JUDGMENT 1. This judgment shall govern the disposal of S.As. No. 236/86 filed by Firm Gendalal Bhanwarlal Jain, Guna and No. 15/87 filed by Firm Dhankumar Vijaykumar Jain, Grain Merchants, Guna, the three appeals having been heard analogously being against the same respondents in view of the common questions of fact and law arising therein. 2. All the three appeals raise the following common substantial question of law:- "Whether the lease in favour of plaintiff/appellant created by officer-in-charge is valid in view of sections 25, 56 and 57 of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972" Shri R.D. Jain the learned counsel for appellants in S.A. No. 235 and 236/86, Shri Anil Mishra the learned counsel for appellants in S.A. No. 15/87 and Shri V.K. Bharadwaj, the learned counsel for respondent Mandi Samiti have been heard. 3. The facts, no longer in controversy at the stage of this second appeal and in so far as relevant for the dispoal of these appeals, may briefly be noticed. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Guna (hereafter the Mandi, for short), a market committee established u/s. 7 of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act", for short), for the mutual benefit and convenience of the Mandi and the traders, divided a part of the market yard into plots to be leased out to the traders operating in the market-yard, enabling construction of shops and godowns by them. The Mandi in its meeting dated 7.10.1966 passed resolution No.7 which was approved by the Director; the approval having been communicated through the latter's memo No. D/AM/2/Pra/5/1/848 dated 1.2.1968. However, the Mandi came to be superseded u/s. 56 of the Act and the Deputy Director, Department of Agriculture, Guna was appointed officer-incharge, notification whereof was issued vide Government of M.P., Agriculture Department, Bhopal No. 4053/5407/14-3/77 dated 19.9.1977. The Director of Agriculture, Government of M.P. Bhopal vide its order No. Mandi/8IPra/5/1/N21203 dated 25.6.79 (Ex. P/2A) allotted five different plots to five different traders of which three are the present plaintiff/appellants. Pursuant to the resolution of the Mandi; as approved by the Director, and consistently with the allotment made by She Director of Agriculture, lease-deeds for a period of 30 years each were executed by the Officer-in-charge on 5.7.1979 and registered with the Registrar of Deeds. Possession was delivered to the allottees. Pursuant to the resolution of the Mandi; as approved by the Director, and consistently with the allotment made by She Director of Agriculture, lease-deeds for a period of 30 years each were executed by the Officer-in-charge on 5.7.1979 and registered with the Registrar of Deeds. Possession was delivered to the allottees. The appointed premium was deposited a day before the execution of the lease-deeds in the office of the Mandi acknowledged under its official receipts as stated in the deeds of lease. An year's rent, as appointed by the lease, was also paid. On 3.8.1979, the Mandi through its Officer-in-charge issued notices to the allottees informing them that the leases were illegal, and not in accordance with the law and hence were not binding on the Mandi. The allottees were informed not to proceed with any construction work over the plots allotted to them. The suits were filed after serving statutory notices on the Mandi. As a Government Officer was holding the office of Officer-in-charge of the Mandi, the Government of M.P. was also joined as party to each of the suits. 4. The plaintiffs alleged the allotments in their favour to be valid and sought for declaration of the validity of the leases coupled with the consequential relief of injunction restraining the defendant/respondents from obstructing the proposed construction of the plaintiffs on the plots allotted to them. 5. The defendants in their written statement challenged the validity of the leases on two grounds: firstly, the sanction dated 25.6.1979 contemplated oy proviso to sub-section (2) of section 7 of the Act in the matter of leases in favour of the plaintiffs was given by the Deputy Director and not by the Director and hence the same was invalid; and secondly, that the lease-deeds were executed by the officer-in-charge alone without joining the Secretary of the Mandi as joint executant of the lease-deeds and hence the lease-deeds having been executed in contravention of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 25 of the Act were invalid and not binding on the Mandi. 6. The second one of the pleas raised by the defendant/respondents has found favour with the Courts below. The lease-deeds have been adjudged invalid and not binding and hence conferring no title on the plaintiffs. The suits have, therefore, been dismissed. 7. 6. The second one of the pleas raised by the defendant/respondents has found favour with the Courts below. The lease-deeds have been adjudged invalid and not binding and hence conferring no title on the plaintiffs. The suits have, therefore, been dismissed. 