Judgment B.L. Yadav, J. 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the prayer is that by issuing a writ of certiorari, the order dated 28th of February 1983 (Annexure No. 9) may be quashed and by issuing a writ of mandamus, the respondents by restrained from giving effect to the impugned order. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner is the owner of a land measuring 13 x 12 yards at Delhi, Bareilly National Highway, near Kilometer No. 209. The land in dispute was purchased by the petitioner under a registered sale-deed on 15th of March, 1937. There were already old constructions when the land was purchased. The petitioner moved an application for permission to repair certain constructions and to make some new constructions, but the permission was not granted under the provisions of section 6 of the U.P. Road Side Land Control Act, 1945 (for short, the Act) This permission was refused on the ground that the petitioner was not the owner of the land. The petitioner, thereafter, fired original salt No. 468 of 1980, in the court of Munsif Rampur, Impleading State of U.P. and the Collector Rampur, for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the petitioner from the land in dispute and restraining them from demolishing the constructions. The suit was decreed on 4th of May, 1981 (Annexure No. 2). Thereafter, an appeal was filed by the respondents, but that appears to be pending. Thereafter, some proceedings were initiated under section 4 of the U.P. Public premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupation Act, against the petitioner. The petitioner has made an application dated 17-7-1981 (Annexure No. 3) for permission to repair and to make certain new constructions, but no order was passed on the same, either refusing permission or granting, hence in view of section 6(6) of the Act, the permission would be deemed to have been granted. The petitioner replied the notice dated 20-7-81 Issued under section 13 of the Act, directing the petitioner that he has raised constructions at 209 Kilometer to the East Side in village Milak without permission of the District Magistrate, hence he has violated the provision of section 5 of the Act and was liable to punishment under section 13 of the Act (Annexure No. 6). The petitioner replied the said notice denying the allegations (Annexure No. 7) and the impugned order thereafter was passed on 28th of February, 1983 (Annexure No. 9) holding that without any permission, the petitioner has raised the constructions hence he was directed to remove the same, otherwise, that would be removed at the expense of the respondents and the petitioner would be liable to pay expenses. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioner had made an application for permission but the same was not replied, hence it would be deemed to have been granted and the petitioner has not raised any fresh constructions rather some repair was made on the basis of the deemed permission and the petitioner being the owner was not liable to demolish the constructions and that the order of Munsif dated 4-5-1981 (Annexure 2) shall have an effect of resjudicata, but the respondents 2 and 3 erred in holding otherwise 4. The learned Standing Counsel on the other hand, refuted the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner's application for permission was, infact, refused as is clear from the observation in the impugned order dated 26-8-80, and hence there was no question of deemed permission to the petitioner and even if there was any order of the Civil Court that would not override the provisions of sections 5 and 13 of the Act, in as much as section 5 has an overriding effect and in case the petitioner's application for permission was rejected; he mast have filed an appeal under section 7 of the Act and there cannot be any estoppel against the statute and the impugned order was correct. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the points for our determination are as to whether the judgment and order of the civil court dated 11-5-82 (Annexure No. 2) would operate as resjudicata, and whether the petitioner's application for permission would be deemed to have been allowed and next whether under the circumstances of the case, the impugned order was correal. 5. 5. As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the suit for permanent injunction was filed in accordance with the provisions of sections 37 and 38 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, but the provision of section 5 of the Act, has an overriding effect in as much as it opens with a non-obstente clause, i.e., notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force. 6. The cardinal canon of interpretation is as stated in Bradury v. Enfield Borough Council (1967) WRL 1211, that a court is bound to give effect to the clear language of the provision. The belief and assumptions of those who framed the Act cannot make the law. We are conscious that Maxims need not be referred machanically but where it is necessary to explain an aspect of the ease, it can be referred. The Maxim "UT RES MAGIS VALEAT AUAM PEREAT", can notes that it is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it, better the Act prevails than perish, lest intention of legislature may go in vain and also that a statute need not be extended to make a case for which there is no provision (See Tin Sukia Electric Supply Co. v State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123 , and Craies on Statute Law 6th Edition P. 69, 70). The next Maxim "UT RES VALEAT POTIUS PEREAT" connotes that the court would avoid the construction which would fail to relieve the manifest purpose of legislation of the presumption that legislature would enact only for bringing about an effective result (See Film Exhibitor's Guide v. State of A.P., AIR. 1987 AP 110). There is another maxim "VERBA ACCIPIENDA SUNT SECUN DUM SUBJECTAM MATERIEM" which means words are to be interpreted according to subject-matter. 