JUDGMENT 1. BY this revisional application, the plaintiff/petitioners impugned order No. 34 dated 2. 9. 92 passed by the learned Munsif, Jalpaiguri in O. C. Suit No. 29 of 1987 rejecting the petition of the plaintiffs under section 151 of the C. P. C. 2. IN a brief conspectus the: fact of the case is, as alleged, that the new shares issued by the defendant/company are not according to law and no occasion arose for issuing such new shares. In issuing such charges the defendant malafide attempted to convert majority shareholders into minority share-holders. So a suit by the plaintiff for declaration that the decision of the board of the defendant/company dated 19th May, 1986 and the purported offer of the defendant company dated 6th January, 1987 and the purported decision of the Board of the defendant company dated 10th february, 1987 and the purported modified order dated 28th February, 1987 in respect of the right shares are illegal, wrongful, without jurisdiction, ultra vires the Act and the Articles of Association of the defendant company, for Receiver, injunction, costs etc. and the same was registered as O. S. Suit No. 29 of 1987 in the Court of Munsif, Jalpaiguri. The suit was contested by the defendant company by filing a Written statement denying all the material allegations in the plaint and the learned munsif dismissed the suit on contest with costs. 3. THE learned Appeal Court allowed the appeal on contest without costs and remitted the case to the Trial Court with the direction to give opportunity to the parties to examine witnesses and to produce documents in addition to what have already been on record and to give a chance to the plaintiff to amend the plaint, for and for adding State Bank of India, jalpaiguri Branch as a party to the suit as the Bank is a necessary party. 4. AFTER remamd the suit was fixed for peremptory hearing on 31st october, 1992 and the plaintiff, in the meantime, on 29th August, 1992 filed an application under Section 151 of the C. P. C. for passing the decree on the. basis of the subsequent event. Though the application was board of the data but the order was passed on 2. 9. 92. basis of the subsequent event. Though the application was board of the data but the order was passed on 2. 9. 92. The subsequent event, that has been pleaded by the plaintiff in its application under Section 151 of the C. P. C. is that there was a boom in the tea market and from the balance sheet of the defendant No. 1 for the year ending 31st March, 1991, it transpires that the defendant No. 1 made a gross profit of Rs. 96,55,263. 64 and the said defendant declared a dividend for a sum of Rs. 3,15,000/- for the year ending March 31, 1991 at the rate of 60% in the share capital after transfering about Rs. 35,65,000/- to general Reservation. Similarly the defendant declared dividend for rs. 2,62,500/- for the year ending in March 1990 i. e. at the rate of 40% of its capital. In other words, in two years i. e. 1989-90 and 1990-91, the defendant No. 1 declared dividend for a sum of Rs. 5,2!,000/- and the said defendant also transferred a sum of Rs, 34,00,000/- to the General reserve in the year ending in March, 1990. 5. A copy of the balance sheet of the defendant for the year ending 31st march, 1991 was annexed to the said petition under Section 151 C. P. C. and a xerox copy of the same was also filed. The plaintiff prayed in that petition under Section 151 C. P. C. that on the basis of the said subsequent event a decree be passed under Section 151 of the C. P. C. 6. THAT application was objected to by defendant No. 1. Appearing for the petition, Mr. P. N. Chatterjee, the learned Senior advocate, contended that the Court should take into account the subsequent event and pass a decree under Section 151 C. P. C. He also contended that as the balance sheet, a document of the defendant, is admitted by the defendant, a decree should be passed on the basis of such admission under Section 151 of the C. P. C. In support of his contention, reliance was placed on the following decisions :- 1. Ramesh Kumar AIR 19912 SC 700 2. Manohar Lal Chapra AIR 1962 SC 527 3. Kashinath Sankarappa Wani AIR 1958 SC 437 4. Jagarnath Jha AIR 1981 Patna 200 5. Syad Jaleel Zana AIR 1981 AP 328 . 7. MR. Ramesh Kumar AIR 19912 SC 700 2. Manohar Lal Chapra AIR 1962 SC 527 3. Kashinath Sankarappa Wani AIR 1958 SC 437 4. Jagarnath Jha AIR 1981 Patna 200 5. Syad Jaleel Zana AIR 1981 AP 328 . 7. MR. Sankar Mitra, the learned Advocate for the defendant, made five-fold contentions. 8. HIS first contention was that no decree can be passed under Section 151 C. P. C. and in this connection, he pointed out the difference and distinction between order and decree by referring to sub-section (2) and sub-Section (4) of Section 2 of the C. P. C. His next contention was that when there are specific provisions in the act for doing certain things, the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 of the C. P. C. cannot be invoked to do that. In this connection he further submitted that a decree can be passed under Rule (6) of Order 12, order 15 and Order 20 of the C. P. C. and no decree can be passed by the court by exercising its inherent power under Section 151 of the C. P. C. In this connection, he placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision, AIR 1961 sc 218 , Padam Sen's case. 9. HIS third contention was that it is the fixed principle of law that a suit must be tried on the original cause of action and new pleas are not to be considered but it there are change of circumstances, the can form the subject of some other proceeding but cannot be considered in that suit unless the plaint is amended. He also contended that this proposition has few exceptions. Sometimes, original claim becomes inappropriate or the law changes affecting the rights of the parties. In such circumstances, amendments of the plaint are allowed, because changed circumstances shortens the litigations and the circuity of action can be avoided thereby. Reliance was placed in support of this contention] on the Supreme Court's decision in Nair Service Societies Limited, AIR 1968 SC 165. 