S. N. SAXENA, J. This revision application is directed against the order dated 5-9-1992 of learned Vlth Addl. Sessions Judge, Kanpur Dehat whereby the Cancelled the bail of the revisionist and directed that he shall be taken into custody. 2. The revisionist was one of the accused facing trial under Sections 302/307,1. P. C. of P. S. Gajner, in District Kanpur Dehat. He was gran ted bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanpur Dehat by order dated 11-12-1990. 3. The revisionist, according to the prosecution story, had opened fire upon deceased Ram Narain as a result of which he had died. It is also said that the revisionist had opened fire upon Udai Narain as a result of which he bad received fire-arm injuries. 4. The learned Vlth Additional Sessions Judge allowed the application of the State for cancellation of the bail granted to revisionist Amrish Kumar alias Pappoo on the ground that the learned Chief Judicial Mggistrate had got no jurisdiction to grant the bail in respect of an offence punishable under Section 302,1. P. C. and his (C J. Ms) order was wholly illegal. Otherwise also it has been said that it was riot a St case for release of the revisionist on bail. 5. The revisionist felt aggrieved by the impugned order and, therefore, preferred this revision application. 6. This court heard the learned counsel for the revisionist as well as the learned A. G. A. 7. It was vehemently argued fot the revisionist applicant that the learned Vlth Addl. Sessions Judge had got no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order which, according to him, could be passed only by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. The contention, however, did not appear to carry force. 8. Learned A. O. A. submitted that the application by the prosecution for cancellation of the bail of the revisionist was moved under Section 439 (7) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 197, which empowered the learned Addl. Sessions Judge before whom the trial was pending to cancel the bail of the revisionist and the revision application, therefore, was liable to be dismissed. He also contended that it was not at all necessary for the prosecution to move the High Court for cancellation of bail by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. 9. Sessions Judge before whom the trial was pending to cancel the bail of the revisionist and the revision application, therefore, was liable to be dismissed. He also contended that it was not at all necessary for the prosecution to move the High Court for cancellation of bail by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P. C. 9. After carefully considering these submissions and Section 439 (2) aforesaid, I find that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had got the jurisdiction to cancel the bail of the revisionist on the grounds that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate bad got no jurisdiction to grant bail to him. Section 439 (2) aforesaid gave the jurisdiction to the Sessions Judge which included Addl. Sessions Judge to cancel the bail without specifying the grounds upon which the order of cancellation may be passed. There was no force behind the argument that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge could cancel the bail only if the accused had tried to win over the witnesses or had threatened them with dire consequences if they preferred to depose against him during the trial but not on the ground that the bail order itself was without jurisdiction. Different grounds upon which the learned Addl. Session Judge could cancel the bail have been specified in Section 439 (2) aforesaid and this Court there fore could not read the same as a part of Section 439 (2 ). The only provision for cancellation of bail was Section 439 (2) aforesaid and in presence of the same, it was not at all necessary for the prosecution to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail by exercising its inherent power. The impugned order thus was rightly passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. 10. It was also contended for the revisionist that the Chief Judicial Magistrate was competent to grant bail to him and the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had wrongly concluded that it could not be granted by him. The contention, however, appears to be devoid of merits. He could grant bail to the revisionist only if there was reasonable ground to show that the revisionist was not guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The revisionist was facing trial for the offence under Section 302, I. P. C. which is punishable with death and Section 307,1. P. C. which is punishable with imprisonment for life. The revisionist was facing trial for the offence under Section 302, I. P. C. which is punishable with death and Section 307,1. P. C. which is punishable with imprisonment for life. The Chief Judicial Magistrate thus had exercised the jurisdiction which actually did not vest in him and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, was justified in cancelling the bail of the revisionist. It is not the case of the revisionist that he was under the age of 16 years or a sick or infirm person on the date of the occur rence. Sub-section (2) of Section 437 of Cr. P. C. , therefore, did not apply to his case. 11. The contention of learned counsel for the revisionist that the revisionist bad acted in self defence and, therefore, was not at all guilty of any offence could not be considered and decided in this revision as it was not the stage for determination of the questions of facts which could be done by the trial Court only after the evidence had been adduced. The Chief Judicial Magistrate not being the trial Court was not at all competent to examine the question as to whether the revisionist has acted in self defence. He thus again had exercised the jurisdiction which did not vest in him as a consquence of which bail was illegally granted by him to the revisionist. 12. Mere fact that the co-accused of the revisionist bad been granted bail did not empower the Chief (Judicial Magistrate to grant bail to the revisionist. The case against him was totally different than the allegations against the co-accused. The conduct of opening fire was attributed to the revisionist. In any view of the matter thus the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had exercised the jurisdiction which did not vest in him. 13. There was substance in the contention of the learned A. G. A. that this revision was not maintainable because grant of bail or cancellation there of during the pendency of a case at the stage of inquiry or trial was a mere interlocutory order and, therefore, the revision application was liable to be dismissed. Learned Counsel for the revisionist no doubt contended that the aforesaid matter did not amount to a mere interlocutory order but the con tention appeared to be devoid of merits. Learned Counsel for the revisionist no doubt contended that the aforesaid matter did not amount to a mere interlocutory order but the con tention appeared to be devoid of merits. 14, Learned Counsel for the revisionist relied upon a decision of the Apex Court reported in 1978 (2) SCC 411 , State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi, but after going through the judgment carefully and throughly, I find that it had no application to the facts of the present case. The bail of late Sanjay Gandhi was cancelled because it was held on fact that he had abused his liberty by attempting to suborn the prosecution witnesses and, therefore, had forfeited his right to remain on bail. The question of jurisdiction of the Court which granted bail to Sanjay Gandhi was not involved in the aforesaid decision. 15 From the above discussion it was evident that this revision applica tion was liable to be dismissed as it was not maintainable and also because the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had without jurisdiction granted bail to the revisionist. 16. The revision application dismissed. The stay granted to the re visionist is vacated. Revision dismissed. .