Honble K.C. AGRAWAL, C. J. — This writ petition has been filed by Amrinder Singh S/o Tara Singh, who is being tried for the offence under sections 4 and 5 of the Anti Hijacking Act, 1982 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) in case No. ASC/Ajmer/1/1985 pending before the Addl. Special Court (Judicial Zone Chandigarh) at Central Jail, Ajmer established under section 7 (2) of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984. 2. Sections 4 and 5 of the aforesaid Act read as under :- "Section-4 Punishment for Hijacking- Whoever commits the offence of hijacking shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. Section-5 Punishment for acts of violence connected with hijacking-Whoever, being a person committing the offence of hijacking of an aircraft, commits, in connection with such offence, any act of violence against any passenger or member of the crew of such aircraft, shall be punished with the same punishment with which he would have been punishable under any law for the time being in force in India if such act had been committed in India." 3. The petitioners counsel urged that so far as Section 4 of the Act is concerned, the maximum and minimum punishment for hijacking is life imprisonment. The Judge trying the offence under section-4 has not been conferred any discretion to award lesser punishment than to life imprisonment, which has been made mandatory in the case of hijacking of an aircraft. 4. The counsel for the petitioner urged that the aforesaid provision contained in Section-4 infringed Sections 235 (2) and 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. Section 235 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides : "Sec. 235 (2) : If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law." 6. Section-354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides : "Sec. 354 (3) When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence." 7. Clause (2) of Section 235 Cr.P.C. was newly added and it did not exist in the old Code of 1898. This provision is according to the new trend in penology and envisages that after a Court holds a person guilty, it must consider the question of sentencing in the light of various factors such as the prior criminal record of the offender, his age, employment, educational background, home life, sobriety and social adjustment, emotional and mental condition, and the prospects of his returning to normal path of conformity with the law. This, however, did not apply to the trials provided under the Act. 8. At this place, we may make a mention of Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ordinarily, the Code will not affect (i) any special law (ii) any local law (iii) any special jurisdiction or power and (iv) any special form of procedure. 9. The Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982 is a special law. The trials under this Act have to be conducted and concluded in the manner provided in that Act. Section 235 (2) Cr.P.C. does not apply to the trials of Anti Hijacking Act. 10. Similarly, Section 354 (3) has no applicability to the present case. This sub-section cast a duty on the Court to give special reasons for awarding sentence of death in a capital case in order that the High Court is in a position to judge whether lower court has exercised its discretion judicially and also to provide material to the authorities concerned at the time of considering the mercy petition by the condemned accused. 11. In the case under the Anti Hijacking Act, only one punishment has been provided and that is under section-4. 12. In recent years, there has been an increase in offences by way of unlawful seizure of aircraft or hijacking. A convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of Aircraft was drawn up at the diplomatic conference held at the Hague in December, 1970 for adoption by States, by the representatives of 77 Governments. For dealing more effectively with offences involving unlawful seizure of aircraft or hijacking, India rectified the convention which involved obligation for making necessary legal provisions for giving effect thereto. 13. For dealing more effectively with offences involving unlawful seizure of aircraft or hijacking, India rectified the convention which involved obligation for making necessary legal provisions for giving effect thereto. 13. The salient features of the convention are : "a) Nature of acts to which the convention applies-The Hague Convention has created a new international offence, the offence of unlawful seizure of aircraft alias, hijacking. The convention covers offences committed by any person on board an aircraft in flight. A person who unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes or exercises control of the aircraft, commits the offence of hijacking, whatever his nationality and whatever the State in which the aircraft is registered and whether the aircraft is in India or elsewhere. The convention applies equally to attempts made and to accpmplices who are on board the aircraft. The convention calls for the offences to be made punishable by several penalties. b) Aircraft to which the convention does not apply-The convention does not apply to military aircraft or to aircraft belonging to customs or police service. c) The convention is applicable only to aircraft in flight but that is say, from the moment when all its external doors are closed following the embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation, or in the case of forced landing-until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board. Any pre-flight or post-flight attempt at hijacking will primarily be the • concern of the territorial State and not within the scope of the convention. d) the prime purpose of the convention is to ensure the punishment to hijacker so as to deter hijacking. To this end, the convention obliges every contracting State in whose territory an alleged hijacker is found either to extradite him or to punish him." 14. The object of this Act was to deter hijacking. To this