ORDER V.S. Kokje, J. 1. This is an application filed by the original defendents challenging the reiection of their application under O. 7. R. 11 of the Code of Civil proeedure in a suit. 2. The non-applicant no.1 brought a suit against the applicants and non-applicants nos.2 to 5 for a declaration that the house No. 83 Sitalamata Bazar. Indore is a joint Hindu family property of the plaintifs is and the defendants and the plaintiffs and defendant nos. land 2 have 6/25th share each in that property and defendant No. 3 has 1/25th share in the property and defendants nos. 4 to 8 jointly have 6/25 th share in that property. The suit was valued for pecuniery jurisdictional Rs. 25,00,000/- and for the purpose of court-fees it was valued at Rs. 300/- and court-fees of Rs. 30/- was affixed. An application under 0.7 r. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was moved on behalf of original defendants no. 4,6,7 and 8 contending that actually the suit is for partition in the garb of declaration and, therefore, ad-valarum court-fee was payable treating it to be a suit for partition. The relief claimed in this application is that the plaintiff be asked to properly value the suit and after realising the court-fees payable on a partition suit; the suit be proceeded with. The trial Court after hearing the parlies, has rejected this application. Hence some of the defendants have come up in the revision against the order. 3. On a perusal of the application and the impugned order passed by the District Court, it appears that the arguments advanced before the District Court were at variance with the contents of the application u/s 7 r. 11 CPC whereas the application states that the suit in reality is a suit for partition and. therefore. should be got valued as such and court-fees be demanded as such, the argument advanced seems to be that the suit was not maintainable because it was a sun for more declaration, without seeking consequential relief of partition which flew from the relief of declaration. The District Court mainly dealt with the argument as to the non maintainability of the suit for not seeking consequential relief. No doubt the District Court has also dealt with the question of valuation of the suit. 4. The District Court mainly dealt with the argument as to the non maintainability of the suit for not seeking consequential relief. No doubt the District Court has also dealt with the question of valuation of the suit. 4. It was contended on behalf of the applicants before me that seeking a deelaration of a defined share amounts to asking for partition and this declaration having been sought, the suit was actually a suit for partition. Reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Santoshchandra & Ors. V. Smt. Gyansundarbai (1970 MPLJ. 363). It was contended that the question of sufficiency of court-fees should be decided as a preliminary issue. In my opinion, this ruling has no application to the facts of the present case where the Court was considering as application under O.7 r. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and there was no question whether a particular issue should be treated as a preliminary issue. If the question of insufficiency of court fees and tenability of the suit are raised in a written statement and preliminary issues are framed then the Court cannot postpone these issues for the final judgment. That is the ratio of Santoshchandra's case (supra). 5. It was further argued that substance of the pleadings and the relief claimed have to be seen and not the form. If the plaint is viewed with this angle, it would be clear that it was a suit for declaration which was actually a suit for partition without specifically claiming partition. Reliance was placed on the decisions reported in Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and others ( AIR 1973 SC. 2384 ). Vithoba Bhanji & Ors. V. Vithal Sakroo & Ors. ( AIR 1958 Bom 270 ), & Santosh Chandra & Ors. V.Smt. Gyansundarbai ( 1970 MPLJ 363 ). 6. In Shamsher Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court observed that the Court deciding the question of court fees should look into the allegation in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for In the aforesaid case the Court held that in substance the suit was for setting aside a decree, which was binding on the plaintiff. In Vithoba's ease (supra) a Division Bench held that in order to decide whether the plaintiff's suit was one which was exclusively a suit for bare declaration that the alienation is not binding upon them, or whether in essence. it was a suit for any further and better relief. it will be necessary to scan the allegalions in the plaint with some care and analyse the substance of the plainiff's claim. In order to see the substance of the plaintiffs claim it is not enough lor a Court to consider the mere allegations that the plaintiff has chosen to make but the Court must go behind the mere form and verbiage of the plaint and ascertain what indeed is the true relief which the plaintiff is asking lor. In Santoshchandra's case (Supra) it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to consequential relief directly flowing there from of which declaration was sought, he must seek consequential relief in the suit and cannot be allowed to bring a separate suit therefor. It is not open to the plaintiff to seek declaration in the first instance and a consequential relief at a later stage by two separate suits. 