JUDGMENT 1. - Although several grounds have been raised in this writ petition involving challenge to the order dated 25.3.1991 passed by the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur, I do not consider it necessary to consider all of them, because, in my opinion order of punishment is liable to be quashed on a short point of failure of the respondent No. 2 to comply with the basic principles of natural justice while passing the impugned order of punishment. 2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner, who was at the relevant time, working as Sub Inspector of Police, was served with a memorandum dated 24.6.90 issued by the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur for an inquiry under rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service ( Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. The petitioner denied the charges. A joint inquiry was held against the petitioner and other four delinquents. The Inquiry Officer (Circle Officer, Dausa) conducted the inquiry and recorded a finding of not guilty against all the delinquents including the petitioner. He submitted a report exonerating the petitioner and other four delinquents. The disciplinary authority, namely, the Dy. Inspector General of Police, however, recorded disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and held that although, none of the witnesses had said specifically against the petitioner, it could not have been possible that the complainants were beaten in the police station without his knowledge and it was the duty of the petitioner to have prevented the use of force by the police personnel against the complainants. The disciplinary authority also took into consideration the past record of the petitioner and after having taking note of the fact that his 18 years increments have been stopped and 52 punishments of censure have been awarded, it ordered compulsory retirement of the petitioner and also ordered reduction of his pension by 10%. It has also been ordered that the salary of the petitioner during the period of suspension, except the subsistence allowance already paid to him, shall be forfeited. 3. The petitioner has assailed the order on the ground that once the inquiry officer had recorded a finding of not guilty, the disciplinary authority could not have punished him without giving a notice containing reasons of disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer and without giving him an opportunity of making representation. 3. The petitioner has assailed the order on the ground that once the inquiry officer had recorded a finding of not guilty, the disciplinary authority could not have punished him without giving a notice containing reasons of disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer and without giving him an opportunity of making representation. Further case of the petitioner is that neither of the charges levelled against the petitioner has been found proved even by the disciplinary authority, because, none of the complainants has specifically deposed against the petitioner and yet the disciplinary authority has punished the petitioner for his so called negligence in not preventing the beating to the complainants in the Police Station. The further case of the petitioner is that although his past record has been taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority, no notice regarding past record has been given to him and no opportunity of explanation was afforded to the petitioner in respect of past adverse record. 4. In reply to the writ petition the respondents have stated that the writ petition is not maintainable because, the petitioner has failed to avail remedy of appeal and review available to him under Rules 23 and 34 respectively. It has also been stated that the petitioner had filed a suit for permanent injunction and the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 19.4.91. Thus, the petitioner tried his best to get interim injunction order from the civil court and having remained unsuccessful, he has approached this Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. It has then been stated that the petitioners service record is wholly unsatisfactory. He has been punished on several occasions in the past. The disciplinary authority has legitimately taken into consideration the past record for imposing the punishment. It has been then stated that F.I.R. No. 77/1991 was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 332, 336, 341, 117, 186, 283 and 307 IPC read with Section 4 of P.D.P.P. Act against 12 persons. These persons were arrested by the Police. Some Incident took place between the police personnel and public at large. The petitioner, who was posted at S.H.O. Police Station, Bandikui, misused his power and revengefully gave beating to 12 accused persons with sticks and Chappals and made them walk in under garments throughout the city of Bandikui after handcuffing them, before their production before the Magistrate. Some Incident took place between the police personnel and public at large. The petitioner, who was posted at S.H.O. Police Station, Bandikui, misused his power and revengefully gave beating to 12 accused persons with sticks and Chappals and made them walk in under garments throughout the city of Bandikui after handcuffing them, before their production before the Magistrate. On a complaint having been made against the petitioner and other four delinquents, order of suspension of the petitioner was issued on 24.3.90 by the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur and an inquiry under Rule 16 read with Rule 18 was held. According to the respondents Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur was fully competent to initiate inquiry against the petitioner. The inquiry officer held that the charges are not proved, but the disciplinary authority considered the record of the inquiry and found that charges levelled against the petitioner are proved to the extent that inspite of being Incharge of the Police Station, he took no steps to prevent his subordinates from giving inhuman