ORDER 1. Both the writ petitions have raised common questions of law and fact and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In both the writ petitions, the writ petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the Assistant Secretary, Metropolitan Development, Salt Lake Branch, Sech Bhawan, Government of West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as the Assistant Secretary) rejecting the prayers of the writ petitioners for mutation of their names in respect of the plots in question at Bidhan Nagar, Salt Lake City, Calcutta. The prayers for mutation of the names of the writ petitioners, in respect of the plots in question, were rejected by the Assistant Secretary by holding that the transfers of the plots in question, made in favour of the writ petitioners by registered Deeds of Transfer executed by the original lessees, were not valid in view of S. 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by which the application of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the T.P. Act) had been excluded in respect of any transfer of land and interest thereon made by the Government. 3. The grounds on which the applications for mutation were rejected by the Assistant Secretary had been considered by me in a recent decision reported Prabir Kumar Kar vs. State of West Bengal & other, 1992 (2) CLJ 261. Ordinarily, I would have delivered a short order relying on my aforesaid decision. But in view of the argument advanced by Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the State respondents, I thought it fit to explain the reported decision and also to consider the submission rendered by Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents. 4. Mr. Chatterjee, appearing on behalf of the respondents sought to argue that the aforesaid decision reported in 1992(2) CLJ 261 really had helped the State respondents. He tried to persuade me to hold that in view of the said decision, the orders passed by the Assistant Secretary could not be interfered with in exercise of my power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of this submission, Mr. Chatterjee took me through paragraph 11 of the said decision. Mr. He tried to persuade me to hold that in view of the said decision, the orders passed by the Assistant Secretary could not be interfered with in exercise of my power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of this submission, Mr. Chatterjee took me through paragraph 11 of the said decision. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that as I had held in the said decision that the provisions of the T.P. Act could not be made applicable to grants and/or transfers made by the Government and that all prohibitions, restrictions, conditions and limitations contained in any Government grant or transfer shall be valid and take effect according to the tenure, no right had been vested to the original lessees to transfer the plots in question to the writ petitioners. It was further submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that Clause VII of the Lease Deeds would show that the lessees were not entitled to sub-divide or sub-let the plots in question or the buildings to be constructed without the consent in writing of the Government, and, therefore, the Government shall have the right to refuse to accept transfer of the plots in question in its absolute discretion. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that in view of S. 3 of the Act also, it was open to the Assistant Secretary to refuse such prayers for mutation. 5. So far as the first submission of Mr. Chatterjee is concerned, I am of the view that Mr. Chatterjee misapplied the principles laid down in the said decision. If we read the entire judgment, particularly the paragraphs 11 and 12 of the same, there cannot be any difficulty in understanding that in the said decision, it has been held that S. 2 of the Act cannot be applied in case of Government grants where no restriction or limitation concerning the transfer of interest of a property relating to any grant of the Government has/had been imposed in the grant itself. Since an argument was advanced by the learned Advocate for the State respondents that my observations in paragraph 11 of the said decision would show that in case of Government grants, no transfer could be made by the lessee in respect of the plot in question, I take the opportunity, in this judgment, to explain the aforesaid decision. The Government Grants Act, 1895 (Act No.15 of 1895) was passed on 10th of October, 1895. The Government Grants Act, 1895 (Act No.15 of 1895) was passed on 10th of October, 1895. The preamble of the Act says that this Act has been enacted in the statute book to explain the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 so far as it relates to grants from the Government and to remove certain doubts as to the powers to the Government in relation to such grants. The objects and reasons of the Act would also show• that as some doubts had arisen as to the extent of operation of the T.P. Act 1882 and as to the power to the Government to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and other transfers of land made by it or under its authority, it was expedient to remove such doubts, the Act was enacted. (Emphasis added). Keeping the preamble of the Act and the objects and reasons for enacting the Act in mind, let me now see whether S. 2 prohibits transfer of interest of government land when no such restriction has been made in the Government grant and/or lease itself or in other words, S. 2 of the Act totally excludes application of all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, so far as the Government grants are concerned. Section 2 of the Act says that in respect of a government grant nothing in the T.P. Act, 1882 shall apply but at the same time, it has been made clear in S. 2 of the Act that every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act has not been passed. Considering the preamble and objects and reasons of the Act and reading the words that every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act has not been passed as used in S. 2 of the Act, in my view, an the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not excluded by operation of S. 2 of the Government Grant Act, 1895 and it does not render all the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act inapplicable to lands held under grant from the Government but the meaning of the Section is that when the Court is called upon to construe an instrument granting land by the Government, it shall construe such grant irrespective of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. See Dost Mohammad Khan vs. Upper India Bank Ltd. III Allahabad Law Journal 628 AIR Lala Kishun Chand vs. Sheo Dutta, AIR 1958 All 879 . Even assuming that in a case of a Government grant and/or Government lease, in respect of a particular plot in question, the T.P. Act cannot be made applicable even then I am of the view that the effect of S. 2 of the Act cannot be held to have excluded the general provisions of law dehors the transfer under the T.P. Act, Both before and after the enactment of the T.P. Act, there has been the law in India that the lessee, as an ordinary incident of an Estate granted to him, can assign his right. Under S. 3 of the Act, all prohibitions, restrictions, conditions and limitations, contained in such grant shall be valid and take effect notwithstanding any law or enactment of the legislature. Accordingly, if the Government had intended to impose a restriction on assignment of a lease, a clause to that effect could have been included in the deed itself. As I have already held in my reported decision that under S. 8 of the T.P. Act, unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, the transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee with all the interest which the transferor is then capable in passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof and, therefore, the principles of S. 8 of the T.P. Act, in my view, are applicable to a lease of the Government. 6. I have already explained S. 3 of the Act in the aforesaid reported decision in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the same. Therefore, I need not reiterate the same in this judgment. 7. In the aforesaid decision, I have already held that the Act is not applicable to the leases of present nature, even then, one more material fact needs to be considered in this connection. It appears from the lease deeds that all the leases in question are for valuable consideration i.e. a lump sum premium is taken by the Government against the leases for entering into the aforesaid lease deeds and the Government also accepts nominal annual rent in respect of the lands in question. Therefore, it is a contractual transaction for a monetary consideration. Therefore, it is a contractual transaction for a monetary consideration. The Government Grants Act, therefore, cannot be made applicable in so far as the present leases are concerned because in all these leases, lessees have been permitted to construct building on their lease-hold lands and therefore, the position of the Government is that of a landlord and accordingly, the lands in question cannot fall in the category of grant under the Act of 1895. Therefore, in view of the discussions made hereinabove the argument of Mr. Chatterjee that in view of S. 2 of the Act which excludes operation of the T.P. Act in respect of a Government Grant or Lease, the transfer made by the original lessee in favour of the writ petitioners is void, cannot be accepted. 8. So far as the second submission of Mr. Chatterjee is concerned, I am of the view that the said submission of Mr. Chatterjee has no substance at all. Mr. Chatterjee, relying on Clause 7 of the lease-deeds, submitted that on a plain reading of the said clause in the lease deeds, it would be evident that the State Government restricted the lessee to transfer their plats without taking consent in writing from it. For proper appreciation of this submission of Mr. Chatterjee, it is necessary to quote Clause 7 of the relevant lease deeds which reads as follows:- "The LESSEE shall not sub-divide or sub-let the demised land or the building to be constructed without the consent in writing of the Government first had and obtained and the Government shall have the right and be entitled to refuse its consent at its absolute discretion." 9. From a bare reading of clause 7 of the lease deeds, it appears to me that only a restriction has been imposed on the lessee to sub-let or subdivide the demised land or the building to be constructed on such land. It only says that the said deeds of lease bar sub-division or sub-letting of the demised premises and/or building that would be constructed on the said land, without taking consent in writing from the Government. Therefore, from this, one can only say that the object of entering into a lease with the lessee is only to prevent further sub-division or fragmentation of the lease-hold land. Therefore, from this, one can only say that the object of entering into a lease with the lessee is only to prevent further sub-division or fragmentation of the lease-hold land. In my view, from this it cannot be said that there is any bar for assignment or transfer of interest of the lessee in respect of his lease-hold land as a whole. It is well settled that sub-letting of a lease-hold property and assignment and/or transfer of the same are totally different concepts. There is no privity of contract between the head-lessor and the sub-lessee but an assingee or transferee is liable by privity of estate to the lessor. In my view, therefore, in case of absolute assignment or transfer of interest by a lessee, there is privity of estate between the Government, who is the lessor and the assignee, while the privity of contract between the lessor and the lessee continues to exist. The lessee shall remain liable for rent to the lessor but this privity of contract between the lessor and the lessee is extinguished when the lessor accepts rent from the assignee or otherwise recognises the lessee as a tenant. Therefore, in my view, prohibition against sub-division or sub-letting of the demised land does not amount to prohibition in respect of assignment and/or transfer in respect of the plots in question. 10. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, I am of the view that the Assistant Secretary acted illegally in holding that in view of S. 2 of the Act, the transfers made in favour of the writ petitioners must be held to be ineffective and invalid in law. Therefore, the aforesaid orders of the Assistant Secretary refusing to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in place of the original lessee must be set aside and the prayers for mutation of the names of the writ petitioners in respect of the plots in question must be allowed. 11. Before parting with this judgment, one more significant factor should also be considered. It has now been brought on record that subsequent to the execution of the lease deeds by the State Government, in favour of the original lessees in the year 1974, the State Government has altered the standard form of the lease deeds. 11. Before parting with this judgment, one more significant factor should also be considered. It has now been brought on record that subsequent to the execution of the lease deeds by the State Government, in favour of the original lessees in the year 1974, the State Government has altered the standard form of the lease deeds. Previously, the standard format was the one that was executed by the original lessees with the State Government and in the said format, as noted earlier there is no clause restraining assignment of the leasehold interest without previous permission of the Government in writing. However, from the standard format which is now being used by the State Government, it appears that the intending leases contain the clause preventing assignment and/or transfer of lease-hold interest without previous permission of the Government in writing. Taking into consideration of the aforesaid insertion of a clause in the present lease deeds, it is evident that the State Government also felt it necessary to make such changes and/or alterations in the clauses of the present lease deeds because of the aforesaid defects arising out of the lease deeds executed by them in the year 1974. 12. For the reasons aforesaid, S. 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of these cases and therefore, the Assistant Secretary has acted illegally in rejecting the prayers for mutation of the writ petitioners by applying S. 2 of the Act against them. 13. Accordingly, both the writ petitions succeed. 14. The orders of the Assistant Secretary, Metropolitan Development, Salt Lake Branch, Sech Bhawan, rejecting the prayers of the writ petitioners for mutation of their names in respect of the plots in question are hereby set aside and/or quashed. 15. The State respondents are hereby directed to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in respect of the plots in question in favour of the writ petitioners forthwith. 16. There will be no order as to costs. Let xerox copies of this order be given to the learned advocates, appearing for the parties, on usual undertaking. Both the writ applications allowed with direction.