HANSARIA, J. ( 1 ) THE opposite party, a police officer, has faced this contempt proceeding. At the relevant time, he was the Officer-in-charge of Pattamundai Police Station. The proceeding has been initiated on a reference from the Sessions, Judge, Cuttack. The allegation is that the opposite party arrested one Jadu alias Ramachandra Sahoo, who has intervened in this case and would be described hereinafter as 'the intervenor', in C. R. Case No. 855 of 1990 on 13-11-1990, despite a certified copy of the order dated 6-11-1990 of the Sessions Judge, Cuttack, releasing the intervenor in the said case on bail having been produced before the former, which was not honoured. The defence of the contemner-opposite party is that the copy of the order in question had not been produced, and it is only in the police station, where the intervenor had been taken afterwards, that mention was made by him about his having been released on bail. He was thereafter forwarded to the court of the S. D. J. M. Kendrapara and was produced on 14-11-1990 before the said court, when his advocate had produced for the first time a certified copy of the order of the Sessions Judge, when he was released on bail by the S. D. J. M. ( 2 ) THE only point for decision, therefore, is whether from the materials on record it can be held that the certified copy of the order of release passed by the learned Sessions Judge had been produced before the opposite party when he arrested the intervenor (Jadu) on 13-11-1990. ( 3 ) SHRI Rath appearing for the opposite party submits that three circumstances would belie the allegation. These are : (i) a look at the certified copy of the order, which is in the file of I. C. C. Case No. 301 of 1990 instituted by the intervenor himself against the opposite party on the allegation of wrongful confinement etc. These are : (i) a look at the certified copy of the order, which is in the file of I. C. C. Case No. 301 of 1990 instituted by the intervenor himself against the opposite party on the allegation of wrongful confinement etc. , would show that this order does not bear any mark of tearing, which would belie the case of the intervenor that when the certified copy of the order was shown to the opposite party, it was torn by him; (ii) the S. D. O. and the S. D. P. O. , who had come to Pattamundai police station on a tense situation having been created after the intervenor had been kept confined in the police station, were not reported by him that the opposite party had arrested him despite a certified copy of the bail order having been shown to him; and (iii) the order of the S. D. J. M. , Kendrapara passed on 14-11-1990 itself would show that when the intervener was produced before him, the certified copy of the order of bail was produced by his advocate, before which nothing had been stated by him even about his release on bail by the Sessions Judge. ( 4 ) IN so far as the first circumstance is concerned, Shri Rath brings to our notice the statement made by the intervenor in Miscellaneous Case No. 1017 of 1990 of the court of the Sessions Judge, Cuttack (which is the case which terminated in the present reference), a photostat copy of which is on record, that after the certified copy of the order had been shown to the opposite party, he used unparliamentary words against the court and "tore the order the threw it at a distance". In cross-examination, however, the statement was that the opposite party had 'bundled' the bail order the threw it to a distance. Reference to other evidence on record, namely, the evidence of the mother of the intervenor who was examined in the aforesaid case as witness No. 3 (the intervenor having been examined as witness No. 1), shows that according to her, the opposite party "snatched the bail order, rubbed it and threw it away". Reference to other evidence on record, namely, the evidence of the mother of the intervenor who was examined in the aforesaid case as witness No. 3 (the intervenor having been examined as witness No. 1), shows that according to her, the opposite party "snatched the bail order, rubbed it and threw it away". ( 5 ) THE aforesaid shows that though the intervener in his examination-in-chief stated about the tearing of the bail order, if the entire evidence is taken in its totality, the same would show that the allegation cannot really be taken to be 'tearing' of the certified copy of the order but of showing violence to it - which was described by the intervenor in his examination-in-chief as 'tearing', in his cross-examination as 'bundling', and by his mother as 'rubbing'. Too such emphasis on the word 'tearing' alone would not, therefore, be justified. We have to see the substratum of the case and should not confine our attention to a particular word used once. To satisfy ourselves whether violence was used, we have perused and certified copy of the order, which is on the record of the aforesaid case, which does bear marks of violence. The certified copy further shows that application for the same was made on 7-11-1990 and it was granted also on the same day. The first circumstance relied on by Shri Rath does not, therefore, belie the allegation. ( 6 ) SHRI Panda appearing for the intervenor urges in this context that the certified copy having been obtained on 7-11-1990, there could not have been any earthly reason not to show it to the opposite party who had come to arrest the intervenor. The submission is undoubtedly weighty and merits acceptance. At this stage, it may be stated that the release order by the Sessions Judge was on a petition under Section 439, Cr. P. C. and perusal of the connected records - the same being Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 892 of 1990 - shows that the intervenor had surrendered before the court of Sessions Judge on 5-11-1990. Earlier to that, the Intervenor had approached the Sessions Judge on 16-10-1990 under Section 438, Cr. P. C. praying for anticipatory bail. P. C. and perusal of the connected records - the same being Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 892 of 1990 - shows that the intervenor had surrendered before the court of Sessions Judge on 5-11-1990. Earlier to that, the Intervenor had approached the Sessions Judge on 16-10-1990 under Section 438, Cr. P. C. praying for anticipatory bail. In that case, the A. P. P. was asked to produce the case diary, but ultimately that petition was not pressed and was rejected on 5-11-1990, and on the same day an application under Section 439, Cr. P. C. was filed, which came to be allowed on 6-11-1990 after remanding the accused Jadu to custody on 5-11-1990. We have mentioned about this aspect of the case, because Shri Rath at one stage had submitted, albeit faintly, as to the legality of the order of the Sessions Judge releasing the intervenor on bail by his order dated 6-11-1990. On being asked as to whether it would be open to the opposite party to question the legality of the order in this proceeding and not to obey the same for that reason, Shri Rath, however, fairly submitted that this stand could not have been taken by the opposite party and that he has really not taken that stand in this case. ( 7 ) AS to the second circumstance, there is nothing on record before us to show as to whether the intervenor had made any grievance or not to the S. D. O. and the S. D. P. O. , who had admittedly come to Pattamundai police station where the intervenor had been kept confined on 13-11-1990 after his arrest. For the present case, we need not go into the background as to why the S. D. O. and the S. D. P. O. had to come to that police station and whether the same was due to the effort on the part of the associates of the intervenor to take him away forcibly from the police station, which led to a tense situation, or whether it was because of the public resentment in having taken the intervener to the police station from his residence handcuffed and naked, as is submitted by Shri Panda - the first version having been given by Shri Rath. It is, however, undisputed that these two officers did come to the police station. It is, however, undisputed that these two officers did come to the police station. But, as already stated, what transpired between them is not known. What, however, appears from the forwarding report of the opposite party is that in that report, the whole of which is typewritten, there is an addition by hand at page 3 reading : "he (accd.) says that he is released on bail but he could not produce the order of the court". This shows that something must have transpired which led the opposite party to insert this in the forwarding report. ( 8 ) SHRI Panda refers in this connection to the evidence of the opposite party given in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 1017 of 1990 wherein it is stated in his examination-in-chief that though initially the intervener had not disclosed about his bail, but as he did it afterwards, he mentioned this fact in his own handwriting in the forwarding report. The learned counsel draws our pointed attention to the statement made in cross-examination by the opposite party that he had "believed the version of the petitioner while forwarding him to the court that he was granted bail by the Court of Sessions". The learned counsel states that nothing further is left to show that despite the opposite party having believed that the petitioner was released on bail, which belief must have been based, according to the learned counsel, because of the production of the certified copy of the order of bail, the intervener was arrested and, as such, the opposite party wilfully violated the Sessions Judge's order. ( 9 ) SHRI Rath, however, first submits in this connection that the aforesaid statement of the opposite party would show that he had perhaps believed the aforesaid version of the intervener or that he might have believed the same. The effort of the learned counsel is to water down the weight of the statement and to protect the opposite party from the consequence of the categorical admission made by him. We would not read the aforesaid statement as "might have believed" or "perhaps believed". It is just 'believed'. There is no ambiguity in the statement; it is quite clear. The effort of the learned counsel is to water down the weight of the statement and to protect the opposite party from the consequence of the categorical admission made by him. We would not read the aforesaid statement as "might have believed" or "perhaps believed". It is just 'believed'. There is no ambiguity in the statement; it is quite clear. It is also not an off the cuff statement made by the opposite party - it was made in a court of law in case which had been instituted against him for initiating contempt proceeding relating to the matter at hand. Then, the opposite party is not a rustic illiterate villager not knowing the import of the admission made by him in cross-examination. He is a responsible police officer. For these reasons, the importance and significance of the aforesaid statement cannot be allowed to be diluted. ( 10 ) SHRI Rath then submits that the opposite party might have believed about the release of the intervener on bail because of the fact that at one stage a petition for anticipatory bail had been filed by the intervener in connection with which the case diary had been called for from the police station, which might have led the opposite party to believe that the intervener might have been released on bail. We do not propose to examine this contention, because whatever might have been the source of information to the opposite party about the release of the intervener on bail, once he took the source to be authentic and believed the factual aspect, it is not necessary to find out as to what was the source and whether the same was authentic or not. It is for this reason that we do not propose to address ourselves on the question as to whether, if the information had been given by the intervener himself, the source could be called authentic, which, according to Shri Rath, could not be so taken. Of course, the learned counsel fairly agrees that if this information would have been derived by the opposite party from an authentic source, then he was bound to act in accordance with it, even if no certified copy of the order would have been produced before him. Of course, the learned counsel fairly agrees that if this information would have been derived by the opposite party from an authentic source, then he was bound to act in accordance with it, even if no certified copy of the order would have been produced before him. The learned counsel has agreed to this aspect of the matter, because the same is founded on four decisions of the apex Court, namely, B. K. Kar v. Chief Justice of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 1367 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 438); Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1089 : (1962 (2) Cri LJ 236); Burnna Prasad v. State of U. P. , AIR 1968 SC 1348 : (1968 Cri LJ 1514); and Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union, AIR 1970 SC 1767 : 1970 Cri LJ 1520. ( 11 ) WE may say a few words here as to why, according to us, despite the opposite party believing that the intervener had been granted bail, he arrested the latter and what prompted him to do so in violation of the order. If a person believes a certain thing to be true, he would normally like to act in conformity with and not against the fact which is believed to be true; and if he does so, there must be strong reason for the same. It is not a case, in our view, where madness led the opposite party to act as he had done, and if it was madness, there was method in it, which Hamlet found. The reason for acting against the fact believed to be true by the opposite party is not difficult to find. The reason was that the intervener was an accused in a case which related to assault on police officer of Pattamundai police station of which the opposite party was the Officer-in-charge and about which alleged action of the intervener the opposite party himself had been reported, as would appear from what is being stated later. So, we are inclined to think that it was the felt necessity of revenge which prompted the opposite party to act against his belief. Be that as it may, the second circumstance mentioned by Shri Rath has no cutting edge. ( 12 ) THIS leaves for consideration the third circumstance mentioned by Shri Rath. So, we are inclined to think that it was the felt necessity of revenge which prompted the opposite party to act against his belief. Be that as it may, the second circumstance mentioned by Shri Rath has no cutting edge. ( 12 ) THIS leaves for consideration the third circumstance mentioned by Shri Rath. That relates to the order passed by the S. D. J. M. , Kendrapara before whom the intervener had been produced on 14-11-1990, a copy of which is Annexure 5. That order can be divided into two parts. The first part is about production of the intervenor, non-moving of bail and ordering for remand till 24-11-1990. The second part deals with filing of power by an advocate named Shri Benudhar Rout along with a petition and a certified copy, inter alia, of the concerned order. Shri Rath submits that this shows and shows clearly, that the certified copy of the order was really in possession, and it is because of this that in when the advocate appeared, he filed the copy of the order, which, not being with the intervener earlier could not be filed by him. ( 13 ) AS to the aforesaid circumstance, the submission of Shri Panda is that the intervener having been taken into custody and the certified copy of the order having been thrown away by the opposite party while arresting the intervener, it was apparently not in his possession when he was produced before the S. D. J. M. ; but that certified copy was picked up by somebody and was handed over to the advocate who produced it before the S. D. J. M. Shri Panda also submits that the normal practice in courts like that of S. D. J. M. is that the formal part of the order is written by the Bench Clerk sometimes, and in the second half the court takes up the matter and passes the final order. On Shri Panda making a submission that a perusal of the order as passed by the S. D. J. M. would bear his submission, the records were called for and we have perused the same. It does show that a part of that (a copy of which is Annexure 5 of aforesaid Misc. Case No. 1017/90) had been written by somebody else than the S. D. J. M. , he should be the Bench Clerk. It does show that a part of that (a copy of which is Annexure 5 of aforesaid Misc. Case No. 1017/90) had been written by somebody else than the S. D. J. M. , he should be the Bench Clerk. That was so from its beginning till "custody till 24-11-1990" (from page 1 of the aforesaid annexure to the first part of fourth line of page 2. Of course, some alterations were made later