Judgment : This appeal by the State has been filed questioning the validity and correctness of the judgment of acquittal recorded by the then learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Coimbatore, in S.T.C.No.497 of 1986 dated 12. 1987, acquitting the respondent/accused, who was tried for an alleged offence punishable under Secs.7(1) and 16(1) (a)(i) read with Sec.2(ia)(a) & (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. To appreciate the contentions raised in this appeal, necessary facts of the prosecution case in brief are stated as follows: P.W.1 Thiru Vinayagam, the Sanitary Inspector of Coimbatore Municipal Corporation, working in Ward number 9, along with his staff, by name Ramakrishnan and Veerasamy, for the purpose of taking food samples, had been to the business premises by name Shanmugha Bakery run by the respondent/accused herein, situated at door number 11/117, Ponniah Gounder street, Coimbatore town, got himself introduced to the respondent/accused who was present, served Ex.P-1 Form VI in the presence of one Mohideen. Then he purchased six loaves of bread weighing 400 gms. each at a cost of Rs.13.50 and obtained cash receipt Ex.P-2 which was attested by the witness. Then, he prepared the necessary samples by duly packing as provided by the Rules strictly and putting the Code words obtained from the Health Officer and affixed necessary seals on it after obtaining the signature from the respondent/accused. Then, he prepared Form VII, Ex.P-3. He gave intimation to the Local Health Authority under Ex.P-4 and sent the food sample for analysis by the Government Analyst and got his acknowledgement Ex.P-5. He sent Form VII and specimen seal in a separate cover and got acknowledgment from the public analyst (Ex.P-6). He handed over the remaining two samples to the Local Health Authority under acknowledgement Ex.P-7. The Report of the Public Analyst was received on 7. 1986. As per the report, the food sample was found to be adulterated. P.W.1 filed the complaint Ex.P-9 under the above sec-tion of law on 7. 1986 after getting the consent of the Health Officer. As per Rule 9(a) he served copy of Form III Report on the accused/respondent on 17. 1986. The served copy is Ex.P-10. He served notice under Sec. 13(2) of the Act with a copy of the report on 17. 1986. The notice is Ex.P-11. The licence issued to the respondent/ accused for conducting bakery is Ex.P-12. As per Rule 9(a) he served copy of Form III Report on the accused/respondent on 17. 1986. The served copy is Ex.P-10. He served notice under Sec. 13(2) of the Act with a copy of the report on 17. 1986. The notice is Ex.P-11. The licence issued to the respondent/ accused for conducting bakery is Ex.P-12. It is the evidence of P. W.2, that on receipt of the sample, he verified the seals and the specimen seals and found them to be correct. On analysis, he found the following: Moisture... 27.06%; Alcoholic Acidity on dry basis..5.48%; Ash insoluble in dilute HCI on dry basis..0.30%. According to him, as per Clause A.18.14 in Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, bread shall contain not more than 0.1% Ash insoluble in dilute HCI on dry basis and was of the opinion, that the ash insoluble in dilute HCI of the sample was in excess to the extent of 200% and hence the sample was adulterated. He issued Ex.P-8, P.W.3 though was examined as an attestor, since he did not support the case of the prosecution he was treated as hostile. 3. On examining the respondent/accused under Sec.313, Crl.P.C. before the trial court, he has pleaded not guilty but denied his having sold the samples, claimed to have been taken in this case. He did not choose to examine any witnesses on his behalf. 4. On assessing the entire recorded evidence, in the context of the plea taken on behalf of the respondent/accused that Ex.P-8. the report of the Public Analyst in Form No.III, does not disclose the details of the date on which analysis by P.W.2 was conducted and that the non-mentioning of the details of the mode of test conducted by him in Ex.P-8 has no evidentiary value and that therefore, conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of the said inadequate and incomplete report of the Public Analyst, and placing reliance on State of Maharashtra v. Gangadhar Kishan Paitwar (BOM), 1983 F.A.J. 283, the learned trial Magistrate, has found that the evidence relied on by the prosecution under Form III as aforesaid is totally wanting in all particulars, and that therefore, noconviction can be sustained and accordingly, recorded his judgment of acquittal of the respondent/accused. Aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred this appeal. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred this appeal. 5. During the course of the arguments, the only point which Mr.Kumaravelu, the learned Government Advocate has canvassed questioning the validity of the judgment of acquittal is that the impugned judgment rendered by the trial Magistrate is liable to be set aside on the ground that Form III, the report of the Public Analyst has been duly filled up by P.W.2 the Public Analyst as contemplated by Rule 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and that too, in the printed form provided by the Act and that therefore, all the necessary details which are required to be given in the said form has been given by P.W.2 and that therefore, basing reliance on the Judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court, the learned Magistrate is not correct in rejecting the Form III in the instant case. Perhaps, this is the only submission made by the learned Government Advocate, based on which, he wanted this Court to set aside the impugned judgment I have gone through Ex.P-8, which is the Form III report of the Public Analyst