P. K. Babri ( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against order of the Rentcontroller dated 6/11/1992, by which he, while refusing to grantleave to defend to the petitioner, has passed an eviction order on the groundof eviction covered by Section 14c of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment)Act, 1988. ( 2 ) S. Gurbax Singh, Gurnam Singh (two sons of deceased Arjansingh) and Smt. Ranjit Kaur, Smt. Gursharan Kaur and Smt. Ranbir Kaurthree married daughters of Arjan Singh) had filed the petition seekingeviction of the petitioner tenant from the rooms, kitchen, latrine, bath. two. stores, as shown in red colour in plan filed alongwith the petition, located inea-32, Inderpuri. New Delhi. The eviction was sought on the ground thatgurbax Singh, the co-landlord/co-owner of -the property, who had retiredfrom Government service as Head Clerk in the year 1979 and had vacatedthe Govt. accommodation and was presently residing with his son in atenanted "house at D-5, Naraina Vihar, bonafide requires the demisedpremises for occupation for himself and members of his family. The property originally was owned by his parents, who had since died leaving behindonly the respondents as the co-owners/landlords. It is admitted case thatprior to filing of the present petition on the basis of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Act 57 of 1988) which introduced this new groundof eviction covered by Section 14c, the respondents bad already filed aneviction petition on the ground of bonafide covered by Clause (e) of provisoto Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, inwhich leave to defend had been granted to the tenant, inter alia, on his pleathat the premises in question had been let out to him for residential-cum-commercial purposes. ( 3 ) THE present eviction petition, thus, was based on a new cause ofaction which became available to Gurbax Singh on the basis of the amendment of the Act and the respondents brought a petition within the limitationprescribed under the statute. ( 4 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner in challenging the eviction order hasurged that as the leave to defend application filed by the tenant in the previous eviction case brought under Section 14 (1) (e) was allowed and thateviction case is still pending, in the present eviction petition also leave todefend application should have been allowed and at any rate, the presentpetition ought to have been stayed till the disposal of the previous evictionpetition. ( 5 ) THERE is no merit in this contention because the present petitionis based on a new cause of action. There is lot of difference between therequirements which are liable to be proved for seeking eviction on the groundcovered by Section 14 (1) (e) and the requirements which are required to beproved for having eviction on the ground covered by Section 14c. A veryimportant ingredient to be proved in the petition filed on the ground ofeviction covered by Section 14 (1) (e) is that the demised premises have beenlet out only for residential purposes which ingredient is not liable to beproved for succeeding on the ground of eviction covered by Section 14c. Itis evident that this amendment which has brought about Section 14c on thestatute has given a new ground of eviction to a special type of landlords whoretire from Government service. So it cannot be said that the leave to defendapplication filed in the present case should have been allowed on mereground that the leave to defend application had been allowed in the previouscase or that the present eviction petition is liable to be stayed till the disposalof the previous eviction petition. ( 6 ) THE most important contention raised by the learned Counsel forthe petitioner is with regard to interpretation of Section 14c as to whetherthe said ground of eviction could be made available to the co-owner whohad not himself let out the premises. On first principle if this Court was toexamine this point, there could be some possibility of agreeing with thelearned Counsel for the petitioner with regard to interpretation of Section14c where the words clearly indicate that landlord who is retired employee ofthe Central Government or the Delhi Administration could bring a titionfor eviction if the premises have been let out by him and are required for bisown residence. However, this point came to be settled by the Supreme Courtin a case decided by three Hon ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Smt. Kanta Goel v. B. P. Pathak and Others. AIR 1977 SC 1599 . A new ground ofeviction had been introduced in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which isprovided in Section 14a. That also gives a right to a particular type of landlord to recover immediate possession of residential accommodation of anypremises let out by him. AIR 1977 SC 1599 . A new ground ofeviction had been introduced in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which isprovided in Section 14a. That also gives a right to a particular type of landlord to recover immediate possession of residential accommodation of anypremises let out by him. While interpreting these words let out by him thesupreme Court in the aforesaid case clearly laid down that Section 14a isevailable as a ground if the premises are owned by him as inherited from hispropositus in whose name the property stood. It was laid down that in hisname and let out by him read in the spirit of the provision and withoutviolence to the words of the Section, elearly convey the idea that thepremises must be owned by him directly which is the case where he, as heir,steps into his father s shoes who owned the building in his own name andlet it out himself. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, placed relianceon another case decided by the Supreme Court in S. Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India and Another, JT 1991 (1) SC 417. This is a judgment againgiven by three Hon ble Judges. The ground of eviction which came up forconsideration by the Supreme Court was Section 14b which gives an immediate right to recover possession of the premises to the members of the armedforces who are to retire. Section 14b also has the words the premises let outby him . However, the question which arose for decision before the Supremecourt was not with regard to interpretation of the said words. The tenants inthe said case had challenged the vires of amending Act (57 of 1988) whichwere brought on the statute book as Sections 14b to 14d. It appears thatwhile bringing on statute those special provisions which give specific rights tocertain classified landlords, the amending Act did not amend the provisionsof Section 25b although the eviction petitions have to be tried summarilyunder the provisions of Section 25b. Summons which were required to beissued in accordance with Sec. 25b Sub-sec. (2) did not pertain to the newgrounds of eviction covered by Sections 14b, 14c and 14d. Even the thirdschedule which contains the form of the summons did not refer to the newprovisions as it was not modified. Summons which were required to beissued in accordance with Sec. 25b Sub-sec. (2) did not pertain to the newgrounds of eviction covered by Sections 14b, 14c and 14d. Even the thirdschedule which contains the form of the summons did not refer to the newprovisions as it was not modified. The Supreme Court held that keeping inview the intention of the legislature as expressed in Sections 14b to 14d, thecourt could supply the words which inadvertently were not supplied by thelegislature in the relevant Section 25b and the Schedule. SO, the question which has arisen for decision in the present case orwhich had been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kantagoel (supra) never arose for consideration in the case of Surjit Singh Kalrabefore the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Singhkalra whiland comparing the provisions of Section 14 (1) (e) with the provisionsof Section 14b in para 12 observed, "but Section 14-B narrows down suchright. It is he who has let out alone could evict. . . ". ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed emphaticreliance on these observations appearing in this judgment. But the learnedcounsel forgets that the Supreme Court was not interpreting the said wordsappearing in Section 14b in the context in which they had been interpretedby the Supreme Court in the previous case while interpreting those wordsspecifically appearing in Section 14a. So, it cannot be said that the Supremecourt had laid down any different interpretation than what had been givenby the Supreme Court in the earlier case while interpreting the similarwords. ( 9 ) EVEN if assuming for the sake of arguments that there is someconflict of decisions between the two judgments even then as both the judgments are by equal strength of Judges and the subsequent judgment does nottake notice of the previous judgment, the ratio laid down in the previousjudgment will still hold the field and would be binding. It has been held bythe Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR1989 SC 1335, that there is hierarchy within the Courts itself here wherelarger Benches over-rule small Benches. It has been held bythe Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, AIR1989 SC 1335, that there is hierarchy within the Courts itself here wherelarger Benches over-rule small Benches. In the well-known case of A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak and Another, AIR 1988 SC 1531 , it was held thatthe practice as developed in the Supreme Court is that a larger Bench isentitled to over-rule the decision of small Bench notwithstanding the factthat each of the decision is that of the Court. The learned Counsel for thepetitioner has cited MM. Yaragatti v. Vasant and Others, AIR 1987 Kar 186 , where a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court had held that ifthere is conflict between decisions of co-equal Benches of the Supreme Court,then the later view should be followed. I am of the view that this is not thecorrect proposition of law : Once it is clear that a Bench of equal strengthcannot over-rule the decision rendered by Bench of same strength thenobviously it is the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court which would bebinding and not the later judgment particularly when the later judgment hasnot taken note of the ratio laid down in the previous judgment. For parityof reason, the judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court ingujarat Housing Board v. Nagajibhai Laxmanbhai and Others, AIR 1986gujarat 81, could not be considered to have laid down the correct proposi-tion of law. ( 10 ) IN Ajudhia Pershad Ram Per shad v. Sham Sunder and Others AIR 1947 Lah 13 (15), it has been held that no Division Bench of a Highcourt, even if it disagreed with the decision of another Division Bench ofthat High Court, would be competent to overrule it. In Sashi Bhusan Ratv. Bhuneshwar Rai and Others, AIR 1955 Pat 124 , it was laid down thatin case there are two conflicting decisions of the Division Benches of a Highcourt, the opinion expressed by the former Division Bench must prevail. ( 11 ) AT any rate, this question is only academic because that judgment given by the Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Kalra s case (supra) is noton the point arising for decision before this Court and which was directlysubject-matter of decision before the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kanta Gael (supra ). ( 11 ) AT any rate, this question is only academic because that judgment given by the