Aiysumma v. Mariyamma — 1993 DIGILAW 125 (KER)

Judgment :- The plaintiff who was successful in the trial court and who lost in appeal is the appellant. The suit was one for a permanent injunction restraining the two defendants-respondents from entering into she plaint schedule property, from dismantling and removing the fence and edus on all the sides and from doing anything which will change the character and lie of the property and from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same by the plaintiff. The properly concerned is 1.83 acres of land in Sy.No.1117/13 A and 17 cents in Sy.No.1117/138 of Thrikkakara North Village. It is styled as Kollatnparambu Purayidom, on the south-west and north of which are properties belonging to the defendants. 2. According to the allegations in the plaint, this property which formed part of a larger extent of 3.58 acres known as Kollamparambu Purayidom belonged to one Pakkayi who had two sons Pareed and Bava. There was a partition of Pakkayi's properties by Ext. A1 dated 7-12-1072 ME namely the plaint schedule property allotted to Parccd and southern portion which had an actual extent of 1.73 acres allotted to Bava. At that time the property had not been surveyed. Subsequently the survey operations were conducted in the years 1082-1084 ME when the property was included in Sy.No.1117 and the plaint schedule property of two acres was surveyed in Nos. 1117/ 13A and 13B with the extents mentioned earlier. After Parced's death his heirs divided the properties among themselves by the deed of partition Ext. A2 dated 10-8-1108. The plaint schedule property was allotted to Ahammad, one of the children of Pareed under this partition. Subsequent to the survey patta for the entire extent of 3.58 acres was issued in the name of Parecd's brother Bava, which was incorrect. Ext. A2 therefore mentioned that the allottee Ahammad may take the steps necessary in law to have the said palta set aside and to have the patta issued in his name. Ahammed subsequently;] assigned his rights over the plaint schedule property obtained under Ext. A2 to the, plaintiff's father Avukkar by the deed of sale Ext. A3 dated 29-1-1109 ME. The plaintiff is the only child of Avukkar and is in possession of the property since his death, for over 20 years prior to the date of suit. She is residing in the property. A2 to the, plaintiff's father Avukkar by the deed of sale Ext. A3 dated 29-1-1109 ME. The plaintiff is the only child of Avukkar and is in possession of the property since his death, for over 20 years prior to the date of suit. She is residing in the property. There are fences on all the four sides and the plaintiff is raising seasonal cultivation. The property, according to the plaintiff, have well defined boundaries and edus on all sides. 3. The defendants husband and wife, purchased the adjacent properties as also the portion of the Kollamparambu Purayidom on the southern side allotted to Bava under the deed of partition of 1072. Bava's rights had actually been transferred to one Kosakkavicettil people who assigned it to one Yusuff Sail by Ext. A7 dated 31-12-1104 ME. The defendants purchased the rights under Ext. A7 and the other adjacent properties which Yusuff Sait had obtained under the documents Exts. A5, A6 and A8 from Yusuff's son Ismail Sait by the document Ext. A4 dated 25-8-1960. Defendants are in possession of the adjacent property allotted to Bava as also the southern properties which had a very large extent of about 16.44 acres. 4. While matters stood thus rumours were afloat of proposal for acquisition of the plaint schedule property and others for purposes of the Greater Cochin Development Authority (GCD a), which according to the plaintiff led the defendants to make it appear as if they were in possession of the plaint schedule property as well. A petition was filed by the second defendant the husband on behalf of the first defendant wife before the Sub Inspector of Police alleging that tile plaintiff and her people had un authorisedly reduced the plaint schedule property to their possession and put up a fence on 23-11-1980. The first defendant filed another petition M.P.No. I of 1981 before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Fort Cochin for action against the plaintiff and others for interfering with their alleged possession, of the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff apprehended that the defendants will make unlawful attempts to trespass into her property and accordingly filed a suit on 13-4-1981 for the reliefs mentioned earlier. 5. The defendants denied the title as well as the possession of the plaintiff. They stated that they had purchased this property as well as the adjacent property from Ismail Sail in whose name the patta stood. 