JUDGMENT Banerjee, J. : This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 21st March, 1990 passed by the learned trial Judge in the Matter No. 1359 of 1989 by which the learned trial Judge allowed the writ application filed by the which the Anirudha Mukherjee one of the candidate who failed to get himself recommended for selection and recommendation made by the Municipal Service Commission for appointment the post of Senior Market Superintendent of Calcutta Municipal Corporation was quashed. Further the appointment given by the Municipal Corporation during the pendancy of the writ application in favour of the appellant was also quashed and that by the said judgment and order the learned trial Judge held that the writ petitioner opposite party was the only eligible who should be treated to be selected by the Municipal Service Commission and that the writ petitioner opposite party No. 1 should be given appointment in the post of Senior Market Superintendent. 2. The fact of this is that on 10th June, 1988 Calcutta Municipal Service Commission issued an advertisement in the newspaper inviting application for appointment for one permanent post of Sr. Superintendent (Market) under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. In the said advertisement the eligibility criteria was that : a) the candidate must possess a degree of a reconginsed University or its equivalent, b) 7 years experience in a responsible position of Revenue Collection in a Government Office, Semi Government Office or Statutory body and c) the age should not be more than 40 year on the 1st January, 1988. It was provided in the said advertisement that the upper age limit according to the said advertisement was relaxable for 5 years for exceptionally qualified candidate. According to the said advertisement the prescribed essential qualification were minimum and mere possession of the same would not entitle the candidate to be called for interview. Pursuant to the said advertisement the writ petitioner Aniruddha Mukherjee as well as the appellant Sadhan Kumar Basu applied for appointment in the said post before the Municipal Service Commission. Initially the writ petitioner was not called for interview but ultimately, the writ petitioner was also called for interview. On the basis of the interview held by the Municipal Service Commission, the name of the appellant was recommended for appointment by the Municipal Service Commission to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. Initially the writ petitioner was not called for interview but ultimately, the writ petitioner was also called for interview. On the basis of the interview held by the Municipal Service Commission, the name of the appellant was recommended for appointment by the Municipal Service Commission to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. The said recommendation made by the Calcutta Municipal Service Commission was challenged by the writ petitioner opposite party by filing a writ application, on the grounds that the appellant did not possess the required experience of Revenue Collection and that the appellant had crossed 40 years of age and as such he could not be selected and/or recommended by the Municipal Service Commission for appointment to the said post. The learned trial judge on consideration of the matter held that the essential duties of a sergeant of Municipal Market was to maintain law and order in the market and for that purpose he was provided with police powers and that as the appellant was holding the post of Sergeant he could not be said to have that requisite 7 years experience in a responsible position of Revenue Collection and in support of his findings he relied upon paragraph 28 of the Market Manual of the Corporation of Calcutta published in the year 1938 and the learned trial judge also held that as the appellant has crossed the age of 40 years. he was disqualified from being considered for appointment in the said post and further on consideration of the matter the learned trial Judge found that the writ petitioner who challenged the appointment of the appellant was only suitable and eligible candidates for such appointment and accordingly directed the municipal authority to appoint the writ petitioner opposite party in the said post. It is a case where the learned trial Judge made assessments of the merits of the appellant as well as the writ petitioner opposite party and came to the conclusion that the appellant could not be selected and/or recommended by the Municipal Service Commission and directed the Municipal Service Commission should recommend only the name of the writ petitioner and directed the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to appoint the writ petitioner opposite party in the same post after quashing the recommendation made by the Municipal Service Commission for appointment in the post of Sr. Superintendent (Market). Superintendent (Market). It is pertinent to mention that against the said judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge neither the Municipal Corporation not the Municipal Service Commission preferred any appeal. It may also be mentioned that the writ petitioner opposite party also applied for the post of Deputy Licensing Officer and the Municipal Service Commissioner selected the writ petitioner opposite party for such appointment in the post of Licensing Officer in December 1990, and thereafter the writ petitioner opposite party left the post of Sr. Superintendent (Market) and joined the post of Licensing Officer in December 1990. After the writ petitioner on being appointed to the rest of Licensing Officer and joined the said post in December 1990 the appellant made as application before the Division Bench of this Court for a direction upon the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to appoint the appellant in the post of Sr. Superintendent (Market) and that the Division Bench of this High Court passed an order on 18th August, 1992 by way