B. S. KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE present petitions are filed by the petitioners who are the detenues challenging the detention orders passed against them by the District Magistrate Surendranagar. It is specifically stated in the said orders dated 4 and 20-9-1992 respectively that the detention was necessary for a period of one year for preventing them from continuing their activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. They were supplied with the grounds of detention on the respective dates of the detention orders. Looking to the contention raised before us it is not necessary to mention the grounds of detention but the petitioners were detained under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the PASA) as dangerous persons whose activities were prejudicial to the maintenance off public order. ( 2 ) IN these petitions several grounds are raised challenging the impugned orders of detention. However Mr. I. B. Pardiwala the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners has pressed only one point before us. The point is that when the Detaining Authority who is a specially empowered officer of the State Government has stated in the detention orders that it was necessary to detain the petitioners for one year and accordingly they were detained for one year that order is bad and illegal. ( 3 ) HE submits that the said orders when they are for one year would be contrary to the provision of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 3 of the PASA which requires approval of the State Government within twelve days. He further submits that the said orders would be contrary to the express provision of Art. 22 (4) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as without the opinion of the Advisory Board of having sufficient ground for detention no person can be detained for more than three months and the impugned orders directly detaining the petitioners for one year are therefore contrary to that Constitutional mandate. He further submits that the impugned detention orders are further contrary to the provisions of the PASA which requires an opinion of the Advisory Board for the purpose of either revoking the order when there is no sufficient ground for detention or for confirming the orders when there is sufficient ground for detention. He further submits that the impugned detention orders are further contrary to the provisions of the PASA which requires an opinion of the Advisory Board for the purpose of either revoking the order when there is no sufficient ground for detention or for confirming the orders when there is sufficient ground for detention. So the impugned orders which are initially for one year are contrary to the provisions of the PASA and that also usurps the power of the Government of confirming the detention orders. The said orders are also contrary to the provision of sec. 14 of the PASA as per which the maximum period of detention is one year when the order is confirmed. In view of the aforesaid grounds Mr. Pardiwala submits that the impugned orders of detention should be held to be bad and illegal and the petitioners should be released forthwith. ( 4 ) IN support of his aforesaid contention he strongly relied on the judgment in the case of Makhan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1952 Supreme Court 27 In the said case the petitioner was arrested and detained under order dated 1-3-1950 by the District Magistrate Amritsar under sec. 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 The petitioner challenged the validity of the said order on various grounds but during the pendency of the said petition the petitioner was served with another detention order dated 30-7-1951 on 16 under the amended provisions of the Prevention Detention Act on 16-8-1951. By the said order the petitioner was to be detained upto 31 the date on which the said Act was to expire. ( 5 ) IN the said judgment it is observed by the Supreme Court as under:" (4) Whatever might be the position under the Act before its amendment in February 1951 it is clear that the Act as amended requires that every case of detention should be placed before the Advisory Board constituted under the Act (S. 9) and provides that if the Board reports that there is sufficient cause for the detention the appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit (S. 11 ). It is therefore plain that it is only after the Advisory Board to which the case has been referred reports that the detention is justified the Government should determine what the period of detention should be and not before. The fixing of the period of detention in the initial order itself in the present case was therefore contrary to the scheme of the Act and cannot be supported". It was argued by the learned Advocate General in that case that if the Advisory Board reports that there is no sufficient cause for the detention the person concerned would be released forthwith and therefore the direction that he should be detained upto 31-3-1952 could be ignored as mere surplusage. The said argument was repelled by the Supreme Court by observing as under:"we cannot accept that view. It is obvious that such a direction would tend to prejudice a fair consideration of the petitioners case when it is placed before the Advisory Board. It cannot be too often emphasised that before a person is deprived of his personal liberty the procedure established by law must be strictly followed and must not be departed from to the disadvantage of the person affected". ( 6 ) THE aforesaid judgment is a judgment delivered by the Court consisting of five Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court headed by the Honble the Chief Justice Shri Patanjali Sastri. ( 7 ) THIS view has been considered subsequently in number of other cases. It is not necessary to refer to all of them. However it is necessary to point out that in the case of T. Devki vs. Government of Tamil Nadu AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1086 the Supreme Court has held that in case where the period is not specified on that ground the order cannot be said to be invalid. That proposition in a way supports the contention of the present petitioners. Not even a single case is cited before us wherein the order in which the detention-period is fixed by the Detaining Authority has been held to be valid. The said judgment has also been followed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Rajendra Mansukhlal Shah vs. Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay and others 1989 Cri. The said judgment has also been followed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Rajendra Mansukhlal Shah vs. Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay and others 1989 Cri. L. J. 1741 It was a case under the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act 1980 where in the detention order itself the period of detention of six months from the date of detention was mentioned and that order has been held to be illegal inter alia following the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Makhan Singhs case (supra ). We respectfully follow the judgment of the Supreme Court and hold that the Detaining authority has usurped the power of the Government and the Advisory Board as per the scheme mentioned in the provisions of the PASA and that the impugned detention orders are contrary to the Constitutional mandate expressed in Art. 22 (4) of the PASA. The impugned orders of detention are therefore bad illegal invalid and hence they are required to be quashed. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY both the Special Criminal Applications are allowed. The impugned orders of detention of the petitioners are quashed. The petitioners are ordered to released forthwith if no more required in any other case. ( 9 ) RULE is made absolute accordingly in both the Special Criminal Applications. Special Criminal Application Allowed. .