JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—This appeal was admitted on the following question of law : "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned District Judge was justified in dismissing the appeal summarily without notice to the respondents." 2. At the very out-set learned Counsel for the appellant stated that he may also be permitted to agitate another question of law arising for determination namely : "Whether the plaintiff who was in settled possession of a part of the suit property ought have been granted decree for injunction that his possession be not disturbed otherwise than in due course of law." 3. On 27th April, 1988 a suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the defendants-respondents wherein a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction was claimed against the defendants from interfering in any manner or carving out or laying out or constructing any road inland measuring 37 Kanals 8 Marlas comprised in Khasra No. 934 and land measuring 7 Kanals I Marla comprised in Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986 as per Jamabandi for the year 1982-83 situate in village Kuthera Jaswalan in Tehsil Amb of District Una. It was alleged that the plaintiff alongwith his brother owned and possessed the suit property over which his Abadi was also located but the defendants at the behest of certain interpreted persons wanted usurp the property for which purpose the defendants were preparing to change the alignment of the road by constructing the same through his property for which, it was alleged, that the defendants had no right. Consequently, a decree for injunction was claimed. 4. The suit was resisted by the defendants-respondent on a number of grounds by denying that the plaintiff was the owner in possession or that he was entitled to a decree of injunction. Resides taking a number of legal objections about the maintainability of the suit etc. It was alleged that the suit land was in ownership of the Central Government as an evacuee property since 1954-55 and that the defendants had constructed a road in the year 1983 in a part of the suit land, which during settlement had been shown as Khasra Nos. 22(7, 2220 and 2222, which were in possession of the defendants as per the latest Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani. 22(7, 2220 and 2222, which were in possession of the defendants as per the latest Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani. The defendants also alleged that the possession of the plaintiff might be there on some portion of the suit property but the same was not better than that of an encroacher. Link road from Guglehar to upper Oel via Kuthera Jaswalan and Mawa Sindhian had been constructed by spending considerable amount and consequently the plaintiff was not entitled to the decree claimed by him. 5. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was owner in possession of 37 Kanals 8 Marlas of land comprised in Khasra No. 934 which bad been shown during settlement as Khasra Nos. 1703, 1704, 1705, 1708, 1709, 1711 and 5622/1707. On the basis of these findings a decree for prohibitory injunction was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants with respect to this property. For the remaining land the trial Court held that land measuring 7 Kanals 1 Maria comprised in Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986 was an evacuee property owned by the Central Government over which the plaintiff had no right, title or interest and these three Khasra numbers were now reflected in revenue records as Khasra Nos. 2217, 2220 and 2222 and as per the entire in the revenue records were in occupation of the Public Works Department and the nature of the same was road. Since the plaintiff was held not in possession over this part of the suit property his suit with respect to land measuring 7 Kanals 1 Marla comprised in Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986 was dismissed by the trial Court vide its judgment dated 20th June, 1992. 6. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the lower appellate Court against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court seeking its modification and claiming a decree for injunction with respect to the entire suit property. The appeal came up for admission before the lower appellate Court on 14th September, 1992 on which date, without issuing notice to the opposite party on perusal of the record, the appeal was dismissed in limine. The appeal came up for admission before the lower appellate Court on 14th September, 1992 on which date, without issuing notice to the opposite party on perusal of the record, the appeal was dismissed in limine. The lower appellate Court while dismissing the appeal negatived the appellants contention that at least on the basis of his settled possession a decree for injunction ought to have been granted by observing that the suit being for injunction simplicitor and his main assertion about ownership having been negatived the decree for injunction was not rightly granted by the trial Court It is this judgment and decree which is under challenge in this appeal. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 8. In so far as the plaintiffs claim with respect to 37 Kanals 8 Marlas of land comprised in Khasra No 934, as per Jamabandi for 1982- 83 is concerned, the same stood rightly decreed by the trial Court. The only dispute now surviving is with respect to the remaining part of the suit property measuring 7 Kanals 1 Maria comprised in Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986 The description of the land was given by the plaintiff, according to the entries made Misal Haquiat for 1982-83 Ex. P-6, wherein the Central Government is shown to be the owner of the property and it is described as an evacuee property but the plaintiff alongwith his brother Din Mohammad is shown in occupation thereof. The old Khasra Nos. of this property are mentioned as 1769, 1770, 1772 and 1778. 