaint except the fact about the tenant is admitted. The tenancy is at the rate of Rs. 200/- and he has been paying rent at that rate. He has been regularly paying rent and rent upto January 1981 has already been paid. He has never committed any default in payment of rent. The plaintiff is not entitled to excess rent. In his additional pleas he stated that the monthly tenancy is only for Rs. 200/- and even that is excessive looking to the rate of rent of the premises in the vicinity. He prayed that the court may determine the standard rent. This written statement was filed by the defendant-appellant on 12.1.84. Statement of the plaintiff was recorded on 20th February 1987. After hearing the parties the trial court decreed the suit vide judgment dated 13.5.87. The defendant-appellant filed this appeal on 22.7.87. Ad-interim stay order was passed in favour of the appellant on 3.8.87. The stay was confirmed on 18.8.87 subject to certain conditions. Statement of the plaintiff was recorded on 20th February 1987. After hearing the parties the trial court decreed the suit vide judgment dated 13.5.87. The defendant-appellant filed this appeal on 22.7.87. Ad-interim stay order was passed in favour of the appellant on 3.8.87. The stay was confirmed on 18.8.87 subject to certain conditions. On 11.3.91 the plaintiff-respondent filed an application for vacation of the stay order. After hearing the parties this court vacated the stay order on 18.11.91. 4. After the vacation of the stay order by the High Court, the plaintiff filed an application for execution on 27.11.91. The defendant filed objections in respect of the execution petition alleging therein that the decree passed by the trial court is null and void because, the premises in respect of which the decree has been passed and possession is to be taken, is the property of the Durgah Khwaja Sahib, Ajn}er and in view of the notification No. E 20 (14) Revenue (1)/76, dated 20.8.76, the provisions of' the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 are not applicable. It was also claimed that the provisions of Durgah Khwaja Sahib Ajmer Act and the Wakf Act are applicable and the plaintiff had himself admitted it to be a property of Durgah Khwaja Sahib. The objections filed by the defendant were rejected by the trial court on 6.2.92. Against that order an appeal has been filed by the appellant and the court has granted interim order in favour of the appellant. On 12.5.92, the appellant has filed two amendment applications, one for seeking leave of the court to amend the written statement filed in the main suit and the other for leave to amend the memo of appeal. 5. The amendment sought in the written statement is by way of insertion of para 10. It has been stated in that paragraph that the disputed property is a Wakf property and is controlled by Durgah Committee. The plaintiff himself is a tenant of Durgah Committee and the defendant is a sub-tenant in the knowledge of the original owner. The provisions of the `1950 Act' are not applicable and therefore, the suit is not maintainable. It has been stated that the Wakf property comes within the definition of the term 'public premises' and any suit regarding the public premises can be heard by the Estate Officer. The provisions of the `1950 Act' are not applicable and therefore, the suit is not maintainable. It has been stated that the Wakf property comes within the definition of the term 'public premises' and any suit regarding the public premises can be heard by the Estate Officer. Reference has been made to the notification issued by the State of Rajasthan by which Wakf properties have been exempted from the purview of `1950 Act'. It has then been stated that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the suit because, no notice under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act had been given. It has been stated that as per the provisions of D.Vigah Khwaja Sahib Act the civil court has no jurisdiction. It has also been stated that in a suit filed by Durgah Committee decree has been passed by the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate (West) Ajmer on 7.9.82 in respect of the disputed premises and therefore, the suit has become redundant. 6. The respondent has filed reply to the amendment application by stating that the amendment is malafide and vexatious. No explanation whatsoever, has been given by the appellant as to why he could not raise the plea regarding the maintainability of the suit in his written statement or at any time during the pendency of the suit for a period of four years and why he could not take this plea in memo of appeal filed in July 1987. The application at this stage has been filed with the sole object of delaying the execution of the decree. The Executing Court has turned down all objections raised by the defendant-appellant and then he has come forward with these amendment applications. If the amendment is allowed it may have the effect of displacing the suit itself. A valuable right has accrued to the plaintiff respondent in the form of decree and he has a right to get possession. The defendant-appellant cannot now be allowed to set up an entirely new case in the garb of amendment of the written statement and the memo of appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the plea regarding jurisdiction has been raised in the written statement. The defendant-appellant cannot now be allowed to set up an entirely new case in the garb of amendment of the written statement and the memo of appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the plea regarding jurisdiction has been raised in the written statement. By making reference to the provisions of Section 2 of 1950 Act Shri Ranjan argued that the property in question belongs to a local authority because Durgah comes within the meaning of the term 'local authority'. He referred to various provisions of the Durgahkhwaja Sahib Act, 1955 and argued that the provisions of the Act prevail qua all other provisions. Shri Ranjan made reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon ( AIR 1969 S.C. 1267 ) , Nanduri Yogananda Laxminarsimhachari and others v. Agasthe Swarswamivaru ( AIR 1960 S.C. 622 ) , Mulakraj Batra v. District Judge, Dehradun ( AIR 1982 S.C. 24 ) , Smt. Mohini and ors. v. Mst. Gopali and Shand ( 1990(1) RLR 553 ) , and Pandit Ishwardas v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (AIR 1979 (unreported judgment) S.C. 231). 8. Shri Ranjan argued that the appellate court has wide discretion in allowing amendment by invoking powers under Order-VI rule 17. According to Shri Ranjan amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceedings including the appellate stage. He argued that by virtue of the amendment sought for by the defendant-appellant a pure question of law is being raised which goes to the root of the matter. The appellant could not raise this plea earlier because, he was not properly advised. Shri Ranjan submitted that the courts have in large number of cases allowed amendment of the pleadings at the belated stage. No prejudice whatsoever, will be caused to the plaintiff-respondent. Shri Ranjan argued that Shri Om Prakash has admitted in his cross-examination that the property,in question belongs to Durgah and therefore, not much evidence will be required to be recorded. 9. Shri U.M. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued that although the court has to adopt a liberal approach in allowing amendment in the pleadings, amendments cannot be allowed once the court finds that the same are vexatious or frivolous. 9. Shri U.M. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued that although the court has to adopt a liberal approach in allowing amendment in the pleadings, amendments cannot be allowed once the court finds that the same are vexatious or frivolous. Where the amendment has been sought with the sole object of defeating the accrued rights of the opposite party, such amendment must not be allowed. Shri Jain submitted that the amendment applications filed on 12.5.92 suffer from a delay of 9 years from the date of filing of the suit and five years of the filing of memo of appeal before this Court. The defendant was having full knowledge about the property being Durgah property because, the defendant has himself stated in his application that Om Prakash was asked one egestion regarding the nature of property. There was no reason for the defendant appellant to have waited for 5 more years before filing the amendment application. Shri Jain then submitted that in the written statement not a whisper has been made by the defendant-appellant denying the existence of his tenancy. In fact, he admitted the factum of tenancy by arguing that rate of rent was Rs. 200/- and not Rs. 350/- per month as claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant requested the court to determine the standard rent. This all shows that through and through the defendant had treated himself to be the tenant of the plaintiff and sought avoidance of decree by alleging that he was not a defaulter in the payment of rent. Shri Jain argued that the property in dispute is not a Wakf property because, the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1954 exclude the properties of Durgah Khwaja Sahib. Therefore, the notification issued by the Government in the year 1976 granting exemption to the Wakf properties had no relevance. Shri Jain further argued that Wakf Committee cannot be treated as a local authority. Shri Jain lastly submitted that the plea regarding notice having not been raised by the defendant in his written statement must be deemed to have been waived and cannot now be allowed to be raised after a period of 9 years. Shri Jain further argued that Wakf Committee cannot be treated as a local authority. Shri Jain lastly submitted that the plea regarding notice having not been raised by the defendant in his written statement must be deemed to have been waived and cannot now be allowed to be raised after a period of 9 years. Shri Jain placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in K.N. Ramkrishnan v. Kewal Chand (AIR 1971 Madras 150) Banta Singh v. Harbhan, (AIR 1974 Punjab 247) , State of Gujarat v. Ramji Mandir Trust ( AIR 1979 Guj. 113 ) Subhodh Bala v. Haikum Singh, ( AIR 1981 Pat. 268 ) , Keratulla S.K. v. Fazulurrehman ( AIR 1984 Cal. 369 ) , Kanhaiya Lal v. Dropadi ( AIR 1992 M.P. 88 ) , Raj Kumar Tejinder Singh v. Dr. Sital Raj Mehta, 1988 (1) RLR 523 Goverdhan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1987 (1) RLR 842 Mohini Devi v. Masjid Committee, 1989 (2) RLR 287. He also placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust (P.) Ltd., AIR 1972 S.C. 2091 , Ishwardas v. State of M.P., AIR 1979 S.C. 551 , Union of India v. Surjit Singh Atwal, AIR 1979 S.C. 1701 , Pandit Ishwar Das v. State of Rajasthan, 1979 (4) S.C.C. 163 . 10. I have given my serious consideration to. the rival submissions and have perused various decisions cited at bar. 11. In P. H. Patil v. P. S. Patil AIR 1957 S.C. , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that all amendments ought to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions (a) not working injustice to the other side and (b). being necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties and the amendment should be refused only where the other cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleadings had been originally correct, but, the amendment would cause him injury which could not be compensated in terms of costs. 12. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal's case (supra), the Apex Court held that the court always gives leave to amend the pleadings unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafidely or acceptance of amendment would cause injury to the other side which cannot be compensated in terms of money. 12. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal's case (supra), the Apex Court held that the court always gives leave to amend the pleadings unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafidely or acceptance of amendment would cause injury to the other side which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The Supreme Court held that, however negligent or careless a party may have been and however late the proposed amendment is moved, amendment deserves to be allowed if it does not cause injustice. 13. In Pandit Ishwar Das v. State of M.P. (Supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that there should be reasonable explanation for delay in making of the application for amendment. 14. In Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust (P) Ltd. (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that, where plea of absence of valid notice terminating contractual tenancy was not taken in the original written statement, an amendment to include the plea after 8 years should not be allowed on account of gross delay and laches. 15. In Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Ladha Ram ( AIR 1977 S.C. 680 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that in a case where amendment introduced an entirely new case and would result in displacing the plaintiff completely it should not be allowed. 16. From the decided cases on which the counsel for the rival parties have placed reliance, following principles emerge : 1. That the amendment of the pleadings should ordinarily be allowed by the Court, once it is satisfied that the amendment is necessary for the just and proper decision of the controversy between the parties. 2. The amendment of the pleadings should not ordinarily be declined only on the ground of delay on the part of the appellant in seeking leave of the Court to amend the pleadings, if the opposite party can suitably be compensated by means of costs etc. Even inconsistent pleas can be allowed to be raised by amendment in the pleadings. 3. However, amendment of the pleadings cannot be allowed so as to completely alter the nature of the suit. 4. Amendment of the pleadings must not be allowed when amendment is not necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in the controversy between the parties. 5. 3. However, amendment of the pleadings cannot be allowed so as to completely alter the nature of the suit. 4. Amendment of the pleadings must not be allowed when amendment is not necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in the controversy between the parties. 5. The amendment should be refused where the plaintiff's suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment. 6. Where the effect of the amendment would be to take away from the defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time or by operation of some law. 7. The amendment in the pleadings should not be allowed where the court finds that amendment sought for has not been made in good faith or suffers from lack of bonafides. 8. Ordinarily, the amendment must not be allowed where a party wants to withdraw from the admission made by it in the original pleadings. 