7. In so far as the first illegality set-up by the defendants in the written statement is concerned, it is not disputed that the sanction was communicated by the office of the Director. The Director has been defined in section 2 (1) of the Act as meaning the person appointed by State Government, by notification, as Director of Marketing and includes any officer empowered by the State Government by notification to exercise or perform such of the powers or functions of the Director as may be specified in such notification. Vide notification No. 3240/4753/14-1, Bhopal dated 17.5.1973, issued by Department of Agriculture, Government of M.P., all the Directors of Agriculture have been appointed Directors under the Act (see: pp. 527-528 Corpus Juris of M.P. Vol. 8, first edition). It was necessary for the defendants, who had set-up the plea of invalidity of the permission, to have produced the relevant material from the office of the Director to show what was the nature of distribution of work between the Director and the Deputy Director and if the Deputy Director could not sign the communications to be made by or on behalf of the Director. The defendant/respondents could also have produced the relevant office record so as to build up the plea that it was the Director and Director alone who could have acted" and not the Deputy Director while communicating the sanction. Nothing such was done. It is not known if the Director was on leave or if there was any vacancy, temporary or otherwise, in the office of the Director, permitting Deputy Director to assume the office of the Director and act in his place or on his behalf. All these were the internal matters of the office of the Director and being within the special knowledge of the defendants, they were expected to produce the relevant material before the Court and substantiate their plea. They did nothing so. Moreover, the plea taken in the written statement was of the prior permission of the Director in the matter of leases in question having been cancelled subsequently by the Director. They did nothing so. Moreover, the plea taken in the written statement was of the prior permission of the Director in the matter of leases in question having been cancelled subsequently by the Director. No order or communication evidencing such cancellation was brought before the Court. The plea taken by the defendants in their written statement did not go beyond its having been simply raised. Apparently for this reason much emphasis has not been laid by the learned counsel for the defendant/respondents on tl\is aspect of the case at the time of hearing before this Court. 8. The core of controversy before this Court has clustered around the interpretation of S. 25 of the Act which reads as under:- "25. Mode of making contracts.-- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, no contract or agreement on behalf of the market committee for the purchase, sale, lease, mortgage or other transfer of or acquisition of, interest in immovable property shall be executed on behalf of the market committee except with the sanction of the market committee. (2) Save as provided in sub-section (1)-(a) the Secretary of the market committee may execute contract or agreement on behalf of the market committee where the amount or value of such contract or agreement does not exceed rupees two hundred, and fifty regarding matters in respect of which he is generally or specially authorised to do so by a resolution of the market committee; (b) the Chairman and the Secretary of the market committee may jointly execute contract or agreement on behalf of the market committee where the amount or value of such contract or agreement does not exceed rupees one thousand; (c) in any case other than those referred to in clause (a) and (b) a contract or agreement on behalf of the market committee shall be executed by the Chairman, the Secretary and one other member of the market committee, who shall have been generally or specially authorised by a resolution of the market committee to do so. (3) Every contract entered into by the market committee shall be in writing and shall be signed on behalf of the market committee by the person or persons authorised to do so under sub-section (2). (4) No contract other than a contract executed as provided in sub-sections (1), (2) or (3) shall be valid or binding on the market committee. (3) Every contract entered into by the market committee shall be in writing and shall be signed on behalf of the market committee by the person or persons authorised to do so under sub-section (2). (4) No contract other than a contract executed as provided in sub-sections (1), (2) or (3) shall be valid or binding on the market committee. (5) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (No. 16 of 1908), it shall not be necessary for the Chairman or any member or Officer or Secretary of a market committee to appear in person or by agent at any registration office in any proceeding connected with the registration of any proceeding connected with the registration of any instrument executed by him in his official capacity or to sign as provided in section 58 of that Act. (b) Where any instrument is so executed the Registration Officer to whom such instrument is presented for registration may, if he thinks fit, refer to such Chairman, member officer or secretary for furnishing information respecting the same and shall, on being satisfied of the execution thereof register the instrument. (6) Where a contract or agreement is entered into on behalf of a market committee the Secretary of the market committee shall report the fact to the market committee at its meeting convened and held immediately following the date of entering into such contract or agreement." 