5. The defendants denied the title as well as the possession of the plaintiff. They stated that they had purchased this property as well as the adjacent property from Ismail Sail in whose name the patta stood. Thus they obtained 3.44.500 acres of land which according to them, stood allotted to Bava under the deed of partition Ext. A", of which 3.27.500 acres was in Sy.No.1117/13A and 17 cents in Sy.No. 1 117/13B. The defendants would contend that as per the revenue settlement effected after the deed of partition, patta was issued to Bava for the entirety of the property. He was in possession. His title and possession stood transferred to Yusuff Sait, and subsequently from his son Ismail Sail to the defendants. The plaintiff had therefore no title or possession over the plain t schedule property which along with others was in the possession of the defendants and had been dealt with by them accordingly. 6. The defendants also stated that they had moved the Sub Inspector of Police, Kalamassery as well as the Revenue Divisional Officer regarding the trespass and removal of fence indulged in by the plaintiff on 23-11-1980 consequential which a. conference was held and the Revenue Divisional Officer directed the plaintif to remove- the fence put up by her which the plaintiff undertook to do. But instead of removing the fence, the plaintiff filed the suit for injunction. The suit has therefore to be dismissed. 7. The evidence on the side of the plaintiff consisted of her documents of title Exts. A1 to A3 as also the documents of title Exts. A5 to A8 of the defendants which she produced to prove that the defendants had no title or possession over the plaint schedule property. The defendants attempted to prove their possession by producing Ext. B5 series of lax receipts, Ext. B4 series of thandapcr accounts, encumbrance cenificale Ext. B3, the order under S.145 Cr.P.C. passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer at Fort Cochin as also the notice received by the first defendant under S.3 of the Land Acquisition Act. There was also oral evidence tendered on either side of which P.W.1 was the plaintiff and D.W.1 was the second defendant. 8. A Commission had been issued to inspect the properties and report and the Commissioner's report is Ext. Cl. The Commissioner was examined on the side of the plaintiff as P. W.4. 9. There was also oral evidence tendered on either side of which P.W.1 was the plaintiff and D.W.1 was the second defendant. 8. A Commission had been issued to inspect the properties and report and the Commissioner's report is Ext. Cl. The Commissioner was examined on the side of the plaintiff as P. W.4. 9. The trial court framed the issue whether the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and in that context went into the evidence in the case. He also framed an issue namely issue No. 3 whether the plaint schedule property had been included in the sale deed in favour of the first defendant and on that issue he found that the first defendant had not obtained title over the plaint schedule property under the sale deed Ext. A4 in her favour as her predecessor had not obtained title over the property under any document. Plaintiff's title to the property was held to be established. 10. On the issue regarding the plaintiff's possession, the trial court inter alia drew the presumption that possession follows title. The trial court also held that plaintiff had adduced evidence showing that she was in possession of the property though the tax due to the State was not being collected from her due to the mistake in the patta issued. He also noted the admission of the second defendant as DW1 that the plaintiff was in possession of the property even before the filing of the suit, though alleged by on trespass. On the basis of the evidence in the case the trial court held that the plaintiff was in exclusive possession and therefore was entitled to the injunction prayed for. The suit was accordingly decreed restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff by force from the plaint schedule property without recourse to appropriate proceedings according to law. 11.. In the defendants' appeal the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the decree of, the trial court and dismissed the suit. According to him, the non-production of Panchayat records, ration card and the voters' list as regards the plaintiff's residence in the plaint schedule property and a Commissioner's report about the absence of coconut trees, jack trees and arecanut trees in the plaint schedule property, went against the Plaintiff as regards the possession of the property. He also relied on the handaper records and Ext. He also relied on the handaper records and Ext. B5 scries of tax receipts to hold that the defendants were in possession. According to him there was no acceptable evidence on the side of the plaintiff to show that she was in possession of the plaint schedule property on the date of suit, while it was in evidence that the first defendant had title over the property and possession had to be presumed in her favour by virtue of tax. The suit was accordingly dismissed. 12. I must mention here itself that in finding against the plaintiff on the question of possession, the lower appellate court did not take note of the admission made by the second defendant as DW1 that the plaintiff was in possession from 23-11-1980 though as stated earlier, his case was that she had trespassed into the property. 