in this part perhaps by the S. D. J. M. ). The remaining part and the one in which mention has been made about filing of a power by advocate Shri Rout is in the hand of the Presiding Officer. So, from what has been stated in the order of 14-11-1990, it cannot be said that the certified copy of the order of release was really in possession of the advocate and was not with the petitioner at all at any time prior to the same having been produced by the advocate before the S. D. J. M. on 14-11-1990. ( 14 ) TO satisfy our mind fully as to whether it could at all be that the order was with advocate Shri Rout, we called for other records, namely, Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 892 of 1990 of the Sessions Judge, Cuttuck, in which the order of bail had been passed, as also Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 836 of 1990, which dealt with the prayer of the intervener under Section 438, Cr. P. C. These records show that Shri Rout was nowhere in the picture when these orders were passed; not even when the C. J. M. had accepted the bail bonds etc. , records relating to which are also available in G. R. Case No. 855 of 1990, which forms part of record of S. T. Case No. 141/30 of 1989, which is the number of the court of the Sessions Judge, to whom of the intervener was committed to stand trial for the offence in question, which gave rise to G. R. Case No. 855 of 1990. All these show that Shri Rout came into picture, so far as the present case in concerned, only when the intervener was produced before the S. D. J. M. on 14-11-1990. All these show that Shri Rout came into picture, so far as the present case in concerned, only when the intervener was produced before the S. D. J. M. on 14-11-1990. ( 15 ) BECAUSE of what had been stated above, we would hold that the circumstances sought to be relied on by Shri Rath cannot assist the opposite party. ( 16 ) WE have another observation to make before we conclude on the question of guilt. The same is that the case in which the intervener was arrested was one in which the informant was none else than a police officer of Pattamundai police station itself and the allegation was that on 30-9-1990, which was the immersion day of Goddess Dugra, he was on duty and the intervener was asked to give side to other 'medha' (i. e. image) when the latter is said to have accosted the former and throttleld him, but somehow the police officer escaped. This was reported to the Officer-in-charge of the police station, the opposite party himself, and a case was registered. This shows that the police officers of Pattamundai police station (including the opposite party) might have adopted a revengeful attitude against the intervener and despite his having been released on bail by the Sessions Judge, they thought it fit to arrest him and teach him a lesson. ( 17 ) IN view of all the above, we are satisfied that the intervener had been arrested by the opposite party despite the former having produced the order of bail passed by a competent court. We, therefore, find the opposite party guilty of contempt. ( 18 ) THIS takes us to the question of sentence. Section 12 (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 may indicate that it is sentence of fine which should normally be awarded when a person is found guilty of civil contempt, as has the opposite party been, but if a special case is made out to show that sentence of fine would not meet the ends of justice and sentence of imprisonment is necessary, the Court should direct detention in civil confinement. ( 19 ) LET it be seen what nature of sentence is merited in the case at hand. This is not the first occasion when a person has been found guilty of civil contempt by this Court and punished for the same. ( 19 ) LET it be seen what nature of sentence is merited in the case at hand. This is not the first occasion when a person has been found guilty of civil contempt by this Court and punished for the same. Indeed, such cases have been many. This Court had occasion to express its mind recently in a number of cases as to what harm commission of civil contempt causes to the entire system of administration of justice and as to why a strict view on sentence is called for to root out this evil, about which it has been stated that of late it has become alien to cancerous growth calling for recourse to strong measures to see that justice becomes available to all, who would not get it if lawful orders of competent courts are violated, which would result in people with muscle power and money power alone being able to settle score on streets. ( 20 ) OF course, sentence has to be awarded keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case and there can be no precedence in such a matter. A sentence has to be tailor-made; it cannot be ready-made. Let us see what where the broad facts of the present case. Let us also see who is the offender. It is both the offence and the offender which is required to be borne in mind while deciding appropriate sentence apart from keeping in view the impact the sentence awarded is likely to have on the society. Further, awarding of sentence is guided by four stars - they represent retribution, prevention, deterrence and reformation. All of them are required to be considered in their proper perspective to decide the quantum of sentence. ( 21 ) LET us first see what constituted civil contempt in the present case. The same is arrest of a person in defiance of Court's order. The act, therefore, violated even the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution. The liberty of the intervener had been taken away without authority of