C. L. Choudhry ( 1 ) M/s. Hind trading and Manufacturing Co. ,the plaintiff has filed this suit for recovery of possession and recovery oflicense fee and damages. The case set up by the plaintiff is that the plaintiffis the joint Hindu Family partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act. An intimation was sent to the Registrar of the Firms regardingthe change into the constitution of the Firm. The defendants attroned tothe partnership firm by paying licence fee and by other conduct. The plaintifffirm is the successor firm of the old firms. The plaint has been signed andverified by Sh. Mahendra Kumar Jain as the Managing Partner of the plaintiff firm. The defendant is stated to be a Private Limited Company registeredunder the Companies Act. Defendent No. 2 is its Managing Director. Theplaintiff firm had taken the site, Plot No 243 of Block B in the lay out ofokhla Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi from the President of India onperpetual Lease under the Deed dated 18/06/1973 and as such theplaintiff firm is the perpetual lessee of the site Plot B-243. After taking thesaid plot on lease, the plaintiff firm constructed the building to run industryfor the purpose of production of sanitary water fittings, castings process. Plaintiff is the owner of the building constructed on the plot. Defendantno. 2 requested the partners of the plaintiff-firm to grant a licence in itsfavour in respect of the part of the building constructed on this plot. Thefirm s then partners agreed to the said request and granted the licence infavour of defendant No. 2 who acted as the Director of defendant No. 1 atthat time. A regular deed of licence was executed on 25-6-1975 by thelicensor and the licensee. On behalf of the firm, the then partner Mr. Pawankumar Jain signed the deed and granted the licence. Defendant No. 2signed the deed of licence having accepted the licence with all terms andconditions on behalf of defendant No. 1 and on behalf of himself as well. According to the terms of the license deed, the licensor allowed the licenseeto use the basement, mezzanine floor and portion of the ground floor of thebuilding B-243, Phase I, New Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi. Theground floor portion which was allowed to be used by the licensee comprisedof one big hall measuring 42 x 29 and one room measuring 13 x8 . Theground floor portion which was allowed to be used by the licensee comprisedof one big hall measuring 42 x 29 and one room measuring 13 x8 . Theother terms and conditions mentioned in the licence deed were that thelicence fee was Rs. 500. 00 per day which included the electricity charges forone day subject to the minimum of Rs. 3. 500. 00 per week commencing fromthe 25th day of June, 1975. The licence fee was payable in advance everyday and in case the licensee failed to pay in advance the license fee, the licensor was entitled to terminate the license without any further notice. It was provided in the license deed that the licensee bad no right, title or interest to possess the said portion except to use the same as the licensee. It I is stated that defendent No. 2 went on paying the license fee at the rate ofrs. 500. 00 per day for a considerable long time but during the year 1978, hecreated the dispute regarding the electric connection which was provided inthe building. He informed the plaintiff by letter dated 9-6-1978 that theelectric consumption from 6-5-1978 to 5-6-1978 was 3156 units and theelectric charges for these units was Rs. 1167. 70 and that he wanted to deductthe amount for that period of 30 days. He started complaining that therewas electric disconnection with effect from 19-5-1978 and that he wanted toget a separate electric connection for the building. A dispute arose betweenthe parties and the plaintiff filled a suit in the Court of Senior Sub Judgeagainst the defendent for permanent injunction restraining the defendant notto instal a new electric connection in the building. Suit was dismissed fornon prosecution. The defendant, also filed an application under Section 45of the Delhi Rent Control Act before the Rent Controller for restoration ofthe electric supply. The defendants claimed tenancy rights over the suitproperty. The Rent Controller passed the interim order restoring the electricconnection to the licensee after holding that it was established prima facie arelationship of landlord and tenant. The finding was only for passing theinterim matter. The application under Section 45 of the Rent Control Actwas dismissed as withdrawn. No Court has given any finding adjudicatingthe relationship of the parties. According to the plaintiff, the intention ofthe parties was TO create the licence and not the lease by the said deed dated25-6-75. The finding was only for passing theinterim matter. The application under Section 45 of the Rent Control Actwas dismissed as withdrawn. No Court has given any finding adjudicatingthe relationship of the parties. According to the plaintiff, the intention ofthe parties was TO create the licence and not the lease by the said deed dated25-6-75. There was no transfer of interest or title in favour of thedefendants The plaintiff was and is prohibited to transfer, sell, assign orotherwise part with possession of the whole or in part of the industrial plotexcept with the previous consent in writing of the lessor. No such consentwas obtained by the plaintiff. Even assuming that such a transfer is by wayof lease in favour of the defendant, it is illegal and void being contrary tothe term of the perpetual lease deed dated 18-6-73 and could not be created. The lease for more than one year cannot be created without registered document. The deed is nothing but a simple license deed which could be terminated at Will. The plaintiff terminated the licence orally on 16-8-1977 whichwas confirmed by a telegraphic communication dated 20-8-1977 addressed todefendant No. 2. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 2 is a licenseeunder the license deed. But on the contrary the defendant No. 2 wasemphatically and repeatedly asserting that defendant No. 1 was the licenseeand defendant No. 2 had signed the license deed as the Director of defendantno. 1. In view of these circumstances, the plaintiff thought of terminatingthe license of the defendants by issuing a notice dated 30-6-1981. Evenotherwise the license was terminated on the ground that the license fee wasnot paid. There was violation of the terms of the license deed by the defendants. It s further stated that even assuming that premises in suit had beengiven on lease and not on license basis to the defendants, defendant No. 2 isliable to pay arrears with effect from 11-8-80 at Rs. 500. 00 per day. Defendant No. 2 falsely alleged that defendant No. 1 is a tenant. The premisesin suit we"e given on license only to defendant No. 2 who executed deed oflicense in his own individual capacity. Defendant No. 2 at all the relevanttimes admitted that he alone was the licensee of the premises in question andhe is now estopped from alleging to the contrary. The premisesin suit we"e given on license only to defendant No. 2 who executed deed oflicense in his own individual capacity. Defendant No. 2 at all the relevanttimes admitted that he alone was the licensee of the premises in question andhe is now estopped from alleging to the contrary. Even if it is proved thatdefendant No. 1 is the license or a tenant then defendant No. 1 is also liableto pay rent/damages/license fee. The licensee had caused damage to thebuilding by blocking the passage and by putting asbestos sheets. It is claimedthat plaintiff is entitled to damage caused to the premises to the extent of Rs. 50,000. 00 by making holes in the RCC columns and Rs. 10. 000. 00 for causingdamages to the other portion of the building. The defendants had not paidthe licence fee for all the 365 days in a year. He went on paying in lumpsum and all those amounts have been credited in the account of the plaintiffmaintained in the name of defendant No. 2. After adjusting the amountpaid by the defendant the amount found due is at Rs. 1. 61. 694. 00 with effectfrom 11-8-80 to 30-6-81 The concerned defendant is also liable to pay thelicense fees upto the date of termination at the same rate of Rs. 500. 