9. On the record of the trial Court copies of entries in revenue record from 1954-55 to 1973-74 have been produced. It appears that there was settlement operation in or about the. year 1982-83 in the revenue estate. Prior to the settlement the land, which is described in Jamabandi for 1982-83 measuring 7 Kanals 1 Maria as Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986 was shown as measuring 6 Kanals 11 Marlas comprised in Khasra Nos 1769, 1770, 1772 and 1778. In Ex. P-5 Jamabandi for the year 1973-74 the plaintiff alongwith his brother is shown to be in occupation as Gair Maurosi. There is no corresponding entry in the column of rent. Similarly, possession of the plaintiff and his brother is shown in the same capacity in Ex. In Ex. P-5 Jamabandi for the year 1973-74 the plaintiff alongwith his brother is shown to be in occupation as Gair Maurosi. There is no corresponding entry in the column of rent. Similarly, possession of the plaintiff and his brother is shown in the same capacity in Ex. P-4, the previous Jamabandi for the year 1968-69. Prior thereto in Ex. P-3, Jamabandi for the year 1963-64 the land is shown to be an evacuee property but the column of possession records it to be in occupation of the Evacuee Department. In Jamabandi for 1959-60 (Ex. P-2) this very land is shown to be owned and possessed by the Evacuee Department. The names of the plaintiff and his brother appear to have been recorded, for the first time, in Jamabandi Ex P-4 in the year 1968-69, on the basis of an entry made in Roznamcha Waquati on 28th March, 1964 vide report No. 330 (copy Ex. P-8) wherein it is stated that as per orders of the Punjab Government lease granted to Din Mohammad and Ali Mohammad and other persons had been given effect to, by delivering possession in the spot. 10. The revenue estate appears to have been under further settlement after 1982-83, which is evident from copy Ex. P7 Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani By the time this Misal Haquiat was prepared, it appears that the road had already been constructed, which is also the finding recorded by the Courts below that the road had been constructed somewhere in the year 1983 and it is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the appellant will not be entitled to decree with respect to that portion of the property through which the road had already been constructed. His contention is that the road had not been construct ed through the entire portion of the suit property. It was constructed through a fraction thereof only. The remaining part of the suit property is being recorded in his and his brothers occupation, which will be evident from document Ex. P-7, 11. The submission made by learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be justified, in case a reference is made to the entries in Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani. In Khewat No. 237 Khatauni No 387 Central Government is recorded to be the owner of three plots of land measuring 0-07.51 hectares, namely, Khasra Nos. 2217, 2220 and 2222. P-7, 11. The submission made by learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be justified, in case a reference is made to the entries in Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani. In Khewat No. 237 Khatauni No 387 Central Government is recorded to be the owner of three plots of land measuring 0-07.51 hectares, namely, Khasra Nos. 2217, 2220 and 2222. Possession of Public Works Department (B and R) is shown over this property. It is shown to be a part of Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986 In the same Khewat No. 237, 9 plots of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 2202, 2203, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2223, 2224, 2227 and 2228 measuring 0-1990 hectares is shown under Khatauni No. 374 in possession of appellant Ali Mohammad and his brother Din Mohammad. Its corresponding old Khasra Nos are shown as part of Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986. 12. The trial Court apparently, by making a reference to copy of Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani Ex. D-l, with respect to three plots of land measuring 0.07.51 hectare in Khewat Nos. 237 min, Khatauni No. 387 min, observed in its judgment that old Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986 after settlement have been shown as Khasra Nos. 2212,2220 and 2222. la fact, Ex. D-l is not the complete copy of Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani of the entire area, which had been carved out of Khasra Nos. 978, 985 and 986. Remaining portion of the property carved out of these Khasra Nos. for which no reference is made by the trial Court and which is not included in the road and is still being shown in possession of the appellant and his brother in the Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani under Khatauni No. 374 of Khewat No. 237. This erroneous conclusion recorded by the trial Court resulted in not granting a decree to the plaintiff on the basis of his settled possession qua this property. 13. The lower appellate Court, in the facts and circumstances, was not justified in having dismissed the appeal in limine. It appears to have failed to apply its mind to the points raised before it, which is apparent on the face of the record, since no mention has been made to the document Ex. P-7. 