N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) ON i. As. Ii, iii and iv whether relief sought for by the parties in i. as. Ii, iii and iv deserve to be granted or not, it is proper and pertinent to note here how the things took place hurriedly and if properly understood it seems that efforts were made to circumvent the orders passed by the courts and to a little extent in an intelligent wayof manoeuvring the things and playing fraud on the court. This observation can. be properly explained by slating the circumstances which lead to filing these applications. ( 2 ) THE revision-petitioner was a tenant under the respondent-landlord in respect of the petition schedule premises which was a non-residential premises where the tenant was carrying on hotel business. The respondent-landlord filed a petition under Section 21 (1) (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (h) and (p) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the act') in h. r. c. No. 47 of 1977 on the file of the i additional munsiff, tumkur. The said petition was contested. Ultimately the said petition came to be dismissed by the learned munsiff on 21-11-1984. Against the said order the landlord preferred a revision in r. r. No. 88 of 1984 before the learned principal district judge, tumkur. When the proceedings were pending, the landlord confined his case only to Section 21 (l) (h) of the act. Accordingly, the learned district judge after hearing both sides passed an order on 20-4-1992 allowing the eviction petition under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, thus reversing the order passed by the munsiff. While allowing the eviction petition, the tenant was granted three months' time to vacate the petition schedule premises. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the order of the learned district judge, the tenant has filed this petition on 1-6-1992. On 7-7-1992 this court granted interim order of stay of eviction for a period of six weeks and further ordered to get the records of the courts below. When the matter was thus pending before this court, on 11-11-1992 the decree-holder filed an execution case in ex. No. 183 of 1992 before the learned munsiff, tumkur. In the execution petition pendency of this crp No. 2518 of 1992 was also mentioned. When the matter was thus pending before this court, on 11-11-1992 the decree-holder filed an execution case in ex. No. 183 of 1992 before the learned munsiff, tumkur. In the execution petition pendency of this crp No. 2518 of 1992 was also mentioned. On 11-11-1992 the executing court passed an order which reads as follows :"heard Sri b. g. Advocate for the decree-holder. If no stay order is therefrom the Hon'ble high court, issue delivery warrant with police help executable by 27-11-1992 with a direction to break open the lock if necessary. Sd/ -. Dated 11-11-1992"on the next date, that was on 12-11-1992 in the margin it was ordered thus :"concerned registers arc verified. Stay order not received. For kind orders. " then the presiding officer passed an order which reads : "hence issue delivery warrant. " sd/ -. Dated 12-11-1992"on 13-11-1992 when this revision petition was listed for admission before this court, the court after hearing the petitioner dismissed the revision petition granting time to the petitioner-tenant to vacate and put the landlord in vacant possession of the schedule premises by the end of November 1995. It is not in dispute that this order of dismissal was passed by this court round about 12 noon. After a lapse of six days from the date of the order i. e. , 13-11-1992 the landlord filed two applications i. as ii and iii requesting this court to recall the order dated 13-11-1992 granting time to the tenant to vacate the petition premises till the end of November 1995 and also to stay the order granting time to vacate contending that by the time the crp had come up for admission and this court while dismissing the revision and granting time till the end of November 1995 to vacate, the Advocate for the landlord had in fact executed the order of eviction on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. with the police help as ordered by the executing court on 12-11-1992 and took delivery of the premises through the bailiff, after drawing inventory of the belongings of the judgment-debtor found in the premises and obtained signatures of the son of the j udgment-debtor and his brother-in-law to the mahazar drawn on the same day ie. , 13-11-1992. , 13-11-1992. On 19-11-1992 the tenant - revision petitioner filed an application under Section 144 read with Section 151 of CPC seeking restitution of the premises alleging that though the decree-holder was aware of the order passed by this court granting time to vacate till the end of November 1995, influenced by the decree- holder the police and the bailiff prepared the document to show that he took delivery of the premises at 8 a. m. , the mahazar and other things were prepared at annexures a, b and c annexed to the applications subsequent to the order passed by this court granting time. In the affidavit it is sworn, the way in which the executing court ordered to take delivery with the police help in the absence of any protest looks quite strange. Further when the executing