7. The learned counsel for the non-applicants relying upon the two eases referred and followed by the District Court also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Kalloomal Tapeswari Prasad (HUF) Kanpur V. The CIT Kanpur ( AIR 1982 SC. 760 ) and M/s Commercial Aviation and Travel Company & Ors. V. Mrs. Vimla Pannalal ( AIR 1988 SC. 1636 ). In Kalloomal's case (supra) the Supreme Court white considering the provisions of the Income Tax Act observed that if properties capable of division are not actually divided mere severance is not sufficient to record finding of partial partition. In Commercial Aviation's case the Supreme Court observed that in matters of valuation for court fees the Court has to accept plaintiff's valuation tentatively. Ordinarily it is not possible for the Court at a preliminary stage to determine the value of the relief. If the Court is itself unable to say what the correct valuation of the relief is. it cannot require the plaintiff to correct the valuation that has been made by him. The decisions referred by the District Court in the impugned order are Lata Laxminarayan V. Rukmahai (1952 N.L.J. 49) and Chaman Khan V. Alladi (1980 All. Law Journal. If the Court is itself unable to say what the correct valuation of the relief is. it cannot require the plaintiff to correct the valuation that has been made by him. The decisions referred by the District Court in the impugned order are Lata Laxminarayan V. Rukmahai (1952 N.L.J. 49) and Chaman Khan V. Alladi (1980 All. Law Journal. 745). In Lala Laxminarayan'.S case it was observed by the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court that a suit under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (old) the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to legal charaeter or property.. By the term "further relieff is meant not any and every kind of relief but one which would complete the claim of the plaintiff and not lead to a multiplicity of suits, That further relief must flow necessarily from the relief of declaration. If the relief is remote and is not connected with the cause of action, the plaintiff need not claim it. It was further observed that each case must be decided on its own facts. A suit for declaration of title by a member of a joint Hindu family who is in possession is maintainable under S. 42 of the specific Relief Act. It is not necessary for him to claim the relief of general partition. The plaintiff or any member of his family can claim that relief subsequently when need arises. In Chamman Khan's case (supra) a Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court took the view that where the plaintiff filed a suit only for declaration of their share in the suit property along with the defendants, the suit could not be said to be not maintainable merely because some of the plaintiffs were found not to have any share in the properly or because the plaintiffs did not claim relief of partition of their share by metes and bounds or for possession. It was further observed that a co-owner is not bound to bring a suit for partition and separate possession if the other co-owner denies his interest in joint property. He may Iike to continue enjoying the property as a co-owner and for that a decree declaring that he is a co-owner is enough and inasmuch as one co-owner's possession is the possession of another, it is not incumbent for him to claim a decree for joint possession either. 8. He may Iike to continue enjoying the property as a co-owner and for that a decree declaring that he is a co-owner is enough and inasmuch as one co-owner's possession is the possession of another, it is not incumbent for him to claim a decree for joint possession either. 8. In the light of the aforesaid position of law let us now examine the present case. A careful reading of the plaint would show that sevaranee of status from the joint family has not been sought for. The mere complaint is that the plaintiff was not being recognised as a co-parcener and that is the cause of action. The relief claimed is declaration that the plaintiff as also the other defendants are owners of a particular share in the properly. It appears that the claim for a defined share has brought complications in the case. If a mere declaration would have been sought In the effect that the plaintiff is a co-parcener of the joint Hindu family, which owned House No. 83. Sitalamata Bazar. Indore. there would have been no complications. We have, therefore, to see whether claiming of declaration as to the specific share in the HUF property would make any difference in this particular case the paramount intention of the plaintiff is to gel his status as a co-parcener of the HUF to which House No. 83 Sitalamata Bazar. Indore belongs declared through Court, particular share in the property of each co-parcener is a subsidiary thing. Actually it is a redundancy or surplusage. A co-parcener with how-so-ever small share in the copareenery property shall have equal right to enjoy the property so long as the joint family continues. Before partition in a joint Hindu family, so far as enjoyment of the property is concerned, it is absolutely irrelevant as to what is the specific share of a particular coparcener at a particular point of time. Reading the plaint as a whole, therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff has specified the shares only to prove his point further and to emphasize the exact situation to the share in the coparcenery properties of the party on the dale the suit was being filed. The plaintiff has given no indication that he intended to separate from the family or to have his share separated. Because of this. The plaintiff has given no indication that he intended to separate from the family or to have his share separated. Because of this. in fact, there is neither a claim for partition in the suit nor actual partition having been taken palce, have been pleaded. In these circumstances, the suit is clearly not for partition in substance also. I am in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in 1980 A.L.J. 745 (supra), that such a suit for a mere declaration is maintainable 9. For the aforesaid reasons. I find no fault with the impugned order. This revision application deserves to be and is here by dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.