R. A. SHARMA, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER was a police constable in U. P. Police. He, alongwith tow others, was convicted, vide Judgment dated 23. 4. 1990, under Section 302 I. P. C. and was sentenced to life imprisonment. All the three Services including the petitioners were further sentenced to two years R. I. for the offence under section 201 I. P. C. and one year R. I. for the offence under Section 4 of dowry Prohibition Act. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. Against his conviction, the petitioner has filed an appeal which is still pending. After his conviction, the petitioner has been removed from service vide order dated 2. 8. 1990 in exercise of power under Sub Clause (a) of Second Proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India, read it with Government order dated 12. 10. 1979. It is against the above order that the petitioner has as filed this writ petition in which validity of Government order dated 12. 10. 1979 has also been al challenged. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition has made only one submission: namely that the Government cannot pass an order under Sub Clause (a) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, until the appeal filed by the petitioner against his conviction is decided in as much as the words conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge means the final conviction as decided by the appellate Court. Learned Standing Counsel has deducted the above submission. ( 3 ) A member of a civil service of a State or who holds civil post under the State cannot be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. Second Proviso to Clause (2) however, lays down that this Clause shall not apply to the contingencies contained in its Sub-Clause (a) (b) and (c) Sub- Clause (a) being relevant is reproduced below: Provided further that this Clause shall not apply- (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; The Government of U. P. vide order dated 12. 10. 10. 1979 has laid down that after a Government servant has been convicted by the Trial Court he can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without waiting for the result of the appeal and if ultimately the appeal is allowed and the conviction is set-aside he is liable to be re-instated with full back wages. ( 4 ) IT is true that appeal is a continued on of the original proceeding which has resulted in conviction, but, as laid down by Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Mohammad Nooh, the relevant extract from which is reproduced below, the original decree or the conviction neither stands suspended nor docs it become inoperative after the appeal is filed, with the result that order of conviction passed by the Sessions Court stands and remains a valid order on which action is laible to be taken by the Government; But as pointed out by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Juscurn Boid v; Pirthichand Lal. 45 Ind App 52; ILR 45 Cat 670 at pp. 678 and 679; (AIR 1918 PC 151 at pp. 152- 153 (J), whatever be the theory under other systems or law, under the Indian Law and procedure and original decree is not suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is merely one of dismissal. There is nothing in the Indian Law to warrant the suggestion that the decree or order of the Court or tribunal of the first instance becomes final only on the termination of all proceedings by way of the appeal or revision. The filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective. In this connection reference may be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Radhey Govind Swarup v. Union of India. The filing of the appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remains effective. In this connection reference may be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Radhey Govind Swarup v. Union of India. relevant extract from has been laid down that an order under (a) of Second proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Government servant by the Trial Court and during pendency of the appeal, in as much as pendency of appeal against conviction, does not have the effect of suspending the conviction and by grant of bail merely the sentence is suspended; It has been held by another Bench of this Court in Han Mohan Shukla v. Basic Shiksha Parishad, W. P. No. 5742 Of 1983 decided on 27. 10. 1983 that mete admission and pendency of appeal against conviction docs not have the effect of suspending the conviction and grant of bail merely suspending the sentence. Accordingly, under Clause (a) of the proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution the Government servant concerned can even during the pendency of an appeal be dismissed without a require departmental inquiry similar view has been taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in. Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 (3) S. L. R. 173. To the same effect is the law laid down by another Division Bench of this Court to case of Raghuveer Singh v. Superintendent of Post Offices and another, wherein dismissal of the employee under Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, after his conviction by Trial Court but during pendency of appeal, was upheld. The law is, thus, settled that a Government servant can be removed after his conviction by Trial Court and during pendency of appeal under Sub Clause (a) of Second proviso to Clauses (2) of Article 311 of the constitution. The law is, thus, settled that a Government servant can be removed after his conviction by Trial Court and during pendency of appeal under Sub Clause (a) of Second proviso to Clauses (2) of Article 311 of the constitution. It may also be mentioned that, as laid down by Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, relevant extract from which is reproduced below, the Second proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, has been enacted in public interest and as a matter of public policy, and it is the public interest that the Government servant, who has been convicted on serious charge, should not be retained in service; The conclusion which flows from the express language or the second proviso is inevitable and there is no escape from it, it may appear harsh but, as mentioned earlier, the second proviso has been inserted in the Constitution as a matter of public policy and in public interest and for public good Just as the pleasure doctrine and the safeguards for a government servant provided in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 have been. It is in public interest and for public good that a government servant who has been convicted of a grave and serious offence or one rendering him unfit to continue in office should be summarily dismissed or removed from service instead of being allowed to continue in it at public expense and to public determent. x x x x x Much as this may seem harsh and oppressive to a government