court said that warrant to be executable by 27-11-1992, no explanation is shown as to why delivery was effected within 15 hours from the date of the order. It is further sworn to in the affidavit of the tenant that signatures found on the mahazar of his son and brother-in-law have been obtained by threat and coercion with the help of the police. Taking delivery of the premises contrary to the order passed by this court and dispossessing the petitioner-tenant in spite of time granted is quite illegal as such petitioner deserves to be put back in possession of the premises. In otherwords he is entitled for restitution. In support of his contentions Sri c. m. basavaraya, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on two following decisions: V. Babulal v M. K. M. Shariff, 1981 (1) kar. L. j. 273, wherein this court while dealing with thescope of sections 144 and 151 of CPC held that the same are applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Control Act, and (ii) in the case of union carbide corporation etc. , etc. V union of India etc. , etc. , AIR 1992 SC 248 at paras 75 and 76 while explaining the scope of Section 144, CPC and its importance and held that when it is found that injustice is going to be caused that Section 144 of CPC. , can be invoked. Thus submitting learned counsel for the petitioner requested that ia-iv filed by him seeking restitution be granted. , can be invoked. Thus submitting learned counsel for the petitioner requested that ia-iv filed by him seeking restitution be granted. ( 4 ) WHERE as Sri u. l. narayana rao, learned senior counsel for the respondent-landlord contended that when delivery of the premises was handed over to the decree-holder on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. that too in the presence of the tenant's son and brother-in-law and a mahazar was drawn handing over some of the articles found in the premises to the representatives of the tenant as such at this point of time to contend that the petitioner is entitled for restitution on the ground that this court while dismissing the revision petition had granted time on 13-11-1992 to vacate the premises till the end of November 1995 does nut deserve to be considered. Learned counsel further contended : i) if the tenant/petitioner was really not aware of taking delivery of the premises he would not have kept silent or negligent in approaching the court well in time with a complaint that in spite of time granted by this court, landlord had obtained delivery of the premises with the help of the bailiff and the police; (ii) when the tenant's son and brother-in-law were signatories to the mahazar it is too much for the tenant now to contend that delivery has been taken by playing fraud and with the connivance of the bailiff and the police. Iii) Section 144 of CPC which the tenant has invoked seeking restitution is not applicable to the present proceedings as the scope of Section 144, CPC is available only in a case where the decree deserves to be varied, annulled or modified and not otherwise. Because in the instant case no decree was there to be varied, annulled or modified. To support his contentions he placed reliance on the decision of this court in the case of M/s. Hameed and hameed enterprises v M/s. Nicky's parlour, 1990 (l)'kar. Lj. Sh. N. 75 : ILR 1989 kar. 835 para 17 of the said judgment reads thus :"17. An order for restitution can be made only in the ends of Justice and if it is absolutely necessary and in the present case I have held that such an order is required to be made. Lj. Sh. N. 75 : ILR 1989 kar. 835 para 17 of the said judgment reads thus :"17. An order for restitution can be made only in the ends of Justice and if it is absolutely necessary and in the present case I have held that such an order is required to be made. However, the question is whether an unconditional order of restitution could have been made in a case of this nature where the judgment-debtor is callous and negligent in the conduct of the suit inasmuch as the suit came to be decreed against him ex pane and thereafter he filed an application for restoration of the suit which also came to be dismissed for default. It is clear from the record in the case that there is a huge sum of rent due from the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder. Therefore, in my view, the restitution should be made subject to the condition that the judgment-debtor shall pay the entire arrears of rent due under the decree till he was disposed by the executing court to the decree-holder before he is put in possession pursuant to the order of restitution made in the case. In the circumstances, crp 3560 of 1986 is allowed in part and the restitution ordered by the executing court is modified accordingly. "thus contending, Sri narayan rao submitted that i. a. iv filed by the tenant be dismissed and i. as. Ii and iii filed by the landlord be allowed. ( 5 ) AFTER hearing both sides and going through the averments made in the affidavits in support of all the applications including the original records, my findings are as follows; it is not in dispute that when on 12-11-1992 the court ordered delivery warrant the civil revision petition was pending before this court. The executing court had ordered that