JUDGMENT (ORAL) H.H. Kantharia, J.- This is an application for contempt of Court by the petitioner-wife initiating contempt proceedings against her husband (hereinafter referred to as "the contemnor") for disobeying the order of maintenance made in her favour by this Court. 2. By a common order dated November 15, 1983 in Civil Application No. 2024 of 1983 and other Civil Applications, this Court (B.C. Gadgil, J.) directed the contemnor to pay interim alimony at the rate of Rs. 100/. per month to the petitioner from July 1982 till December 1983 and continue to do so for the subsequent months on or, before the 15th day of each month. Further, by an order dated April 12, 1984 in Civil Application No. 1317 of 1984 in First Appeal No. 258 of 1983, this Court (S.K. Desai, J.) directed the contemnor to deposit Rs. 500/- in the Court on or before April 18, 1984. According to the petitioner. the contemnor has intentionally, wilfully and in calculated defiance not complied with the said orders. On the contrary, according to her, the contemnor has been openly saying that inspite of the orders of this Court, he shall not pay any alimony to her. The petitioner, therefore, contended that the contemnor is guilty of contempt of this Court under Section 2(b) read with Section 12 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Contempt of Courts Act') for which he should be suitably punished. 3. Admittedly, the contemnor has so far not paid any money to the petitioner pursuant to the orders passed by this Court. Instead, he has filed a lengthy reply challenging the contempt proceedings saying that the orders passed against him are void ab initio and that he has not wilfully disobeyed the same further adding that he has no money to pay as maintenance to his wife. 4. On the submissions made before me, the only point that arises for my consideration is whether the contemnor is guilty of wilful disobedience of the directions passed and orders made against him to pay alimony to his wife. 5. According to Mr. Katikar, learned Counsel appearing for the contemnor, his client cannot be held guilty of contempt of Court as he has not wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court. 5. According to Mr. Katikar, learned Counsel appearing for the contemnor, his client cannot be held guilty of contempt of Court as he has not wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court. The submission of the learned Counsel is that the contemnor has no money to pay as maintenance to his wife in compliance of the directions passed and orders made against him by this Court and as such he is not guilty under Section 2(b) read with Section l2( 1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 6. Now, as per Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, "civil contempt" means willful disobedience (emphasis supplied) to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. The question, therefore, is whether the contemnor has wilfully or deliberately disobeyed the orders of this Court by not paying the maintenance allowance to his wife as directed by this Court. I am not able to persuade myself to agree with the submission of Mr. Katikar that his client cannot be held guilty of contempt of court because he has not wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court inasmuch as he has no money to pay to his wife. The record produced before me shows that the contemnor is a practising lawyer. A copy of the letter bearing No. BC/ 2306/86 dated June 12, 1986 from the Secretary of the Bar Council of Maharasht.ra is a proof thereof. Mr. Pai appearing for the petitioner-wife produced in the Court a list of cases which shows that the contemnor has been appearing as an Advocate in the High Court, City Civil Court, Small Causes Court and the Courts of the Metropolitan Magistrates in Bombay. Mr. Pai also brought to my notice two oral orders recorded by this Court on November t 1990 and November 5, 1990 by my learned brothers Mr. Justice S.M. Jhunjhunuwala and Mr. Justice A.A. Cazi which documents show that the contemnor has appeared in this Court as recently as in the month of November, 1990. Mr. Pai then produced for my perusal page No. 73 of the 1988 Directory of the Bombay Telephones which shows that the contemnor owns a telephone. The contemnor had filed Pauper. Petition No.1 of 1979 in this Court praying that he be allowed to sue as pauper. Mr. Pai then produced for my perusal page No. 73 of the 1988 Directory of the Bombay Telephones which shows that the contemnor owns a telephone. The contemnor had filed Pauper. Petition No.1 of 1979 in this Court praying that he be allowed to sue as pauper. This Court had made proper enquiries in the said application and by an order dated March 22, 1990, the Additional Prothonotary and Senior Master had held that the contemnor was not entitled to file a pauper petition as he had sufficient means to pay the Court fees. Therefore, it is quite clear that the contemnor has sufficient means to pay maintenance to his wife. The rate of maintenance had been fixed at Rs. 100/- per month. This amount, on the face of it, is too small to grumble about. Of course, the same had been increased by this Court later on August 3, 1990 to Rs. 500/- per month. But that is a different question. All said and done, there is no denying the fact that the contemnor is liable to maintain his wife. However, he has been consistently and persistingly raising all sorts of contentions to defy the orders of this Court and refusing to pay maintenance to his wife. He was refused the right of audience by this Court holding that he had disobeyed the order of this Court which was just and binding upon him and the interest of justice requires that he purged himself of the contumacious conduct before he is heard and, therefore, until the interim alimony arrears are paid the contemnor would not be heard in the matter. These observations were made by Mr. Justice S.M. Daud on February 25,1986 in Civil Application No. 5028 of 1986. Then, on August 3, 1990 Mr. Justice Daud had said that the First Appeal Nos. 257 and 258 of 1983 shall not be activated until the condition imposed upon the appellant of that case (the contemnor in this case) complies with the order dated February 25, 1986, regarding deposit of maintenance. From these facts and circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible and inevitable that the contemnor is more than wilful in not obeying the orders of this Court by refusing to pay maintenance allowance to his wife. His attitude has been absolutely nonchalant which amounts to an affront to the Court and its majesty. 7. From these facts and circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible and inevitable that the contemnor is more than wilful in not obeying the orders of this Court by refusing to pay maintenance allowance to his wife. His attitude has been absolutely nonchalant which amounts to an affront to the Court and its majesty. 7. One should bear in mind that those who live by law, like the contemnor here, must stand by law and should not violate the orders of the Court which brings the noble profession of law in disrepute. By his conduct, the contemnor has tarnished the image and glory of law and the law Courts and their orders. He was expected to be more respectful to the judicial pronouncements. But sorry to say that he has thrown to the winds all the norms and decency and respect for the Courts. He has gone to the extent of stating in his reply that his wife has been meeting the Judges of this Court in their chambers with crocodile tears. He has not only wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the orders of this Court but has also continued to do so till today by adopting defiant attitude. It is unfortunate that a practising Advocate of this Court should do such a thing. He deserves deterrent sentence. 8. In this view of the matter, this contempt petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The contemnor is held guilty of contempt of Court under Section 2(b) read with Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. 9. Before parting with the case, I wish to put on the record my appreciation for the work done by Mr. Pai as amicus curiae. The matter was referred to him by the Bar Council of Maharashtra under their programme of extending legal aid to poor litigants. I must say that Mr. Pai has very ably assisted the Court for which the Court is grateful to him. 10. At this stage, Mr. Katikar makes an oral application that the execution of this order be stayed for four weeks as his client would like to file an appeal. The request is granted. CLARIFICATION MADE IN THE OPEN COURT ON FEBRUARY 18, 1992 This petition arose on account of the matrimonial dispute between husband and wife. 10. At this stage, Mr. Katikar makes an oral application that the execution of this order be stayed for four weeks as his client would like to file an appeal. The request is granted. CLARIFICATION MADE IN THE OPEN COURT ON FEBRUARY 18, 1992 This petition arose on account of the matrimonial dispute between husband and wife. The wife has taken contempt proceedings against her husband for not complying with the orders of this Court granting her maintenance allowance. The real contesting parties are thus the husband and the wife. However, the State of Maharashtra has been impleaded as formal party. Mr. K.K. Tated, Assistant Government Pleader, was shown as appearing for the State of Maharashtra. Immediately after the conclusion of the arguments in the second session of Friday, the 14th February 1992, I dictated the judgment in the open Court. 15th February, 1992 was a nonworking Saturday for the Court and 16th February, 1992 was a holiday being Sunday. The typed copy of judgment was put up for my signature on Monday, the 17th February 1992. Just at this time it was noticed that my daughter had earlier appeared in this matter on behalf of the State of Maharashtra, a formal party. This fact was not brought to my notice before hearing the matter and dictating the judgment either by the office or by the Court Sheristedar or by the petitioner or by her advocate or by the husband or his advocate. I heard the matter and delivered the judgment, being ignorant of the fact that my daughter, had earlier appeared in the matter. Hence I did not sign the judgment and thought it just, fair and proper to bring this fact to the notice of the learned advocates of both sides and directed the office to notify the matter on board for clarification today. I accordingly clarified the entire position to both sides' advocates. Both of them have no objection to my signing the judgment. Hence, I am now signing the judgment in the open Court in the presence of both sides' advocates. Petition allowed.