JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the relief has been sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 9-1-1989 (Annexure-1), passed by the U.P. Public Service Tribunal, quashing the order dated 29-8-1973 (terminating the services of respondent No. 1) and directing the respondent No. 1, to be in continuous service, with all consequential benefits. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that order of termination of the service of respondent No. 1 was not passed by way of punishment and the principles of natural justice were not required to be followed. As the work and conduct of respondent No. 1 was not found satisfactory hence the order of termination (Annexure No. 3) was correctly passed. Certain reported cases, were also cited where it was held in the matter of some irregularity of service, the principles of natural justice may not be followed. 3. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1, on the other hand, urged that the impugned order was correct, there was no ground for interference, and the cases relied upon were distinguishable. 4. In our opinion as the order of termination of respondent No. 1 was by way of punishment, hence the principles of natural justice ought to have been followed and reasonable opportunity of hearing ought to have been afforded to respondent No. 1 before passing the order terminating his services. Apart from statutory provisions providing the opportunity of hearing before passing the order effecting the legal rights and services of the respondent No. 1, there are three very old maxims, namely, (1) "Audi Alteram Partem" (2) "Nemo Debe Esse Judex Inpropria" and (3) "Qui Aliqnid Statuerit Parte Inalidita Altera Acquum Licet Dixerit Haud Acquum Facerit,." The first connotes that no one may be condemned unheard, the corollary of which is that the person concerned should be given a reasonable notice of the nature of the case to be met (See Errington v. Minister of Health, (1935) 1 KB 249; Franklin v. Minister Tower and Country Planning, (1948) AC 87; John v. Rees, (1970) Ch. D. 345). 5. The second maxim connotes that no one shall be a judge in his own cause. D. 345). 5. The second maxim connotes that no one shall be a judge in his own cause. Tim third maxim connotes that the Authority or the Tribunal must not only decide anything without hearing other side, but must also act and pass such an order that not only justice has been done but it must also appear to have been done. 6. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Janies Louderwill, 470 US 532 : 84 Law Edn, 494, it was held as essential principle of due process, that a deprivation of life, liberty or property be preceded by notice and opportunity of hearing, appropriate to the nature of case. ("See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 US 306 : 94 Law Edn 865). We have described that the root requirement of the due process clause being that an individual be given an opportunity of hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest. ("See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US 371 : 28 Law Edn 2nd 113. 7. In Sita Ram v. District Inspector of Schools, 1985 UPLBEC 783, a Division Bench adopted the observations made of the Supreme Court : "Along course of decisions beginning with Bentley's case, (1723) 1 Str 443, and ending with some very recent cases establish that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet justice of common law will supply omission of the Legislature. The principle of "Audi Alteram Partem" which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard, is part of rules of natural justice." 8. We have not made mention of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner as those were the cases on particular facts of that case and the ratio in those cases need not be extended to the present case. In the present case, it was a definite case of respondent No. 1, who was employed as a temporary Conductor in U.P. Roadways by the Asstt. General Manager, UPSRTC, Gorakhpur and was given extension, from time to time. On 29-8-1973, his services were terminated on account of misconduct, details of which have been given in the impugned order. It was also case of the petitioner that the work, and conduct of respondent No. 1 as Bus Conductor was found extremely unsatisfactory and consequently his services were terminated. On 29-8-1973, his services were terminated on account of misconduct, details of which have been given in the impugned order. It was also case of the petitioner that the work, and conduct of respondent No. 1 as Bus Conductor was found extremely unsatisfactory and consequently his services were terminated. The grounds for termination were that the bus conducted by respondent No. 1 had been checked on 22-8-1973 by the Checking Squad and the conductor was found carrying 10 adults and 5 children passengers without ticket and three cycle etc Just within a week, his services were terminated on 29-8-1973 on account of specific ground of misconduct said to have been committed on 22-8-1973. A finding has been recorded by the Tribunal that no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for showing cause against the alleged misconduct and termination of service. As the services of respondent No. 1 were sought to be terminated on account of alleged misconduct, under the relevant rules and also under the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and also under the general rules, the opportunity of making explanation and the opportunity of hearing was a must. But as no such opportunity of hearing was afforded to respondent No. 1, the. impugned order dated 9-1-1989 allowing the claim petition of respondent No. 1 under Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976, was correct. We find no justification for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as the principles of natural justice have been violated while passing the impugned order of termination. 9. In view of the premises aforesaid, the present petition falls and it is dismissed. The interim stay, if any, is vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.