17. In this case, the amendment application has been filed after almost 9 years of the filing of the suit, 8 years of the filing of the written statement and after almost five years of the filing of the appeal before this court against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. No explanation worth the name has been offered by the appellant for this delay in seeking leave of the court to amend the pleadings. Nothing has been said in the application as to why the appellant could not make application for leave to amend the written statement during the pendency of the suit; why such amendment was not sought at the time of filing of the first appeal and above all, why after a period of five years of the filing of the second appeal the amendment was being sought for. It has come on record that the appellant applied for grant of stay order on the execution of the decree passed by the trial court. The stay order was passed by this court in favour of the appellant, but, on account of non-fulfilment of the conditions stipulated by this court, the stay order was subsequently vacated. When the respondent applied for execution of the decree the present appellant raised objections to the maintainability of the execution petition and only after the rejection of the objections the appellant thought it proper to seek leave of the court to amend the written statement. When the respondent applied for execution of the decree the present appellant raised objections to the maintainability of the execution petition and only after the rejection of the objections the appellant thought it proper to seek leave of the court to amend the written statement. Thus the only object of the amendment is to deprive the respondent of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour by the trial court. Such an amendment cannot be termed as bonafide. If such an amendment is allowed, the respondent will be deprived of an important and valuable right. That apart, I find that so far as the notification No. F 20 (14) Revenue-I/76 dated, 20.8.76 which has been issued under section 2(3) of 1950 Act has no relevance whatsoever; because, under that notification the Government had granted exemption to all the premises owned by Wakfs registered under the Wakf Act. Provisions of Wakf Act, 1954, show that the property of Durgah Khwaja Sahib, Ajmer, is not governed by the Act of 1954. Obviously, the property of Khwaja Sahib cannot be registered as a Wakf under the Act. Whether or not Durgah Khwaja Sahib can be treated as a local authority, is a highly disputed question and cannot be decided without evidence. Acceptance of this amendment application at this stage will thus cause irreparable injury to the respondent which cannot be compensated in terms of money. That apart, I find that so far as the plea of absence of notice,is concerned, the same was open to be raised by the defendant appellant at the earliest stage. For the reasons best known to him, the defendant did not raise the objection regarding absence of notice. He must, therefore, be deemed to have waived the plea of notice and after a period of almost 9 years he cannot be allowed to raise this plea by way of amendment of the written statement. 18. The decision of this court in Smt. Mohini v. Mst. Gopali (supra), on which Shri Ranjan has placed reliance, is of little help to the appellant. This court allowed the application for amendment filed in a second appeal. In the original written statement filed by the defendant he had pleaded, that he was owner of the disputed property since the time of his ancestors and that he. 'vas not tenant and had been in possession of the property since long. This court allowed the application for amendment filed in a second appeal. In the original written statement filed by the defendant he had pleaded, that he was owner of the disputed property since the time of his ancestors and that he. 'vas not tenant and had been in possession of the property since long. By way of amendment the defendant sought leave of the court to add the plea of adverse possession. This Court opined that the amendment sought for will not cause any irreparable injury to the opposite side and specific plea had already been raised by the defendant about the long possession of the property. Similarly, in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Pandit Ishwardas v. State of M.P. (1979 (UJ) S.C. 231 and Nanduri Yogananda Laxminarsimhachari (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court-have laid down that an amendment of the pleadings can be permitted at the belated stage. That principle of law does not call for any further discussion, but, those decisions cannot be read as maintaining general proposition of law that amendment of pleadings should be allowed in all cases irrespective of the utter negligence on the part of the party applying for amendment and irrespective of the fact that the amendment if allowed, will cause irreparable harm to the other side. 19. In Mohammod Issaq v. Mohmmod Igbal (1978 S.C. 798) their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Mysore High Court which had declined amendment of the written statement and observed : "The amendment of the written statement sought in appeal was on such facts which if permitted to be introduced by way of amendment, would have completely changed the nature of their original defence. It would have brought about entirely new pleas which were never taken in the original pleadings. The additional evidence sought to be adduced was in respect of the act stated in the amendment petition and such amendment was rightly rejected by the High Court. 20. This decision is fully applicable to the facts of this case. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, the amendment applications filed by the appellant are dismissed.Application For Amendment Dismissed. *******