K. SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, his brothers were the accused. The investigation was going on. Charge-sheet was not filed for a period of ninety days from the date of detention of the accused. In the circumstances, the detention is challenged as illegal detention and the present writ petition is filed for the release of the said accused persons. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the two accused themselves had moved the District Judge, Mysore for their release on this ground, without any success. It was held that that the charge-sheet was filed within ninety days and therefore, question of illegal detention did not arise. This order of the Sessions Court was affirmed by this court in Cr. P. 1135 of 1992 in its order dated 12-8-1992. The result of this affirmation of the order of the Sessions Court is nothing but an affirmation of the finding that there was no delay in filing the charge- sheet as contended by the petitioners therein. If so, the question is whether this court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, can give a different finding and then order the release of the accused. The obvious answer is in the negative. The order of the Sessions Court stood merged in the order made by this court in Cr. P. 1135 of 1992. Even though the affirmation of the order of the Sessions Court was made in the criminal petition filed under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, it cannot be denied that the result of the order of this court, though made by the learned single judge, is to affirm the order of the learned Sessions Judge. If the doctrine of merger is attracted, it follows that no writ lies against an order made by another judge of this court vide Shankar Ramachandra Abhyankar v Krishnaji Dattatraya bapat, AIR 1970 SC 1 . At page 4, the Supreme Court held:"now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court-below. At page 4, the Supreme Court held:"now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the court-below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the high Court as a superior court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior courts in those of superior courts would be affected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. "the Supreme Court also observed, alternatively, at page 5 thus:"even on the assumption that the order of the appellate court had not merged in the order of the single Judge who had disposed of the revision petition we are of the view that a writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the High Court when the respondent had already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If there arc two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the sub ordinate court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions. "consequently, we hold that this writ petition is not maintainable. Mr. Ravi Malimath, petitioner's learned counsel relied on the decision in k. A. Abbas v Satyanarayana Rao and Others, 1992 (4) Kar. LJ. 371: ILR 1992 kar. 3456. In the said decision, this court directed the release of the accused because extension of custody was sought without producing the accused. "consequently, we hold that this writ petition is not maintainable. Mr. Ravi Malimath, petitioner's learned counsel relied on the decision in k. A. Abbas v Satyanarayana Rao and Others, 1992 (4) Kar. LJ. 371: ILR 1992 kar. 3456. In the said decision, this court directed the release of the accused because extension of custody was sought without producing the accused. Learned counsel also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Aslam Babalal Desai v state of Maharashtra, AIR 1993 SC 1 . We are of the view that there is no scope for us to apply the principle referred in these decisions since we are of the view that this writ petition is not maintainable for the reasons stated above. On merits, it has to be noted that the accused were arrested on 17-1-1992 and the charge-sheet was filed on 16-4-1992, If 17th January is considered, the period of ninety days would be over on 15th April, 1992 and therefore, it was contended that the filing of the charge-sheet on the next day would render the detention illegal under Section 167 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. We do not express any opinion on this question, in view of the finding on the first question about the maintainability of the writ petition. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .