B. S. KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE present Application is filed for challenging the detention order passed by the District Magistrate Bhavnagar on 6th of July 1992 The petitioner was also supplied with the grounds for detention. ( 2 ) ON perusal of the grounds it appears that there were two cases under Prohibition Act against the petitioner one was CR. No. 39/90 and the other was C. R. No. 5/92. There were also statements of four witnesses recorded on 24th February 92 but this statement pertains to different incident. These statements are verified by the District Magistrate himself and on the basis of the aforesaid material and also considering other less drastic remedies the detaining authority arrived at the subjective satisfaction that with a view to preventing petitioner from continuing his activities prejudicial to the public order he should be detained and accordingly the aforesaid order is passed. ( 3 ) IN this matter Mr. J. T. Trivedi learned Advocate appears for the petitioner. He has argued this matter at length before us. The first point which was submitted before us is that C. R. No. 39 which is shown in the grounds for detention as pending on the date when the aforesaid order was passed was in fact disposed of earlier and for that he has relied at the Annexure D of the petition which is at page 46. Annexure D is an extract of the register of cases tried by Judicial Magistrate First Class in summary of Saverkundla and it was in respect of Criminal case No. 1095/90 and the date of commission of offence is shown as 19 July 90 and on perusal of the names of the accused the name of the present accused appears at serial No. 3. As witnesses had turned hostile all the accused were acquitted. The said order is dated 28th February 92 It is submitted that this is a vital fact that should have been brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority and the detaining authority has not applied its mind to this vital aspect and therefore the subjective satisfaction is vitiated and therefore the order of detention should be quashed. ( 4 ) IT may be stated that if this would have been the only ground on which detention order was based the submission was fully justified with the support of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of D. S. Agarwal AIR 1989 S. C page 1282. In this case there is another case also registered against him and also there are four different incidents narrated in the statement of the witnesses. So there are other five grounds also. In view of Section 6 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act 1985 when a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each ground and accordingly such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague non-existent non-relevant not connected or not proximately connected with such person or invalid for any other reason whatsoever and further that it shall not be invalid and or inoperative on the ground that it was not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in Section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention. Sub-section (b) makes it very clear that the Government or the officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. ( 5 ) WHEN language of the Section is very clear with regard to the separate order deemed to have been made on each ground and further on the subjective satisfaction of the officer making the order of detention on the remaining ground or grounds it does not require any authority to support the aforesaid understanding of Section 6 of the PASA Act Still however learned Advocate Mr. J. T. Trivedi submits that as the ground No. 1 of CR. No. 39/90 is not available the subjective satisfaction with regard to the remaining grounds is equally vitiated. This argument is quite contrary to the express language of Section 6 of the Act. J. T. Trivedi submits that as the ground No. 1 of CR. No. 39/90 is not available the subjective satisfaction with regard to the remaining grounds is equally vitiated. This argument is quite contrary to the express language of Section 6 of the Act. He has tried to take support from the judgment in the case of D. S. Agarwal (supra ). The said case was cited before this Court in the case of Chandulal Jethalal Jaiswal vs. Commissioner of Police and in paragraph 25 of the said judgment the said case has also been considered in the light of the judgment in the case of Prakash Chandra Mehta vs. Commissioner and Secretary Government of Kerala 1986 S. C. page 687. It was also pointed out that D. S. Agarwals case was a case wherein the person was detained as he was a dangerous person as per the definition of the PASA Act. There was five cases registered against him out of which there was compromise under case No. 1 and one another case was also compromised. Two were shown to be pending trial where in fact that was not the correct statement inasmuch as the said cases were already disposed of before the detaining authority passed the order of detention. Therefore in fact there was only one order pending and therefore it cannot be held to be the dangerous person unless he is a habitual offender. In the background of the aforesaid facts the observations were made by the Supreme Court in that case. Further in view of the fact that there are five other grounds in this case as per Section 6 there are separate detention orders with subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for the remaining grounds as per clause (b) of Section 6. The said judgment of D. S. Agarwal (supra) therefore would not be applicable in such cases. Further in view of the fact that there are five other grounds in this case as per Section 6 there are separate detention orders with subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for the remaining grounds as per clause (b) of Section 6. The said judgment of D. S. Agarwal (supra) therefore would not be applicable in such cases. ( 6 ) IT may be pointed out that Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Chamanlal Manjibhai Soni AIR 1981 S. C. page 1480 while quashing the order of this Court has observed with reference to Section 5-A of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) as under:"the reason for enacting Section 5a was that the fact that several High Courts took the view that where several grounds or mention in an order of detention and one of them is found to be either bad or irrelevant then the entire order is vitiated because it cannot be predicted to what extent the subjective satisfaction of the authority could have been influenced by the vague or irrelevant ground. It was to displace the basis of these decisions that the Parliament enacted Sec. 5a in order to make it clear that even if one of the grounds is irrelevant but the other grounds are clear and specific that by itself would not vitiate the order of detention. The aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court squarely applies to the PASA Act where Sec. 6 is inserted on the same lines of Sec. 