00 perday and thereafter till thedate of suit at the same rate. Plaintiff also claimedinterest at the rate of 18% per annum. On these pleas, a decree for possession and licence fee and damages is claimed. ( 2 ) SUIT is contested in behalf of the defendants. A joint writtenstatement has been filed on behalf of the defendants. The plea taken up inthe written statement is that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain andtry the suit. Suit is barred by the provisions of Section 50 of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act as defendant No. 1 is in possession of the premises as a tenantand not as a licensee. Suit has not been properly valued for the purposes ofcourt fee and jurisdiction. The suit is not maintainable under the provisionsof Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Suit is barred by the provisions of Section 50 of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act as defendant No. 1 is in possession of the premises as a tenantand not as a licensee. Suit has not been properly valued for the purposes ofcourt fee and jurisdiction. The suit is not maintainable under the provisionsof Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Suit is barred by principles ofres-judicata as on the same cause of action, nemely-that the defendant No. 2 was a licensee whose license had been terminated, plaintiff filed a suitbefore the Sub Judge against defendant No. 2 which was dismissed for nonprosecution, plaintiff, therefore, could not file any suit on the same cause ofaction. Suit is claimed to be barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code ofcivil Procedure. on merits, it is denied that the plaintiff was a registeredpartnership firm and that Shri M. K. Jain was its partner/manager and thepresent plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the property. Suit is notmaintainable at the instance of the present plaintiff. The defendant No. 2negotiated a tenancy of the premises on behalf of defendant No. 1consequent upon which defendant No. 1 was inducted as a tenant in thepremises by the owner/landlord with effect from 25-6-1975 at a monthly rentof Rs. 15,000. 00. The tenancy was for commercial purposes and was grantedfor the purposes of manufacturing. The defendant No. 1 has all along beenusing the premises as its factory and office and had installed plant andmachinery therein. The rent of Rs. 15. 000. 00 included Rs. 2500. 00 per monthas charges for electricity consumed in the premises by defendant No. 1 whichfacility was withdrawn in May, 1978, whereafter defendants got their ownelectricity connection in the premises. The case of the defendant is thatduring the negotiations between the owner and the defendant No. 1 weregoing on for the lease of the said premises, the owner/landlords hadsuggested that allegedly for tax purpose, defendant No. 1 would execute alicense agreement, although the real relationship between the parties would bethat or landlord and tenant. Accordingly, license deed dated 25/06/1975was executed between the parties and defendant No. 2 signed the deed in hiscapacity as Managing Director of defendant No. 1. The license agreementwas never given effect to and did not correctly record the relationship betweenthe parties. All throughout there was a relationship of landlord and tenantbetween the parties. Accordingly, license deed dated 25/06/1975was executed between the parties and defendant No. 2 signed the deed in hiscapacity as Managing Director of defendant No. 1. The license agreementwas never given effect to and did not correctly record the relationship betweenthe parties. All throughout there was a relationship of landlord and tenantbetween the parties. Defendant No. 1 had been in exclusive possession,control and use of the said premises without any light or interference by theplaintiff. According to the real arrangement between the parties, defendantno. 1 was to exclusively maintain the repairs of the suit premises for whichdefendant No. 1 would be entitled to out month s rent for each year ofoccupation. The plaintiff had not undertaken any maintenance and repairsof the premises since inception of the tanancy and defendant No. 1 hadundertaken all maintenance at his own costs. It is denied that defendantno. 2 paid license fee to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 500. 00 per day. Infact, rent at the rate of Rs. 15,000. 00was being paid by defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 or in the alternative defendant No. 2 as Managing Directorof defendant No. 1 was a tenant for an indefinite term which tenancy is notterminable at the will of the owner/landlord. In fact, the validity of termination of the license is denied. Defendant paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 15,000. 00 per month as the elecricity was supplied and thereafter defendantno. 1 obtained its own electric connection and used electricity only therefromand accordingly rent was paid at the rate of Rs. 12,500. 00. The allegationsof causing damage to the premises and blocking passage have been denied. Itis denied that defendant No. 2 is liable to pay any arrears as stated. It isdenied that premises were given to defendant No. 2 as a licensee or thatdefendant No. 2 executed the deed in personal capacity as stated. Therefore,the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages as claimed. ( 3 ) PLAINTIFF has hied replication to the written statement filed onbehalf of the defendants. I he pleas set up by the defendants have beendenied and the case sei up by the plaintiff in the plaint is reiterated. On thepleadings of the parties following issues were framed on 1-2-1985 : 1. Is the newly constituted plaintiff firm the owner of the propertyin question ? OPP2. I he pleas set up by the defendants have beendenied and the case sei up by the plaintiff in the plaint is reiterated. On thepleadings of the parties following issues were framed on 1-2-1985 : 1. Is the newly constituted plaintiff firm the owner of the propertyin question ? OPP2. Was defendant No. 1 inducted in the premises as tenant andnot as licensee 7 OPD3. Is defendant No. 2 not a licensee of the premises in suit ? OPD4. What is the rate of license fee/rent payable and for what periodin respect of the premises in suit ? OPP5. In case the defendant No. 1 or the defendants are held to belicensee and the license stands revoked as alleged by the plaintiff to what amount of the mesne protits/damages is the plaintiffentitled ? UPP6. Is the plaintiff-lirm registered under the Partnership Act and ifnot; is the suit maintainable in view of the provisions of Section69 of the Partnership Act / UPf7. Has the plaint been properly valued for purposes of Court-feesand jurisdiction ? OPP8. Is the suit or any portion thereof barred by the provisions ofsection 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act ? OPD9. Is the suit barred by principles of res judicata of the provisionsof Order 2 Rule 2 and Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedureas alleged by the defendants ? OPD10. Has the property been damaged and if so to what amount isthe plaintiff entitled and from whom of the defendants ? OPP11. Is the plaintiff entitled to interest ? If so at what rate and forwhat period 7 OPP12. To what amount, if any, is the plaintiff entitled and from whomof the defendants ? OPPOn 11/09/1987 following additional issue was framed : "whether the defendants have been and/or are entitled to deductany amount by way of maintenance and repairs annually ? If so,since when and to what extent ?" ( 4 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. My findings onthe above issues are as under : ( 5 ) ISSUES No. 1 and 6. These issues are inter-connected so I will deal with these issuestogether. Sh. Mahender Kumar Jain appearing tor the plaintiff deposedthat the plaintiff-firm was duly registered under tile Partnership Act. Heproved certified copy of Form A, Ex. PW1/1 He deposed that he is one ofthe registered partners of the plaintiff-firm and his name appeared in Ex. These issues are inter-connected so I will deal with these issuestogether. Sh. Mahender Kumar Jain appearing tor the plaintiff deposedthat the plaintiff-firm was duly registered under tile Partnership Act. Heproved certified copy of Form A, Ex. PW1/1 He deposed that he is one ofthe registered partners of the plaintiff-firm and his name appeared in Ex. PW/1 as one of the partner and he signed and verified the plaint. Hefurther deposed that plaintiff-firm was constituted in 1951 and registered on31. 5. 1951. It was reconstituted in 1970 and again in 1975 and finally in 1978because of retirement of some of its partners. Firm remained owner of theproperty belonging to the firm as originally and subsequently constituted. Property in dispute also belongs to the plaintiff-firm. In cross-examinationhe stated that land underneath the property in suit was taken on lease injune, 1973 by the plaintiff-firm from DDA. He proved copy of the leasedeed Ex. DW1/ua. The firm was reconstituted with effect from 1975 afterexecuting deed of dissolution and by writing a fresh deed of partnership dueto retirement ofmembers of the family. He proved photo copy of the deedof dissolution dated 10/09/1975 and the deed of partnership dated 8/10/1975 of reconstituted firm. He also proved a deed of dissolution of the firm dated 6. 