13. The plaintiff challenges the decision, of the lower appellate court. She has filed an application in this court C.M.P.No. 5608 of 1987 seeking leave to amend the plaint by incorporating the relief for a declaration that she is the absolute owner in possession of the plaint schedule property on the strength of her title. The defendants-respondents are objecting to the amendment sought by the plaintiff. 14. The plaintiff contends that she has got title over two acres of plaint schedule property as per the documents Exts. A1 to A3. She also slates that she has been in possession of the property since the death of her father who was in possession before that under the assignment obtained by him from Ahammed. The title to the property which is traced to Ext. A1 and the allotment made thereunder cannot be disputed. The fact that patta was issued for the entire properly including the plaint schedule property in the name of Bava when the survey operations took place, does not confer any title or possession on Bava. It is pointed out that the defendants have not stated as to how or when Pareed or his successors were divested of their title or possession. The plaintiff says that the written statement is significantly silent on this aspect. The property is clearly demarcated and properly bounded and is in fact surrounded by the defendants' properties. Plaintiff also refers to the admission made by DW1 that after 23-11-1980 the plaintiff is in possession, though according to him it was on trespass. The plaintiff says that the written statement is significantly silent on this aspect. The property is clearly demarcated and properly bounded and is in fact surrounded by the defendants' properties. Plaintiff also refers to the admission made by DW1 that after 23-11-1980 the plaintiff is in possession, though according to him it was on trespass. This submission has not been taken note of by the lower appellate court. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to the decree of injunction. 15. Counsel for the respondents on the other hand, contends that the defendants are in possession of the property in evidence of which they have produced Exts. B4 and B5. The patta stood in the name of Bava. The title to the property therefore vests in Bava and his successors. Possession was also with them. Even assuming that the plaintiff was in possession, she was not entitled to a decree of injunction against the original title holder, a proposition in support of which the respondents rely on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. Alexander, AIR 196S SC 1165, M.K. Setiy v. M.V.L. Rao, AIR 1972 SC 2299 and of the Karnataka High Court in K.V. Narayan v. S. Sharana Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnt. 77. It is stated that the decision to the contrary of Khalid, J. of this court in KarthiyayaniAmma v. Govindan, AIR 1980 Ker. 224 is erroneous and requires reconsideration. I shall now consider the respective contentions. 16. The suit is essentially one for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession. Therefore, the primary-question which arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff was in possession of the plaint schedule property on the date of the suit. The property in question is having an extent of two acres of which 1.83 acres lies in Sy.No.1117/13A and 17 cents in Sy.No. 1117/J3B. This was allotted to Pareed under the deed of partition Ext. A1". It devolved on Pareed's heirs and under the partition between those heirs namely Ext. A2, it stood allotted to Ahammed who assigned it to the plaintiff's father Avukkar by Ext. A3 on 29-1-1109. The property devolved on the plaintiff as Avukkar's heirs on his death. There cannot be any doubt about the devolution of rights. A1". It devolved on Pareed's heirs and under the partition between those heirs namely Ext. A2, it stood allotted to Ahammed who assigned it to the plaintiff's father Avukkar by Ext. A3 on 29-1-1109. The property devolved on the plaintiff as Avukkar's heirs on his death. There cannot be any doubt about the devolution of rights. But then the patta for the entire 3.58 acres of Kollamparambu Purayidom stood issued in the name of Bava, the owner of the southern portion. This mistake was noted by the branch of Pareed as could be seen from the recitals made in Exts. A2 and A3 that the transferees thereunder may take legal proceedings to have the patta corrected. Patta by itself does not confer any title. It is only evidence of title. In the light of Exts. A1, A2 and A3, it cannot be doubled that the two acres of plaint schedule property stood allotted to Pareed and that it has devolved on the plaintiff in the manner stated i>y her. The title of the plaintiff to the plaint schedule property stands established by Exts. A1, A2 and A3. But then, the contention of the respondents is that the patta for the properties was issued in the name of Bava, and that this was done after due enquiries. The only ground on which the defendants claim title to the property is the issue of patia in the name of Bava and its having con tinned on that basis all along. This by itself is not sufficient to divest the plaintiff of her title to the property, if otherwise, it vests in her. There is absolutely no explanation in the written statement of the defendants or in their evidence, as to how