servant, this Court must not forget that the object under lying the second proviso is public policy, public interest and public good and the Court must, therefore, repeal the reputation to be carried away by feelings of commiseration and sympathy for those government servants- who have been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by applying the second proviso, sympathy and commiseration cannot be allowed to out weigh considerations of public policy, concern for public interest, regard for public good and the peremptory dictate of a Constitution prohibition. Unless action is taken under the above provision immediately after his conviction by the Trial Court on a criminal charge the very purpose of the proviso will be frustrated, in as much as it normally takes years and years before the appeal is decided in High Court and thereafter by Supreme Court and during all this period the Government servant will continue to be in service and will be entitled to all his remunerations and if under suspension the subsistence allowance which, after some time, maybe equal to 3/4th of his salary. All this amount will be paid at the public expense by which neither public merest nor public good will be benefited. On the. Other hand, if the Government servant is removed from service, immediately after his conviction by the Trial Court, in exercise of power under Sub Clause (a) of Second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, and if the appeal is ultimately allowed he will be entitled to be reinstated with full back wages and he will, thus, not suffer any irreparable loss. But if he is allowed to remain in service and continue to draw salary or subsistence allowance, as the case may be, and ultimately his appeal is dismissed, the amount so paid to him may not, in many cases, be recovered from him. This will be a great burden on the public exchequer. That apart, by his continuance in service inspite of his conviction on a criminal charge public interest and public order may suffer irreparable loss. The conviction recorded by the trial court is as good a conviction as the one recorded by the appellate Court and it is fully operative. Once a conviction is thus rendered the State is entitled to act under Sub Clause (a) of the Second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The Government Order dated 12. 10. 1979 has merely explained the position which was implicit in the above provision. No exception can be taken to the impugned order as well as the Government Order dated 12. 10. 1979, referred to above. The order of conviction, passed against the petitioner, was fully operative and it was open the. Government to take action under Sub Clause (a) of Second proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. No exception can be taken to the impugned order as well as the Government Order dated 12. 10. 1979, referred to above. The order of conviction, passed against the petitioner, was fully operative and it was open the. Government to take action under Sub Clause (a) of Second proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) THE following cases, which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner, in support of his submission, do not lend support to the case of the petitioner excepting the decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Trilochan Singh v. State of Rajasthan: (a) R. S. Das v. Divisional Superintendent. (b) Kunwar Bahadur v. Union of India. (c) Trilochan Singh v. Slate of Rajasthan; (Supra ). (d) Vidya Charan Shukla v. Purshottam Lal Kaushik. In R. S. Das. v. Divisional Superintendent (supra), the petitioner therein was convicted on 18. 12. 1956, against which he filed an appeal, during pendency of which he was dismissed from service. Thereafter his appeal was allowed. After his appeal was allowed he applied for reinstatement which request was refused. He accordingly med the writ petition praying for quashing the order refusing to reinstate him after his appeal was allowed. On the above facts the question which came up for decision before this Court, as mentioned in para 2 of that judgment, was whether the case of the two petitioners, even though they were ultimately acquitted in appeal, is covered by Clause (a) of proviso under Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. Learned Single Judge of this Court held that as the appeal is continuation of this Court held that as the appeal is continuation of the original proceeding and after the appeal was allowed, it cannot be said that the petitioner therein has been convicted on a criminal charge, with the result that there remains no order of conviction to sustain order of removal and the petitioner, as such, is entitled to be reinstated. In Special appeal filed against the above judgment of learned Single Judge a Division Bench of this Court, the decision of which is reported in (Divisional Superintendent v. Ram Saran Das (Supra) has also laid down that conviction on a criminal charge under Sub Clause (a) of Second proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution means a criminal charge which has finally resulted in conviction i. e. the conviction by the last court and not by Trial Court alone, in as much as proceedings in the appellate court are continuation of the proceedings in the Trial Court. On that basis it was held that once the order of conviction, recorded by the Trial Court is set aside by higher Court there remains no conviction in the eye of law, with the result that entire basis on which order of removal was passed, stands removed. Relevant extract from that judgment is reproduced below; The punitive action taken against the civil servant was based solely on the order of conviction, and the removal of the order of conviction has the effect of removing the entire basis of such an order, Once, therefore, the order of conviction falls, the very foundation on which the order of dismissal was based disappears and the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank must fall with it. Similar question case up for consideration in case or Kunwar Bahadur v. Union of India (Supra ). In that case the appellant there in was convicted on 17. 5. 1956 and 21-5-1956 he was removed from service in exercise of power conferred on Government under Sub Clause (a) of proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. The appeal which he filed against the order of conviction was, however, allowed on 9. 4. 