13. The lower appellate Court, in the facts and circumstances, was not justified in having dismissed the appeal in limine. It appears to have failed to apply its mind to the points raised before it, which is apparent on the face of the record, since no mention has been made to the document Ex. P-7. Had it correctly applied its mind there was no reason why the appellant and his brother, who were duly recorded in occupation of the property, should not have been granted a decree for injunction on the basis of the settled possession more particularly, in view of the document Ex. P-8, which recites that by virtue of lease granted by the Punjab Government, the appellant and his brother were put into possession on 28th March, 1964. No doubt Rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code empowers the appellate Court to dismiss an appeal in fine. Without notice to the opposite party, when it finds that prima facie there is no merit in the appeal but the discretion given in this rule is a judicial discretion and not an arbitrary jurisdiction, which deserves to be used sparingly and in exceptional cases The first appellate Court is this final Court of fact which by the procedure established by law is enjoined upon with duty to adjudicate upon the facts which can only be done by a careful and elaborate consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record When there are triable issues, may be of law and (or) facts or when there are questions of fact involved raising a controversy, an appeal should not be dismissed summarily. 14. In Mahadev Tukaram Vetale v. Smt. Sugandha, AIR 1972 SC 1932, the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of summarily dismissing an appeal when triable issues arise for determination. Following the ratio in Mahadev Tukaram Vetales case (supra) in a latter judgment in Umakant Vishnu Junnakar v. Parshuram Damodar Vaidya, AIR 1973 SC218, the Supreme Court held that when much volume of evidence oral and documentary had been led and before the appeal Court triable issues were raised it was not permissible for the appeal Court to summarily dismiss an appeal. 15. In the instant case appellant and his brother were recorded in revenue records to be in occupation of 7 Kanals 1 Maria of land since 1968-69. 15. In the instant case appellant and his brother were recorded in revenue records to be in occupation of 7 Kanals 1 Maria of land since 1968-69. The basis and nature of possession was a lawful authority, namely, lease by the Punjab Government. Only a fraction of land had been covered by road. Public Works Department was shown in possession thereof. The remaining land is still being shown in occupation of the appellant and his brother It is not pleaded, nor shown that they had been dispossessed. Entries in revenue records carry a presumption of truth, which is rebuttable one. In these circumstances, the lower appellate Court was not at all justified in having dismissed the appeal summarily and that too without even caring to discuss oral and documentary evidence. 16. It is an established proposition of law that a person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed of the property otherwise than in due course of law. This proposition has been reiterated by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of H. P. and others, 1992 (1) Sim LC 320. In para 18 of the report it has been held : "It is a settled law that where a person is in settled possession of the property even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except of recourse to law. This proposition of law as laid down in Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy, 511 1A 293, was approved by the Supreme Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 203, and was further followed in Ram Rattan and others v. State of Utter Pradesh, (1972) SCR 232, where it was further observed that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act of or process of trespassing.. But this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. The principles laid down in these pronouncements have further been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs Shobha Venkat Rao, JT 1989 (3) SC 489." 17. In circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. The principles laid down in these pronouncements have further been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs Shobha Venkat Rao, JT 1989 (3) SC 489." 17. In case on account of the acts of the defendant(s), the plaintiff felt aggrieved of being dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, there is no manner of doubt that the plaintiff-appellant ought to have been granted decree for injunction with respect to that portion of the property which was not covered by the road. 18. Consequently, while deciding the first question of law formulated, in the negative and the other question, as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant, in the affirmative, the present appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is modified by granting a decree for injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants restraining them from interfering with plaintiffs possession over the land measuring 37 Kanals 8 Marlas comprised in Khasra No. 934 entered at Khewat No. 284 min, Khatauni No. 408 min, as per Jamabandi for the year 1982-83 and with respect to a part of the suit property, shown in the Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani as 9 plots of land comprised in Khasra Nos 2202, 2203, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2223, 2224, 2227 and 2228 measuring 10. 0 hectares entered at Khewat No. 237 min, Khatauni No. 374 of Mauza Kuthera Jaswala Uperla, the plaintiff is granted a decree for injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff-appellant otherwise than in due course of law. Suit with respect to three plots of land measuring 0.07 51 Hectares entered at Khewat No. 237 min, Khatauni No. 387 min of Misal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid Sani situate in Kuthera Jaswala Uperla stands dismissed. Costs on parties. Order accordingly.