of interim order directing the Municipal Corporation to appoint the appellant on Ad-hoc basis in the post of Sr. Superintendent (Market). “An application was filed by C. M. C. to recall that order which was also bested along with the appeal. In the said application it was stated that the appellant could only be entitled to hold the said post provided the appeal is allowed and the order of the learned trial Judge is set aside”. The case of the appellant is that the Municipal Service Commission being fully satisfied with the eligibility criteria forwarded the name of the appellant to the Municipal Corporation. It was submitted that such a recommendation as made by Municipal Service Commission to the Municipal Corporation cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution since recommendation was made to Municipal Corporation and not to the court and that on the basis of the recommendation Municipal Corporation may or may not accept the recommendation and make an appointment. Recommendation and the appointment are two different things and that writ of Mandamus is not available for the purpose of quashing a recommendation as recommendation is not binding upon the Municipal authorities. Recommendation and the appointment are two different things and that writ of Mandamus is not available for the purpose of quashing a recommendation as recommendation is not binding upon the Municipal authorities. Further it was submitted that the eligibility criteria which have been laid down by the authorities concerned was fully satisfied by the appellant inasmuch as the Municipal Service Commission was satisfied with the eligibility criteria and at the interview relaxed the age of the appellant on being satisfied with that the appellant was a fit candidate whose age should be relaxed and thereafter selected him and made the recommendation to Municipal Corporation and further it was pointed out that even if the appellant did not satisfy the required minimum experience at that time the appellant’s service was entitled to be automatically regularised on acquiring the required experience while holding that said post. In this connection, it was stated that it may be mentioned that the appellant possessed the requisite experience for being selected and appointed to the post of Sr. Superintendent (Market) having been specifically admitted and ascertained by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the Municipal Service Commission having satisfied with regard to the experience when selected the appellant such selection and recommendation could not be challenge on the grounds that in the Market Manual which was made in the year 1938 where there was no mention that the duties and responsibilities of a sergeant relate to Revenue Collection. In view of the fact that in the preface of the said Manual it was stated that the said Manual that “according to the system prevalent there and the provisions herein as regards duties of an individual officers has to be adjusted according to the staff provided in respective Markets”. It was further submitted that the said Market Manual was not statutory and that the same did not reflect the duties and responsibilities of the said post in recent times. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. It was further submitted that the said Market Manual was not statutory and that the same did not reflect the duties and responsibilities of the said post in recent times. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. In the affidavit in-opposition filed before the learned trial Judge affirmed by Sri Pranab Kumar Maity, Deputy Market Commissioner (N) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation have clearly stated : “It appears from the records that the respondent No. 8 was appointed Sergeant in the Market Department has to play vital role for the matter of collection of Revenue particularly when it is not paid by the stall holders and others who are liable to pay such revenue to the Corporation. The duties and functions of the Sergeant have been mentioned in the Market Manual. It is needless to mention that the market department itself is a revenue earning department and everyone who is working in the market department is directly or indirectly involved in revenue collection. It appears from the records that on or about 4th March, 1982 the respondent No. 8 took over the charge of Intally Market from Shri Animesh Ranjan Ghosh under an order of the respondent No. 2 and has acted therein in that capacity till 16th of March, 1964. The petitioner has been working as Sergeant of Gurudas Market on or from 19th June, 1985 and he took over the charge of Superintendent of Ultadanga Municipal Market on and form 16th March, 1988 and as per the authority concerned. Therefore the respondent No. 8 has been discharging his functions and duties of superintendent of both the markets viz. Gurudas Market and Ultadanga Municipal Market. I do not admit that the respondent No. 8 has never gained experience in revenue collection in a full time employment or that the said officiation of the respondent No. 8 in the post of Superintendent of Gurudas Market is illegal as vaguely alleged or at all.” 3. Gurudas Market and Ultadanga Municipal Market. I do not admit that the respondent No. 8 has never gained experience in revenue collection in a full time employment or that the said officiation of the respondent No. 8 in the post of Superintendent of Gurudas Market is illegal as vaguely alleged or at all.” 3. It was further submitted in the said affidavit that the Municipal Commission was the appropriate authority to say whether the appellant who was the respondent No. 8 in the writ application had fulfilled the requisite qualification to appear at the interview before the said selection committee and that it was stated that the Municipal Service Commission after scrutinising the papers relating to qualification, experience of the appellant was duly satisfied in this regard and ultimately, the