11. 1978 and also deed of partnership dated6. 11. 1978. No evidence has been led on behalf of the defendant so far asthis aspect of the matter was concerned. Ex. PW1/da is copy of the perpetual lease dated 18. 6. 1973 executed on behalf of the President of India infavour of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. This perpetual leasedeed is signed by Sh/shri Pawan Kumar Jain, N. C. Jain. N. K. Jain, A. K. Jain, R. K. Jain and Mrs. Sudha Jain, all partners of M/s. Hind Trading andmanufacturing Co. Firm of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. wasdissolved on 10/09/1975. S/shri Pawan Kumar Jain, Nem Chandjain, and Smt. Sudha Jain retired from the pertnership whereas S/shrimahender Kumar Jain, Abhay Kumar Jain, Rajnish Kumar Jain were thecontinuing partners. It was provided in the deed that the retiring partners,namely, Nem Chand Jain, Pawan Kumar Jain and Mrs. Sudba Jain wouldbe paid their credit balance in the books as on 30. 6. 1975 in full and finalsettlement of the account and all the assets and liabilities were taken over bythe continuing partners. On 8/10/1975. a fresh partnership deed,ex. It was provided in the deed that the retiring partners,namely, Nem Chand Jain, Pawan Kumar Jain and Mrs. Sudba Jain wouldbe paid their credit balance in the books as on 30. 6. 1975 in full and finalsettlement of the account and all the assets and liabilities were taken over bythe continuing partners. On 8/10/1975. a fresh partnership deed,ex. PW1/dc was executed between Mahender Kumar Jain. Abhay Kumarjain, Rajnish Kumar Jain, Lov Kumar Jain. Kush Kumar Jain and Nalinkumar Jain. It was provided in this deed that the partnership businesswould continue to be carried on, in the name and style of M/s. Hind Tradingand Manufacturing Co. and the other terms and conditions of the partnership would remain unchanged and would be the same as are contained in thedeed of partnership executed on 10. 9. 1975. Plaintiff-firm was again dissolved by deed of dissolution dated 6. 11. 1978, Ex. PW1/dd by which certainpartners retired. It was provided in this deed that the entire assets andliabilities of the business on the date of the dissolution had been taken overby continuing partners and were held entitled to deal with the same in theway they deem fit. It was further provided that the continuing partners i. e. S/shri Mahender Kumar Jain. Rajnish Kumar Jain, Lov Kumar Jain, Kushkumar Jain, and Nalin Kumar Jain would be exclusively owner of the plotno. B-243, Phase I, New Okhla Industrial Complex, New Delhi and superstructure constructed thereon and the retiring partners would have absolutelyno concern or right with the same. Then another partnership was executedon 6. 11. 1978 i. e. Ex. PW1/de between S/sh. Mahender Kumar Jain, Rajnishkumar Jain, Lov Kumar Jain, Kush Kumar Jain, and Nalin Kumar. It wasprovided that the parties shall run the business under the name and style ofm/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. which dissolved with effect from30. 6. 1978 and now the present partners would carry on the business in partnership under the name and style of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturingco. It was further provided that partnership constituted by means of thedeed would be succeeding to the business of the said previous partnership assole successor. Ex. PW1/1 is the certified copy of Form-A from the Registrarof firms showing the registration of the firm M/s. New Hind Trading andmanufacturing Company. Shri V. P. Singh appearing for the plaintiff statedthat M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. Ex. PW1/1 is the certified copy of Form-A from the Registrarof firms showing the registration of the firm M/s. New Hind Trading andmanufacturing Company. Shri V. P. Singh appearing for the plaintiff statedthat M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. is the registered firm dulyregistered with the Registrar of firms on 31. 5. 1951 and thereafter there hadbeen certain changes in the Constitution of the firm which was duly incorporated by the Registrar of firms and the firm stands registered with theregistrar of firms. He further stated that the firm has been carrying on thebusiness since 1951. Certain partners retired and thereafter new partnerswere taken and some of the partners which were there in 1975 when the premises in dispute was given on license are still there. It was submitted thatmahender Kumar Jain who was one of the partners on 6. 6. 1975 when thedeed of license was executed in favour of defendadt No. 2, was still a partnerin the firm. It was further argued that plaintiff-firm is the owner of theproperty in dispute by virtue of various partnership deeds and the retiringpartners were given their share and they had released their interest in favourof the continuing partner and the continuing partner became the owner ofthe property. On the other hand Mr. Shashi Vansh Bahadur contended thatthe plaintiff-firm had executed a deed in 1970 which was subsequently dissolved and new partnership was created and the new partners are not owner ofthe property in dispute. Perpetual lease deed was executed in the name ofsix partners who were partners of M/s. Hind Trading and Manufacturing Co. at the relevant time and they are the owners of the property. I have considered the relevant contentions of the parties. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. V. P. Singh should prevail. No doubt the firm was dissolved in197 5 and 1978 and certain partners retired, but a new firm was constitutedwhich took over all the assets and liabilities and business of the previous firm and they are continuing the business under the same name andstyle. Even otherwise there are certain persons who were originally partnersin 1975 and are still continuing to be partners with the plaintiff firm. Allthe assets and liabilities of the previous firm were taken over by the subsequent partners. The property in question is now owned by the newly constituted plaintiff-firm. The newly constituted firm can file this suit. Even otherwise there are certain persons who were originally partnersin 1975 and are still continuing to be partners with the plaintiff firm. Allthe assets and liabilities of the previous firm were taken over by the subsequent partners. The property in question is now owned by the newly constituted plaintiff-firm. The newly constituted firm can file this suit. Evenotherwise Mahender Kumar Jam is one of the partners who was there in theyear 1975 and he also signed the lease deed as one of the partners, still continues to be a partner of the plaintiff-firm. He has signed and verified theplaint. These issues are decided accordingly. ( 6 ) ISSUES Nos. 2 and 3 : Contention of the plaintiffs is that they gave the house on licensebasis by virtue of deed of licence dated 25. 6. 1975, Mark A. The relevantterms of the agreement are reproduced below for the sake of convenience : (1) "that the Licensor is owner in possession of the entire buildingconstructed on the plot measuring about 2520. 8 sq. yds. bearingplot No. B-243, situated at Okhla Industrial Area, Phase I,new Delhi-44. The Licensor had obtained the perpetual leaseof the said plot from the President of India as per deed dated 18/06/1973. The Licensee hereby agrees not to violateany of the terms of the said perpetual lease dated 18/06/1973. (2) That the said Licensee shall be entitled to use the electricityconnections i. e. light and power connections fitted in the saidbuilding owned by the Licensor. (3) That the Licensee shall be entitled only to use the entire basement, the entire Mazzanine floor, and a portion on groundfloor i. e. one hall measuring 42 x 29 and one room measuring13 x8 of their said building. (4) That the Licensee shall pay in advance to the Licensor a dailylicense fee at Rs. 500. 00 (Rupees five hundred only) per daywhich includes electricity charges for one day subject to aminimum of Rs. 3,500. 00 (Rupees three thousand and fivehundred only) per week commencing from Wednesday the 25thday of June, 1975. . The Licensee fee shall be payable inadvance every day. 500. 00 (Rupees five hundred only) per daywhich includes electricity charges for one day subject to aminimum of Rs. 3,500. 