A. N. RAY, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application challenging that part of the Award where the learned Arbitrator refused to grant pendente lite interest to the petitioner. ( 2 ) IN this matter the first award was passed by the learned Arbitrator on or about 7/12/1991 on the following terms :-" (1) That the said Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. the respondent abovenamed do pay to M/s. Engineering Construction Services the claimant a sum of Rs. 2,25,000. 00 (Rupees two lacs twenty five thousand only ). The said sum is to be paid by Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. within a period of 60 (sixty) days from this day (to-day) and will carry interest at the rate of 15% per annum till realisation. (2) I further award that the said Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. do pay to the said claimant M/s, Engineering Construction Services the costs of the proceedings held before me which I assess at a sum of Rs. 30,000. 00 (Rupees thirty thousand) only, The said sum of Rs. 30,000. 00 will also be paid by Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. within 60 days from this day (today ). " ( 3 ) THERE was a change of law in regard to the power of an Arbitrator to grant pendente lite interest and inter alia for the said reason the Award was remitted for reconsideration of the matter of grant of interest. ( 4 ) AFTER reconsideration the same learned Arbitrator passed the subsequent Award on the following terms :-" (A) Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. will not pay any pendente lite interest to M/s. Engineering Construction Services. (b) Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. will pay interest to Engineering Construction Services on the sum of Rs. 2,25,000. 00 (Rupees Two lakhs twenty five thousand only) as awarded by me on 7/12/1991 at a rate of 15 per cent per annum from 7/12/1991 till the date when any decree that may be passed by the Hon'ble Court and thereafter it will be in accordance with the decree that may be passed by the Hon'ble Court in that regard. (c) So far as direction for payment of the costs of Rs. 50,000. (c) So far as direction for payment of the costs of Rs. 50,000. 00 payable by Mining and Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd. to Engineering Construction Services as awarded by me in my award dated 7/12/1991 as mentioned in clause (2) of the operative portion of the said award dated 7/12/1991 is concerned, the award remains unaltered. (d) Each party will pay and bear its own costs in respect of the proceedings held before me after the award was remitted to me. " ( 5 ) IT is argued by Mrs. Mukherjee appearing for the petitioner that the learned Arbitrator committed legal misconduct; alternatively, he passed an Award, which was erroneous on the face of it, i. e. , he committed an error apparent in passing the second Award in August, 1992. Mrs. Mukherjee further submitted that since further interest on the sum of Rs. 2,25,000. 00 was granted by the learned Arbitrator from 7/08/1991, and that too at the substantial rate of 15% per annum, there could be no reason conceivable, why no interest should be disallowed for the period pendente lite, i. e. , for the period during which the reference was continuing. Mrs. Mukherjee states that this discloses an error apparent on the face of the award. ( 6 ) MRS. Mukherjee has based her argument on an authority, which I shall refer to immediately hereafter, and submitted that the facts and circumstances of file case could not justify the decision of refusal of interest pendente lite by the learned Arbitrator, and that in the present view of law taken by the Supreme Court the Court a to rectify such injustice and relieve the party suffering from such injustice by virtue of an award, which cannot be supported in the facts and circumstances in any manner whatsoever. ( 7 ) THE authority relied upon by Mrs. Mukherjee, which was also relied upon by Mr. Banerjee appearing for the respondent, and indeed which is the authority, which must be the starting point for any enquiry into the law as to grant of pendente lite interest by an Arbitrator in India, is the five Judge decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Irrigation Department v. G. C. Roy, reported in AIR 1992 SC 732 . Paragraph 45 of the judgment in that case runs as follows :-"45. Paragraph 45 of the judgment in that case runs as follows :-"45. Where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute (along with the claim for principal amount or independently) is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest pendente lite. This is for the reason that in such a case it must be presumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties and therefore when the parties refer all their disputes or refer the dispute as to interest as such to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest. This does not mean that in every case the arbitrator should necessarily award interest pendente lite. It is a matter within his discretion to be exercised in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping the ends of justice in view. " ( 8 ) IT cannot but he held on the basis of the above authority that an Arbitrator need not necessarily award pendente lite interest in all cases. But if the facts and circumstances of the case do not justify refusal of pendente lite