10. HIS fourth contention was that the Court should intervene with the order challenged, if there is some jurisdictional error in the order impugned. In support of this contention Mr. Mitra relied on a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court R. Cambray and Company (Private) Limited. 1988 (1) CLJ 161. 10. HIS fourth contention was that the Court should intervene with the order challenged, if there is some jurisdictional error in the order impugned. In support of this contention Mr. Mitra relied on a Division Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court R. Cambray and Company (Private) Limited. 1988 (1) CLJ 161. To point out as to the meaning of "illegality" and "with material irregularity" as contained in section 115 of the C. P. C. he cited the case of Ajay Kumar Sinha, 1969 (1) CLJ 556, a Single Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court. His last contention was that the Appeal Court has given directions for disposal of the suit by the Trial Court in a particular way. In view of that directions, it was not open for the Trial Court to pass a decree under section 151 C. P. C. 11. I have given my anxious thought in this matter, I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Chatterjee, the learned senior counsel, for the reasons as under. 12. MR. Chatterjee relied on the Supreme Court decision in Ramesh kumar (supra), where the Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that the normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the suit. But this is subject to an exception. Whenever subsequent events of fact or law. which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court is not precluded from taking a "cautious cognizance", of the consequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. Similar view is taken by the Patna High Court in Jagarnath Jha's case (supra ). True, the Supreme Court is Manohar Lai Chopra's case (supra) inter alia, held that, "the inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code. " their Lordships also relied on a particular passage of Padam Sen's case (supra) where the Supreme Court has held that-The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court, by the Code. " their Lordships also relied on a particular passage of Padam Sen's case (supra) where the Supreme Court has held that-The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court, by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is mot in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. 13. MR. Mitra also placed reliance on the decision in Padam Sen's case (supra ). According to him, when there are specific provisions in the Code for passing the decree, the same cannot be passed under Section 151 of the Code. 14. SIMILAR view has been expressed by the A. P. High Court in the case of sued Jaleel Zena (Supra) where it has been held that the inherent power of the Court to take notice of the subsequent circumstances to do complete justice between the parties and to mould relief accordingly, is undoubted. Where such a course claims to avoid multiplicity of proceeding it is all the more desirable that the court exercises its jurisdiction and inherent power in this direction. There could not be any quarrel to the proposition that under Section 151, the Court can take into consideration the subsequent event. But in this case what is the subsequent event? As has been pleaded by the petitioner in its application under Section 151, the subsequent event is the balance sheet of the defendant No. l for the year ending 31st March, 1991, a copy of which was annexed to the petition under Section 151 and a xerox copy of the same was filed before the trial court. 15. MR. Chatterjee, the learned senior counsel, contended that from the said balance sheet, it would appear that the defendant No. l does not require any further capital and that the cash credit limited to the defendant No. l was enhanced. Accordingly, there is no necessity to raise further capital by issuing right shares. 16. THE said balance sheet has not yet been admitted in evidence by the trial court. The application under Section 151 was filed before the date of hearing. Accordingly, there is no necessity to raise further capital by issuing right shares. 16. THE said balance sheet has not yet been admitted in evidence by the trial court. The application under Section 151 was filed before the date of hearing. The defendant was not called upon by the plaintiff to admit the said balance sheet. Mr. Chatterjee contended that as per Commercial Documents evidence Act, 1939, the said balance sheet ought to have been admitted into evidence, by the trial court. 17. THE Supreme Court, in Kashinath Sankarappa Wani's case (supra)has pointed out that the copy of the balance sheet, which is obtained from the office of the register of Companies, is admissible under that Act, 18. IN the instant case no such copy has been produced before the court. Only a xerox copy has been produced apart from the booklet of the balance sheet, as was annexed in the petition under Section 151 C. P. C. That apart, the contents of such balance sheet has been disputed by the defendant No. l in its objection to the petition under Section 151 of the c. P. C. in different paragraphs of that objection and particularly in paragraph of that objection. The appeal Court has given certain directions to the trial Court for disposal of the suit in certain manner. As per that direction, the plaint has been amended by the plaintiff by adding the State Bank of India, Jalpaiguri as a party/defendant. Additional written statement has already been filed and according to the direction of the appeal court; it is now incumbent on the part of the trial court to record the evidence, both documentary and oral, if so produced. On the face of the said direction, it is not open for the trial court to dispose of the case in some other way. 19. SO, there is no subsequent event before the trial court of which the court could take any cognizance. Accordingly, I find that there is no jurisdictional error committed by the trial court in passing the impugned order and I feel that the impugned order should be sustained. . 20. IN the result, the revisional application is dismissed. All orders of ad-interim stay stand vacated. There will be no order is to costs. Application rejected.