9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellants that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) have different fields to operate; in so far as a lease is concerned, it is governed by sub-section (1) alone and sub-section (2) does not have any applicability. On the contrary, it is contended by the learned counsel for the defendant/respondents that sub-sections (2) and (3) operate in addition to sub-section (1), meaning thereby that each and every contract entered' into by or on behalf of the market committee must satisfy the requirements of sub-section (1), (2) and (3), all; failing compliance with any of the sub-section, the contract entered into by the market committee shall cease to be valid or binding by the force of sub-section (4). 10. A careful reading of section 25 provides solution to the riddle though one cannot resist observing that the section as a whole is not very artistically drafted. 10. A careful reading of section 25 provides solution to the riddle though one cannot resist observing that the section as a whole is not very artistically drafted. Lack of care is reflected prima facie by the fact that part of sentence – "which he is (or who shall have been) generally or specially authorised by a resolution of the market committee (to do so) – "occurring at the end of clauses (a) and (c) of sub-section (2) does not occur at the end of the language of clause (b), though to avoid absurdity and arbitrariness that part of the sentence shall have to be necessarily read in clause (b) also. Similarly, in sub-section (1), (2) and (6), the terms 'contract' and 'agreement' have been separately used without there being the necessity of using the two terms distinctly while sub-sections (3) and (4) use 'contract' merely. The use of term 'agreement' in this section, in the context of the provisions, is redundant and superfluous inasmuch as a contract is an agreement enforceable by law (see: section 2 (h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872). It could never have been the intendment of the Legislature to have provided for agreement being entered into on behalf of the market committee which may not be enforceable by law. 11. An analytical reading of section 25 makes it clear that the Legislature while drafting the section contemplated two types of contract: (i) contracts for the purchase, sale, lease, mortgage or other transfer of or acquisition of interest in immovable property; (ii) contracts other than those specified above. First class of contracts has to satisfy two conditions to be valid and binding on the market committee: (i) it must have the sanction of the market committee; (ii) it must satisfy the requirement of other provisions of the Act, such as proviso to sub-section (2) to section 7 of the Act providing for every acquisition or transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise of immovable property being preceded by the permission of the Director in writing. The second class of contracts is out of the ken of sub-section (1). It is further classified into three by reference to the amount or value involved therein, higher the amount or value, heavier the precaution taken by increasing the number of responsible signatories to the contract. 12. The second class of contracts is out of the ken of sub-section (1). It is further classified into three by reference to the amount or value involved therein, higher the amount or value, heavier the precaution taken by increasing the number of responsible signatories to the contract. 12. An interesting question may arise on the language of sub-section (3) -Is it only the second class of the contracts, contemplated by sub-section (2) which must be in writing and signed on behalf of the market committee by the person or persons authorised to do so under sub-section (2)? What would happen to the contracts relating to immovable property covered by sub-section (i)? Can it be said that the Legislature intended such contracts need not be in writing and signed on behalf of the Market Committee by someone authorised? 13. The problem may not arise for two reasons: firstly, the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and allied Acts dealing with transfer or acquisition of interest in immovable property invariably provide for contracts being executed in writing, accompanied by further formalities such as those of stamp duty or registration; secondly, the phrase "shall be executed" occurring in sub-section (1) itself implies the necessity of such contracts being executed in writing. The market committee while sanctioning the contract may itself lay down the mode of making the contract, authorising such person or persons as would act for and on behalf of the market committee while executing the contract. Reference may be made to section 18 of the Act which provides for the market committee appointing sub-committees consisting of one or more of its members for the performance of any of its duties or functions and to which the powers of the market committee may be delegated. The market committee while sanctioning a contract may authorise its chairman/secretary/one or more of its members or officers to act on its behalf while executing the contract. This is implicit in sub-section (1). In view of all these factors, it was not necessary to have made a provision like sub-section (3) in respect of the class of the contracts covered by sub-section (1). 