appellant was recommended by the Municipal Service Commission for appointment to the post was made. It was further stated that the authorities concerned have acted in the matter in accordance with law not according to their whims and sweet will as alleged by the writ petitioner opposite parties. It was further stated in the said affidavit that the concerned authorities of Corporation used to give appointment to the candidate who is selected and recommended by the Municipal Service Commission and as such he cannot have any claim for the said post. It was further stated in the said affidavit filed by the Municipal Corporation that the writ petitioner opposite party could not be stated to have experience in a responsible position of revenue collection inasmuch as the writ petitioner opposite party could not be stated to have experience in a responsible position of revenue collection inasmuch as the writ petitioner opposite party while working as checking Inspector cannot be said to be holding a responsible position and his experience to revenue collection as Checking Inspector cannot be considered for appointment to the post of Senior Superintendent (Market) and that in fact experience in revenue collection in a responsible position means that the candidate concerned must have experience in revenue administration and in framing policy with regard to revenue collection. The duties of the Checking Inspector were to check the collection of Sircar which could not be considered as experience in revenue collection in a responsible position. 4. Mr. The duties of the Checking Inspector were to check the collection of Sircar which could not be considered as experience in revenue collection in a responsible position. 4. Mr. Bilash Ranjan Neogi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended in the first place that the Market Manual have no force of law and in support of his contention reliance was placed to a decision of Sabyaschi Mukherjee, J. (At His Lordship was then) in (1) Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta, AIR 1973 Cal 488 wherein it was held that the Rules of Assessment and Collection Manual 1917 of the Corporation of Calcutta have not any force in law. Merely 1917 of the Corporation of Calcutta have not any force in law. Merely because they were followed as being found convenient and worked fairy for a number of years, a corporation is not obliged to observe them following decision of this court in the (2) Corporation of Calcutta v. Moti Chand Chowdhury, (1936) 40 CWN 818 and also in the decision of this Court in the case of (3) Union of India v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1955) 59 CWN 91. It was further observed in this case that there was no law which required that the practice, however, convenient it might, and however, fairly it might work out over a period of years that it must be observed. The Supreme Court in the case of (4) R. Abdul Rowther v. State Transport Appellant Tribunal, Madras reported in AIR 1959 SC 896 observed that rules not framed under the statute did not create any statutory obligation. Relying on those decisions Mr. Neogi submitted that the learned trial Judge was wholly wrong in solely relying upon the provisions of Market Manual which have no force in law and it was framed in the year 1938 and that anything contained therein could not be head to be conclusive and binding for all time to come Mr. Neogi further submitted that the learned trial Judge was in error in holding that the post of sergeant in such Market carries with its police power. Police power can only be conferred upon a person who is appointed in accordance with the police Act and/or Regulation made thereunder. It is further submitted by Mr. Neogi further submitted that the learned trial Judge was in error in holding that the post of sergeant in such Market carries with its police power. Police power can only be conferred upon a person who is appointed in accordance with the police Act and/or Regulation made thereunder. It is further submitted by Mr. Neogi that such pre-constitutional manual published for information and guidance accordance to the practice prevalent at that time cannot be said to be final, conclusive for all parties for all time to come. According to the municipal Authority the practice have changed in changed situation. 5. Mr. Neogi further submitted that Municipal authorities have stated that the market department is itself a revenue earning department and everyone who was working in such department is directly or indirectly involved in revenue collection. When the Calcutta Municipal Corporation which is a creature of statute states on affidavit that the post which was held by the appellant was its attached with the revenue earning activity directly or indirectly in that event on the basis of the said market manual published on the basis of practice prevalention 1938 the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that the appellant did not have the requisite qualification, Supreme Court in the case of (5) Maheswar Prasad Srivesteva v. Sureswar Singh reported in AIR 1976 SC 1404 held that in matters involving consideration of question regarding inadequacy or sufficiency of training, the Public Service Commission, having benefit of expert opinion is beat suited to judge whether the particular candidate is qualified for a particular post and that the court should hesitate to interfere with the direction of the appointing authority so long as it is exercised bona fide. In that case a point was raised that the unsuccessful candidate has no locus standi to challenge the appointment of successful candidate since he was not found suitable for appointment to the post. But this question was not considered by the Supreme Court in the view of the fact that in that case it was held that the appellant was duly qualified for post. In that case the appointment of the appellant was challenged by the respondent No. 1 therein in the sole ground that he was not duly qualified to be appointed as Drug Inspector Alleging that he has not the requisite training which was necessary for such appointment. In that case the appointment of the appellant was challenged by the respondent No. 1 therein in the sole ground that he was not duly qualified to be appointed as Drug Inspector Alleging that he has not the requisite training which was necessary for such appointment. It was further submitted by Mr. Neogi that it is not the function of the court to sit in appeal over the decision of the selection committee and to serutinise the relevant records of the candidate and assess the suitability of the candidates as has been done by the Learned Trial Judge. Supreme Court in the case of (6) Dalpat Abasosheb Salunka v. Dr. B. S. Mahajan, AIR 1990 SC 434 held that whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted selection committee which has the expertise on the subject. The Court has no such expertise. The decision of the selection committee of comparative merit cannot be interfered with by the court as it is not be function of the court to hear appeals over the decision of the selection committee. References was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (7) National Institute of Mental Health v. Dr. Kalyan Raman & Ors. reported in AIR 1992 SC 1806 . In this case it was held that the function of the selection committee is administrative and it need not give reason for recommending candidates for appointment but fair procedure must be observed. (8) Indian Wireless Corpn. v. Capt. Shukla & Ors. (1992) 5 SLR SC 519 it was held that the court will have a very limited jurisdiction to interfere with the process of promotion and selection so long as the rules are not violated or made arbitrarily. It was next submitted that the writ court have no jurisdiction to interfere with the recommendation and/or to set aside any recommendation inasmuch as the recommendation was made by Municipal Service Commission to the Municipal authorities and not to the court and as such the court cannot scrutinise the recommendation and cannot interfere with the recommendation. Recommendation was not binding and writ court cannot interfere with the recommendation of the commission. In this connection reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (9) Jotindra Kumar & Ors. Recommendation was not binding and writ court cannot interfere with the recommendation of the commission. In this connection reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (9) Jotindra Kumar & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 1984 SC 1850 . 6. It was next submitted by Mr. Neogi that even assuming that at a point of time when selection was made the appellant had not the requisite experience but subsequently the appellant had gained experience on the basis of admitted fact and that in this connection reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (10) Ram Swarup v. State of Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 168 wherein the Supreme Court has held that if the appointment was irregular requirement of minimum experience of holding a particular post having not been satisfied such appointment as held would be automatically regularized on the candidate’s acquiring that extent of experience while holding the post subsequently. With regard to direction of the learned trial Judge to give promotion and appointment to the writ petitioner opposite party straightway to the higher post setting aside the recommendation made in favour of the appellant was on the fact of it illegal inasmuch as the writ petitioner cannot have any such right to get promotion and/or appointment as a matter of tight, In this connection reference was made to a decision of the Supreme Court on the case of (11) State of Haryana v. Subhas Chandra, 1973 (2) SLR 137 SC wherein it was held that an aggrieved party must have a right to enforce it, since promotion is not a right the same cannot be enforced by writ court. 7. On behalf of the writ petitioner opposite party, Mr. Sumit Kumar Panja submitted that the learned trial Judge was right in setting aside the recommendation as the appellant had not the requisite experience in revenue collection and he was over-aged. It was further submitted by Mr. Panja that the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the appellant had not requisite qualification relying upon market manual which according to Mr. Panja was statutory and binding. It was further submitted in the facts and circumstances of the case that the learned trial Judge was right in directing the Municipal Corporation to give appointment to the writ petitioner/opposite party. It was further submitted by Mr. Panja was statutory and binding. It was further submitted in the facts and circumstances of the case that the learned trial Judge was right in directing the Municipal Corporation to give appointment to the writ petitioner/opposite party. It was further submitted by Mr. Panja that the appellant was asked to work as Superintendent while holding the post of sergeant and the same was purely on temporary arrangement for time, having no claim to the post and that such an experience must be held to a part-time experience and that such experience acquired on the basis of appointment in the post of Superintendent purely on temporary arrangement could not be treated to be a valid experience for the purpose of considering the appellant’s case for appointment having the requisite experience. It was further submitted that 7 years experience in a responsible position of revenue collection was not fulfilled in the instant case. It was further submitted by Mr. Panja that the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the writ petitioner opposite party was the most suitable candidate because of the fact that the appellant was an ordinary graduate while the writ petitioner opposite party was a Science Graduate. Both have got L. L. B. degrees. It was further submitted that the appellant passed H. S. in 3rd division whereas the writ petitioner opposite party passed H. S. examination in 2nd Division, It was further submitted that the Municipal Service Commission being statutory body and the officers are public servant they will have to discharge their duties within the four corners of the statues and they cannot exercise discretionary power illegally and arbitrarily. It was further submitted that discretion of a statutory body in never unfettered and if the decision of statutory body is influenced by extraneous consideration which it ought to have taken into account then the decision cannot stand. 