and compared it with the original Form III provided under the Rules. I am satisfied that P.W.2, in preparing the Form No.III report has fully complied with and provided all the details which are required to be furnished in the Form III as contemplated under the Rule under the relevant Act. In this regard, in the context of the case law cited and relied on by the learned trial Magistrate, I am not able to appreciate the conclusion arrived at by the learned Magistrate and thereby accord my concurrence for the Form with reference to its contents, I am fully satisfied to hold that Ex.P-8 bears no laches committed by P.W.2, the Public Analyst with reference to its burden of proof, authoenticity and the details and particulars required to be furnished in the same and that therefore, I am not in a position to endorse my seal of approval to the finding of the learned trial Magistrate. It follows, that the learned trial Magistrate has committed an error of law,and misconceived the legal position in recording a judgment of acquittal on the basis of Ex.P-8. It follows, that the learned trial Magistrate has committed an error of law,and misconceived the legal position in recording a judgment of acquittal on the basis of Ex.P-8. It is not the specific finding of the learned Magistrate that in what capacity and details and particulars Ex.P-8 is wanting and as to how and in what manner Ex.P-8 is not in compliance with the legal mandate. In the correct in holding that the conviction cannot be based on Ex.P-8, which according to him is an inadequate and incomplete document. On the contrary, it is full and complete with all the particulars and details and is in total compliance of the legal acquittal of the respondent/accused on the said basis alone. Having thus considered the very nature of the requirements and therefore, conviction can be safely based on Ex.P-8. Maybe, the judgment relied on behalf of the respondent/ accused, rendered by the Bombay High court, would not come to the rescue of the Respondent herein, in the sense that the facts in the instant case are totally distinguishable from the case cited above. Therefore, in this regard, after having fully gone through the details of Form III Ex.P-8 in this case, I am fully satisfied to hold, that the view and conclusion of the trial Magistrate is not correct and accordingly, it is hereby set aside. 6. But however, in this appeal preferred by the State, the State cannot be allowed to succeed on that ground alone. Mr.V.Gopinathan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused, has raised an important question of law, which goes to the very root of the prosecution case, which has not been countered in any manner on behalf of the State. While stating so, learned counsel Mr.Gopinathan, drew my attention to Sec.20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which deals with the cognizance and trial of offences under the Act. While stating so, learned counsel Mr.Gopinathan, drew my attention to Sec.20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which deals with the cognizance and trial of offences under the Act. Sec.20(1) reads as follows: "No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under Sec.14 or Sec.14-A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government: Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser or recognised consumer association referred to in Sec.12, if he or it produces in court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint". Basing his reliance on the above Section learned counsel contended that the six word sentence ‘I consent to launch the prosecution’ by which consent has been given by the Health Officer and Local Health Authority to launch prosecution against the respondent/accused has not complied with the legal mandate inbuilt in the above section of law, which would clearly mean by a careful reading that the sanctioning authority while according sanction to launch the prosecution, must apply its mind by going through the relevant papers and materials before according sanction to launch the prosecution and that in the absence of which, the prosecution launched against any accused for the offence is vitiated and the consequent prosecution is to be held as not proper. 7. The Supreme Court in A.K.Roy v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1986S.C. 2160:1986Crl.L.J. 2097: (1986)4 S.C.C. 326 : (1986)3 F.A.C 66: (1986)2 A.P.L.J.(S.C.) 34:1986 S.C.C. (Crl) 443: (1986) F.A.J. 514., has held as follows: "The use of the words in this behalf in Sec.20(1) of the act shows that the delegation of such power by the Central Government or the State Government by general or special order must be for a specific purpose, to authorise a designated person to institute such prosecutions on their behalf. The terms of Sec.20(1) of the Act do not postulate further delegation by the person so authorised; he can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and record his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the public interest". The terms of Sec.20(1) of the Act do not postulate further delegation by the person so authorised; he can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and record his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in the public interest". 8.In Chunni Lal v. State, 1974 Crl.L.J. 13,a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has held as follows: "Where a composite document consisting of the complaint under Secs.7/16 of the Act on one side of the paper and the form of sanction on the other side was entirely in the handwriting of the Food Inspector except the signature of the competent sanctioning authority, it was held that the internal evidence from the document clearly showed that the sanctioning authority had appended his signature without applying his mind to the facts and therefore the sanction and the consequent prosecution thereon were invalid". 