R.N. SAHAY, J. 1. This appeal by the defendant no. 1 is from the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Dhanbad dated 16th December, 1986 which affirmed the decree of the Munsif dated 27th May, 1983 by which the suit filed by the respondents was decreed in terms of the relief claimed in the plaint. 2. The plaintiffs who are respondent nos.1 to 5 in this appeal filed suit fop declaration that they are entitled to continue in their services even after taking over charge of the Coal washery plant by the defendant no. 1 (appellant) from defendant no. 3 (respondent no. 6) and for certain consequential reliefs. 3. The relief was claimed on the strength of the following averments in the plaint; The plaintiff and other 147 Workmen had been working in Sudamdih Coal washery from diverse date of 1977 directly under M/S Machally Bharat Engineering Co. Ltd. (defendant no. 6) a contractor under the Principal employee (appellant). The plaintiffs had worked more than 240 days at the time of institution of the suit. The plant constructed by the respondent no. 6 was to be handed over to the appellant on the completion of the work. 4. The appellant required 395 workmen for the plant after take over. They had made many appointments but required 121 workmen more which was to be filled up. The plaintiffs apprehended that they will be retrenched and fresh appointment will be made. The plaintiffs were members of Coal field Labour Union which protested against the illegal and arbitrary action of the management thro• ugh the Union and raised an Industrial dispute. 5. The appellant in its written statement pleaded threshold bar of the suit before the Civil Court since dispute was only capable of being adjudicated under the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. The suit being enforcement of contact of service was barred under section 14 (b) and Section 34 of the Specific Relief’s Act. It was further averred that the plaintiffs had been engaged by the contractor (respondent no 6). The contractor having completed the job the workers engaged by them including the plaintiffs retrenched by the contractors except few who were allowed to continue for the purpose of maintenance of the plant before complete handing over to the appellant. It was further averred that the plaintiffs had been engaged by the contractor (respondent no 6). The contractor having completed the job the workers engaged by them including the plaintiffs retrenched by the contractors except few who were allowed to continue for the purpose of maintenance of the plant before complete handing over to the appellant. Eventually washery was taken over completely by the appellant and the maintenance staff were retrenched after payment of necessary statutory terminal dues. 6. It was denied that the appellant was principal employer. As the contractor was not connected with any mining operation, there never was relationship employer and employee between the workmen and appellant. 7. It is not necessary to refer to other defence of the appellant as the facts outlined above is sufficient to have an idea of the nature of the controversy in the suit. 8. Both the courts below have held the suit to be maintainable and granted relief claimed by the workmen (plaintiffs). 9. The appeal was admitted to decide the following substantial question of law: I. Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit : II. Even if the suit was maintainable, whether the court below could have passed the decree in the form it has been passed". 9. The appellate court has held that no doubt the dispute could well be decided under the Industrial Dispute Ac. 1947 but aggrieved workmen were as much entitled to take shelter of the civil court as relief flowed under the general common law. In other words the plaintiff had option either to avail remedy under the I. D. Act or file suit in a civil court. The learned Additional District Judge invoked the second dictum propounded by Untwalia : J : in the leading case of premier of Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamakar Santaram wadke : A.I.R. 1975 ; S.C. : 2238." if the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative leaving it to the election of the suit or concerned to choose his remedy for the: relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. According to the appellant the first dictuni propounded by Untwalia : J. was applicable in the facts of this case according to which if the Industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act. Then the only remedy available to the suit or not get an adjudication under the Act. 10. In Raja Ram Kumar Bhargava Vs. Union of India. (1988) 1 Supreme Court Cases 681 M.N. Venkatachaliah, J did not decide the question whether the suit was maintainable by an Assesses for interest on refund of Excess profit Tax under Section 67 (7) of the Excess of Profit Tax Act, 1940 but reiterated the principles land down by the Judicial Committee in Secretary of the State Vs. Mask and Co. A.I.R. 1940 (PC) 105, Dhulabhai Vs. State of M.P. A.I.R. 1969 : SC 78. The learned Judge has observed : "Generally speaking, the broad guiding consideration are that wherever a right not preexisting in common law is created by a statute and that statute itself provided a machinery for the enforcement of the right both the right and the remedy having been created uno flatu and a finality is intended to the result of the statutory proceeding, then even in the absence of an. exclusionary provision the civil court's jurisdiction is impliedly barred. If, however, a right pre-existing in common law is recognised by the statute and a new statutory remedy for the enforcement provided, without expressly excluding the civil court's jurisdiction, then both the common law and the statutory remedies might become concurrent remedies leaving open an element of election to the persons of inherence. 11. In recent culling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jitendra Nath Biswa Vs. M/S Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. it was held by G.L. Oza : J. "It is, therefore, clear that this Act i.e. Industrial Disputes Act not only confers the right on a worker for reinstatement and backwages it the order (If termination or dismissal is not in accordance with the standing orders but also provides a detailed procedure and machinery for getting this relief. Under these circumstances, therefore, there is an apparent implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. Under these circumstances, therefore, there is an apparent implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. In Dhulabhai's case (A.I. R. 1969 : S.C. 78) a five judges Bench of this Court considered the language of section 9 and the scope thereof in respect of exclusion of jurisdiction and it was observed (at page 89 of A.I.R.) "Where" there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute" It is, therefore, clear that the scheme of the Industrial Dispute Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court by implication in respect of remedies which are available under this Act and for which a complete procedure and machinery has been provided in this Act" 12. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned Senior counsel for plaintiff respondent has contended that the rights of the plaintiffs to claim the relief flow under general common law and not under the I.D. Act alone and hence the jurisdiction in the civil court and Industrial court was concurrent. 13. The plaintiffs by the plaint claims they had pleaded 240 days service in a year and hence they have prescriptive right under the statute and the appellant did not illegally absorve them in service after the workmen completed the job under Menally Bharat Engineering Co. ltd. 14. It cannot be argued by any stretch of imagination that this right is available to the plaintiffs under the common law. It is so patent that the relief claimed can be granted only under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1914. One significant fact which be noted that the majority of the workmen succeeded in getting relief by the Industrial Tribunal which was affirmed up to the Supreme Court. The Courts below were largely influenced by this consideration as is evident from the tenor of the judgment of the appellate court. 15. One significant fact which be noted that the majority of the workmen succeeded in getting relief by the Industrial Tribunal which was affirmed up to the Supreme Court. The Courts below were largely influenced by this consideration as is evident from the tenor of the judgment of the appellate court. 15. This brings us to the second aspect of the case as to whether section 14 (b) and Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 poses another hurdle in the way the plaintiffs getting relief assuming the jurisdiction of the civil court which is not barred. 16. It is settled law that the court do not grant specific performance of the contract of service and, therefore, when there is purported termination of service of contract, a declaration that the contract subsisted is to be rarely be made (Bhool Chand V. Kurushetra University) A.I.R. 1968 : S.C. 292; Francis V. Municipal Councillors of Kuala Lampur (1962) 3 All. E. R. 633 ; Barber V. Manchester Regional Hospital Board (1958) 1 All E.R. 322 and Vidyodaya University of Ceylon V. Silva (1964) All E.R. 865 (P.C.) 17. In Dr. S. Dutta V. University of Delhi: A.I.R. 1959 : S.C. 1950, there was an arbitration award in favour of Dr. S. Dutta a professor of the Delhi University that he was dismissed wrongfully and malafide and that it had no effect on his status and he continued to be in service. The Supreme Court held that award directed specific performance of contract of service and was, therefore, unforceable in view of section 14(1) (b). 18. The position is totally different where termination is in breach of statutory rules. In such cases the termination/dismissal can be declared null and void and declaration can be granted, the servant is entitled to continue in service (In Ridge V. Baldwin (19 54) A.C. 40; Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (1970) SC 1244; In Sirsi Municipality Vs. Cecella Kom Francis Tellis : A.I.R. 1973: S.C. 855 and in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli Vs. Lakshmi Narain: A.I.R. 1976 : S.C. 888). 