the title to the property which was in Pareed, Ahammed, Avukkar and the plaintiff, stood transferred or vested in Bava or his successors in any manner known to law. There is no explanation whatsoever on this point, except that the patta was issued in the name of Bava. But patta as I mentioned earlier is not a document of title, but only an evidence of title. The properties stood allotted to Farced and he was put in possession under Ext. A1. There is no explanation whatsoever on this point, except that the patta was issued in the name of Bava. But patta as I mentioned earlier is not a document of title, but only an evidence of title. The properties stood allotted to Farced and he was put in possession under Ext. A1. It has not been disclosed as to how this possession of Farced or his successors was divested in any manner known to law; for that matter, there is no case for the defendants that the possession of Pareed or any of his successors was lost by trespass by Bava or any of his transferees/ successors. There is therefore nothing on record to indicate that Bava or those claiming under him came into possession of this property, or that they had derived title thereto in any manner. On the other hand, it is clear from the boundary descriptions inExts.A2 and A3 that the adjacent southern property, which had been allotted to Bava, had been transferred to Kosokkaveettil people. The boundary description in Ext. A7, the deed of purchase by Yusuff Sait of 16.44 acres is significant in this connection. In that the eastern boundary is shown as the property belonging to Pareed. The descriptions in Exts. A2, A3 and A7 were made at a time when there was no controversy regarding the title to the property or its possession. These as well as the recitals in Exts. A2 and A3 about the mistake in the patta issued to Bava after the survey are proof positive to show that the title to the property was in Pareed, and that he was also in possession. 17. The issue of the patta to Bava is not at all conclusive of the matter. Ext. B4 series namely the extracts from the Thandaper accounts are not sufficient in law to prove either the title or the possession of the defendants. Ext. B5 series of tax receipts are also inconclusive for the same reason inasmuch as the tax, which is a small amount, was collected from the- patta holder, namely Bava and his successors. No attempt has been made by any person to get the patta rectified, but that will not alter the title or possession from where they lay, or affect the rights of the real title holder or his possession. No attempt has been made by any person to get the patta rectified, but that will not alter the title or possession from where they lay, or affect the rights of the real title holder or his possession. The documents produced by the defendants are therefore inconclusive to prove that the defendants were in possession of the suit property, at any time. Regarding title, the defendant's documents of title, Ext. A4 onwards do not show that the property allotted to Pareed in Ext. Al was dealt with by those documents. 18. Though it is strictly unnecessary to deal with the question of title, in this suit, which is one for injunction mainly, I have to deal with the matter as both the lower courts had addressed themselves on the point. Besides, it was also argued before me, particularly by the respondents to contend that even if the plaintiff was found to be in possession on the date of suit a decree of injunction shall not be passed as the first defendant is the owner of the properly the question now is whether the plaintiff has established that she was in possession of the suit property on the dale of the suit. The report of the Commissioner Ext. Cl shows that the property had well defined boundaries namely fences and edus on all the four sides. The boundary demarcates and separates the property from the surrounding areas, which belong to the defendants on three sides, with a Panchayat road on the eastern side. The Commissioner has noted that the fences were old. He has also noted that there was no vegetation in the defendant's property; nor again in the plaint schedule property, but the plaint schedule property had been ploughed and kept ready for cultivation. If really the plaint schedule property belonged to, or was in possession of the defendants, there was no need for any boundary demarcating the plaint schedule property from the surrounding property of the defendants. If really the plaint schedule property belonged to, or was in possession of the defendants, there was no need for any boundary demarcating the plaint schedule property from the surrounding property of the defendants. The very existence of well defined boundaries and fences, the fences being old, despite the lapse of the long number of years of six decades and more during which the properties are alleged to have been dealt with together, and even 20 years after the purchase by the first defendant herself on 25-8-1960, established conclusively that the plaint schedule property was distinct and different from the surrounding property of the defendants and was being dealt with as such all along. This is a significant pointer to the fact that defendants were not in possession of the plaint schedule property; it probabilises the plaintiff's case that herself and her predecessors had been in possession of this property all along. There is no explanation worth the name for the existence of the boundaries and fences within defendants property. If it is accepted that the plaint schedule property belonged to them and was in their possession. 