8. Having given anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties in the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that it is well settled principal that recommendation made by Municipal Service Commission is not binding upon the appointing authority and that recommendation cannot be interfered with by this Court inasmuch as it is well settled principle that condition precedent for issue of Mandamus is the existence of legal right. The right that can be enforced under Art. 226 of the Constitution must ordinarily be right of the petitioner himself who complains infraction of such right (See (12) Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; (13) State of Orissa v. Madan Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 12 ; (14) Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 ; (15) Dr. Rai Shibendra v. Governing Body Of Nalanda Collage, AIR 1962 SC 12 10; (16) Dr. Uma Kant Saran v. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 964 ). Making of a recommendation in favour of one and not making of recommendation in favour of another does not give any cause of action and does not create any right for any party to move writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The only except is that if the recommendation involved some error of law it is likely that a Court would, in principle, by prepared to review the error and declare the recommendation invalid. Secondly, in the matter of making recommendation by the Municipal Service Commission, the court cannot interfere with the recommendatory process. Supreme Court in the case of Jotindra Kumar v. State of Punjab (Supra) avers since the recommendation by the Commission is not binding and no mandamus lies Supreme Court also held in (17) A. N. D. ‘Silva v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1962 SC 1130 that since president of India is not bound by the recommendation of the Union of Public Service Commission and that such recommendation cannot be challenged. Supreme Court in the case of (18) Dharmendra Prasad Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1989 SC 997 averred that the writ court is only concerned with the decision making process and cannot interfere with the decision unless it can be established that the decision making process was not duly observed and because of non-observance of the procedure the decision was vitiated. Accordingly, we are of the view that the writ petitioner opposite party had no right to challenge the recommendation made by the Municipal Service Commission to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation recommending the name of the appellant for such appointment. Accordingly, we are of the view that the writ petitioner opposite party had no right to challenge the recommendation made by the Municipal Service Commission to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation recommending the name of the appellant for such appointment. Next question is whether the writ court have jurisdiction to direct the Municipal authorities to appoint and/or to promote the petitioner opposite party straightway when his name was not recommended and not considered fit for appointment by the said municipal commission. This point is well settled that the Court cannot direct the Authorities to give promotion. No mandamus lies purely in discretionary matter and/or duties. While giving promotion the authorities concerned had to exercise discretion. Court can direct the authority to exercise discretionary power when the authorities have failed to exercise as the discretionary. The promotions and appointments are not purely ministerial functions but are discretionary functions and/or duties. In case of discretionary matter court cannot direct the authorities concerned to exercise the discretion in a particular manner as directed by the court. Supreme Court in the case of (19) State Bank of India v. Maniruddin, AIR 1987 SC 1989 held when the promotion to a higher post is to be made on the basis of merit, an officer can claim promotion to higher post as a matter of right by virtue of seniority alone. The Supreme Court in the case of (20) Sant Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 SC 1910 have held that no body has got any right to get any appointment and promotion, the only right that is there to be considered along with other eligible candidates before appointment to selection post there will be no breach of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution because everyone who was eligible in view of the condition of the service was entitled to consider, was actually considered before promotion to this selection post were actually made. In the instant case admittedly because of the pendency of the matter the appellant in any event have acquired the required experience even assuming that he had not the experience at the time when such recommendation was made and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Swarup’s case (Supra) such selection had automatically been regularised and validated. With regard to the finding made by the learned trial Judge that in view of the Market Manual the appellant had no requisite qualification. In this connection the affidavit of the Municipal authority must prevail and the said affidavit the Municipal Corpn. have specifically stated that the duties and responsibilities of the said post were