19. In Venkata Rao V. Secretary of State 64 I.A. 55 and Ranga Chari Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi (1970) SC 1244; In Sirsi Municipality Vs. Cecella Kom Francis Tellis : A.I.R. 1973: S.C. 855 and in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli Vs. Lakshmi Narain: A.I.R. 1976 : S.C. 888). 19. In Venkata Rao V. Secretary of State 64 I.A. 55 and Ranga Chari Vs. Secretary State 64 I.A. 40, the appellant before the Privy Counsel had been dismissed in contravention of the rules made under section 968 Government of Union Act, 1890 but Judicial Committee refused to grant declaration the dismissed servant continued in service. 20. Law relating to dismissal and refer against illegal and exercise of power therefore may be stated thus : (i) Contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable under section 14(1) (b) of the Specific Relief Act, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1050. (ii) Where there is a breach of the requirement of a statute, the court will give a declaration that the dismissal is ineffective and the servant continues to be in service Commissioner of India V.I.M. Lall, A.I.R. 1948 P. C. 121). (iii) A statutory body is one which is established or created by a statute e. g. Indian Airlines Corporation and similar bodies; but a body which is only governed or administered by certain statutory provisions is not a statutory body. (Executive Committee vaish College Vs. Lakshmi Narain ; A.I.R. 1976 & SC 888). (iv) In the case of such non-statutory bodies a dismissed employee cannot specifically enforce his contract of personal service. (v) In the case of statutory bodies a dismissal which is without jurisdiction, malafide or in breach or natural justice so as to be in contravention of the doctrine of Ex-debito justicice the court will give a declaration as in I.M. Laws case. 21. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant. B.C.C.L. is a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd. and is constituted under section 61 - of the Companies Act and is fully and wholly owned by the Government of India. It is, thus 'other authorities' and an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India under Part-III of the Constitution arid it, therefore, is amenable to enforcement of fundamental rights of its employees. Both the courts below have concurrently held that the suit was maintainable and the respondents are entitled to relief claimed. It is, thus 'other authorities' and an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India under Part-III of the Constitution arid it, therefore, is amenable to enforcement of fundamental rights of its employees. Both the courts below have concurrently held that the suit was maintainable and the respondents are entitled to relief claimed. This court, therefore, under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not entitled to set aside a concurrent decree. 22. Mr. P. K. Sinha submitted that large number of employees like respondents got relief under the Industrial Dispute Act. The award was affirmed up to the Supreme Court. In this situation if the decree of court below is set aside, this will result in unreasonable discrimination and a model employer like B.C.C.L. cannot be permitted to act unreasonably in the matter of conditions of service of workmen. Mr. Sinha also submitted that Civil Court had at least jurisdiction to grant a decree of mandatory injuction restraining the defendant from forbearing from giving effect to the illegal order retrenching or terminating the services of the plaintiffs under the Industrial Dispute Act. No such relief could be granted under section 11A of Industrial Disputes Act. 23. Mr. P.K. Sinha has relied on the decision 1991 (3) Judgment To day 465=1991 BBCJ 182. Mr. Sinha submitted that the Supreme Court in aforesaid case recognised that declaratory suit of the present nature was maintainable. Mr. P.K. Sinha in support of his contention relied upon the case reported in A.I.R. 1973 (SC) and Vaish Degree College Case AIR 1976 (SC) 888 and 1967 (1) S.L.R. 228. The contention of Sinha that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was maintainable by the civil court is absolutely untenable, in view of the reasons stated in earlier part of the judgment. The decisions cited by Mr. P. K. Sinha does not support his contention. 24. It is true that the most of the workmen got relief from the Industrial Court but the plaintiffs approached the civil court, in the hope they could obtain interim injunction against action of the appellant. Respondent/plaintiff were ill advised to file suit instead of joining the other workmen in reference before Industrial Tribunal. In my opinion, at this stage the suit is not maintainable, the question of equitable relief does Dot arise. 25. Respondent/plaintiff were ill advised to file suit instead of joining the other workmen in reference before Industrial Tribunal. In my opinion, at this stage the suit is not maintainable, the question of equitable relief does Dot arise. 25. For the reason stated above this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree under appeal is set aside, The plaintiff's suit is dismissed as Dot maintainable. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.