interest, in that event would the Court be justified in sitting in appeal over the Award, or that part of the Award, which refuses to grant pendente lite interest ? The above authority nowhere lays down this that in cases of refusal of grant of pendente lite interest, the Court will freshly re-enter into the facts and circumstances of the case, to test whether the Arbitrator had a good and sufficient reason for refusing to grant pendente lite interest. ( 9 ) IN my opinion the above authority does not go so far, which would of course be going a step beyond the ordinarily known law of Arbitration. It was made clear in the said judgment that the grant of pendente lite interest is a matter within the discretion of the learned Arbitrator. This is manifest from the last sentence of paragraph 45 quoted above. Nowhere did their Lordships indicate anything which would justify the proposition that pendente lite interest during reference is a matter to be determined by exercise of discretion of the Arbitration Court, or that the Arbitration Court can enter into the reasonableness of refusal of pendente lite interest by the Arbitrator. Nowhere did their Lordships indicate anything which would justify the proposition that pendente lite interest during reference is a matter to be determined by exercise of discretion of the Arbitration Court, or that the Arbitration Court can enter into the reasonableness of refusal of pendente lite interest by the Arbitrator. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court dictim that grant of pendente lite interest is in the discretion of the Arbitrator, is, therefore, primarily for the guidance of the Arbitrator himself, and the Arbitrator is not allowed to refuse pendente lite interest under any stated misconception that he has no power to grant the same. If he were to do so by making his misconception known in the Award, then he will have committed an error of law apparent on the face of the Award. But here, there is no suggestion that the learned Arbitrator was labouring under any erroneous impression that he had no power in law to grant pendente lite interest on the other hand, the Award was remitted because of restoration of the position at law that the Arbitrator had such power to grant interest pendente lite. ( 11 ) MRS. Mukherjee has also relied upon a decision of a single Bench of this Court presided over by S. B. Sinha J. in the case of Khusiram v. Mathuradas reported in (1948) Cal WN 826 wherein, I cannot help noticing, Mr. R. S. Bachawat (as his deceased Lordship then was) had appeared before the Court for the appellant. The said case is a good authority for the proposition that if an Award is so bad that no reasonable man could have come to such a decision, or if there has been misconducting of the Arbitration proceeding, or if the Award contains in it such a gross mistake, as is impossible to arrive at in any manner whatsoever, then the Award can be set aside. Indeed an Award of such a nature would at least border upon being a perverse Award. ( 12 ) IN my opinion, the present Award can in no manner be called a perverse Award or an Award which no reasonable man can make, or that it contains any gross mistake. After all, a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court envisaged possibilities where grant of pendente lite interest would be refused by the Arbitrator in his discretion. After all, a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court envisaged possibilities where grant of pendente lite interest would be refused by the Arbitrator in his discretion. If an Arbitrator cannot refuse to grant pendente lite interest at all, then he cannot be said to have a discretion in the matter. But as we have seen, the Supreme Court has authoritatively pronounced that the Arbitrator has full discretion in that matter. ( 13 ) MRS. Mukherjee has relied upon Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of West Bengal Financial Corporation reported in AIR 1983 Cal 381 . She has stated that this case is a good authority for the proposition that some sort of interest pendente lite must be granted against money claims, and the Court does not have discretion to refuse to grant interest pendente lite altogether. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Irrigation Department, this case has to be read in that light, even if this decision is an authority for the proposition Mrs. Mukherjee has submitted it to be an authority for. The Court said in the judgment at p. 384 :"so there is no discretion as to granting or non-granting of interest at all. This is also a construction, which is possible on a proper reading Section 34 of the Code and perhaps that should be in harmony with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act to which our attention was drawn. " ( 14 ) THAT case was a case on mortgage, and interest pendente lite was allowed by the Division Bench only at the rate of 1/2% per annum. It would need perhaps a further examination in an appropriate case, whether the above case actually interpreted Section 34 to mean, that in no circumstances does a regular Civil Court ever have any jurisdiction to refuse to grant interest pendente lite altogether, or whether the lack of discretion would occur only in special cases of debts secured by mortgage of immovable properties. I need not enter into that question any further as I am concerned not with the jurisdiction