19. I can also draw the presumption that possession follows title. For the reasons staled already, I am of the opinion that the title to the plaint schedule property vests with the plaintiff, having regard to the devolution as per Exts. Al, A2 and A3, and the absence of any explanation on record for the defendants to show as to how the litle of Pareed and his successors was lost and the property went to Bava or his successors. 20. Apart from the above, the evidence in the case, particularly the admission of the second defendant as DW 1 is itself conclusive of the plaintiff's possession of the suit property. The plaintiff has spoken to her case when she was examined as P.W.1. She has examined two other witnesses P.Ws. 2 and 3 to corroborate her case. She has also not examined the Commissioner as P.W.4. But the decisions in the case need not be rested on the evidence of the plaintiff or her witnesses for the reason mat the 2nd defendant himself has when examined as DW1, admitted the plaintiff's possession of the property on the dale of the suit. She has also not examined the Commissioner as P.W.4. But the decisions in the case need not be rested on the evidence of the plaintiff or her witnesses for the reason mat the 2nd defendant himself has when examined as DW1, admitted the plaintiff's possession of the property on the dale of the suit. The second defendant started with his assertions that the defendants were in possession of the properly and that the Greater Cochin Development Authority had taken proceedings for acquisition of part of the properties in their possession. DW1 was cross examined at length on the side of the plaintiff in relation to the possession of the plaint schedule property. Then he admitted that the plaintiff was residing in the plaint schedule property There are two houses in the suit property, both of which were occupied. In the stress of further cross-examination, he eventually admitted that the plaintiff was in possession of the plaint schedule property since 23-11-1980. Of course he would say that she trespassed into the property on that day and constructed a fence and that thereafter nothing happened. He approached the Revenue Divisional Officer with a petition, in the objection to which the plaintiff contended that she had been in possession of the property. This admission of DW1 is clinching to establish plaintiff's possession of the suit property on the date of the suit, though allegedly on trespass. DW1 has not chosen to explain this admission of his in re-examination. The statement of DW1 that after the trespass and construction of fence on that day, nothing happened is quite evasive and does not establish that the plaintiff vacated the alleged trespass after that date. It has therefore to be held that the plaintiff has been in possession of the property in any event from 23-11-1980 and that her possession remained undisturbed on the dale of suit, though the defendants had taken proceedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer against the alleged trespass. 21. We arc concerned at this stage only with the possession as on the date of suit. Being a suit for injunction, the only question for consideration is one of possession. 21. We arc concerned at this stage only with the possession as on the date of suit. Being a suit for injunction, the only question for consideration is one of possession. If so, and if the plaintiff had possession on the date of the suit, whatever be the length of the possession, the defendants cannot take the law into their hands and attempt to dispossess the plaintiff forcibly without recourse to proceedings in the manner prescribed by law. The plaintiff's possession on the date of suit being established, she is entitled to a decree of injunction against any forcible dispossession from the property, without recourse to proceedings in the manner prescribed by law. 22. Counsel for the defendants maintain that if title to the property vested in them, the plaintiff, who according to him, is only a trespasser is not entitled to a decree of injunction for which he relies on the decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Karnataka High Court already mentioned. 23. This question does not really arise for consideration, as I have already held that the title to the property has vested in the plaintiff under Exts. Al, A2 and AM have also mentioned that I had necessarily to go into this question because of the contention raised by the respondents as mentioned above, that no decree of injunction could be passed in any event. I shall however deal with this question as well in deference to the argument addressed by counsel. 