9. In State v. Appuswami, 1980 L. W. (Crl.) 196, this Court has held that, "There is-no extraneous evidence in this case to show that the Municipal Health Officer who issued the first sanction order and the Municipal Commissioner, who was in charge and Municipal Health Officer and has issued Ex.P-8, had applied their minds to the facts of the relevant case and come to a prima facie conclusion that any offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act had been committed by any of the accused in this case." 10. In Ramanbhai Shivabhai Prajapathi v. State of Gujarat, (1991)1 E.F.R. 547, the Gujarat High Court has held as follows: "Bare perusal of the sanction letter reveals that it is a simple sanction given by the authority to prosecute the petitioner for the alleged offences under the Act. It is in the printed form and only certain details regarding the name of the accused Sections under which the accused person is to be prosecuted, date, business etc. is filled in. By this letter, the Food Inspector has been given power to launch complaint-prosecution against the petitioner. The wording of sanction letter reveals that it is simple sanction permitting the Food Inspector to launch prosecution against the petitioner-accused for the offences alleged to have been committed under the Act. Competent Authority has not given any reasons justifying the sanction in the public interest. The wording of sanction letter reveals that it is simple sanction permitting the Food Inspector to launch prosecution against the petitioner-accused for the offences alleged to have been committed under the Act. Competent Authority has not given any reasons justifying the sanction in the public interest. While exercising the powers under Sec.20 of the Act, sanctioning authority must give reasons for giving sanction to prosecute the accused and if it fails to record such reasons, to its satisfaction, it is not a valid sanction. This being the position in law, the inevitable conclusion is that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind and has not recorded reasons while granting sanction to prosecute the accused and, therefore, the sanction cannot be said to be in accordance with law. Therefore, the prosecution launched on the petitioner on invalid sanction is, therefore, bad in law". 11. In Shyam Lal v. Stare, (1991)2 E.F.R. 277, the Delhi High Court has held as follows: "A bare reading of Sec.20(1) of the Act makes it abundantly clear that the authority competent to sanction prosecution for a case under the Food Adulteration Act has to apply mind and go through the documents for coming to the subjective satisfaction that the facts disclosed to him warranted the giving of sanction. In the instant case, the sanction order is silent as to whether any record was produced before the said authority for coming to the subjective satisfaction for the grant of sanction. It is also conspicuous by its absence from this record as to whether any material was placed before the said authority at the time he signed this order or even prior to it. In these circumstances, the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that it is a stereotyped sanction which might have been signed in routine without even papers being placed before the said authority cannot be said to be without substance especially when the complainant has failed to bring on record the relevant material to support that the sanctioning authority had gone through the relevant papers.". 12. In Adda Kasivisweswara Rao v. State of A.P., (1991)2 E.F.R. 416, a learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court has held as follows: "As per Sec.20(1) of the Act the sanctioning authority has to apply its mind before granting sanction to the Food Inspector to the facts of the case. 12. In Adda Kasivisweswara Rao v. State of A.P., (1991)2 E.F.R. 416, a learned single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court has held as follows: "As per Sec.20(1) of the Act the sanctioning authority has to apply its mind before granting sanction to the Food Inspector to the facts of the case. It should also give its reasons for according sanction. If there is any lacuna in the sanction order, then the entire prosecution vitiates and the accused is entitled for its benefit. From a reading of sanction order in the instant case it becomes very clear that the authority has not applied its mind as to what is the adulteration and for what reasons it is according sanction. The sanction order clearly shows that the order is passed mechanically without applying its mind properly. Therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed by the appel-late court are set aside." 13. Thus, in the light of the legal ratios well enunciated in the above case laws mostly relied on by the learned counsel Mr.Gopinathan, if applied to the facts of the present case, more particularly to the complaint filed by P.W.1 against the respondent/accused herein, it is seen from the original complaint that it is in printed form and the columns have been filled up by handwriting with all the necessary details and particulars, much worse too is seen in the reverse side of the complaint. The words ‘I consent’ is in the printed form followed by the subsequent words "to launch the prosecution" written in ink. These words are found on the left hand side column of the reverse of the complaint. Below that it appears in the print, the column for Signature of the Food Inspector or the Sanitary Inspector. On the right hand side, the Health Officer and Local Health Authority has signed it. This part of the supposed sanction was taken as a subject of severe attack by the learned