warrant to be executable by 27-11-1992. The executing court had ordered that warrant to be executable by 27-11-1992. That means time was there till 27-11-1992 but no explanation has been given as to why within 15 hours from the date of the order the bailiff was in a hurry to execute the warrant with the police help, that too at about 8 a. m. even the hours mentioned in the mahazar appear to be inserted later because at pages 5 and 7 of the original records of the executing court, at the top of right hand side of the said pages in kannada it is mentioned thus : "time morning 8 a. m. " "jfcbcda emr^ 8 ^> otl" but the handwriting on these pages differs. Except the landlord and the bailiff none of the other signatories to these two documents have put the time beneath their signatures. Warrant which is at page 4 of the record of the executing court at its reverse after writing some particulars the name of the bailiff has been written on a piece of paper and pasted with the date as 16-11-1992. It is not mentioned either in the mahazar or in other documents produced, why the signature of the sub-lessee has not been obtained though it has been canvassed that the tenant has sub-let the premises. From this, it is clear the executing the warrant on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. is full of doubtful and bailiff must have obliged the decree- holder. ( 6 ) SRI narayana rao, submitted that if really delivery was not effected on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. the tenant would not have kept silent on the other hand he would have complained to the court much earlier to 19-11-1992. He was aware that this court while dismissing the revision petition had granted time till the end of November 1995 to vacate the premises. Thus the tenant is not entitled for restitution of the premises because of his own silence and negligence. To this, the answer is that if really delivery was effected on 13-11-1992 at 8a. m. the said fact the decree-holder would have brought to the notice of the court on the samcday when the court dismissed the revision petition he should have brought to the notice of this court taking possession on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. at least on the next working day. m. the said fact the decree-holder would have brought to the notice of the court on the samcday when the court dismissed the revision petition he should have brought to the notice of this court taking possession on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. at least on the next working day. But the decree-holder did not inform the court. On the other hand he came to the court on 19-11-1992 with the present i. as. His conduct in keeping silent from 13-11-1992 till 19-11-1992 on which date he filedap- plications supported by affidavits sworn to on 19-11-1992 falsifies the theory that he took delivery of the premises on 13-11-1992 at 8a. m. hence, points 1 and 2 canvassed by Sri u. l, narayana rao have no substance. ( 7 ) REGARDING the third point that the application filed by the tenant under Section 144, CPC is not maintainable is again incorrect. Reliance placed on the decision reported in 1990 (1) kar. Lj. Sh. N. 75 : ILR 1989 kar. 835, if understood properly the conclusion is that even in hrc proceedings Section 144, CPC can be invoked. Whereas reliance placed by Sri basavaraya rendered in the case reported in 1981 (1) kar. Lj. 273, supra supports the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant in full. In addition to this when a complaint has been made to the court praying for its interference to prevent abused of the process of the court, in such an event court cannot keep silent or raise hands and say that it has no jurisdiction to interfere because such an application has been by invoking wrong provision of law. After all court's duty is to render substantial Justice and not to deny Justice on technical grounds to a person who enters the temples of Justice for relief. A litigant comes to the court with full faith and confidence that he would get Justice here. If the court denies Justice to such a person by taking excuses of procedural rigidities or technicalities the very faith the litigant has in the judicial system will be shaken. In fact the Supreme Court in the case of union carbide corporation v union of India (supra) has very clearly and effectively explained the role of the courts and ultimate object in invoking Section 144 of CPC. The relevant discussion is at paras 75 and 76 which read thus :"75. In fact the Supreme Court in the case of union carbide corporation v union of India (supra) has very clearly and effectively explained the role of the courts and ultimate object in invoking Section 144 of CPC. The relevant discussion is at paras 75 and 76 which read thus :"75. Strictly speaking no restitution in sense that any funds obtained and appropriated by the union of India requiring to be paid back arises. The funds brought in by the ucc are deposited in the reserve bank of India and remain under this court's control and jurisdiction. Restitution is an equitable principle and is subject to the discretion of the court. Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure, embodying the doctrine of restitution does not confer any new substantive right to the party not already obtaining under the general law. The Section merely regulates the power of the court in that behalf. 76, but in the present case, Section 144, CPC, does not in terms apply. There is always an inherent jurisdiction to order restitution afortiorari where a party has acted on the faith of an order of the court. A litigant should not go back with the impression that the judicial process so operated as to weaken his position and whatever it did on the faith of the court's order operated to its disadvantage. It is the duty of the court to ensure that no litigant goes back with a feeling that he was prejudiced by an act which he did on the faith of the court's order. Both on principle and authority it becomes the duty of the court as much moral as it is legal to order refund and restitution of the amount to the ucc if the settlement is set aside. Both on principle and authority it becomes the duty of the court as much moral as it is legal to order refund and restitution of the amount to the ucc if the settlement is set aside. " ( 8 ) THE scope of Section 144 of CPC is where a decree or an order is varied or reversed in an appeal, revision or other proceedings or is set aside, or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the court which passed the decree or order shall on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise cause such restitution to be made as well, so far as may be place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified, ( 9 ) SRI u. l. n. rao, incorrectly understanding scope of Section 144, CPC argued that since there is no variation, reversal or modification of the decree or Order, relief under Section 144, CPC cannot be granted to the tenant. In my view the submission made by Sri narayana rao, has no substance for the simple reason that while dismissing the revision petition, this court granted time to vacate till end of November 1995. Granting lime to vacate implies that giving effect to the order of eviction is kept in abeyance till the end of November 1995. In addition to this, against grating time till the end of November 1995, no attempt has been made by the landlord immediately either to seek modification or recalling the said order to prefer any appeal before the Supreme Court. Failure to take steps well in lime clearly establishes that he too had satisfied and had no objection when this court granted time till the end of November 1995 to vacate. But subsequently, he changed his mind and managed to gel the records prepared so as to show that he took possession of the premises on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. a few hours earlier to this court granting time to the tenant to vacate. But subsequently, he changed his mind and managed to gel the records prepared so as to show that he took possession of the premises on 13-11-1992 at 8 a. m. a few hours earlier to this court granting time to the tenant to vacate. If the landlord was really a law abiding citizen, and has sense of any respect to orders of this court he would have immediately informed the executing court that mistake crept in while taking delivery and would have informed the executing court that let the tenant continue till the time granted by the high court expires. But he failed to do so. The reason being to circumvent the orders passed by this court. From the circumstances explained it is clear that the landlord managed to get delivery of the premises in spite of order passed by this court granting time. If the order passed by this court granting time to the tenant. If illegality committed is allowed and time granted is allowed to be frustrated because of manoeuvring of things by the bailiff and other concerned, the sanctity attached to the order of the court will be defeated. If such things are encouraged and if tactics used are accepted, then it becomes very easy for such parties to manage things and thus circumvent the Provisions of the law or or- ders. In such an event orders of the courts will remain only on the paper and not to be executed or respected. Since it is said that injustice has been caused to the tenant-revision petitioner he deserves for Justice and if necessary help. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, the applications i. as ii and iii filed by the landlord stand rejected and application i. A. Iv filed by the tenant revision petitioner stands allowed and he is entitled for restitution of the premises. ( 11 ) THE landlord-decree-holdcr to put back the tenant in possession of the petition premises within one week from this day and if the landlord does not put the tenant in vacant possession of the premises within this period the tenant is entitled to sock police help. ( 12 ) THE landlord decree holder to pay cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the tenant revision petitioner. ( 13 ) A copy of this order be communicated to the learned district judge, tumkur, to enquire into the conduct of the concerned bailiff. ( 12 ) THE landlord decree holder to pay cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the tenant revision petitioner. ( 13 ) A copy of this order be communicated to the learned district judge, tumkur, to enquire into the conduct of the concerned bailiff. --- *** --- .