24. I n Narayanan v. Mathai, 1966 KLT 1 (AIR 1966 Ker 179), a Division Bench" of this court held that possession by itself was a substantive right recognised by law and has legal incidents attached to it apart from ownership. Such possessory right is heritable, devisable and transferable. A person having such an interest must be allowed to en fore those rights against all the world except those who have a better title or better right than himself. Therefore a person in wrongful possession, if dispossessed by a trespasser without title, can recover possession on the sole ground of his prior possession. The same view was reiterated by another Division Bench in rev. fr.k.c. Alexander v. Nair Service Society, 1966 KLT 333 (AIR 1966 Ker. 286). Therefore a person in wrongful possession, if dispossessed by a trespasser without title, can recover possession on the sole ground of his prior possession. The same view was reiterated by another Division Bench in rev. fr.k.c. Alexander v. Nair Service Society, 1966 KLT 333 (AIR 1966 Ker. 286). It was reiterated, that the person in possession, even if he be a trespasser can on the strength of his possessory title, recover possession from any person, except the true owner who dispossessed him, if he files a suit within the period limited by law. Therefore an earlier possessor has a proper title to the property and he can, unless his title has been extinguished by limitation, recover not merely from the trespasser who dispossessed him, but from any subsequent possessor. In other words, possessory title is well recognised in law and is liable to be protected against any highhanded dispossession from any other quarter. This decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Nair Service Society v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165 with like observations. 25. The question is whether this principle can be extended to an action against forcible dispossession by the true owner of the property. In Perry v. Clissold 1907 Appeal Cases 73, the Privy Council observed that a person in possession of land as owner and exercising the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world, but the original owner and if the original owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of limitation,' his rights will for ever be extinguished and the possessory owner will acquire an absolute title. 26. It is true that in the aforesaid cases it was held that the rights of the person in possession are valid against the entire world except the true owner. But that is not to say that the true owner can take the law into his-hands and dispossess the person in possession, although a trespasser, without recourse to the due process of law or forcibly. All that these decisions intended to lay down was that the person in possession can resist claims for recovery of possession from any quarter except the true owner. But the true owner should have recourse to due process of law, to recover possession of the property even from a trespasser. All that these decisions intended to lay down was that the person in possession can resist claims for recovery of possession from any quarter except the true owner. But the true owner should have recourse to due process of law, to recover possession of the property even from a trespasser. That this is the true legal position was laid down by Raman Nair J. in Vasndeva Kurup v. Ammini Amma, 1964 KLT 468, where he observed: "It seems to be the policy of the Indian law that a person in possession, albeit without title, is entitled to remain in possession even as against the lawful owner until evicted in due course of law. The lawful owner is not entitled to take the law into his own hands and throw out the person in possession. Under S.54 of the Specific Relief Act, an injunction may be granted not merely to protect a plaintiffs right to property but also to protect his enjoyment thereof. True, the grant of an injunction is discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised in accordance with the policy of the law which is that a person in peaceful possession should be maintained in possession until evicted in due course of law. If a person in possession is dispossessed, he can bring a suit under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act within six months of the dispossession and recover the property even though he has no title and his, dispossesses has. If that be so, why should the court not prevent the dispossession and why should it insist on his being actually dispossessed before it gives him relief'. I am in agreement with this statement of law which accords with the rule of law, and the obligation of all citizens to abide by due process of law to enforce their rights. In Karlhiyayani Amma v. Govindan, AIR 1980 Kerala 224 Khalid, J. (as he then was), was dealing with an analogous situation and the question was whether a person in possession could sustain a suit for injunction against the true owner, from forcibly dispossessing him from the properly. After an elaborate consideration of the decisions on the point, the learned judge observed as follows: "The ultimate position, therefore, reduces itself to this: can a person in possession without title sustain a suit for injunction against the rightful owner if he proves possession? Yes. After an elaborate consideration