7. Now the provision of section 5 contemplates that whatever might have been said in any other law for the time being inforce, in other words, even though the suit for permanent injunction is filed under the provisions of sections 37 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, but nevertheless that would be subject to what has been provided under different provisions of this Act. To put it differently, whatever might have been the result of an order, as in the present case, the suit for injunction was decreed in favour of the petitioner upholding his possession over the constructions and land in dispute, but as that construction could not have been raised, after the permission of the Collector in writing as contemplated under section 6 was refused, hence that decree of the Civil Court in the suit for injunction would be of no avail to the petitioner as section 5 has got an overriding effect, as the land In suit was situate in the controlled area. Hence the building could have been constructed or re-erected only with the previous permission of the Collector under section 6 of the Act, Even if some building plan might have been approved under the U.P. Municipality Act or under the U.P. Urban Building Regulation and Development Act, but nevertheless that would be of no avail (See Syed. Hasan Irshan v. C.J.M., 1985 ALJ 2034). Even though the petitioner has applied for the permission to repair certain constructions and to raise certain new construction before the Collector Rampur on 20-6-1980, but that permission was refused as is clear from the statement of facts made in the impugned order, when the said application of the petitioner was rejected on 26-8-1980. The case of the petitioner appears that the permission was not refused. This was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but as the statement of fact has been made in the impugned order, the same has to be accepted as correct. The principle of such statement of fact has been stated in State of Maharastra v. V. Ramdas Sri Niwas Naik, AIR 1982 SC 1249 to the effect that the statement of fact, regarding proceedings in any court of law, made by a party recorded in a judgment of the court, is conclusive and not open to be contradicted, only the court recording the fact can rectify the error. In case the petitioner wanted that the statement of fact in the impugned judgment regarding rejection of the petitioner's application for permission to re-erect or to repair the building under section 6 of the Act, was incorrect, in that event, the petitioner must have made an application to the court concerned. Petitioner cannot dispute that statement of fact first on the basis of arguments before this court. Petitioner cannot dispute that statement of fact first on the basis of arguments before this court. We are accordingly of the opinion that the petitioner's application for repair of the building to re-erect the building was rejected. In case, the petitioner was aggrieved by the rejection of his application under section 6, in that event, the right of appeal was provided against such order of rejection under section 7 of the Act. The petitioner must have availed that remedy but having failed to do so, it is now too late to deny that the petitioner's application for permission was not rejected and by implication the same was allowed. As the petitioner's application was rejected and petitioner has raised the construction, in that event, there would be no justification to hold that such construction was legal. It was in violation of the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the Act, and the same was punishable under section 13 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 13 enables the Collector to pass an order to restore to its original state or to bring into conformity with the conditions which have been violated and in case that person fails to do so within three months of the order, it is open to the Collector to take such measures as may appear to him to be necessary to give effect to the order. 8. Section 13 of the Act was not capable of two interpretations, rather only one interpretation was to be placed and it was to the effect that under sub- section (1), the contravention of the provisions of section 12 by the use of any land as brick field or contravention of the provisions of sections 5 and 6 was punishable with fine, which could be extended to Rs. 500/-and in case of continued contravention with further fine of Rs.15/- per day. The Collector has in addition to the power under section 1 and 13, the power to direct the person concerned to bring the construction to its original state as the same existed before the contravention of the provisions of section 6, in other words, the mode provided under Sub-sections 2 and 3 was to be complied with when the doing of any thing is prescribed in a particular manner by statutory provision, it is not open to any court or party to do it, in a different way. In the present case, as section 13(2) enables (he Collector to pass an order to bring the construction in conformity with the original state before the contravention contemplated by section 5 and 6 of the Act, consequently, the order was perfectly valid and consistent with the Intention of the legislature and the mode provided under section 13 of the Act 9. Reverting to the next point, as to whether there can be estoppel against the statute, suffice it to say that the said statutory provisions of sections 5, 6, 7 and 13 were quite clear and section 5 has got overriding effect and it opens with a non-obstante clause. Consequently, there is nothing to undertake and if order/decree was obtained by the petitioner in his favour on the basis of Civil Court decree filed by him, the same would be of no avail as there can not be any estoppel against the statutory provision in view of section 5 of the Act. Even if there was no judgment, order and decree in favour of the petitioner, that would remain subject to provisions of sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Act, in other words, even if the decree was in favour of the petitioner, but that would be rendered insignificant in view of section 5 etc. Consequently, the judgment and decree of the Civil Court neither can operate as bar, nor operate as resjudicata, nor it shall have any effect over the provisions of the Act. Our answer to the questions proposed are that the judgment and decree in favour of the petitioner would not operate as resjudicata, nor it shall have any effect as there is no estoppel against the judgment and the petitioner's application for permission having been rejected, as it is obvious from the statement of fact in the impugned order. Thus, there is no question of 'deemed' application for permission to have been allowed. 10. We do not find any error, much less error apparent in the impugned order. In view of the premises aforesaid and applying priori and Post Priori reasoning, we find petition devoid of merits. Consequently, we dismiss the same without any order as to costs. 11. Thus, there is no question of 'deemed' application for permission to have been allowed. 10. We do not find any error, much less error apparent in the impugned order. In view of the premises aforesaid and applying priori and Post Priori reasoning, we find petition devoid of merits. Consequently, we dismiss the same without any order as to costs. 11. We direct the office to in from within two weeks from the date of receipt of the order, the result of the petition having been dismissed to the Collector Rampur, City Magistrate, Rampur and Sub-Divisional Officer, National Highway and Public Works Department that the aforesaid petition has been dismissed and the interim stay dated 29-4-83 has been vacated and they may proceed 12. A certified copy of this order may be given to the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week from the date of this order. Petition dismissed.