Supreme Court in Surjit Singh Kalra s case (supra) is noton the point arising for decision before this Court and which was directlysubject-matter of decision before the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kanta Gael (supra ). Same view has been expressed by a Single Bench of thiscourt while deciding C. M. (Main) No. 241/91, B. N. Bajaj v. Maj Gen. S. N. Puri, decided on December 12, 1991. A Division Bench of this Court inthe case of B. N. Chanana v. Union of India etc. 1990 Rajdhani Law Reporter (DB) 68, also had followed Smt. Kanta Gael s case (supra) and so also asingle Bench has given the same interpretation following the case of Smt. Kanta Gael (supra) in the case of Mrs. Sarla Luthra v. Gadore Tools (P) Ltd. 1993 RLR 22 . ( 12 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has then contended thatthere is no proof that the respondents were heirs of the deceased owner/landlord. It is surprising that such a contention has been raised before thiscourt. I have gone through the pleadings and find that in the leave to defendapplication as well as in the affidavit filed alongwith the application the petitioner has categorically admitted that the eviction petition has been brought. by the co-owners/landlords. There was no plea taken that the persons whohave filed the eviction petition were not the legal heirs of the owner. The onlyplea taken was that there were two other legal heirs, namely, Surjit Singh ands. J. S. Narang. In the counter-affidavit it was pleaded by the owners/landlords that both of them are dead. In rejoinder the petitioner pleaded thatlegal heirs of the said persons have not been joined as co-landlords and coowners. It was specifically put to Counsel for the landlords/owners as towhether there are any other legal heir left by those two persons. It wasstated that except the respondents landlords/owners no other legal heirshave been left by those persons. No affidavit was filed by the tenant as towho are those legal heirs, if any, of the deceased persons who have been notjoined as respondents. So, I hold that there is no merit in this contentionraised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner which I hereby, negative. No affidavit was filed by the tenant as towho are those legal heirs, if any, of the deceased persons who have been notjoined as respondents. So, I hold that there is no merit in this contentionraised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner which I hereby, negative. ( 13 ) IT was then contended by the learned Counsel for the petitionerthat Gurbax Singh had retired from the service since long and thus, hecannot take advantage of Section 14c. Similar contention was raised in thecase of Surjit Singh Kalra in respect of similar ground of eviction covered bysection 14b. It was held that the statute gives a right to even the retiredofficer to bring a petition within a period of one year from the introductionof the said provision by the Amending Act, 1988 and the petition havingbeen brought within one year of the date of the enforcement of the Amending Act cannot be considered not maintainable because the officer had retiredlong back. In the present case, the ingredients which go to consitute a newground of eviction covered by Section 14c clearly are established and in thepresent case the Rent Controller was fully justified in declining the leave todefend application and in passing the eviction order against the petitioner. ( 14 ) BEFORE parting with the case I may mention that the learnedcounsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment ofthis Court in Smt. Abnash Kaur v. Dr. Avinash Nayyar and Others, 1974 Rent Control Reporter 350, where the Full Bench had held that a landlord is entitled to file a new eviction petition on the strength of a new cause of actionarising subsequently to the filing of the previous petition. The landlordhas a choice either to seek amendment of the previous evictionpetition or tobring a new eviction petition. The Full Bench held that in practice the landlord would be well advised in amending the previous eviction petition ratherthan filing a separate one. The Full Beach has not laid down the law that ifa separate eviction petition is brought on the new cause of action the samewould not be maintainable or is liable to be stayed till the decision of theprevious eviction petition. What the Full Court was considering was whetherthe amendment of the eviction petition already pending could be permissibleor not for including a new ground of eviction arising during the pendency ofthe eviction petition. What the Full Court was considering was whetherthe amendment of the eviction petition already pending could be permissibleor not for including a new ground of eviction arising during the pendency ofthe eviction petition. The Full Bench held, that such an amendment could beallowed. So, nothing mentioned in this judgment is of any help to thepetitioner in the present case. Another judgment cited by the learned Counselfor the petitioner is Mohammad Khalil Khan and Others v. Mahbub Ali Mianand Others, AIR 1949 Privy Council 78. It was laid down in this judgmentthat the correct test in cases falling under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code ofcivil Procedure is whether the claim in the new suit is, in fact, foundedupon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for theformer suit. In case the causes of action in the two suits are the same, thenthe new suit cannot proceed. This ratio is not applicable in the present casewhere the ground of eviction covered by Section 14c is distinct and differentfrom the ground of eviction covered by Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act. No other point has been urged before me. I find no merit in this petition which I, hereby, dismiss with costs.