counsel for the respondent/accused. At the outset, I may observe that there is every force and substance in his contention. .14. Aconjoint reading of Sec.20(1)of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act would clearly envisage that the duty of the Local Health Authority or the competent authority in according its sanction for prosecution would not amount to or cannot be taken as an empty formality. At the outset, I may observe that there is every force and substance in his contention. .14. Aconjoint reading of Sec.20(1)of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act would clearly envisage that the duty of the Local Health Authority or the competent authority in according its sanction for prosecution would not amount to or cannot be taken as an empty formality. It was clearly and demonstrably made out by the Courts of Law in this country that the intention of the legislature in providing for the competent authority to sanction to launch the prosecution for offences under the Act, to be exercised with due care and caution, which would mean, that they should go into all the materials and records placed by the Sanitary Inspector or the Food Inspector pertaining to the relevant facts constituting the offences and then only, on being satisfied with the materials underlying the records, prima facie atleast, the competent authority has to accord its sanction and it cannot be taken that it has to accord its sanction so mechanically without applying its mind and this process, has been inbuilt in the above section for the simple object that vexatious launching of the prosecution is to be avoided at any cost and that was the one and only reason, the according of sanction under Sec.20(1) of the Act has been provided in the enactment. Thus, it is the well settled judicial view, that the Local Health Authority, while according its sanction to its Sanitary Inspector or any other person to launch the prosecution against any person must apply it’s mind to all the relevant materials and papers placed before it and on being satisfied with the prima facie case against the person against whom the offence is alleged, then for the reasons expressly to be stated, he must accord the sanction for prosecution. Otherwise, it goes without saying, that the sanction accorded is bad in law and not in compliance with the legal mandate inbuilt in the above section. I have carefully perused the so-called sanction accorded by the Health Officer and Local Health Authority on 7. 1986 in six words sentence as above stated, The so-called sanction does not even visualise any perusal of the records produced before him, nor even the competent authority has satisfied with the prima facie materials available in the records placed before him in according the sanction. 1986 in six words sentence as above stated, The so-called sanction does not even visualise any perusal of the records produced before him, nor even the competent authority has satisfied with the prima facie materials available in the records placed before him in according the sanction. In the light of the above legal laches pointed out by the learned counsel Mr.Gopinathan, I am fully satisfied to hold, that the sanction accorded in this case, is bad in law and is clearly in the teeth of Sec.20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and accordingly, no prosecution can be launched. 15. Of course, Mr.Kumaravelu, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State, faintly submitted that any defect in the sanction is a curable one and does not ipso factor render the prosecution invalid. This argument of the learned Government Advocate, is without any force and made out of the legal bias. When the legislature itself has enacted the above legal aspect as a mandatory one, there is no reason for not following the above mandate by the authorities competent under the relevant Rules while launching the prosecution against the erring public. Therefore, I am totally unable to persuade myself to accept the contention projected by the learned Government Advocate. On the other hand, I totally agree with the contention forwarded by Mr.V.Gopinathan, learned counsel for the respondent/accused and fully subscribe my view to the contention projected by him. On this ground, the appellant has to lose its hold at its very base itself. .16. But however it has to be noticed that the impugned judgment under this appeal was rendered as early as on 12. 1987 and the disposal of this appeal has thus consumed more than six years by now. It was brought to notice by the learned counsel for the respondent/accused that the respondent/accused has become very old and has closed down his bakery business and he is now in the verge of his last clays and as such, under these circumstances, to think of even to interfere with the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Magistrate and to have a converse view would result rather in great in justice and would not help in discharging the social accountability even. While recording the above statement made at the Bar, I do not propose to proceed with this appeal, on the basis of the above said factual aspects. While recording the above statement made at the Bar, I do not propose to proceed with this appeal, on the basis of the above said factual aspects. Suffice it for me at this juncture to hold that this appeal lacks merits in toto and deserves to be rejected in limine. But however, the finding recorded by the learned trial Magistrate, on the basis of Ex.P-8 is hereby set aside, but for the legal point which was most strenuously emphasized on behalf of the respondent/accused, I am not inclined to interfere with the judgment recorded by the learned trial Magistrate. 17. In the result, the appeal fails and accordingly it is dismissed.