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act. It is verbatim same and therefore interpretation given to Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act would be applicable to Section 6 of the PASA Act. ( 7 ) IN this connection reference was made to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Justice S. B. Majmudar and Justice V. H. Bhairavia in Special Criminal Application No. 923 of 1988 decided on 17. 4. 1989. So far as the said judgment is concerned it may be stated that justice S. B. Majmudar was party to the judgment in the case of Chandu Jaiswal (supra) and it was delivered on 12. 1. 1990 in Special Criminal Application No. 364 of 1989 and therefore it is subsequent in point of time. 4. 1989. So far as the said judgment is concerned it may be stated that justice S. B. Majmudar was party to the judgment in the case of Chandu Jaiswal (supra) and it was delivered on 12. 1. 1990 in Special Criminal Application No. 364 of 1989 and therefore it is subsequent in point of time. In that view of the matter it is clear that Justice Majmudar being a party to the judgment in Spl. Criminal Application No. 923 of 1988 has agreed with the view taken in the case of Chandu Jaiswal (Spl. Cri. Appln. No. 364/89 ). There might be contrary judgments. However in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court which is binding on all the High Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution of India it is not necessary to refer the matter to Larger Bench because of the contrary views taken by other Division Benches of this Court. ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid settled position of law we hold that when there are six deemed separate orders of detention against the petitioner in respect of six grounds out of which one ground is not available as the relevant material was not placed before the detaining authority; to the extent of the order passed on the basis of C. R. No. 39 of 1990 subjective satisfaction will be vitiated but that will not affect the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority in respect of other five different grounds. ( 9 ) THE next contention raised by Mr. Trivedi is that merely because the petitioner is a bootlegger that by itself would not be a ground for detaining him unless it is necessary to detain him for the purpose of preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Mr. Trivedi submitted that the term public order is in contradiction of the term order. It is true that there is difference between order and public order. His submission is academically quite correct. Unless it is necessary for preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order no such order of detention can be passed. Trivedi submitted that the term public order is in contradiction of the term order. It is true that there is difference between order and public order. His submission is academically quite correct. Unless it is necessary for preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order no such order of detention can be passed. The question is whether the detaining authority had material before him for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction on the point of necessity of detaining the petitioner for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The words acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order used in sub-section (I) of Sec. 3 are to be read with in the line of meaning given in sub-section (4) of Sec. 3 of the PASA Act along with its explanation. The said explanation clearly widens the scope of the term public order as generally understood. Whether it is a breach of public order or mere law and order was a matter of controversy in number of cases. The Supreme Court has considered this controversy right from the case of Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740 . In the said case speaking for the majority Justice Hidayatullah and pointed out the distinction in the following words:"one has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the Stale". ( 10 ) FURTHER in para-18 of the judgment in the case of Harpreet Kaur reported in AIR 1992 SC 979 it has been observed that From the law laid down by this Court as noticed above it follows that it is the degree and extent of the reach of the objectionable activity upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to public order. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Whenever an order of detention is questioned the courts apply these tests to find out whether the objectionable activities upon which the order of detention is grounded fall under the classification of being prejudicial to public order or belong to the category of being prejudicial only to law and order. ( 11 ) IN the present case it is clear that on account of the behaviour of the petitioner as a bootlegger at times the even tempo of the society was disturbed. ( 12 ) APART from this the bootlegging activity would affect the health of the public at large and that would bring the activity within the wider meaning of public order given in sub-section (4) of Sec. 3 of the PASA Act because this activity directly or indirectly would adversely affect or is likely to affect adversely the public health. This view is taken by this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 737 of 1987 in the case of Rajendrakumar N. Shah vs. State of Gujarat 1988 GLH 140 . Same view has been approved by the Supreme Court when the said case was carried in appeal the judgment of which is reinforced in AIR 1988 SC 1255 . In the said case the District Magistrate while passing the impugned order inter alia stated as under ( 13 ) IN order to safeguard the health of the people of Gujarat for public peace and in the interest of the nation with a view to stop such anti national activities for the purpose of public order and public peace and in the interest of the State. The Supreme Court in para-14 of the said judgment observed as under:"in our opinion these words added by way of superscription were wholly unnecessary. They were set out by the District Magistrate presumably because of total prohibition in the State. In future it would be better for the detaining authorities acting under Secs. 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act to avoid such unnecessary verbiage which are of little or no consequence and give rise to unnecessary debate at the Bar". They were set out by the District Magistrate presumably because of total prohibition in the State. In future it would be better for the detaining authorities acting under Secs. 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act to avoid such unnecessary verbiage which are of little or no consequence and give rise to unnecessary debate at the Bar". ( 14 ) AFTER the aforesaid observation made by the Supreme Court the District Magistrates have stopped giving such reasons as were given in the case of Rajendrakumar (supra ). Thus it is clear that the District Magistrate has arrived at the subjective satisfaction of necessity of detaining the person for preventing him from continuing his activities as a bootlegger which are prejudicial to the public order as per the wider meaning given in sub-section (4) of Sec. 3 alongwith the explanation on the basis of the material placed before him in respect of the remaining grounds. Therefore it cannot be held that Detaining authority has no material to base his subjective satisfaction on the point of public purpose. ( 15 ) IT may be stated that the judgment in the case of Piyush Kantilal Mehta vs. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad and another AIR 1989 S. C. 491 was cited for the purpose of pointing out that it was not a case of disturbance of public order. In the case of Harpreet Kaur (supra) said judgment was considered in para 22 and observed as under:"the Court found that the detenue was only a bootlegger and he could not be preventively detained under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act 1985 unless as laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 3 of that Act his activities as a bootlegger had the potential of affecting adversely or were likely to affect adversely. the maintenance of public order and on the Peculiar facts of the case it was found that the alleged activities of the detenu did not affect public order but created only a law and order problem". As the said case stood on peculiar facts it cannot be treated as law laid down on the point of public order. Therefore we do not find any substance in this point raised by Mr. Trivedi. ( 16 ) MR. Trivedi learned Advocate for petitioner further contended that the statements of the witnesses are of the same date i. e. 24. 2. Therefore we do not find any substance in this point raised by Mr. Trivedi. ( 16 ) MR. Trivedi learned Advocate for petitioner further contended that the statements of the witnesses are of the same date i. e. 24. 2. 1992 and according to him all the statements are recorded on one day in a mechanical fashion and therefore they need not be considered for the purpose of arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. ( 17 ) IT may be stated that the Police has recorded those statements and they have been verified by the District Magistrate himself. When that is so there is no scope for argument that they were statements of fictitious persons or that they were not genuine statements. It is for the detaining authority to consider the statements. This Court cannot sit in appeal against the order of the detaining authority. This Court has very limited jurisdiction to consider as to whether the subjective satisfaction was properly arrived at by the detaining authority meaning thereby whether it was vitiated on account of ignoring some relevant material. However that is not the contention raised before us. Under the circumstances we do not find any merit in this. ( 18 ) THE next point raised by Mr. Trivedi is regarding illegible copies of the documents supplied to the detenu particularly the FIR in C. R. No. 39/90. We have perused the said F. I. R. and we found that it is quite legible and written in beautiful handwriting. Therefore we do not find any substance in this point raised by Mr. Trivedi. ( 19 ) THE last contention raised by Mr. Trivedi is that the petitioner was released on parole and that once when he was released on parole there was a necessity for detaining him. It may be stated that the PASA Act provides that the Govt. can release the detenu on parole temporarily. When such power is kept with the Govt. for temporary release by way of granting parole it is clear that the Govt. does not want to be so cruel that even in appropriate cases also Govt. would refuse parole otherwise if a detenu is released on parole in appropriate case an argument will be advanced as is done in the present case that he cannot be detained. ( 20 ) IT may be stated that in this case Mr. does not want to be so cruel that even in appropriate cases also Govt. would refuse parole otherwise if a detenu is released on parole in appropriate case an argument will be advanced as is done in the present case that he cannot be detained. ( 20 ) IT may be stated that in this case Mr. U. R. Bhatt learned AGP has rightly brought to our notice that the detenu was released on parole for 10 days from 1. 9. 1992 to 10. 9. 1992 on the ground of severe sickness of his wife who was hospitalised. When the Govt. has shown some sympathy to petitioner and he was released on parole on the ground of sickness of his wife that would not affect the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. It may be staled that in past there were certain cases where detenus were released on parole frequently. In certain cases under the provisions of the Prevention of Blackmarketing Act detenus were granted parole even before executing the detention order. Under the circumstances in one case the Court was required to make an observation to the effect that if the detenus are granted parole frequently it was not necessary to detain them. But such observation would not affect the proper detention order passed by the detaining authority where parole was granted in the appropriate case. We therefore do not find any merit in this point raised by Mr. Trivedi. . ( 21 ) BEFORE parting with this judgment we may point out that Mr. Trivedi has pointed out that in fact externment proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and notice thereof was discharged on 22. 4. 1991. It is true that in the year 1991 externment proceedings were initiated and notice thereof was discharged. However the present detention order is dated 6. 7. 1992 i. e. after a period of more than one year. At the time of passing the detention order the detaining authority has to consider the question as to whether less drastic remedy can be adopted. In this case the detaining authority has given reasons in the grounds that less drastic remedies are time consuming and therefore they are not adopted. We do not find any inconsistency between the two. At the time of passing the detention order the detaining authority has to consider the question as to whether less drastic remedy can be adopted. In this case the detaining authority has given reasons in the grounds that less drastic remedies are time consuming and therefore they are not adopted. We do not find any inconsistency between the two. Otherwise also the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Valjibhai Ranchhodbhai Patel vs. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad City 1992 GLH 144 held that whenever the question of necessity to detain a person is to be considered it is not necessary to consider less drastic remedies like externment etc. In view of the said Full Bench decision it is not necessary to deal with this argument of Mr. Trivedi that though notice issued in earlier proceedings was discharged it was not taken into consideration by the detaining authority. Therefore it cannot be said that because the earlier notice which was discharged was not placed by the Sponsoring Authority before the detaining authority relevant material is not taken into consideration and therefore the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is vitiated. We therefore do not find any substance in this argument also. No other point is urged before us. In result the petition falls and stands dismissed. Rule discharged. Petition Dismissed. .