also connected with the collection of revenue. If the Municipal Corpn. who is a statutory employer come forward with the statement on oath that the said post is connected with the revenue collection only employer knows better then anybody also what are the duties and responsibilities attached to a particular post and court cannot sit over such a decision of the authorities concerned what are the duties of a post when not prescribed under the law, are purely question of facts. The Market Manual is not statutory and that on the basis of Market Manual we are of the view that the court below was wrong in holding that the appellant had not the requisite qualification. The said manual was neither statutory nor binding upon the authorities concerned inasmuch as the said manual was published at a point time when there was no statutory provisions and that the said manual was prepared according to prevalent in 1935 cannot be accepted to be prevalent for all time to come, particularly, when the Municipal Corpn. have stated in the affidavit the nature of the duties and responsibilities attached to the post of Sergeant, we are of the view that the writ court had no jurisdiction to decide the disputed question of facts and that this writ court cannot usurp the power and functions of the recommendatory body and/or the appointing authority in this behalf. The commendation of the export bodies like Municipal Service Commission cannot be interfered with by this Court, Supreme Court in Maheswar Prasad (Supra) have held that the decision of the public Service Commission having the benefit of expert opinion is better situated to judge whether particular candidate is qualified for a particular post or the court should hesitate to interferes in such matter and that the court shall not interfere unless it is established such power has been exercised no bondfide. There is no allegation of acting bona fide. No ill-motive was imputed against the authorities. There is no allegation of acting bona fide. No ill-motive was imputed against the authorities. In the instant case the learned trial Judge in substance set over the decision of the Calcutta Municipal Service commission as an appellant authority. It is well settled that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in writ court cannot sit over the decision of any authority in appeal. Mandamus is not a writ of right. It is issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the court. We are of the view that the decision which has been decided by the learned trial Judge is beyond the power of the writ court. The writ of Mandamus is regarded as one of the highest remedy in the Indian Judicial system. It is issued only where there is clear and specific legal right to be performed by the respondent of the particular duty sought to be informed. The learned trial Judge has considered the functions of the Municipal Service Commission and/or Municipal Corporation as purely ministerial in nature. But the process and/or power of recommendation and/or selection are not ministerial in nature. But they are discretionally in character involving the exercise of some degrees of judgement on the part of the authorities concerned. Mandamus lies to compel performance of duties which are purely ministerial in nature and show clearance specific that no clement of discretion in made in their performance. In the instant case, in our view, the learned trial Judge has gone beyond the power of the writ court in setting aside the recommendation and directing the appointment to the writ petitioner opposite party. Further it also appears that he has joined the post and as such there is no subsisting right of the writ petitioner/opposite parties. It is well settled principle that the courts may quash unlawful decision and require the public body to consider the matter according to law but cannot substitute their own view on the entitlement for that of public body. 9. On the question of relaxation of age, the advertisement provides the power to the authorities concerned to relax the age when the candidate was exceptionally qualified and that when relaxation was made, it must be presumed, the authorities concerned considered the appellant to be exceptionally qualified and this cannot be interfered with, by this court. 9. On the question of relaxation of age, the advertisement provides the power to the authorities concerned to relax the age when the candidate was exceptionally qualified and that when relaxation was made, it must be presumed, the authorities concerned considered the appellant to be exceptionally qualified and this cannot be interfered with, by this court. There is requirement to give reason and/or disclose any reason for making recommendation and for selection. There is no right to reason in such a matter. Accordingly, in view of the stand taken by the Municipal Service Commission and the stand taken by the Municipal Corporation on affidavit and on the basis of the material placed before us we do not find any ground to interfered with the recommendation and selection of the appellant and accordingly, the learned trial Judge was wrong in holding that the appellant was disqualified on making assessment after going into the merits of the candidature and directing selection of the writ petitioner opposite parties. We are of the view that the order of the learned trial Judge cannot stand as it is contrary to the basic and well settled principles and that the learned trial Judge went beyond the power of the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution and as such the order of the learned trial Judge dated 21st March, 1990 is set aside and the writ application stands dismissed. The appeal is accordingly allowed. “Since the appeal is allowed no order is passed on the application filed for vacating the interim order passed by the Division Bench on 18th August, 1992. The C. M. C. has now to issue formal order of appointment in the said post forthwith”. Chakravarty, J. : I agree.