00 (Rupees three thousand and fivehundred only) per week commencing from Wednesday the 25thday of June, 1975. . The Licensee fee shall be payable inadvance every day. In case the Licensee fails to pay in advancethe Licensee fee for any day the Licensor shall be entitled toterminate the license without any further notice and thelicensee shall then remove his goods machinery and otherarticles then lying in the said basement, mazzanine floor and theportion of ground floor of the said building. (5) That in the event of any portion of the building belonging tothe Licensor being damaged on account of and act of default,negligence or omission on the part of the Licensee he shallforthwith execute all the necessary repairs thereto or in thealternative pay adequate compensation to the Licensor , on thataccount besides the License fee agreed as above. (6) That the Licensee shall have no right, title or interest to possessthe said basement, mazzanine floor and portion of ground floorof the said building except to use the same as a licensee for theaforesaid purposes on the condition of his paying the agreeddaily license fee. (7) That the Licensor shall be entitled to terminate the licensehereby granted to the Licensee if and when any objection israised by the President of India or any other authority on hisbehalf to the said user by the Licensee. In the said event thelicensee agrees to remove his articles goods etc. that may belying in the said building at once and that the Licensee shall beliable to pay such amount which may be claimed by and on behalf of the President of India from the Licensor with respect tosaid building. (8) That the Licensee shall not store place or use the portion of thebuilding belonging to the said Licensor in any manner contraryto law or in a manner which has been or may be prohibitedunder any rules, regulations or statute applicable to the saidbuilding. (8) That the Licensee shall not store place or use the portion of thebuilding belonging to the said Licensor in any manner contraryto law or in a manner which has been or may be prohibitedunder any rules, regulations or statute applicable to the saidbuilding. ( 7 ) SHRI Mohinder Kumar Jain, one of the partners of the plaintiff-firmappeared in the witness box and deposed that Ramesh Chand Chopra, defendant No. 2 was inducted in the premises in dispute as a licensee under a deedof license dated 25/06/1975 executed by him on the one hand and hisbrother Pawan Kumar Jain on behalf of the plaintiff-firm on the other hand. The receipt for the license fee was also issued by the firm in favour of defendant No. 2 in his personal name. He identifies the signatures of his brotherpawan Kumar Jain on the license deed and also the signatures of defendantno. 2. He further deposed that by letter dated 25. 6. 1975 Ex. Public Witness 1/2. defendant No. 2 had forwarded to the plaintiff a pay order for Rs. 45,000. 00as security to be refunded to him after termination of the license and he hadtaken the property on license basis from them. This letter indicated that thelicense deed was signed by defendant No. 2 firstly for defendant No. 1 as itsdirector but later on he had scored off the words "for Di Di Modes Pvt. Ltd. and director" and had signed this cutting and had also written his name. Heidentified the signature of defendant No. 2. According to the agreementarrived at between plaintiff and defendant No. 2, defendant No. 2 was to paythe plaintiff a sum of Rs. 500. 00 per day by way of license fee for use ofportion in question He further deposed that this amount had been paid tothem by way of license fee till 10/08/1980 by defendant No. 2. Heused to make payment by way of bank drafts. On 19/05/1978, defendantno. 2 got a separate connection from Delhi Electric Supply Undertakingwithout their consent or permission and thereafter he started deductingrs. 2500. 00 per month from the license fee being payable for the wholemonth at the rate of Rs. 500. 00 per day. He proved the copy of the accountmaintained by the plaintiff which is Ex. On 19/05/1978, defendantno. 2 got a separate connection from Delhi Electric Supply Undertakingwithout their consent or permission and thereafter he started deductingrs. 2500. 00 per month from the license fee being payable for the wholemonth at the rate of Rs. 500. 00 per day. He proved the copy of the accountmaintained by the plaintiff which is Ex. Public Witness I/j. He further deposed thatthe defendants have damaged the property by making holes in the RCCpillars of the basement and by making unauthorised construction of sheds etc. He further stated that they also damaged the staircase wall; since defendantno. 2 had to pay the amount of license fee in advance but had failed to paythe same as such plaintiff was entitled to charge interest at the rate of 18%till date of payment. The license of the defendant was terminated by servingnotice dated 30/06/1981 by which the defendant was asked to restore thepremises to the plaintiff. In cross-examination, he deposed that land underneath the property in question was taken on lease by the plaintiff from DDAvide lease deed, copy of which is Ex. P. W. 1/ua in June, 1973. He furtherdeposed that he was not present when the deed of license had been signed bydefendant No. 2 and by his brother. It is also in his statement that the licensemoney was paid to the plaintiff by defendant No. 2 at the rate of Rs. 500. 00per day for a period of 30 days or 60 days or even 90 days in advance. Thedrafts were initially sent under the letter head of defendant No. 2 but lateron he started sending the drafts under the letter head of defendant No. 1 butby specifically staling that it was a draft by him. He denied the suggestion thatelectricity in the premises had been disconnected by the plaintiff in the year1978. In fact, they had load capacity of 30 horse power and defendant No. 2had started using it to the extent of more than 100 horse power. He had installed load master to check the extra use of electricity by defendant No. 2 whereupon he started making grievance that they had dis-counected the electricity. He denied the suggestion that the plaintiff thereafter paid the amount at therate of Rs. 15,000. 00 per month irrespective of number of days in the month. He had installed load master to check the extra use of electricity by defendant No. 2 whereupon he started making grievance that they had dis-counected the electricity. He denied the suggestion that the plaintiff thereafter paid the amount at therate of Rs. 15,000. 00 per month irrespective of number of days in the month. He further deposed that his brother Pawan Kumar Jain in his capacity aspartner of the plaintiff firm negotiated with defendant No. 2 before the Deedof Licence was executed. He did not know what was understood betweendefendant No. 2 and the plaintiff through Pawan Kumar Jain in regard tothe source of the payment of the licence fee. He had been protesting todefendant No. 2 about using the premises for manufacture of garments. Themanufacture of garments was not permissible in accordance with the terms ofthe lease deed between the plaintiff and the DDA. Defendant No. 2 was allin all of the defendant No. 1. I he factory in the premises in dispute used towork between 8 a. m. to 5 p. m. The premises had been in possession ofdefendant No. 2. The defendants had employed a Chowkidar who used toguard. Defendant No. 2 and his employees used to lock it. The key was withhim. There are two entrance gates to the property in question. One is for theexclusive use of the defendants where they have their own security guard andone is for common by the plaintiff as well as by the defendants. Themezzinine floor was earlier not locked by the defendants as their chowkidarsused to be there but he also had a room and afterwards the defendants tookforcible possession and started locking that portion independently. He didnot take any action when forcible possession of the room was taken bydefendant No. 2. He denied the suggestion that licence deed was got signedfrom defendant No. 2 with the understanding that it was needed for incometax purposes and it did not incorporate the correct understanding arrived atbetween the plaintiff and defendant No. 2. He denied the suggestion that suitpremises were given on rent initially at a monthly rent of Rs. 15,000. 00 todefendant No. 1 right from beginning or that licence deed was the samedocument which was never acted upon. He denied the suggestion that nodamage has been caused to the property. He denied the suggestion that suitpremises were given on rent initially at a monthly rent of Rs. 15,000. 