end, the Convention obliges every contracting State in whose territory an alleged hijacker is found, either to extradite him or to punish him. 15. As stated above, the purpose of passing the Act was to deter hijacking. The object of this Act was to deter hijacking. To this end, the Convention obliges every contracting State in whose territory an alleged hijacker is found, either to extradite him or to punish him. 15. As stated above, the purpose of passing the Act was to deter hijacking. This has been dealt with by Starke in his book on Introduction to International Law at page 64 :- "Several law making conventions have been concluded in regard to matters of international criminal law, for example, the Geneva Conventions dealing with the Suppression of counterfeiting Currency (1929), and with the Suppression of the International Drug Traffic (1936), the Single Narcotic Drugs Convention adopted at New York in 1961, the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), the Hague Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970), and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971). Under these conventions: States have concerted or may concert their action for the punishment of certain international offences or crimes in which individuals alone were concerned. Thereby, delinquents such as international drug traffickers and counterfeiters and persons hijacking an aircraft, have become subjects of conventional rules of International Criminal law in much the same v ay as, although not to the same extent as pirates jure gentium under customary rules." Oppenheim states : "International Law imposes the duty upon every State as far as possible to prevent its own subjects, and such foreign subjects as live within its territory, from committing injurious acts against other States. A State which either intentionally and maliciously or through culpable negligence does not comply with this duty commits an international delinquency for which it has to bear original responsibility...(A) State must, according to International Law, bear vicarious responsibility for such injurious acts of private individuals as it is unable to prevent." 16. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Parliament contravened the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution in not providing discretion to the Courts in the matter of awarding punishment and laying down that a person convicted for the offences contemplated by the said Act would be liable to life imprisonment. Such a provision was in breach of Art. 21 of the Constitution which provides : "Art. 21. Such a provision was in breach of Art. 21 of the Constitution which provides : "Art. 21. Protection of life and personal liberty-No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." 17. Counsel for the petitioners submission was that rehabilitation being the sentencing purpose, the more serious the offence, the more damaged must be the personality of the offender, and hence, he must be detained by the State in order to repair the damage. 18. The submission has no substance. We have noticed above while quoting the passage of the Hague Convention that the purpose of passing the Act was providing deterrent punishment. That purpose, the Parliament thought, could be achieved by providing life imprisonment in each and every case where the offence is established. For this purpose, a Judge was not given discretion to award different punishments in different cases. 19. The Parliament intended that there should be no sentencing disparity and for this purpose, Section-4 was enacted. The sentencing task is so complex, with so many factors to be taken into account that no two cases are alike. That will be maintained particularly when the purpose of the sentence has been described as rehabilitative and tailored to suit the defendants needs. But, here the offence is so grave and it affects the country so tremendously that the Parliament did not want to take the risk of awarding any sentence than life imprisonment. This Act had been passed on the lines of the Convention in which 77 countries of the world decided to take up the offence of hijacking seriously and in every country the Convention laid down that the sentence should be the same. 20. When the Parliament has enacted a law, which was within its competence, it is not open to this Court to hold it to be ultra vires the Constitution or Art. 21 of the Constitution. For trial of all the accused, the procedure is the same. 21. Cooley in his book on A Treatise on the constitutional limitations has said. "In exercising this high authority, the Judges claim no judicial super-macy; they are only the administrators of the public will. For trial of all the accused, the procedure is the same. 21. Cooley in his book on A Treatise on the constitutional limitations has said. "In exercising this high authority, the Judges claim no judicial super-macy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." 22. The moment a court ventures to substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature, where the Constitution has vested the legislature with power over the subject, that moment it enters upon a field where it is impossible to set limits to its authority, where its discretion alone will measure the extent of its interference. Any legislative Act which does not infringe the Constitution has to be presumed valid and must be enforced. 23. Counsel for the petitioner urged that by the decision in Bachan Singh V/s State of Punjab (1), the Supreme Court held Section 302 I.P.C. to be valid and, as such, the ratio decidendi of Bachan Singhs case shall govern the question as to the validity of any penal provision. 24. We are not in agreement with the submission made by the petitioners counsel. In that case, the controversy was different than what is before us. 25. In the present case, Section-4 of the Act provides only one sentence. It cannot be said that Section-4 is invalid on that ground. 26. For the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.