JUDGMENT A.B. Srivastava, J. 1. This is a defendant's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 14-2-1975, passed by Sri G.B Singh then IV Additional District Judge, Kanpur, whereby he confirmed the trial court decree for eviction, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation while setting aside the decree for a sum of Rs. 500/- as damages for alleged demolition of a wall. Suit no 647 of 1968 was filed by the plaintiff- respondent alleging that it is a registered partnership firm, entiled to sue through one of its partners Ram Chandra Prasad Agarwal. The defendants- appellants were the plaintiffs-tenants of an ahata, bearing Municipal No 118/ 299, situated In Mohalla Kaushalpuri, Kanpur City on Rs. 85/- per month as rent They, however, sublet a portion of the premises in their tenancy to one Gurubux Singh alias Buxi Singh, resident of house No. 118/339 Kaushalpuri without the permission of the plaintiffs. The said subtenant has further constructed a new puce a wall, put a 'chhappar', cattle troughs tethering pegs and tin shed in the premises in question. The defendants also demolished a portion of the eastern and southern boundary walls of the plaintiffs and misappropriated its bricks valued Rs. 500/-. They have also created nuisance by digging a big pit in the ahata and storing cow dung therein. On account of these acts of theirs the defendants have rendered themselves liable to ejectment. The plaintiff, accordingly, serued two notices, one dated 2-8-1968 and the other dated 24-8-1968, on the defendants. The notice dated 24-8- 1968 was served on 27-8-1968 and on expiry of one month period on 26-9-1968 the tenancy stood determined. The suit was, accordingly, filed for ejectment, arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation and also Rs. 500/- as damages for misappropriation of the bricks. 2. The defendants-appellants who contested the suit, admitted the factum of service of notice but denied rest of the contentions. They pleaded that the plaintiff, a firm, could not be the lessor of the premises in question nor has it any right to terminate the tenancy or file the suit for ejectment and damages etc. against the defendants. They denied having sublet any portion of the promises in question to Gurubux Singh and also denied having made any construction or material alterations in the premises in question or having committed nuisence. against the defendants. They denied having sublet any portion of the promises in question to Gurubux Singh and also denied having made any construction or material alterations in the premises in question or having committed nuisence. The learned Munsif who tried the suit held that the suit as framed is competent, the plaintiffs have proved the factum of subletting and nuisance and also the defendants having demolished a portion of the plaintiff's boundary wall and used its bricks in making new construction. The tenancy of the defendants having been terminated by a valid notice they are liable to ejectment. He, accordingly, decreed the plaintiff's suit in toto. 3. The learned first appellate court in appeal confirmed the findings of the trial court on all the issues except the finding regarding alleged demolition of the boundary wall and causing damages to the extent of Rs. 500/- or having made material alterations. He, accordingly allowed the appeal in part, set aside the judgment and decree awarding Rs. 500/- as damages and confirmed the decree for eviction, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation Aggrieved the defendants have come up in appeal to this Court. 4. Learned counsel for both the sides have been heard and the record of the courts below has been perused. The questions raised in this appeal are that the plaintiff firm not being a juristic person was not competent to terminate the tenancy of the defendants or to file a suit for eviction arrears of rent etc. The finding of the courts below on the question of subletting is based on no evidence, whereas the finding regarding commission of nuisance is perverse. Now those may be examined. 5. Taking up first the question as to whether the termination of tenancy and institution of the suit by the plaintiff is competent, the contention on behalf of the defendants-appellants is that the firm not being a juristic person could not enter into a contract of tenancy and consequently could not give the notice to quit nor could it file the suit. 6. There can be no dispute about legal proposition that a firm is not a juristic person and consequently not capable of entering into a contract of tenancy or maintaining a suit as such. 6. There can be no dispute about legal proposition that a firm is not a juristic person and consequently not capable of entering into a contract of tenancy or maintaining a suit as such. But simply because the firm is alleged to be the landlord and notice is given, and suit filed, in its name through a partner, it will not render the suit unsustainable, because the statement that a firm entered into a contract of tenancy is merely a common parlance way of describing the real legal relationship to the effect that, the partners of the firm were a party to the contract. This view finds support from the principles laid down in Puran Chandra v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, 1959 ALJ 343, relied on by the appellants themselves. The principles laid down in J. K Jute Mills Company Limited v. Firm Birdhi Chandra Sumer Mal, AIR 1958 Alld 176 and Saligram Chunni Lal Bahadur and Company v. Abdul Gani, AIR 1953 Assam 206, also support this proposition, 7. In view of the above legal and factual position therefore the two courts below were perfectly justified in their conclusion that there was a valid termination of tenancy of the defendants by means of notice dated 24-8-1968 given by one of the partners of the firm, and the suit filed in the name of the firm through the said partner is competent and maintainable. 8. Now taking up the second question as to whether the defendant- appellants have sub-let a portion of the Ahata in their tenancy, it would be found that the same is concluded by a concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below. They have categorically found that the eastern portion of the Ahata is in the exclusive possession of one Gurubux Singh alias' Buxi Singh, who as per the plaintiff's contention is a resident of a premises adjoining the Ahata in suit. They have categorically found that the eastern portion of the Ahata is in the exclusive possession of one Gurubux Singh alias' Buxi Singh, who as per the plaintiff's contention is a resident of a premises adjoining the Ahata in suit. The conclusion of the two courts below are based on an appraisal of the evidence led by the parties, which included the statements of PW 1, M. C. Mathur, an Advocate Commissioner proving his report of local inspection and the PW 2 Surya Prasad Misra the Manager of the plaintiff firm, who specifically stated that in the year 1968, the defendants sub-let the eastern portion to Gurubux Singh who is in exclusive possession over the same since then The evidence in denial of the DW 1 Madan Singh on these points was simply evasive. Being a finding of fact, it is not open to challenge in this second appeal, more so when it is based on legally admissible evidence. The contention that the report and testimony of the Advocate Commissioner, PW 1, S. C. Mathur could not be relied on in deciding the question of sub-letting is also not tenable in view of the fact that the testimony consisted of what the Commissioner had found on the spot, and not of his opinion or conclusion. The commissioner's report to the effect that in the eastern portion the cattle of Gurubux Singh were tied and he was found managing these cattle, based on occular observation on the spot, is clearly admissible in evidence as local inspection for such purpose is clearly envisaged by rule 9 of Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. It is true that there was no direct evidence led about any contract of sab-tenancy or payment of rent by Gurubux Singh to the defendants, but in its very nature such a sub-letting being clandestine affair direct evidence cannot ordinarily be available. What is necessary is that the sub-tenant must be in exclusive possession over the tenanted property or any specific portion thereof. The plaintiff having proved the same the courts below were justified in their conclusion about sub-letting the decree for eviction on this ground thus is fully justified. 10. What is necessary is that the sub-tenant must be in exclusive possession over the tenanted property or any specific portion thereof. The plaintiff having proved the same the courts below were justified in their conclusion about sub-letting the decree for eviction on this ground thus is fully justified. 10. Now as to the next question regarding nuisance also it would be found that there is a clear finding of the two courts below that, it was not as if the defendants were keeping the cow-dung in the Ahata in question temporarily rather, a large quantity thereof was stored in the Ahata and a pit had also been dug for the purpose. Storage of cowdung in open, in such large quantity, and long period obviously constituted nuisance and the defendants incurred the liability of eviction on this count also. In view of these foregoing conclusions therefore the suit of the plaintiff for ejectment, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation was rightly decreed by the courts below. This appeal has accordingly to fail. 11. The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs to the plaintiff- respondent. Appeal dismissed.