00 todefendant No. 1 right from beginning or that licence deed was the samedocument which was never acted upon. He denied the suggestion that nodamage has been caused to the property. P. W. 3, Rajinder Singh whoappeared as witness for the plaintiff deposed that he had been carrying onthe business of Estate Agents for the last 25-30 years in the Okhla Industrialarea. His business includes the making of parties together who wants to haveagency agreement, lease agreements and licence agreements in respect ofvarious immovable properties. He identified his signatures on the license deed. He deposed that document was signed by Pawan Kumar Jain of the plaintiff-firm and defendant No. 2 in his presence. It was attested by two of thewitnesses. The deal between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 had been struckthrough him and he had done the negotiations in the matter. The deal wasfor giving premises on license basis. As far as be remembered, it was decidedthat defendant would pay to the plaintiff Rs. 500. 00 per day. In cross-examination he deposed that he did not know what was the difference between leaseand license. The document was executed at the advice of an Advocate whohad told the plaintiff that the property in dispute had been built on lease holdland of the DDA and it could not be let out on rent. He did not know ifaccording to the agreement of lease between DDA and owner, the ownercould part with possession thereof in favour of any person. Some meetingswere held in his office and n the office of the plaintiff in regard to theexecution of the license deed. He admitted that when he got the deal struckbetween a tenant and a landlord, he also got 15 days rent from the landlordand 15 days rent from the tenant. He could not say whether the premiseswere taken by defendant No. 1 or defendant No. 2 in his personal capacity. Plaintiff has also proved documentary evidence in support of his contention. Ex. P-l is copy of the receipt dated 8. 1. 1976 which shows that amount ofrs. 15,000. 00 was received by Abhay Kumar Jain, partner of the plaintiff-firmon account of license fee from R. C. Chopra for 30 days as per deed of licenseexecuted on 25/06/1975. Plaintiff has also proved documentary evidence in support of his contention. Ex. P-l is copy of the receipt dated 8. 1. 1976 which shows that amount ofrs. 15,000. 00 was received by Abhay Kumar Jain, partner of the plaintiff-firmon account of license fee from R. C. Chopra for 30 days as per deed of licenseexecuted on 25/06/1975. This receipt is counter signed by R. C. Chopra. Similarly Ex. P-2 is receipt dated 15,1. 1976 fur the sumofrs. l5,000. 00. Ex. P-3 is also receipt dated 3/03/1976 for an amount of Rs. 15,000. 00. Ex. P-4 is also the copy of the receipt for an amount of Rs. 15,000. 00. Ex. P-5is copy of letter dated 14. 6. 1977 written by Administrative Officer of Di Dimodes Private Ltd. by which two demand drafts dated 10. 6. 77 and 13. 6. 77for Rs. 15,000. 00 each were sent to the plaintiff for license fee for two monthsi. e. May, 1977 and June, 1977. Ex. P-7 is the letter dated 9/06/1978 byr. C. Chopra, defendant No. 2 written to the plaintiff-firm. In this letter itwas stated that according to the terms of the license deed, payment ofrs. 15,000. 00 for 30 days in the beginning of every month was to be taken. The amount included electricity charges for 30 days. According to the understand ing with the plaintiff the amount of electricity charges was to be takenrs. 2500. 00 for 30 days and whenever the electricity charges fell short of thatamount, he used to refund to them the difference. The electricity consumptionfor 30 days covering the period 6. 5. 1978 to 5. 6. 1978 amounted to 3156 Units. The consumption charges work out to Rs. 1167. 70. As the amount fell shortof Rs. 2500. 00 plaintiffs were requested to refund to the defendant the difference of Rs. 1332. 30 (Rs. 2500. 00 minus 1167. 70) forthwith. It was furtherstated in this letter that supply of electricity had been cut off without anyvalid reason and plaintiffs have disentitled themselves to receive the amountat the contractual rate. It was further stated that if the supply of electricitywas not resumed immediately, their liabilites of monthly advance paymentwould be limited to Rs. 12,500. 00 only after deduction of Rs. 2500. 00 from thecontracted amount Ex. P-8 is letter by plaintiff. to defendant No. 2 by whichthe receipt of letter dated 23. 4. It was further stated that if the supply of electricitywas not resumed immediately, their liabilites of monthly advance paymentwould be limited to Rs. 12,500. 00 only after deduction of Rs. 2500. 00 from thecontracted amount Ex. P-8 is letter by plaintiff. to defendant No. 2 by whichthe receipt of letter dated 23. 4. 1979 was acknowledged and it was refutedthat there was no license agreement between the parties. The contention ofdefendant No. 2 that he was a tenant was also refuted. Ex. P-9 is the copy ofthe notice dated 30/06/1981 by which the license of the defendant wasterminated and the amount at the rate of Rs. 500. 00 per day was demanded. Defendant was required to deliver the possession on or before 9. 6. 1981. Ex. P-6 is the letter by R. C. Chopra, defendant No. 2 dated 14. 10. 1977acknowledging the receipt of draft of Rs 45. 000. 00on account of license fee. Ex. P-8 is also letter dated 18. 11. 1977 by R. C. Chopra to the plaintiff-firmthat the draft sent by him were on account of amount of 30 days for thebuilding in their occupation. Ex. P-1 I is another letter by R. C. Chopra tothe plaintiff dated 9. 6. 1978 wherein it was stated that according to the termsof the deed of licence, they were making to the plaintiff advance payment ofrs. 15,000. 00for 30 days in the beginning of every month. Ex. P-12 is thecopy of the letter written on behalf of the plaintiff to R. C. Chopra acknowledging that letter dated 23. 4. 1979 written by R. C. Chopra to the plaintiff. In this letter the contention of R. C. Chopra was refuted that there was nolicense deed/agreement between the parties. Ex. P-l 3 and P-14 are the copiesof notice dated 30,6. 1981 by which the license of the defendants was terminated w. e. f. 16. 8. 1977. The defendant was called upon to deliver the possession and pay all the arrears on or before 9. 7. 1981. ( 8 ) ON behalf of the defendants, defendant No. 2 stepped into thewitness box and deposed that he was the Managing Director of defendantno. 1. They needed certain accommodation and contacted Rajinder Singhbedi, Estate Agent for this purpose. Rajinder Singh told him to meet thelandlord and discuss the terms including the rent to be paid by the company. 1981. ( 8 ) ON behalf of the defendants, defendant No. 2 stepped into thewitness box and deposed that he was the Managing Director of defendantno. 1. They needed certain accommodation and contacted Rajinder Singhbedi, Estate Agent for this purpose. Rajinder Singh told him to meet thelandlord and discuss the terms including the rent to be paid by the company. His meeting took place with Nem Chand Jain and his son Pawan Kumar Jainat the residence of Jain somewhere in June 1972. After the negotiations itwas agreed between the parties that the premises would be let to the companyat a monthly rent of Rs. 12. 500. 00 and Rs. 2. 500. 00 as monthly electricitycharges. It was agreed that they could use as much electricity as was needed. Jain explained to, him that on account of some instruction of DDA, it was notpossible to execute the Lease Deed but some other document would beexecuted. Mr. Jain assured him that the relationship between the partieswould be that of a landlord and tenant. An agreement thereafter wasexecuted. After the execution of the agreement, he had been paying rent tothe landlord by means of draft which was debited to the account of defendantno. 1. Every month same smount was being paid. The tenancy of thepremises in dispute was taken by the company and not by him. He had signedthe document marked a for and on behalf of the company. At that time,he had not objected to signing of the document because he was told bymr. Jain and Mr. Bedi that because of restriction of the DDA that was theonly manner in which he could take the premises on rent. Some time in theyear 1977 the landlord stopped the electricity, with the result that the company started paying rent of Rs. 12,500. 00 and stopped making payment of theelectricity charges. When the electricity was stopped, he had filed a suitagainst the landlord for restoration of electricity. In the meantime the company made an application to DESU for obtaining direct connection which wasgranted. After he got the direct connection from the DESU he did not pursuethe proceedings for restoration of the electricity. It was agreed that thecompany would be entitled to deduct one months rent in a year for maintenance purposes. However, the deduction was not made. In the meantime the company made an application to DESU for obtaining direct connection which wasgranted. After he got the direct connection from the DESU he did not pursuethe proceedings for restoration of the electricity. It was agreed that thecompany would be entitled to deduct one months rent in a year for maintenance purposes. However, the deduction was not made. The company was inexclusive possession of the premises in dispute and there was no restriction inentry and exit of the staff of the company. The company had its own lockand key. ( 9 ) IN crors-examination he deposed that he was not in possession ofthe premises in suit. The possession was with defendant No. 1. He denied thesuggestion that the main entry was locked by the plaintiff. He also deniedthe suggestion that the license fee of the premises in the market was Rs. 500. 