treatment to the accused persons. According to the respondents, it was not necessary for the disciplinary authority to supply copy of the reasons for disagreement and it was also not necessary for it to give opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 5. So far as the preliminary objection of alternative remedy is concerned, I must observe that availability of alternative remedy in a given case is a factor which the Court is entitled to take into consideration in order to refuse to exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but merely because the alternative remedy is available under the Rules, jurisdiction of this court is not ousted. One of the excepted categories of cases in which the plea of bar of alternative remedy is not invoked by the High Courts is in the matters where allegation of violation of principles of natural justice is involved. For this purpose, I need only make a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antrim Zila Parishad Muzaffarnagar ( AIR 1969 S.C. 556 ) and also of this Court in Vivek Prakash Mathur v/s State of Rajasthan ( 1988 (2) RLR 428 ) : [ 1988(6) SLR 765 (Raj.)] . For this purpose, I need only make a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antrim Zila Parishad Muzaffarnagar ( AIR 1969 S.C. 556 ) and also of this Court in Vivek Prakash Mathur v/s State of Rajasthan ( 1988 (2) RLR 428 ) : [ 1988(6) SLR 765 (Raj.)] . Having regard to the facts of this case, I am of the considered opinion that it is not a fit case in which the petitioner should be non-suited only on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of appeal and failure of the petitioner to avail the same. The other preliminary objection about the petitioner having filed the Civil Suit and having withdrawn the same, is also of no consequence. There is no manner of doubt that the petitioner did file a suit for permanent injunction but it is also clear that the same had been withdrawn before filing of the writ petition. The petitioner may have applied for grant of temporary injunction and may have remained unsuccessful, but, this Court also did not give any relief to the petitioner by way of interim stay and the stay application filed by the petitioner had been dismissed by the Court on 3.12.91 itself. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner cannot be denied relief on the ground that he had earlier filed suit for permanent injunction. 6. Coming to the merits of the case, I find that the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jaipur, has acted in total disregard of the principles of natural justice while passing the impugned order of punishment. Admittedly, the inquiry officer had recorded a finding that the charges levelled against the petitioner are not proved. I am not saying that the disciplinary authority was not entitled to disagree with the findings of the inquiry officer, record its disagreement and pass an order of punishment but, what was required to be done by the disciplinary authority was to have complied with the provisions of Rules 16(9), 16(10) and 16(12) of 1958 Rules before passing the order of punishment. At the same time, it ought to have complied with the minimum requirement of principles of natural justice. 7. At the same time, it ought to have complied with the minimum requirement of principles of natural justice. 7. In Hari Narain Goyal v/s R.S. W.H. Corporation and others (1983 R.L.R 520) , this court has held that in case where the disciplinary authority dis-agrees with the findings of 'not guilty' recorded by the inquiry officer, it must record reasons for its disagreement and communicate the same to the delinquent and give an opportunity of submitting explanation to the delinquent in regard to, those reasons for disagreement. After an elaborate discussion on the subject, I have in , Vijai Singh v. R.S.R.T.C, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1372/1984 decided on 7.10.92 , held that every quasi judicial authority is under an obligation to furnish all adverse materials to a party against whom an order affecting his/its civil rights is passed. The party against whom order is sought to be made has a right to know about the adverse material and to offer his/its explanation. In departmental proceedings the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, if they are adverse to the delinquent, are required to be supplied. This is the consistent view taken by this court in large number of decided cases. If the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer which arc favourable to the delinquent, it has to record its reasons. The delinquent can get an opportunity to know about these reasons only when a notice of the reasons of disagreement is given to him. If the disciplinary authority imposes the punishment without communicating those reasons to the delinquent, the disciplinary authority will be held to have acted on the basis of adverse circumstances without giving an opportunity of explanation to the delinquent. Even in cases, where the Statutory Rules are not applicable, compliance of the principles of natural justice is implicit and in the present case, apart from the rules of natural justice, even the bare requirement of rule 16(9) warrants that the disciplinary authority must consider the record of inquiry as referred to in Rule 16(8) and record its findings on the charges levelled against the delinquent together with its reasons for disagreement. Although the Rule 16(10) has been amended vide notification dated 10.6.83, this Court has taken the view that supply of copy of inquiry report together with reasons for disagreement is still necessary. Although the Rule 16(10) has been amended vide notification dated 10.6.83, this Court has taken the view that supply of copy of inquiry report together with reasons for disagreement is still necessary. Rule 16(12) clearly brings out this obligation of the disciplinary authority. The use of the words "if not already supplied to the delinquent" used in Rule 16 it is incumbent on the disciplinary authority to furnish a copy of the report of inquiry officer together with reasons for disagreement. 8. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the copy of inquiry report and for that reasons for disagreement have not been made available to the petitioner. Thus, there is clear violation of Rules 16(9) and 16(10) and 16(12) of 1958 Rules. Rule 16(9) has been held to be mandatory by the two division bench decisions of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Amolak Chand ( 1983 RLR 246 ) and Vasudeo K Hardasani v. State of Rajasthan ( 1989(1) RLR 99 ) . 9. Thus, on account of clear violation of Rule 16(9) and the principles of natural justice the impugned order of punishment is liable to be set aside. 10. There is yet another serious infirmity with which the order of disciplinary authority suffers. A look at the order of the disciplinary authority shows that it has relied on the past adverse record of the petitioner for imposing penalty of compulsory retirement. Rule 14 of 1958 Rules provides that any of the penalties specified in the rule can be imposed for good and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. This rules postulates application of mind of the disciplinary authority regarding the quantum of punishment which is required to be imposed on the delinquent. The disciplinary authority is required to record reasons which must be good and sufficient. When the reasons are recorded the Court has a right to examine the validity of those reasons. In imposing a particular punishment the disciplinary authority has a right to look into the record of the delinquent employee. Such record may contain good entries or may contain bad entries. Such bad entries may be in the form of adverse remarks or punishments. In imposing a particular punishment the disciplinary authority has a right to look into the record of the delinquent employee. Such record may contain good entries or may contain bad entries. Such bad entries may be in the form of adverse remarks or punishments. But, before the adverse service record is taken into consideration it is incumbent on the disciplinary authority to give a notice to the delinquent about it proposal to consider the past adverse record for imposing a particular punishment. In State of Mysore v. K Manche Gowda ( AIR 1964 S.C. 506 ) the Supreme Court held that, if the past record of a delinquent is taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority without notice to him, the order of punishment is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. Since, in the present case, no notice was given to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority before taking into consideration the past record order of punishment of compulsory retirement has to be held as contrary to the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed. 11. "There is one more reason as why the order of punishment passed against the petitioner must be quashed. The disciplinary authority has itself observed that nobody has specifically stated against the petitioner, but being Incharge of the Police Station, it could not have been possible that the accused were given beating without the knowledge of the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner cannot escape his responsibilities. A look at the charges levelled against the petitioner shows that the allegation levelled against the petitioner is that he took out the accused from the custody one by one at about 2.30 P.M. and gave beating in collaboration with Ratan Lal, Head Constable, Purshottam Singh and Hari Om Constables and that he took 12 accused persons handcuffed and in under garments to the Court of the Magistrate and this was done with the object of humiliation and bringing the accused persons in disrepute. When these charges have not been found proved by the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority also says that nobody has specifically stated against the petitioner, it was not open to the disciplinary authority to punish the petitioner for his negligence to prevent the happening with the accused at the Police Station. When these charges have not been found proved by the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority also says that nobody has specifically stated against the petitioner, it was not open to the disciplinary authority to punish the petitioner for his negligence to prevent the happening with the accused at the Police Station. Although the petitioner may have neglected in the performance of his duties, but unless he was charged with the allegation of negligence it was not open to the disciplinary authority to punish him with that charge. 12. The disciplinary authority was apparently over enthusiastic in punishing the petitioner. This is evident from the nature of the penalty imposed by it. Apart from the order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner by way of punishment is/has ordered with holding of 10% pension of the petitioner and forfeiture of salary during the period of suspension. Since no period of with holding of 10% pension has been specified, it can be assumed that the penalty will remain operative for the remaining life-time of the petitioner. The disciplinary authority has not recorded any finding that the petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct. Apart from the fact that the disciplinary authority has not given any notice to the petitioner of proposing a penalty of with holding of 10% of his pension, Rule 14 does not specify with holding of pension or a part thereof, as a punishment. Such punishment can be imposed only under Rule 170 of the Rajasthan Service Rules and that too by the Governor. Therefore, it must be held that in awarding punishment the disciplinary authority has exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction and it has acted in utter disregard of the statutory Rules.For the above mentioned reasons, the order dated 25.3.91 passed by the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Jaipur, is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated and shall be given all consequential benefits.Petition allowed. *******