law; indeed, in gross violation of law. May be that the intervener is involved in many cases and may be he is an undesirable person, as mentioned by Shri Rath obliquely. The act, therefore, violated even the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution. The liberty of the intervener had been taken away without authority of law; indeed, in gross violation of law. May be that the intervener is involved in many cases and may be he is an undesirable person, as mentioned by Shri Rath obliquely. This presentation of the intervener is disputed by Shri Panda, according to whom, the intervener is a respectable person as he is a Sarpanch of Pattamundai Gram Panchayat and an ex-Councillor of Pattamundai N. A. C. , as stated in the petition filed before the Sessions Judge which gave rise to Miscellaneous Case No. 1017 of 1990. Be that as it may, the offence alleged against the intervener in G. R. Case No. 855 of 1990, in which he was arrested, was one which does not speak about his depravity - the alleged assault etc. had taken place when a procession for immersion of Goddess Dugra was being taken and police officer had asked to give side to another procession. There is no baseness here, no moral turpitude is involved. Then, the intervener is undoubtedly a citizen of India and this Court has to see that liberty of an Indian, even of bad character, is taken away only in accordance with the procedure established by law. If a person protected by Art. 21 is allowed to be arrested despite an order prohibiting it, a serious view has to be taken to preserve and protect rule of law. ( 22 ) LET us now see who is the offender. He is none else than a police officer, who is to maintain rule of law. He is a limb of the law enforcing agency and cannot become part and parcel of law violating agency. Further, he is no ordinary police officer. At the relevant time he was the Officer-in-charge of a police station to whom people look forward to protect themselves from the violaters of law. An Officer-in-charge of a police station is clothed with so vast powers by the Code of Criminal Procedure that an offence committed by such a person has to be viewed seriously. The higher the power, the greater the responsibility of the holder of power. ( 23 ) AS to retribution, it can be said that the same has no relevance when a Court decides to punish a contemner. The higher the power, the greater the responsibility of the holder of power. ( 23 ) AS to retribution, it can be said that the same has no relevance when a Court decides to punish a contemner. The grossest form of retribution is "eye for eye, tooth for tooth". It is not with a view to retribute at all that Courts spring into action to punish a contemner, there is perhaps some misconception in this regard. Retribution has no place in a case where a Court decides to punish a contemner. It is not to preserve the dignity of the Court that it punishes or wants to punish a contemner; it is really to preserve the rule of law and the faith of the people in the system of administration of justice that Courts come forward to discharge this unpleasant duty. ( 24 ) PREVENTION, of course, has its place in the sentencing ethos even while sentencing a contemner because repetition of the offence of contempt is something which a Court would like to take care of, and adequate care at that because this cannot be allowed to become part of habit, as it does not augur well in a polity governed by rule of law. ( 25 ) DETERRENCE is definitely a factor to be borne in mind. The violator of Court's order has to be punished in such a way that others would think twice, indeed, think many times, before they take to their head to violate Court's order, which, as stated in by this Court in a number of cases, has very wide ramifications. ( 26 ) REFORMATION not relevant in the present case. The trait of character, which can be said to lie at the root of the offence at hand is not such which by a reformative touch can really bring about a change in the character of the offender, as it was the desire to take revenge which was responsible for the offence. The desire for revenge has been at the root of many evils; many wars have been fought for this from time immemorial. A person who would like to take revenge would go almost mad and would take resource to all actions - legal or illegal, moral or immoral, right or wrong, good or bad, - just to feed fat his grudge. A person who would like to take revenge would go almost mad and would take resource to all actions - legal or illegal, moral or immoral, right or wrong, good or bad, - just to feed fat his grudge. Such is the intensity of a feeling of revenge in a human mind that reformation has perhaps a very little role to take care of this type of mental set up. ( 27 ) BEARING in mind all the aforesaid aspects of the matter concerning sentence and the need to preserve rule of law and the further stark fact that the contemner is none else than the one who owes as obligation to the society to preserve rule of law, we are of the opinion that a sentence of fine would not meet the ends of justice and the present has to be a case where sentence of civil imprisonment has to be awarded. But then, this sentence need not be for long duration. We are of the view civil imprisonment for a period of seven days would be the proper, reasonable and adequate sentence to be awarded in the present case, and we so award. ( 28 ) THE proceeding is closed by finding the opposite party guilty of civil contempt and by sentencing him for the same to civil imprisonment for seven days. ( 29 ) S. K. MOHANTY, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly. .