1957. Thereafter he filed a suit in Civil Court for declaration that the order of his removal from service is void and for other necessary relicts in connection therewith. The suit having been dismissed he tiled appeal before this Court the question which came up for consideration before or this Court was whether word conviction in Sub Clause (a) of the proviso means conviction by Trial Court alone of the conviction by the last Court. The suit having been dismissed he tiled appeal before this Court the question which came up for consideration before or this Court was whether word conviction in Sub Clause (a) of the proviso means conviction by Trial Court alone of the conviction by the last Court. In other wants the question was whether the, Government is entitled to maintain its order passed after the conviction by the Trial Court under Sub Clause (a) for the provision, even if the appellate court has allowed the appeal and set-aside the conviction This Court held that after the Conviction has been set-aside in appeal, the Government cannot chum benefits of Sub Clause (a) of proviso to Clause (2) of articles 311 of the Constitution. While laying down as above, this Court rejected the States argument relating to inconvenience and delay by holding that it was for the Government to decide whether to pass an order under Sub Clause (a) of provision Article 311, immediately after the conviction is recorded by the Trial Court or after the appeal or revision is decided, but if the action is take immediately after the conviction by the Trial Court and the appeal is ultimately allowed the employee is liable to be reinstated. In this connection relevant extract of the judgment of Honble Oak, J. as contained in para 19 of the judgement is reproduced below; Mr. N. D. Pant urged that if the interpretation suggested by Mr. M. P. Singh is accepted their would be inordinate delay in the disposal of departmental proceedings. In every case Government will have to wait for the result of an appeal or revision. Now it is always open to Government to pass an order of dismissal or removal from service immediately after a criminal Court records conviction. In that case me administration runs the risk of the conviction being later set aside in appeal or revision. It is for the administration to decide whether in a particular case it should pass an order of dismissal or removal immediately after conviction by the Trial Court, or wait for the result of a possible appeal or revision. Such considerations of expediency can have little bearing on the interpretation of Article 311 of the Constitution. Hon ble Dwrivedi, J. was also of the similar view. Such considerations of expediency can have little bearing on the interpretation of Article 311 of the Constitution. Hon ble Dwrivedi, J. was also of the similar view. Relevant extract from his Lordships judgment is as follows: Shri Pant strenuously pressed upon us that our view will delay the employees day of judgment until the appeal or revision against his conviction has been decided. I am not quite certain that it is the inevitable result of our view. But that aside, the argument is familiar old argument of administrative convenience. It was laid to rest about two decades ago by Lord Atkin with this eloquent epitaph. Convenience and justice are often not on speaking term. General Medical Council v. Spacknan, 1943 A. C. 627. So no more be said of it. Honble Gangeshwar Prasad, J. white agreeing with the other two Honble Judges laid down as under: - So long as a conviction remains liable to be set aside it cannot be said to be determination its nature and its legal. Consequences, whether the conviction is already in question before a superior court or DOL The state of things created thereby is liable to change and. naturally, an order of dismissal which seeks to justify its non-compliance with the requirement of Article 311 (2) on the basis of such a conviction stands upon an insecure foundation. The order cannot have a higher validity than the conviction from which it derives its precarious justification and it must remain subject to the ultimate shape which is given 10 the state of things by the order of the superior court before which the conviction is challenged. If the conviction is set aside, the state of things is made to undergo a change not merely from the date of the setting aside of the conviction but from the date of the conviction itself. xxxxx If it is found that the conviction was subsequently set aside, it must, in my opinion, be held that at no point of time was the person concerned a person whose conduct, on the ground on which he was dismissed from service, had led to his conviction. The decision of Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Charan Shukla v. Purshottam Lal Kaushik (Supra), relates to the provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act. The decision of Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Charan Shukla v. Purshottam Lal Kaushik (Supra), relates to the provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act. In that case the nomination of a candidate, inspite of his conviction by Trial Court, was accepted, but before Election petition could be decided by the High Court his appeal against the conviction was allowed. The Supreme Court has laid down as under; The acquittal of the appellant herein by the appellate court, during the pendency of the election-petition must be held to have completely and effectively wiped out the disqualification of the appellant with retrospective effect from the dale of the conviction, so that in the eye of Jaw it existed neither at the date of scrutiny of nominations, nor at the date of the election or at any other stage of the process of being chosen. In short, the acquittal of the appellant before the decision of the election-petition pending in the High Court, had with retrospective effect, made his disqualification non-existent, even at the day of the scrutiny of nomination. ( 6 ) IN case the contention of learned counsel to the effect that unless the appeal or revision against the conviction, is decided the person concerned cannot be said to have been convicted, is accepted, it will result in precarious position, in as much as inspite of his conviction his nomination cannot be rejected under Representation of Peoples Act till the matter is finally decided by the High Court and Supreme Court, Which may take several years. ( 7 ) THE decision of learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in the ease of Trilochan Singh (supra) however, support the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, in as much as it has been laid down therein that the above provisions can be invoked against the Government servant only in those cases where the conviction has become final and that provision would not be attracted in case where the conviction is in under challenge in appeal and the appeal is still pending. However, In view of the decisions of Division Benches of this Court in Radhey Govind Swarup v. Union India (1984 A. W. C. 295) (supra) and Raghuveer Sing-h v. Superintendent of Post of flees (1984 U. P. Service Cases, 73 (supra), as well as decision of Full Bench of this Court in Kunwar Bahadur v. Union of India (AIR 1969, Alid. 414) (supra ). it is not possible to agree with the views expressed by Rajasthan High Court. ( 8 ) FOR the reasons given above the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Writ Petition dismissed.