P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) THIS civil revision is directed against order ofeviction passed by the Additional Rent Controller on 24/09/1988, onthe ground of eviction covered by Clause (e) of proviso to Sub-section (1) ofsection 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. ( 2 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner has urged only one legal contention inseeking setting aside of the eviction order. He has not challenged the findingsof the Additional Rent controller that the demised premises were let out tothe petitioner for residential purposes only and the respondent-landlord bona-fide requires the same for occupation as residence for himself and for hisfamily members dependent upon him and that neither the landlord nor hisfamily members are in possession of any reasonably alternate suitable residential accommodation. ( 3 ) THE contention raised before me is that eviction petition broughton 7/06/1984, was premature as it had been brought within five years ofthe transfer of the property in question in favour of the respondent-landlordwhich according to Counsel for the petitioner took place with issuance of asale certificate on 13/01/1984. ( 4 ) THIS property in question was auctioned and sold to the respondent under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The auction took placeon 11/08/1961 and the sale certificate came to be issued on 13/01/1984 and the,sale certificate Ex. AW1/1 recites that the respondent has beenmade owner of the property in question with effect from 6/01/1962. This objection was not raised by the petitioner in the written statement butthe petitioner came to raise this objection by filing an application before theadditional Rent Controller. The Additional Rent Controller vide his orderdated 20/02/1987, had dismissed the application taking the view thatrespondent-landlord became owner with effect from 6/01/1962, the datementioned in the sale certificate. An appeal was filed before the Rent Controltribunal. The Rent Control Tribunal, inter alia, held that the appeal wasnot maintainable and he also agreed with the view of the Additional Rentcontroller on merits. The appeal was dismissed on 15/04/1987. C. M. (Main) No. 155/88 was filed in the High Court but the same was allowed tobe withdrawn by the Court with liberty to challenge the impugned order ofthe Additional Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal in any proceedings which may have to be taken by the tenant against the final order. The appeal was dismissed on 15/04/1987. C. M. (Main) No. 155/88 was filed in the High Court but the same was allowed tobe withdrawn by the Court with liberty to challenge the impugned order ofthe Additional Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal in any proceedings which may have to be taken by the tenant against the final order. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has, however, contendedthat such a plea ought not to be allowed to be raised in the Civil Revision assuch a plea has not been raised in the written statement. I am afraid thatthis contention cannot be given any importance in view of the fact that thisis a legal plea which is available to the tenant on the admitted facts. ( 6 ) THE facts with regard to this particular plea. as are evident fromthe affidavit filed by the landlord himself in these proceedings, are that hewas a displaced person from Pakistan and he occupied the ground floorwhereas one late Shri Sarab Dayal, another displaced person, had occupiedanother portion of the property and Shri Dholan Dass, predecessor-ininterest of the petitioner, who was again a displaced person, had occupied athird portion of the property. This property was auctioned by the Managingofficer under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act on 11/08/1961 andrespondent being the highest bidder had offered price of Rs. 11,050. 00. Thisbid was accepted and the respondent had given the price in shape of hisverified claim in the sum of Rs. 6,149/92p and another verified claim of hisassociate, namely, Sh. Harbhaj Rai in the sum of Rs. 4900/08p. It is mentioned that Sarab Dayal had filed objections to the bid of the respondentbeing accepted. The objections were allowed and vide order dated 30/08/1963, the Assistant Settlement Commissioner had set aside the said auction. Ultimately writ petition was filed by the respondent in the High Courtfor setting aside of the orders of the authorities and for restoration of theacceptance of his bid. The said writ petition was allowed vide judgmentdated 6/08/1976. Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the heirs ofsarab Dayal, who had died during the pendency of the proceedings, and theunion of India, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 7/08/1980. A special leave petition was filed by the heirs of Sarab Dayal in the Supremecourt which came to be dismissed on 3/08/1982. Letters Patent Appeals were filed by the heirs ofsarab Dayal, who had died during the pendency of the proceedings, and theunion of India, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 7/08/1980. A special leave petition was filed by the heirs of Sarab Dayal in the Supremecourt which came to be dismissed on 3/08/1982. ( 7 ) IT appears that Rallia Ram, on his sale being cancelled, had movedthe Settlement Officer (Sales) for adjustment of his claim, which was to beadjusted in respect of the property in question, to be now adjusted againstanother property C-IV/28, Lajpat Nagar. This request was accepted videorder dated 18/11/1965, copy of which is mark a . Earlier to thatby order dated 28/08/1963, copy of which is mark b , the tenants wererequired not to attorn in favour of Rallia Ram as the sale in his favour hadbeen cancelled. ( 8 ) IT is mentioned in the affidavit that the asssociate, whose verifiedclaim was requested to be adjusted in the sale price, had later on withdrawnhis consent to get his claim adjusted and withdrew his amount. Sarab Dayal,who was the tenant in the property, was required to deposit arrears of rentwith the Managing Officer and it was ordered by the Court that in caseultimately Rallia Ram was to succeed in the writ petition, Rallia Ram wouldbecome entitled to the, said amount. In this way, the amount of the verifiedclaim of Rallia Ram and also the amount which became due to Rallia Ramon becoming successful in the litigation came to about Rs. 9,577/86. Therewas a deficiency of a sum of Rs. 1,472/14p. Rallia Ram-respondent thendeposited the said amount vide demand draft dated 24/03/1983 and thesale certificate came to be issued, as mentioned earlier, on 13/01/1984. ( 9 ) THE short question which arises for consideration is whether thesale to Rallia Ram would be deemed to have taken place with effect from 24/03/1983. or from the date mentioned in the sale certificate ? Thematter is covered by a judgment of the Supreme Court given in Bishan Paulv. Mothu Ram, AIR 1965 SC 1994 . ( 9 ) THE short question which arises for consideration is whether thesale to Rallia Ram would be deemed to have taken place with effect from 24/03/1983. or from the date mentioned in the sale certificate ? Thematter is covered by a judgment of the Supreme Court given in Bishan Paulv. Mothu Ram, AIR 1965 SC 1994 . In the said case also the question whicharose for decision was as to when did title in a property sold under Section 20 read with Rule 90 and Rule 92 of the Rules would be deemed to havepassed-whether it passed on the confirmation of sale or on payment of thefull price or on the date the sale certificate is issued ? The Supreme Courtafter referring to Rule 90 in detail observed that the Rules which had beenearlier reproduced show that auction is held on a date fixed and is subject toreserved price and the officer conducting the saledeclares at the fall of thehammer as to who is the highest bidder and then the highest bid is subject tothe approval of the Settlement Commissioner and the period of seven daysmust elapse before the bid is approved within which application can be movedby any interested person for cancellation of the bid and if the bid is approved,the highest bidder is recognised as the auction purchaser and he is required toproduce a treasury challan in respect of the balance of the purchase moneywithin a period of 15 days which can be extended and when full purchaseprice is paid, certificate is to be issued in Form No. XXII which is to beto the. Sub-Registrar (Registration) and if the balance of the amount is notpaid, the amount of advance in deposit is forfeited and the auction purchaseris left with no claim over the property. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court held that passing of the title, thus, presupposes the payment of price in full and the question is at what stage thistakes place, and for which there are other distinct stages in the sale of theproperty which are : (a) the fall of the hammer and the declaration of thehighest bid; (b) the approval of the highest bid by the Settlement Commissioner or officer appointed by him; (c) payment of the full price afterapproval of the highest bid; (d) grant of certificate; and (e) registration of thecertificate. ( 11 ) IT was emphasized by the Supreme Court that it is also clear thattill payment of full price, title is in abeyance for the rules themselves say thatif the price is not paid the auction purchaser has no claim to the property. The Supreme Court also noticed the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure contained in Order XXI, Rule 92 and Rule 94 which now by a statutoryprovision ante-dates title by a fiction to the date of auction. However, thesupreme Court held that this fiction cannot apply to the sale being madeunder Section 20 read with Rule 90 of the Act and the Rules. ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court again noticed the amendment of the proforma of the sale certificate which now required a date to be filled in fromwhich date the auction purchaser was to be deemed to be owner. Thesupreme Court observed that the reason appears to be this that the balanceof the purchase price may not be paid before the acceptance of the highestbid but much latter and it may be necessary to put in the date of the payment rather than the date of approval of the bid. The Supreme Courtemphatically laid down that the intention behind the rules appears to be thatthe title shall pass when the full price is realised and this is now clear fromthe new form of the certificate and so, it was held that so far as title wasconcerned it must be deemed to have passed and the certificate must relateback to the date when the sale became absolute. ( 13 ) SO. it is quite clear that sale becomes absolute not on the datethe highest bid is confirmed by the authorities but on the date the full consideration of the sale is paid. A Single Bench of this Court in K. N. Kapoor v. Union of India and Others, AIR 1976 Delhi 31, after examining the provisions of Rule 90 held that where the purchaser of the property at a publicauction fails to comply with the conditions imposed by Rule 90 and fails todeposit fie full once the. purchase becomes a nullity and the purchaser hasno claim to the property and even no order for cancelling the auction sale isnecessary. purchase becomes a nullity and the purchaser hasno claim to the property and even no order for cancelling the auction sale isnecessary. ( 14 ) EVEN in M/s. Bombay Salt andchemical Industries v. L. J. Johnsonand Others, AIR 1958 SC 289 , which has been also referred by the Supremecourt in the case of Bishon Paul (supra) same principles of law were laiddown and it was observed that it is clear from the rules and conditions ofsale imposed under Rule 90 that the declaration that the person was thehighest bidder does not amount to a complete sale; the fact that bid has to beapproved shows that till such approval the auction purchaser has no rightand it would further appear that even after approval the purchaser has yet topay the balance price and if he fails to do so he has no claim over the property. Thus, the correct position is that on the approval of the bid by thesettlement Commissioner, a binding contract of sale of property to the auction purchaser comes in existence and on issuance of a sale certificate thetransfer of the property takes place Where the balance on the purchaseprice has not been paid, it must be held that there has still been no transferof the property sold at the auction. ( 15 ) IN view of the above, it is quite clear that the title in the property could not be deemed to have passed to the respondent till he had madethe full payment which he came to make only on 24/03/1983, as isadmitted by him in his affidavit dated 3/07/1989, filed in these proceedings. So, there is no need to now decide the application C. M. 346/89 by which thepetitioner wanted to produce on record the copy of the challan showing thesaid deposit of the amount by the respondent as this fact stands admitted bythe respondent in the affidavit. This application is dismissed as infructuous. So, in law the respondent would be deemed to have become owner of theproperty with effect from 24/03/1983, when he paid the balance amountof the sale price. The authorities had no power or jurisdiction to declarehim as owner with effect from any earlier date as the rules do not permit it. The eviction petition having been brought within five years of the respondenthaving become owner of the property by transfer, was not maintainable. The authorities had no power or jurisdiction to declarehim as owner with effect from any earlier date as the rules do not permit it. The eviction petition having been brought within five years of the respondenthaving become owner of the property by transfer, was not maintainable. Hence, the eviction petition being premature was liable to be dismissed. ( 16 ) THE Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the eviction petition before the expiry of five years and mere fact that during the pendency ofthe proceedings in the Court five years period had elapsed cannot cure thejurisdictional defect appearing in this case. Subsequent events cannot makethe original petition maintainable because on the date the petition was filedthe Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain such a petition. ( 17 ) I allow this civil revision, set aside the impugned order anddismiss the eviction petition as premature under Section 14 (6) of the Delhirent Control Act. The parties are left to bear their own costs throughout.