of a regular Civil Court but with the powers of the Arbitrator. ( 15 ) MRS. Mukherjee next relied upon a decision in the case of Santokh Singh reported in AIR 1992 SC 1809 . I need not enter into that question any further as I am concerned not with the jurisdiction of a regular Civil Court but with the powers of the Arbitrator. ( 15 ) MRS. Mukherjee next relied upon a decision in the case of Santokh Singh reported in AIR 1992 SC 1809 . In that case the learned Arbitrator had granted interest pendente lite from the date of entering upon the Reference of the learned Arbitrator himself. But the Reference had actually commenced earlier. The Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of that case did not permit interest pendente lite to remain only for the truncated portion of time during which the Reference was pending before the learned Arbitrator, whose award was ultimately made and published. Full interest pendente lite for the entire period of reference was granted by the Supreme Court. However, I find from the said case, no proposition of law that interest pendente lite, for even a truncated portion of time, can never be granted by any Arbitration under any circumstances whatsoever. It must be remembered, what the Supreme Court does for the ends of justice in the facts and circumstances of a particular case would never bind any Court upon the doctrine of precedent. Some reason or some proposition of law must be there expressly stated in the judgment itself or impliedly inherent therein upon the basis of which the doctrine of precedent can at all function. Moreover, the said case is not exactly in point, because we are not concerned with interest pendente lite granted for a truncated portion of time during which the reference was pending, but we are concerned with a case where interest pendente lite was altogether refused and further interest from the date of the Award was granted. ( 16 ) THIS brings me on to consider Mrs. Mukherjee's submission, whether that can ever happen. Mrs. Mukherjee's submission is that it is impossible for any reasonable person to refuse interest pendente lite and yet grant further interest from the date of the Award. She said that this is impossible because identical principles govern the exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of interest pendente lite and further interest. With all due respect I am unable to agree. She said that this is impossible because identical principles govern the exercise of discretion in the matter of grant of interest pendente lite and further interest. With all due respect I am unable to agree. It is not necessary for me to set out here in detail the principles that govern the discretion of Court and other bodies in the matter of grant of interest pendente lite and the discretion in the matter of grant of further interest. It suffices for me to state here that the factors governing exercise of such discretion are not necessarily identical. A plaintiff might lose interest pendente lite as a consequence of his dilatory tactics in bringing the trial to a conclusion. The same plaintiff might not necessarily lose interest upon judgment, which is granted, for one thing, to encourage the judgment-debtor to make a quick liquidation of the judgment debtor and for another, to compensate the judgment creditor in cases of dilatoriness the judgment-debtor. ( 17 ) AGAIN if the judgment-debtor goes up for appeal against the judgment granting interest upon judgment, then ordinarily the time during which such appeal is pending would cause interest upon judgment to mount up and if the appeal is lost by the judgment debtor, then he would have to pay an additional amount by way of interest upon judgment and that would be a direct consequence of the judgment-debtor taking a proceeding in which he proves to be unsuccessful. ( 18 ) SUCH an appeal would not similarly affect the amount granted by way of interest pendente lite. That can only be affected for reasons other than preferring of an appeal by the judgment-debtor, say, if the judgment itself is substantially set aside for some reason or other. ( 19 ) THESE two above reasons are in my opinion sufficient to indicate that it is quite possible for an arbitrating body to grant further interest upon Award and yet refuse interest pendente lite. Grant of such an award in one case and refusal to award in the other do not necessarily indicate any logical inconsistency or any error of law apparent on the face of the Award. ( 20 ) MRS. Grant of such an award in one case and refusal to award in the other do not necessarily indicate any logical inconsistency or any error of law apparent on the face of the Award. ( 20 ) MRS. Mukherjee also relied upon a decision in the case reported in AIR 1973 SC 683 , which might have been relevant in case the Award were set aside for in that event, on the above authority, I might have inserted a rate of pendente lite interest without having to remit the award once again. But in view of what is stated above the question does not arise at all. ( 21 ) MR. Banerjee also relied upon the decision is the case reported in AIR 1992 SC 2192 , which re-affirms the old law as to what is an error apparent on the face of the Award. I need not make any further specific reference in regard thereto. ( 22 ) IN view of the above, I dismiss the application. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.