14. This is implicit in sub-section (1). In view of all these factors, it was not necessary to have made a provision like sub-section (3) in respect of the class of the contracts covered by sub-section (1). 14. The use of the phrase "save as provided in sub-section (1)", in the opening part of sub-section (2), expresses the legislative intent that those contracts for which provision was made in sub-section (1) were being excluded from the category of contracts for which provisions were being made by sub-section (2). That is why sub-section (3) was confined in its operation to sub-section (2) alone, excluding sub-section (1) from its ken; else, the words "under sub-section (2)" would not have been wasted by the Legislature while writing the language of sub-section (3). Sub-section (4) specifically refers to sub-sections (1), (2) and (3). Sub-sections (5) and (6) are generalised in their expression. They operate in respect of both the classes of contracts contemplated by sub-sections (1) and (2) though sub-sections (1) and (2) are not specifically referred in sub-sections (5) and (6). It can be said that sub-section (2) is a general provision governing all contracts by Market Committee; the expression "save as provided in sub-section (1)" carves out an exception over sub-section (1). All contracts (or agreements) relating to immovable property referred to in sub-section (1) are taken out of the operation of sub-section (2). 15. It follows that the contracts of the class contemplated by sub-section (1) need not satisfy the requirements of sub-section (2). In other words, validity and binding efficacy of the contracts relating to immovable property within the meaning of sub-section (1) is incapable of being determined by reference to the requirements of sub-section (2). 16. Whenever a market committee is superseded u/s. 56 of the Act, the elected market committee stands dissolved, all the assets in the market committee vest in the State Government and the Director appoints an officer-in-charge. Vis. 57, all powers and duties of the market committee under the Act, subject to the control of the Director, become available to be exercised and performed by the officer-in-charge (or by a committee, if appointed). All the property vesting in the market committee vests in the officer-in-charge or the committee-in-charge, in trust for the purpose of the Act. In short, the officer-in-charge becomes the market committee. All the property vesting in the market committee vests in the officer-in-charge or the committee-in-charge, in trust for the purpose of the Act. In short, the officer-in-charge becomes the market committee. If the officer-in-charge acts, it is as if the entire market committee was acting. A contract executed by the officer-in-charge, is a contract executed by the market committee. The officer-in-charge may sanction the contract within the meaning of section 25 (1) of the Act. If he himself executes the contract, it is the market committee itself executing the contract as a body though in the event of the contract touching an immovable property attracting applicability of proviso to sub-section (2) of section 7, the prior permission of Director in writing shall have to be obtained and the act of tbe officer-in-charge shall be subject to the control of the Director. Of course, in the matter of immovable property, the Director shall be a trustee acting for the purpose of the Act. This aspect of the case need not detain the Court any longer for it is not the case of the defendants that the officer-in-charge bad committed any breach of trust or the Director had struck off the execution of the lease by the officer-in-charge, in exercise of its supervisory power. 17. It is clear that the Courts below committed a gross error of law in testing the validity of the lease in question, on the touchstone of section 25 (2) of the Act, which was clearly inapplicable. 18. No other point was urged. No other infirmity in the leases was pointed out on behalf of the defendant/respondents. 19. The leases in favour of the three plaintiffs were legal and binding. The defendant/respondents could not have restrained such user and occupation of the property covered by the leases as was authorised therein. The Courts below committed a jurisdictional error in dismissing the suit. 20. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed. The judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. The suits filed by the three plaintiff/appellants are directed to be decreed. It is declared that the lease-deeds dated 5.7.1979 executed by the Officer-in-charge of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Guna in favour of the three plaintiffs are valid and binding. The defendant/respondents are permanently restrained from interfering with the construction work of the plaintiff/appellants, if otherwise in accordance with law. The suits filed by the three plaintiff/appellants are directed to be decreed. It is declared that the lease-deeds dated 5.7.1979 executed by the Officer-in-charge of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Guna in favour of the three plaintiffs are valid and binding. The defendant/respondents are permanently restrained from interfering with the construction work of the plaintiff/appellants, if otherwise in accordance with law. In view of the purely legal controversy arising for decision in the suit costs are directed to be borne as incurred through out. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.