JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J—The petitioner Kaman Singh, a Forest Guard, Satrukha Forest Beat, Kutlehar Forests, District Una, has preferred this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying for expunction of adverse remarks recorded in paragraph 8 of the judgment passed by Judicial Magistrate (I), Hamirpur, in case No. 6-IH/89, decided on December 7, 1991 under sections 32/33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. 2. A case under sections 32/33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 was instituted against four persons, namely, Sarotu Ram, Bakshi Ram, Bant Ram and Smt. Leela Devi in the trial Court. The allegations against the aforementioned accused were that on 6-5-1988, the original accused No, 4, Leela Devi bad engaged other co-accused for construction of verandah by breaking upon Government land in Government Forest of Cheli Satrukha on an area of 30 x 9’. The petitioner who was Incharge of Satrukha Forest Beat, on his spot visit found the aforesaid encroachment in the Government Forest and issued damage report against the original accused persons. The matter was reported by him to the higher authorities and complaint was filed by Block Forest Officer, Barsar Block, Kutlehar Forests, duly counter-signed by the Divisional Forest Officer, Una Forest Division, Una. 3. Five witnesses including the petitioner, who figured as PW 2, were, examined by the prosecution and accused were examined under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial Judge has not accepted the prosecution case and acquitted the accused for the alleged offence. While acquitting the accused, the trial Judge has, however, made the adverse remarks about the conduct of the petitioner and the Divisional Forest Officer, Una. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, it is stated as below; "In the light of the aforesaid evidence, the prosecution case has no merit at all It Is most unfortunate that due to misconduct of the forest officials, the accused had to suffer the agony of long trial in court for an act which was not at all offence under the Forest Act or in any other law The present challan was filed In court on 21-4-1^89 and from 25-5-1989 right uptil now, the accused had been facing trial in this Court. In my opinion, there was no reasonable ground for making accusation against any of the accused and as such I find It to be a fit case where the complainant should be required to pay compensation to accused for such false accusation. Accordingly, therefore, it is ordered that notices be issued to Forest Guard Kaman Singh of block forest office, Barsar Block, Kutlehar Forests and Divisional Forest Officer, Una Forest Division Una to appear in person and to show cause why they should not pay compensation to each of the accused for filing frivolous and false complaint against the accused, for which separate proceedings be started. A copy of this judgment be placed in that proceeding” It is with that part of the judgment, I am now concerned with in this revision petition. 4. Ms. Devyani Kuthiala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that these remarks of the learned Judicial Magistrate are unwarranted, unfair, derrogatory, hurtful to the reputation and status of the petitioner and in violation of the principles of natural justice as, the learned Counsel contends, no opportunity was ever given by the learned trial Judge to hear the petitioner before recording these remarks. She further asserts that as per the revenue records, Khasra No. 249 is a protected forest known as Cheli Satrukha9 and the petitioner, who was a Forest Guard, acted in good faith and in lawful discharge of his duties when he issued the damage report after detecting that an area of 30’ X 9’ had been broken open for adding a verandah to her residential house by accused No. 4. It is further contended that original accused No. 4 had contravened the provisions of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, and also the provisions of H. P. (Land Preservation) Act, 1978 and the petitioner had valid reasons to believe that the accused had encroached upon the protected forest and issued the damage report against the accused in good faith in the lawful discharge of his duties. 5. Before examining these submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to certain earlier decisions where the right of Courts to make free and fearless comments and observations on the one hand and the corresponding need for maintaining sobriety, moderation and restraint regarding character, conduct, integrity etc. of parties, witnesses and others are concerned 6. of parties, witnesses and others are concerned 6. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703, it was held in paragraph 10 of the judgment as follows ;— “If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this t the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same time, it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisation defeat the very purpose for which they are made It has been Judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself ; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks ; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncement must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." 7. Vide also in R. K Lakshmanan v. A. K Srinivasan AIR 1975 SO 1741, wherein this ratio has been referred to and followed. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Dr M L. Ahuja and others v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, 1975 Cr LJ 330, observed in paragraph 4 of the judgment in the following manner i "4. It is abundantly clear that a trial Court is expected to give only such remarks which are necessary to sustain a judicial finding. In other words, only such remarks need be made in the judgment which are in furtherance of the ends of justice and not to fulfil any other object except deciding the case in a correct perspective so that appropriate finding is given. In other words, only such remarks need be made in the judgment which are in furtherance of the ends of justice and not to fulfil any other object except deciding the case in a correct perspective so that appropriate finding is given. It is undisputed that the remarks should be borne out from evidence and must not be pure surmises and conjectures made by the Court, If the intention is to harm any public servant, or even if that intention is missing but the remarks made are reckless and are likely to jeopardise the interest of public service and endanger the prospect of a public servant and even injure his reputation or harm his official career, such remarks require to be expunged as they are no longer necessary. In other words, the remarks made by the trial Judge should be bona fide and should be directed only to one and the only end, namely, the dispensation of justice in trial." 9. In A. M. Mathur v Parmod Kumar Gupta, AIR 1990 SC 1737, K. Jagannatha Shetty, J., speaking for the Court observed (at page 1741) : "Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be a constant theme of our Judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect; that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the Executive and Legislature. There must be mutual respect. When the qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process/ (Para 13) 10. In para 14 of this judgment, the Court further observed that: “The Judges Bench is a seat of power. Not only do Judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. The Judges have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the Court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of Counsel, parties or witnesses. Not only do Judges have power to make binding decisions, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. The Judges have the absolute and unchallengeable control of the Court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of Counsel, parties or witnesses. We concede that the Court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert to their conduct.” [See (i) Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushan Kart (1986) 2 SC 81 at p. 824, (ii Himachal Pradesh Transport Corporation v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1990 Sim LC p. 362]. Applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion that the observations made and aspersion cast on the petitioner by the learned trial Judge are wholly and utterly unjustified and unwarranted. The petitioner had a bonafide belief that the area encroached by the original accused was a forest land notified as protected forest and by breaking land in protected forest for residential use by original accused No 4 she thereby contravened the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 as it amounted to diverting forest area for an utterly different purpose He had issued the damage report against the original accused in good faith and in the lawful discharge of his duties. These remarks were not at all necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. Nor weee they essential for the decision of the case, so, integral part thereof. In case, these remarks are deleted, there is no effect of changing the content or effect of the judgment. 11. Similarly, the observations of the trial Judge for initiating action against erring Divisional Forest Officer, Una, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case are un-called for and unnecessary. 12. In case, these remarks are deleted, there is no effect of changing the content or effect of the judgment. 11. Similarly, the observations of the trial Judge for initiating action against erring Divisional Forest Officer, Una, in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case are un-called for and unnecessary. 12. I find merit in the contentions of the petitioner, for the aforesaid reasons, I allow the revision petition and direct the derogatory remarks made against the petitioner and Divisional Forest Officer, Una, set out earlier to stand expunged from the judgment under revision. Petition allowed.