00per day. He did not remember whether upto October 78 electricity wassupplied by the plaintiff or not. He also denied the suggestion that there wasno agreement that the defendant No. 1 would maintain the premises. Certaindocuments were also proved on the record on behalf of the defendant. ( 10 ) EX. D-1 is the letter dated 17-8-1981 by defendant No. 1company to the plaintiff demanding the receipts of the rent paid by it. Ex. D-2 is also the letter dated 8-5-1981 to the plaintiff asking for white washingthe entire building. Ex. D-3 is another letter dated 8-5-1981 by defendantno. 1 to the plaintiff demanding the receipts for the rent paid. Ex. D-4 isthe letter dated 25-4-1981 by defendant No. 2 to the plaintiff informing theplaintiff that he was not a licensee under the plaintiff and there was noquestion of terminating the alleged license. In this letter he denied hisliability to pay the damages as claimed by the plaintiff. Ex. D-5 is the letterby defendant No. 1 asking for the receipt of the rent paid. Ex. D-7is aletter dated 18-3-1981 by defendant No. 1 informing the plaintiff that theelectricity connection remained disconnected since 19-5-1978 and thereforethe plaintiff was not entitled to payment of Rs. 2. 500. 00 towards the electricitycharges. The. defendants are liable to nay a sum of Rs. 12,500. 00 towards therent. Ex. D-8 is also a letter dated 7-1-1981 written on behalf of the defendant addressed to the plaintiff forwarding pay order for Rs. 25. 000. 2. 500. 00 towards the electricitycharges. The. defendants are liable to nay a sum of Rs. 12,500. 00 towards therent. Ex. D-8 is also a letter dated 7-1-1981 written on behalf of the defendant addressed to the plaintiff forwarding pay order for Rs. 25. 000. 00 towardsthe rent for October and November 1981, Ex. D-11. is the letter written bythe defendant to the plaintiff sending an amount of Rs. 12. 500. 00 towards therent for the month of August, 1990. Ex. D-10 is the letter by the defendantto the plaintiff by which the plaintiff was informed that defendant No. 1 wasthe tenant and defendant No. 2 was not a licensee and defendant No. 2 wasnot liable to pay the amount. Ex. D-1 I is a letter dated 14-8-1980 to thesame effect as is Ex. D-10. Ex. D-12 is another letter by defendant No. 1 tothe plaintiff informing the plaintiff that they were not entitled to receive thesum of Rs. 2. 500. 00 on account of electricity charges as the electricity wasdisconnected. Ex. D-13 is a letter dated 28-4-1980 written by defendant No. 1 informing the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 is a tenant and defendant No. 2 is not a licensee at all and is not liable to pay any amount towards tenancy. Exs. D-15. D-18, D-19, D-20, D-22. D-23. D-24, D-26, D-27, D-28, D-30,d-31, D-32. D-33. D-34, D-35, D-37 and D-38 are the letters written by thedefendants on the same lines. ( 11 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. On behalf ofthe plaintiff it was urged that the relationship between the parties was that ofa licensor and a licensee which is evident from the deed dated 25-6-1975. The intention of the parties wasto create a license and not a lease. Theland underneath the building is on lease with the plaintiff and it was a specificcondition of the lease that the plaintiff could not sub-let or part with possession of any of the building constructed on the land. On the other hand, thecontention of Mr. Shash Vansh Bahadur is that the relationship between theplaintiff and the defendant was that of a landlord and the tenant. Exclusivepossession of the property was given to the defendant and the parties in factintended to create a relationship of landlord and tenant. On the other hand, thecontention of Mr. Shash Vansh Bahadur is that the relationship between theplaintiff and the defendant was that of a landlord and the tenant. Exclusivepossession of the property was given to the defendant and the parties in factintended to create a relationship of landlord and tenant. In support of hiscontention he relied upon the following judgments : AIR 1965 SC 610 , AIR1988 SC 184, AIR 1974 SC 396 , AID 1959 SC 1262; 1965 Bombay Lawreports 462, and 1966 Bombay Law Reports 400. ( 12 ) IN a recent case of Khalll Ahmed v. Tuffail Hussein Samasbhai: air 1988 SC 184 , a similar question arose whether the agreement in questionwas a Lease or a License. In support of their respective contentions theparties cited a number of judgments in Khalid Ahmed s case (supra), and Ifind that the judgments cited before me by the Counsel for the parties werethe same as were cited before the Supreme Court in that case. The judgments were discussed by the Supreme Court in paras 9 and 10 which parasare reproduced below :- "in support of this appeal Mr. R. F. Nariman very laboriously took us through the documents. He submitted that thedocument in question in the instant case read as a whole was leaseand not a licence. He referred us to the decision of this Court inthe case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R. N. Kapoor, (1960) I SCR 368; (AIR 1959 SC 1626) where at page 383 thiscourt noted that there was a marked distinction between a leaseand a license. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882defined a lease of immovable property as a transfer of a right toenjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration of aprice paid or promised. Under Section 108 of the said Act, thelessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A leaseinvolves a transfer of an interest in land, Subba Rao, J. as thelearned Chief Justice then was, observed in that case. Under Section 108 of the said Act, thelessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A leaseinvolves a transfer of an interest in land, Subba Rao, J. as thelearned Chief Justice then was, observed in that case. This Courtreferred to the Well known decision in the case of Errington v. Errington, (1952) I All ER 149, where Lord Denning reviewing thecase law on the subject summarised the position as follows :"the result of all these cases is that, although a person whois let into exclusive possession is, prima facie, to be considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to beso if the circumstances negative any intention to create atenancy. "the Court of Appeal in England again in Cobb v. Lane, (1952) All LR 1199 considered the legal position and laid downthat the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining thecharacter of a document. Somervell, L. J. had observed : "the solution that would seem to have been found is, asone would expect, that it must depend on the intention of theparties. " Denning L. J. also reiterated the same decision. Reviewing these at page 384 of the report (1) that to ascertain whether adocument created a license or lease, the substance of the documentmust be preferred to the form; (2) the real test was the intention ofthe parties whether they intended to create a lease or a license; (3) if the document created an interest in the property, it is a lease,but if it only permitted another to make use of the property, ofwhich the legal possession continued with the owner, it was alicence; and (4) if under the document a party got exclusive possession of the property, prima fade, he was considered to be a tenant:but circumstances might be established which negative the intentionto create a lease. Mr. R. F. Nariman very strenuously relied on the decision ofthis Court in Mrs. M. N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb (1964)6 SCR 642 at page 653 : ( AIR 1965 SC 610 at 614 ). This Courtemphasised that if the exclusive possession to which a person wasentitled under an agreement with a landlord was coupled with aninterest in the property, the agreement would be construed not as amere license but as a lease. Mr. Nariman s point was that thefacts of the case were identical to the facts of the present case. This Courtemphasised that if the exclusive possession to which a person wasentitled under an agreement with a landlord was coupled with aninterest in the property, the agreement would be construed not as amere license but as a lease. Mr. Nariman s point was that thefacts of the case were identical to the facts of the present case. Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Bombay High Courtin the case of Sohan Lal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit, (1966) 68 Born. LR 400 where Tarkunde, J. observed that theintention of the parties and exclusive possession were important. elements. This decision was approved in appeal by this Court insohanlal Naraindas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit, (1971) 3 SCR319 were this Court reiterated that the test of exclusive possessionwas important point. He drew our attention to the observations ofshah, CJ. at page 321 of the report. Reliance was also placed onthe observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in the decision of Qudrat Ullah v. Muunicipal Board, Bareilly-, (1974) 2 SCR 530 where at page 533; ( AIR 1974 SC 396 at page 397) of the report Krishna lyer, J. observed that there is no simple litmus test to distinguish a lease asdefined in Section 155, Transfer of Property Act from license asdefined in Section 52 of the Easement Act. but the character of thetransaction turns on the operative intent of the parties. To putpreecisely if an interest in immovable property entitling the transfereeto enjoyment was created, it was a lease; if permission to use landwithout exclusive possession was alone granted, a licence was thelegal result. After discussing the case law on the subject the Court held as under :- "we are of the opinion that this was a license and not alease as we discover the intent. For this purpose reference may bemade to the language used and the restrictions put upon the use ofthe premises in question by the appellant, in the document in question the expression license was introduced and Clause (2) said thatit was only for the business purposes. The license fee was fixed. It permitted user only for 20 hours. Restriction in the hours ofwork negates the case for a lease. Clause (12) Js significant whichgave to the licensor the right to enter upon the premises and inspectthe same at any time. The license fee was fixed. It permitted user only for 20 hours. Restriction in the hours ofwork negates the case for a lease. Clause (12) Js significant whichgave to the licensor the right to enter upon the premises and inspectthe same at any time. In our opinion the background of the factsof this case and the background of the entire document negate thecontention of the appellant that it was a lease and not a license. " ( 13 ) APPLYING the principles laid down by the Supreme Court inkhalid Ahmed s case (supra) I am of the opinion that the document is alicense and not a lease. The intention of the parties was to create a licenseand not a lease. ( 14 ) CLAUSE 3 of the agreement provides that the licensor shall beentitled only to use the premises. Clause 4 of the License Deed providesthat the licensee shall pay in advance to the licensor a daily license fee atrs. 500. 00 per day which includes electricity charges for one day subject to aminimum of Rs. 3,500. 00 per week. Clause 6 of the License Deed providesthat the licensee shall have no right, title or interest to possess the premises. ( 15 ) THE surrounding circumstances of the case and the backgroundof the facts negates the contention of the defendants that it was a lease andnot a license. Mahender Kumar Jain stated that the defendant No. 2 wasinducted in the premises as a licensee under the Deed of License dated25-6-1975. The amount was fixed at Rs. 500. 00 per day. The licensee wasrequired to pay in advance to the licensor a daily amount of Rs. 500. 00 perday with electricity subject to a minimum of Rs. 3,500. 00 per week. It wasprovided in the deed that the licensee would have no right title or interest topossess the premises except to use the same as a licensee on the condition ofhis paying the agreed daily licensee fee. The Licensor was entitled toterminate the license granted to the licensee. It was deposed by Mahenderkumar that the land underneath the building was taken from DDA bymeans of a Perpetual Lease Deed. It was a condition stipulated by thedda that the lessee i. e. the plaintiff would notsell, transfer or otherwisepart with possession of any part of the industrial plot except with theprevious consent in writing of the lessor. It was deposed by Mahenderkumar that the land underneath the building was taken from DDA bymeans of a Perpetual Lease Deed. It was a condition stipulated by thedda that the lessee i. e. the plaintiff would notsell, transfer or otherwisepart with possession of any part of the industrial plot except with theprevious consent in writing of the lessor. It was further provided that nosuch consent would be given for a period of 10 years from the commencement of the lease. The commencement of the lease was from 24-3-1973. Rajinder Singh, through whom the transaction was made also deposed thatthe document was executed at the advice of the Advocate, who had told thedefendant that the property was built on the lease hold land of the DDAand it could not be let out on rent. In all the correspondence exchangedbetween the parties prior to June 1978, when the dispute arose on account ofdisconnection of electricity, the defendants have been remitting the amountas a license fee calculated @ Rs. 500. 00 inclusive of electricity charges. Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra himself admitted in his statement that Mr. Jainexplained him that on account of some restrictions of the DDA, it was notpossible to execute the lease deed hut some other agreement would beexecuted. This shows that it was clear to the parties that the premises couldnot be given on rent, that is why a deed of license was executed between theparties. The statement of Mr. Chopra that Mr. Jain assured him that therelationship between the parties would be that of a landlord and tenantcannot be accepted. The documents coupled with the surrounding circumstances of the case clearly indicate that there was an intention to create alicense and not a lease. I hold that by virtue of document dated 25-6-1975,license was created and not the lease. ( 16 ) IT is a simple agreement and falls within Article 5 of the Stampact and is properly stamped. The license deed is exhibited as Ex. P-X. The license deed was signed by Ramesh Chander Chopra. No doubt in therecital it is stated as under : "this DEED OF LICENSE is made this 25th day of June, 1975,between M/s. HIND TRADING and MFO. CO. The license deed is exhibited as Ex. P-X. The license deed was signed by Ramesh Chander Chopra. No doubt in therecital it is stated as under : "this DEED OF LICENSE is made this 25th day of June, 1975,between M/s. HIND TRADING and MFO. CO. , B-243, Okhlaindustrial Area, Phase-1, New Delhi-44, a Partnership firm throughits partner Shri Pawan Kumar Jain son of Shri Nem Chand Jain,hereinafter called the LICENSOR of the one part; AND Rameshchander Chopra son of Shri Lal Badri Nath Chopra, resident ofp-76. NDSE Part II, New Delhi a Director of M/s. Dl Dl MODES (PVT.) LTD. New Delhi with its Regd. office situated at AB-8. Safdarjang Community Centre. New Delhi, hereinafter called thelicensee of the other part. " ( 17 ) EX. P-1. Ex. P-2, Ex. P-3 and Ex. P-4, are the receipts issued bythe plaintiff for the receipt of licensee fee from Mr. Ramesh Chanderchopra. These are counter signed by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra. Thereare letters which were written by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra in hisindividual capacity dealing with plaintiff as a licensee. Ex. P. W. 1/2 is aletter dated 25-6-1975 of the same date on which the Deed of License wasexecuted. It reads as under :- " 25/06/1975. M/s. Hind Trading and Mfg. Co. Galibarna,baratooti. Sadar Bazar,delhi-6. Dear Sir,we are thankful to you having granted to me the Licence to use aportion of your property situated at B/243, Okhia Industrial Area,phase I with effect from 25/06/1975. I hereby enclose Payorder No. 0833449 dated 25-6-75 on Bank of India, Connaughtcircus, New Delhi for Rs. 45. 000. 00 as security for due performanceof all the terms of the deed of Licence dated 25/06/1975 inyour favour. The said amount shall be repayable to me as soon asthe licence is terminated for any reason whatsoever. I shallremove all my articles goods and machinery that may be lying innyour premises on the termination of the Licence. Kindly acknowledge the receipt. Thanking you,sd/-Yours faithfullyfor Di Di Modes Private Limited,sd/- (R. C. Chopra)Director" ( 18 ) UNDER this letter it was written yours faithfully, for Di Dimodes Pvt. Ltd. and it was signed by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra,director. Thereafter the words di Di Modes Pvt. Ltd. , Director werescored off and the cutting was initialed by Mr. Chopra. Kindly acknowledge the receipt. Thanking you,sd/-Yours faithfullyfor Di Di Modes Private Limited,sd/- (R. C. Chopra)Director" ( 18 ) UNDER this letter it was written yours faithfully, for Di Dimodes Pvt. Ltd. and it was signed by Mr. Ramesh Chander Chopra,director. Thereafter the words di Di Modes Pvt. Ltd. , Director werescored off and the cutting was initialed by Mr. Chopra. Shri Mahenderkumar Jain deposed that the letter was signed by Ramesh Chander Choprafirstly for defendant No. 1 as its director but later on he had scored off thewords for Di Di Modes Pvt. Ltd. as Director and had also written hisname. This position was not refuted by Mr. Chopra when he stepped intothe witness box. It was urged on behalf of the defendant No. 2 that thecompany Di Di Modes Pvt. Ltd. had been the tenant and Mr. Chopra signedon behalf of the company. I do not agree with the contention raised onbehalf of the defendants. The license deed and the letter dated 25-6-1975would clearly show that they were signed by Mr. Ramesh Chander Choprain his individual capacity. No doubt after 1977 Ramesh Chander Choprabad been corresponding as Managing Director of the plaintiff company butthat will not change his status. He signed the license deed not on behalf ofthe company but in his individual capacity and also the letter dated25-6-1975. I am of the view that the license was granted in favour ofdefendant No. 2 personally and not in favour of defendant No. 1. In viewof my finding I hold that the defendant No. 2 was a licensee of the premises. ( 19 ) ISSUE No. 7the parties did not address arguments on this issue. So it isdecided in favour of the plaintiff. ( 20 ) ISSUE No. 8in view of my finding that there was relationship of licensor andlicensee between the parties, the suit is not barred by the provisions ofsection 50 of Delhi Rent Control Act. ( 21 ) ISSUE No. 9no material has been placed on the record to show that the suitis barred under the provisions of "order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civilprocedure. ( 22 ) ISSUE NO. 10this issue was not pressed,: ( 23 ) ISSUE Nos. 4, 5 and 12 and Additional Issue Framed on 11-9-1987all these issues are inter-connected and I would like to decidethese issues together. ( 22 ) ISSUE NO. 10this issue was not pressed,: ( 23 ) ISSUE Nos. 4, 5 and 12 and Additional Issue Framed on 11-9-1987all these issues are inter-connected and I would like to decidethese issues together. ( 24 ) THE plaintiff has alleged that the premises were given on alicense basis at a rate of Rs. 500. 00 per day whereas the contention of thedefendant is that it was given on rent @ Rs. 15,000. 00 per month. The plaintiffs have alleged in the plaint thatthe amount is due from 11-7-1980 @ Rs. 500. 00 per day. But this has been denied on behalf of the defendants. Thiscourt by order dated 17-5-1984 appointed a Receiver to protect the suitproperty and to collect a sum of Rs. 12,500. 00 per month and the arrears onthat basis from 1-3-1981 out of the profits received by the defendants fromtheir sales. This order was challenged by the defendants and a Divisionbench of this Court passed an order on 23-8-1984 by way of interim arrangement in the following terms :- "present : Mr. V. N. Kaura, Counsel for the appellant. Mr. L. R. Gupta, with Mr. Arun Kumar, Counsel forthe respondent/applicant. C. M. 3148184counsel for the parties agree that the following clarificationsof the order dated 23/07/1984 may be made in the mannerbelow:-1. That the appellant will deposit rupees one lac five thousand incourt on or before 17/11/1984. 2. That the appellants will deposit the amount of rupres twelvethousand five hundred every month as it falls due regularly infuture starting from the month of July, 1984. 3. That the appellants will be entitled to withhold rupees twelvethousand five hundred on account of one month every year forrepairs. 4. We make it clear that the respondent will be entitled to contestthe appellants alleged right to claim deduction of 9 monthsamount on account of repairs as well as the appellants allegedright to withhold one month s rent in future on account ofrepairs. 5. The defences raised by the appellants will be decided by thelearned Single Judge including the right of the respondent toclaim further relief. 6. That the question, which of the appellants is a tenant or alicensee, is left open and will be decided by the learned Singlejudge. 7. The respondent will be entitled to withdraw the amountdeposited under this arrangement. This arrangement is with-out prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in thesuit. 6. That the question, which of the appellants is a tenant or alicensee, is left open and will be decided by the learned Singlejudge. 7. The respondent will be entitled to withdraw the amountdeposited under this arrangement. This arrangement is with-out prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in thesuit. C. M. is disposed of. Sd/- Avadh Beharijudgesd/- G. C. Jainjudge. " ( 25 ) FROM the record it is not at all clear as to how much amount thedefendant has paid towards his liability. It has also come in the evidencethat by Deed of License dated 25-6-1975 it was agreed that the defendantswould pay @rs. 500. 00 per day inclusive of electricity charges. It has alsocome in evidence that the defendant got the electric connection in its ownname on 19-5-1978. Thereafter the defendants have been paying theamount @ Rs. 12,500. 00 per month to the defendant. According to thedefendants it was agreed that out of the total amount of Rs. 15,000. 00, Rs. 2,500. 00 would be paid towards electricity charges. There is no evidence tothis effect that the plaintiff had agreed that the amount of electricity chargeswould be Rs. 2,500. 00 per month. However, in view of the material placedon the record and the various orders passed by this Court, I hold that from19-5-1978 the defendant No. 2 is liable to pay the arrears @ Rs. 12,500. 00 permonth. Since it is not clear as to how much amount has been paid onbehalf of the defendants to the plaintiff, it is not possible to record anyfinding as to how much amount is due to the plaintiff. For this purpose Iappoint Mr. V. K. Seth, Advocate, 425, Lawyers Chambers, Delhi Highcourt, New Delhi, as a Local Commissioner to go into the accounts betweenthe parties right from the beginning i. e. 25-6-1975 till the possession isrecovered by the plaintiff. The amount would be calculated @ Rs. 15,000. 00per month from 29-6-1975 to 18-5-1978 and thereafter @ Rs. 12,500. 00 from19-5-1978 till the possession is delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff. The fee of the Local Commissioner is tentatively fixed at Rs. 5. 000. 00 to bepaid by the plaintiff initially. ( 26 ) THERE is another dispute whether the defendant is entitled todeduct any amount by way of maintenance and repairs of the premises. Inorder to keep the premises in good repairs, certain repairs are needed. The fee of the Local Commissioner is tentatively fixed at Rs. 5. 000. 00 to bepaid by the plaintiff initially. ( 26 ) THERE is another dispute whether the defendant is entitled todeduct any amount by way of maintenance and repairs of the premises. Inorder to keep the premises in good repairs, certain repairs are needed. Evenunder the Rent Control Act a tenant is entitled to allowance of one monthsrent in a year for effecting the repairs. In my opinion the licensee should alsobe entitled to such allowance. So I hold that the defendant No. 2 would beentitled to deduct the amount calculated at one months license fee in a yearprovided it is shown that the defendant No. 2 actually carried the repairsand spent the amount. The defendant No. 2 will have to furnish the proofof the amount so spent and thereafter he would be entitled to deduct theamount not exceeding one months license fee in a year. The Localcommissioner will also go into this aspect as to how much amount thedefendant No. 2 is entitled to on account of this deduction. ( 27 ) ISSUE No. IIIn my opinion no case is made out for award of interest sodecide this issue against the plaintiff. ( 28 ) IN view of my findings that the defendant No. 2 was a licenseeand the license was revoked, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree forpossession. Accordingly, I pass a decree for recovery of possession inrespect of the premises in dispute in favour of the plaintiff and against thedefendants. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I think the justicewill be well met if the parties are left to bear their own costs. List this suitfor further directions on 30-4-1993 to await the report of the Localcommissioner.