JUDGMENT 1. - This case arises out of a first information report no. 198/92 filed at police station Nagar for offences under Sections 304B, 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code wherein petitioner who, according to herself, is aged 14 years. Puransingh Jat had lodged a report on 20.10.1992 alleging that his daughter Murti was married with Bhupal Singh on 21st June, 1991. He had given maximum goods as per his capacity but when his daughter Murti came to the village after about a month, told that her mother-in-law, father-in-law, husband and sister-in-law, i.e., the petitioner, are harassing her for giving lesser dowry. She stated that a demand of Rs. 50,000/- had been made. She alleged various atrocities by the in-laws. It was alleged in the report that she was murdered on 20.10.1992 and they cremated her body. Since it was a case of dowry death he lodged the report on which a case for offence under Sections 304B, 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code has been registered. An application for anticipatory bail was moved by the petitioner before the trial court which has been refused, hence she approached this court. 2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that she is only 14 years of age and therefore, her case falls within the provision of Juvenile Justices Act and, hence cannot be arrested. It is submitted that she was a student in Government School and according to the school register her date of birth is 1.1.1979. The submission is that date of birth of her elder brother is 1977 as per his Secondary Examination record and that there is no manner of doubt that she cannot be tried by the regular courts, it is contended that bail application was rejected by the trial court on the ground that she was not produced before the court when the learned Judge asked her to be produced and this was because had she been produced without any inquiry she would have been sent to prison straight off which would have been contrary to law. Learned counsel submits that this court in Sunder v. State, 1989(1) R.L.R. 224 , Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan R.Cr.C. 1992 page 609 and Farhat Hussain v. State of Rajasthan 1990(15) R.Cr.C. 128 has safe-guarded the rights of the min others whose age is not above 15 years and whose cases fall under the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act. 3. As against this learned counsel for the Complainant opposed the application on the ground that anticipatory bail cannot be granted in matters of dowry deaths. His submission is that this has been strongly condemned by the Supreme Court in Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1987 SC 737 . 4. I have given my anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully gone through the cases cited before me. It appears from the order passed by the learned trial court that one of the factors which weighed with him heavily was that Mst. Saroj was not produced before him despite his order, dated 6.1.93 but that fact alone, in my opinion, should not have persuaded him to reject the bail application as he should have considered the question of age objectively. The provisions of Juvenile Justice Act have to be applied in all cases where a child falls within the definition of a juvenile. The provisions of the Act are mandatory and this legislation is a milestone in consideration of legal human rights of younger generation. It is obligatory for the court to construe the provision strictly and to zealously see that juveniles are not made to suffer, whatever the nature of the offence may be. For consideration of the cases regarding bail, the court has to give due regard to the circumstances of the case and the age of the accused, more particularly when the accused is termed as a juvenile or may be termed as a juvenile. Mr. Joshi appearing for the Complainant wanted this court to reject the bail application on the basis of the observations made by their Lordships in Samunder Singhs case (supra) wherein the court has observed as under: "It was neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail which order was very likely to occasion prejudice by its very nature and timing. we therefore consider it essential to sound a serious note of caution for future." The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court have to be respected as the same are binding on this court also, but the question is that these observations have been made in a case where father-in-law was granted anticipatory bail and there were no circumstances which otherwise required to be considered which put the accused in special category of cases, such as the cases of juveniles, sick and infirm persons, pregnant ladies etc. In the instant case the question is to be considered in context with the age of the accused. In Sunder v. State (supra) I had taken the view that Section 18 of the Juvenile Justice Act is operative only when the present accused is arrested or detained or appeared or is brought before the Juvenile Court but does not envisage the situation like anticipatory bail. In my opinion, a juvenile cannot be placed at a disadvantageous position than an adult who is accused of an offence and, therefore, he is not precluded to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Section 438 Criminal Procedure Code. I had however, directed the accused in that case to be released on his guardians executing a bond as conclusively the accused-petitioner was a juvenile. In Farhat Hussain v. State of Rajasthan (supra) my learned brother Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma had placed reliance on the school record in the matter of the children and granted anticipatory bail in a case where there was a controversy of the age and the school registers entry was challenged by the Complainant. I considered the question in case of Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan (supra) and directed in that case that the petitioner should approach the competent court under the Juvenile Justice Act for safe-guarding his rights and it is expected of the police as well as the court to give due respect to the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The observations made in this case in no way come in conflict with what I had said in Sunders case. There are catena of cases of this court and other courts that the juveniles should be treated differently and the court should be zealous in giving effect to the mandatory provisions of law which are milestone in direction of reformatory theory. 5. There are catena of cases of this court and other courts that the juveniles should be treated differently and the court should be zealous in giving effect to the mandatory provisions of law which are milestone in direction of reformatory theory. 5. In the present case the learned Sessions Judge rejected the bail on the ground that there is nothing contrary to indicate that petitioner is a juvenile and the case is still at investigation stage, in my opinion, that was not a proper approach. In the instant case the school registers entry concerning the petitioner and her brother was on record and that ought to have been considered in the light of the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case Umesh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR, 1982 SC 1057 . Prima facie because of the entry in the school register of the petitioner herself and that of her elder brother indicates that she is a juvenile, she cannot be permitted to be arrested and sent to police custody. A detailed enquiry in respect of her age must be made and till then her rights are required to be safe-guarded. 6. I, therefore, direct that she shall not be arrested and if arrested shall be released forthwith by the Arresting Officer/Investigating Officer on her/her guardians entering into a bond for a sum of Rs. 1000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of A.O./I.O. However, in case the court of competent jurisdiction after a proper inquiry comes to the conclusion that the petitioner is not a juvenile, it is not precluded from having recourse to the normal law. *******