of the decisions on the point, the learned judge observed as follows: "The ultimate position, therefore, reduces itself to this: can a person in possession without title sustain a suit for injunction against the rightful owner if he proves possession? Yes. In this case, plaintiff is found to in be possession. On the finding, he should be granted the injunction prayed for. A person in possession can be evicted only in due process of law. Even the rightful owner cannot eject him with force. If he cannot be evicted with force, he continues to be in possession and he can resist invasion of his possession by everyone including the rightful owner. If the rightful owner threatens his peaceful possession, he can approach Courts of Law and pray for the equitable relief of injection to protect his possession". I am in agreement with this view. 27. A contrary view was taken by as learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court nNarayan v. Sharana Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnataka 77. This does not accord with the consistent view taken by this court in the decisions cited earlier, right from Vasudeva Kurup 's case 1964 KLT 468. Nor does it accord with the law expounded by the Privy Council in Peny v. Clissold 1907 AC73, which again only recognised the right of the true owner to proceed in accordance with law to establish his right to the properly. Depriving a person in possession of protection in a civil action for injunction will lead to a situation where might is right, with persons taking the law into their hands and forcibly evicting persons in possession without recourse to the due process of law. It must be mentioned here that law abhors violence and use of force, even in assertion of rights. That is why citizens arc obliged to have recourse to courts of law for enforcement of their rights. But that precisely will be the consequence, if the view taken by the Karnataka High Court is to be accepted. It must also be noted that the person in possession may have his own rights to set up against the owner and he will be deprived of opportunities to set them up if no protection is afforded against forcible dispossession by the owner. 28. It must also be noted that the person in possession may have his own rights to set up against the owner and he will be deprived of opportunities to set them up if no protection is afforded against forcible dispossession by the owner. 28. The decision in Nair Service Society AIR 1968 SC 1165 and M.K. Setty AIR 1972 SC 2299 only lay down generally that the title of the person in possession is good against the whole world, except the true owner. I have already delineated the scope of this principle earlier, when I mentioned that it only means that the trespasser cannot resist any claim for possession made by the true owner of the property in due process of law. But that does not mean that the true owner can enter into the properly without recourse to process of law. 29. The apprehension of the plaintiff in this case was that she was going to be forcibly dispossessed from the property by the defendants who according to her were powerful men of the locality. She therefore sought the relief of injunction from the court. Even assuming that she had no title to the property, (which as I have already held is not correct), She cannot be forcibly dispossessed from the property by use of might or force by the defendants or their men. She is entitled to have her possession protected against any such illegal dispossession, otherwise than in due course of law. This contention raised by counsel for the respondents is not therefore sustainable and is overruled. 30. The reasons stated by the appellate court to hold that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property are not correct in law. He omitted to take note of the vital admission made by DW1 about the plaintiff's possession after 23-J 1-1980. The decision of the appellate court is vitiated by non-avalanche to material evidence on record. He has also misread and misunderstood the documents to title, of the plaintiff and of the defendants. It is true that the question of possession is a question of fact on which ordinarily the second appellate court will not interfere. But non-advcrlancc to vital admissions or material pieces of evidence and misreading of documents-of title as happened in this case, do justify interference by this court under section 100 C.P.C. more A.alojlicccaaraalbe said to, be defective as is contended to be. But non-advcrlancc to vital admissions or material pieces of evidence and misreading of documents-of title as happened in this case, do justify interference by this court under section 100 C.P.C. more A.alojlicccaaraalbe said to, be defective as is contended to be. In the circumstances the decision of the owe appellate court is contrary to the evidence in he case and is unsustainable. The decree and the judgment of the trial court decreeing the suit as prayed for, have to be restored. The second appeal is therefore allowed. The decree and the judgment of the lower appellate court are set aside, and those of the trial court restored. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout.