JUDGMENT Gyani, J. 1. Undisputed facts of the case arc that the petitioner was employed in the State Bank of India as Cashier-cum-Clerk and posted as such in Jeewaji Chowk Branch at Gwalior from July 3, 1980 to February 19, 1983, on which date she was transferred to Indore where she joined the next day i.e. February 20, 1983. 2. Admittedly the petitioner operated three accounts, one standing individually in her name, and the remaining two jointly with mother Smt. Indu Sahastrabudhe, and sister Neeta Sahastrabudhe respectively. Her personal account was closed on March 16, 1983. The account held along with mother was closed on June 21, 1983 and with sister on February 18, 1983. More than ten months after her transfer from Gwalior the petitioner was given to understand that certain amount without indicating any break-up approximately Rs. 4980/- had been overdrawn from her accounts, which she was asked on December 29, 1983 to make good which she did. 3. According to the petitioner a draft letter was given to her for writing on the same day December 29, 1983 which she wrote. This letter has been filed as Ann.D. 1 to the petition. Six months after this letter Ann.D. 1, the petitioner was served with a charge sheet on June 26, 1984 charging her with five fictitious credit entries. Out of these five entries it is an admitted position that three entries allegedly made on March 1, 1983, March 16, 1983 and June 20, 1983 are too apparently subsequent to her transfer to Indore on February 19, 1983. One credit entry for Rs. 1000/- is shown to have been made on February 17, 1983, in the joint account held by the petitioner along with her sister Neeta, just a day before it was closed on February 18, 1983 but despite this credit entry of Rs. 1000/- allegedly made on February 17, 1983, the total amount shown and withdrawn as closing balance on February 18, 1983 on closure of account, is only Rs. 78.15p. 4. The petitioner submitted her reply Ann. 'E' to the charge sheet, denying the charges. A domestic inquiry was held on completion of which the petitioner was served with show cause notice proposing termination from service. The petitioner gave detailed reply Ann. to this notice. The disciplinary authority passed impugned order Ann. 'H' against which an appeal was preferred supported by written submissions Ann. 'I'. 'E' to the charge sheet, denying the charges. A domestic inquiry was held on completion of which the petitioner was served with show cause notice proposing termination from service. The petitioner gave detailed reply Ann. to this notice. The disciplinary authority passed impugned order Ann. 'H' against which an appeal was preferred supported by written submissions Ann. 'I'. The appellate authority confirmed the order of termination. The appellate order is Ann 'J' which is dated June 28, 1986. 5. The petitioner has approached this Court challenging impugned orders Ann. 'H' and Ann. 'J'. on the ground of perversity and non-application of mind. 6. It is the petitioner's case that sometime in late 1983 a party was sent from Bhopal to Gwalior to investigate into the working of Jeewaji Chowk Branch, and after some days of investigation it was found that fictitious entries were made in several staff accounts and the same were not balanced for two years. The respondents in their return, admit this position albeit in a guarded manner and with slight reservation and contended that fictitious entries were found only in the petitioner's accounts. As for others their pleaded case is "in other staff accounts there were only over-drafts due to non-posting of letter cheques, withdrawals, and debit-slips working mistakes, mistakes in casting balance, and mistakes in posting of vouchers to correct accounts." Such is the admitted working of the Bank. 7. It may not be out of place to note here at this stage itself, that learned counsel for the respondent was specifically asked to explain, in face of the alleged credit entry of Rs. 1000/-made on February 17, 1983, on closing account on February 18, 1983 the petitioner was paid Rs. 78.15p. He was at pains to explain this glaring discrepancy. 8. Shri Chafekar learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has advanced three-pronged attack - that the findings arrived at in the domestic enquiry are purely based on surmises, they are perverse in reasoning as well as approach of the authorities. Ann. 'D' the letter dated December 29, 1983 obtained from the petitioner has been totally misinterpreted and misconstrued ignoring the context and its real nature, the appellate order is not a speaking order at all. It suffers from total lack of application of mind, more so in the face of written submissions made by the petitioner. 9. Ann. 'D' the letter dated December 29, 1983 obtained from the petitioner has been totally misinterpreted and misconstrued ignoring the context and its real nature, the appellate order is not a speaking order at all. It suffers from total lack of application of mind, more so in the face of written submissions made by the petitioner. 9. Shri Dagaonkar learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank on the other hand subimitted that the petitioner has not said a word that the Ann.D a letter written by the petitioner is not even alleged to have been written under threat or coercion. According to him in face of this letter the petitioner has made a clear admission of charges and no interference with the impugned dismissal orders Ann. 'H' and 'J' is called for. He also denied the charge of perversity of findings. 10. Before proceeding to deal with the perversity of findings it would not be out of place to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. B.C. Goel, (1964-I-LLJ-38) as relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner which also deals with the degree of proof required in such matters at the departmental enquiry. It was a case where the delinquent public officer was charged with serious allegation of offering bribe. The Supreme Court enunciating the principles has held as follows at pages 44-45 "It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311(2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311(2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant, found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence. In fact, in fairness to the learned Attorney-General, we ought to add that he did not seriously dispute this position in law." 11. Quoting with approval the above judgment, the Supreme Court has in Nandkishore v. State of Bihar (1978-II-LLJ-84) held that disciplinary proceedings before the domestic Tribunal are quasi-judicial in nature: (pp.87-88): "Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, we may remind ourselves of the principles, in point, crystallised by judicial decisions. The first of these principles is that disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of a quasi-judicial character, therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i.e. evidential material which with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in the domestic inquiries. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in the domestic inquiries. As pointed out by this court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (supra) "the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocents are not punished applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules." A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, (1984-I-LLJ-2) and a recent judgment as reported in Union of India v. Ramzan Khan, (1991-I-LLJ-29) propounding the quasi-judicial nature of these proceedings. 12. It now remains to be seen in the light of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court whether the respondents have conducted the disciplinary inquiry in accordance with these principles. 13. Just have a look at the approach of the inquiry officer; it would reveal the inherent bias with which the inquiry was conducted, apart from other infirmities that it suffers. 14. Having found the delinquent guilty in the preceding para, the enquiry officer in his report Annexure 'F' proceeds to consider the defence of the petitioner and arrives at a conclusion not supportable by any reasonable hypothesis. Her stand was that she was not at Gwalior branch on being relieved from there on February 19, 1983. The petitioner, it is stated, visited the branch at Gwalior, and to quote from the enquiry report Ann, 'F': "As the other employees visit these previously branches she also visited Gwalior branch but taking into consideration the size of the 'P' Division at Gwalior the possibilities of making entries in ledger cannot (be) fully ruled out and it could very well be possible if some one has the intention to do so." 15. Going by mere possibility, for which there is absolutely no foundation in the evidence, it is concluded that the petitioner is responsible for the entries in the ledger. The enquiry officer does not pause for a while to think about the accessibility how could she have access to these ledgers.? It is not the respondents' case that some one in the Bank had made available the same. 16. The factual background can and should not be lost sight of. It was soon after her marriage that the petitioner was transferred. It is not the respondents' case that some one in the Bank had made available the same. 16. The factual background can and should not be lost sight of. It was soon after her marriage that the petitioner was transferred. If on return to Gwalior she visited the Branch to meet her friends how can it be inferred in absence of any material whatsoever on record on mere possibility that she was responsible for the entries made in the ledgers. It was as well as a casual visit to meet her old colleagues. 17. The enquiry report as such is primarily based on the hand-writing expert's opinion. It relates to the first charge that the employee had made five fraudulent entries in the three accounts. Now this expert opinion apart from keeping aside for a while a question of what evidentiary value the opinion of an expert carries. There is another intrinsic infirmity attached to it. It is the opinion given by the Bank hand-writing expert who is on the regular panel of the Bank. There is another hand-writing expert's opinion available on record. It is a case of opinion versus opinion of hand writing expert and this is how the enquiry officer deals with it which is as under: "The employees all of whom are officers in the bank's service were working at the "personal banking division" of the bank's Gwalior branch. Out of the above five entries except item (i) the initials appearing under the respective columns have been denined by the officials whose initials are copied. This fact has also been confirmed by the Bank's Handwriting Expert who mentioned that these initials are not of the officials whose standard initials have been given to him for examination. But the defence expert while agreeing that 2 out of the 4 disputed initials are not the initials of the officials whose specimen standard initials have been examined by him; whereas the remaining 2 initials i.e. D/2 and D/3 he has not categorically stated that they are not the initials of the officials when examined, but has clearly mentioned that these initials are also not made by Mrs. Bhide. Bhide. The bank's handwriting expert in very clear terms ruled out being all these 4 initials are of the officials but is also unable to opine who has made these initials in case of D-2 and D-4 but has opined in case of D-2 and D-3 that there appears a down stroke with a top loop which looks like 'P' and is very similar to the formation of initials of Smt. Anjali Bhide since this....part in D-2 and D-3 is fairly normally written its similarity with Mrs. Bhide's initials is significant and suggestive of the probability of D2/D3 being made by Smt. Bhide (Page 3 of PEX 25 para 4)." The reasoning of the enquiry officer has to be found in the subsequent para.- "The point arises here who have initialled these 4 of the five entries under reference and with what interest? If without considering time being the opinion reports of the experts, the simple reply a layman will submit- the person who is thus benefited with these acts-" As has been noted above despite the entry of Rs. 1000/- allegedly made on February 17, 1983 on closing of account just next day on February 18, 1983, without there being any withdrawal shown, in the meanwhile all that the petitioner was paid was Rs. 78-15 p. If this was the balance added by deposit of Rs. 1000/- by making fictitious entries as alleged the withdrawal ought to have been Rs. 1078.15. But that is not the case. Yet the inference drawn is who is to be benefited with those acts. Similarly apart from inherent infirmities in going by mere similarity without considering the intrinsic worth of such opinion evidence, it is on closure of account that the amount were paid to the petitioner. The same enquiry officer at one stage while dealing with the expert opinion examined in defence has observed: "The defence had mentioned about the claims of their handwriting expert when compared with Bank's expert and by both the experts have submitted their opinions and it is likely that opinions may not be similar in text or meaning, but the defence expert has agreed with the opinion of the Bank's expert on two disputed initials but where the Bank's expert has suggested the probability of two initials being made by the employee, the defence expert has categorically made an opinion stating that the two viz. D2 and D3 are not of the persons where initials are made, he did not say who made it but added that the employee did not make it. I have my own reservations for judging his opinion so expressed." 18. The opinion expressed by the hand writing expert for whatever worth it is essentially depends on the reasons assigned for forming such opinion. If there are dissimilarities and two disputed signatures do not tally, it is not for the expert to say as to who made it On the basis of material supplied to him he had applied his expertise in arriving at his conclusion whether the disputed signature is that of the person whose admitted signature is supplied to him. As regards D2 and D3 the defence expert had given his categorical opinion and the Bank expert had merely suggested the probability, that too without reasons. 19. Now with this state of affairs prevailing as regards opinion versus opinion and the inherent bias attached to such opinion, considering the same in the background of factual matrix of the case, holding the delinquent guilty of the charge is absolutely without any foundation. The law on the point is well settled. The opinion of handwriting expert is supported by sound reasons. The enquiry officer himself has observed: "I have my own reservations for judging his opinion so expressed." Even without making any reason to judge the opinion it is discarded simply because it comes from the defence expert. 20. There has to be some degree of definite-ness pointing to the guilt of the delinquent, that is what the Supreme Court has all along propounded in the matter of domestic enquiry which is of quasi-judicial nature and in the instant case even this some degree of definiteness is still lacking. 21. Shri Dagaonkar learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank argued that the petitioner is self-confessed and condemned delinquent as is evident from the letter written by her which is dated December 29, 1983 (Ann. R.A.). This letter is put forth and projected by the respondent as trump card. It is reproduced here for ready reference; "To The Br.Manager St.Bank of India. Gwalior. Res, Sir. I am given to understand that there is some irregularities in my three S.B. a/cs to the tune of Rs. 4900/- maintained in your Br. for which I stand liable. R.A.). This letter is put forth and projected by the respondent as trump card. It is reproduced here for ready reference; "To The Br.Manager St.Bank of India. Gwalior. Res, Sir. I am given to understand that there is some irregularities in my three S.B. a/cs to the tune of Rs. 4900/- maintained in your Br. for which I stand liable. I hereby accept my mistakes and am depositing Rs. 4900/- for the loss the bank had to suffer due to my lapses and do assure you sir that I shall not repeat such type of mistakes in future. As I request you to take suitable action against me as you deem fit. Yours faithfully Sd. Mrs. A. Bhide Sd. Sou. Indu Sahastrabudhe Dated December 20, 1983 December 29, 1983" Apart from petitioner, it is also signed by her mother Smt. Indu Sahastrabudhe. How was she required to sign it is not explained. 22. It was argued by the learned counsel appearing for the Bank that there is not a word in the petition that this letter dated December 29, 1983 was either obtained under duress or coercion from the petitioner. The date is significant. As noted earlier she had already been transferred from Gwalior on February 19, 1983 and she joined at Indore the next day i.e. February 20, 1983. It was the time when an inspection team was deputed to go into the state of affairs prevailing in the Gwalior branch. Learned counsel has to some extent accepted that there is no allegation of undue influence or coercion in the petition in obtaining the letter dated December 29, 1983 Ann. R.4 from the petitioner. The petitioner has given back-grounds of event in para 4 of the petition that she was called to Gwalior in the last week of December, 1983 and apprized about the fictitious entries and was called to deposit the amount which she did in good faith. Merely because the allegation of undue influence, duress or coercion is not made, and for good reasons, as the petitioner believed that she was merely asked to make good the loss which the Bank bad to suffer; as an employee of the Bank the excess withdrawal as alleged were made good. The letter itself ex facie shows that she was given to understand that there were some irregularities in her accounts to the tune of Rs. 4900/-. 23. The letter itself ex facie shows that she was given to understand that there were some irregularities in her accounts to the tune of Rs. 4900/-. 23. It is apparent that no break-up was shown to the petitioner. She was asked to make good the over-drawn amount. The actual amount shown as overdrawn is Rs. 4980/-; except for the signature obtained of the petitioner vouchers were also filled in the by Bank on the same day i.e. December 29, 1983 when this draft letter as given to the petitioner was also got written and signed by her. It does not stand to reason that a person having made fictitious entries as alleged by the respondent would postpone withdrawal for such a long time. The authorities have failed to consider this vital aspect of the matter. 24. It was almost six months after obtaining the letter Ann. D on December 29, 1983 that a charge sheet was given to the petitioner on June 26, 1984. The inquiry officer has observed that if the petitioner wanted to contradict it she could have done earlier than July 10, 1984 when she obtained the charge sheet and for not having contradicted, her defence was rejected as an afterthought. 25. A question of afterthought would arise for consideration if the petitioner had been apprised of the fact that she was charged with having made fraudulent entries. On the other hand she was given to understand that certain irregularities in her accounts had been committed and she was called upon to make good the overdrawn amount which she as an employee of the Bank honestly did. If there is any afterthought it is on the part of the respondent-Bank, that having obtained the writing letter has now been exploited for basing the charges of making fraudulent entries. Nothing prevented or could prevent the Bank from coming out with this case even at the stage when the letter D. was obtained. Instead, six months thereafter the charge sheet is issued and it is expected of the delinquent employee to have contradicted the same; there was no occasion to do unless the charge sheet is served. The reasoning of the inquiry officer cannot be approved. 26. The findings are based on pure suspicion and surmises unsupportable by reasons. Instead, six months thereafter the charge sheet is issued and it is expected of the delinquent employee to have contradicted the same; there was no occasion to do unless the charge sheet is served. The reasoning of the inquiry officer cannot be approved. 26. The findings are based on pure suspicion and surmises unsupportable by reasons. Having been transferred from Gwalior branch on December 19, 1983 the petitioner had absolutely no connection with the branch after February 19, 1983 to intermeddle with the entries. Three out of five entries are dated March 1, 1983, March 16, 1983 and June 22, 1983, long after the petitioner had left the branch and the fourth entry is dated February 17, 1983 just two days before she was relieved. There is absolutely no evidence direct or indirect to show that she had at any time handled the relevant ledgers. The inquiry report essentially based is report given by the Bank's handwriting expert As has been observed by the Supreme Court in Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad Isa AIR 1963 SC 1728 , the evidence given by the experts of handwriting can never be conclusive, because it is, after all, opinion evidence. 27. The suggestive probability expressed by the Bank expert D. 2 and D. 3 on account of their similarity is itself indicative of the inherent bias which an expert must always be free from while giving his opinion. 28. Further as the inquiry officer has relied on the statement of Shri Neema examined as P.W. 2 who stated that some of the entries appeared to be in the handwriting of the petitioner, erroneously enough the inquiry officer proceeded under the assumption that this statement has not been challenged. In the cross-examination specific challenge has been drawn to this statement about the entries being in the handwriting of the petitioner and when this particular question was being put pertaining to the entry in question in the same was not allowed on the objection of the presenting officer that the witness is not an expert of handwriting and such suggestion could not be put to him. Surprisingly enough the inquiry officer draws an adverse inference and bases his conclusion on the ground that the statement is not challenged; when in fact it is objected and the objection is allowed. 29. Surprisingly enough the inquiry officer draws an adverse inference and bases his conclusion on the ground that the statement is not challenged; when in fact it is objected and the objection is allowed. 29. Reading the report as it is, one cannot escape the conclusions that an attempt has been made to put the cart before the horse. Reasons are sought for justifying the conclusion. It would further be clear from the approach of the inquiry officer when he says that it is the petitioner who was to be benefited by these entries as it could have been made by no other person than the petitioner. This is really begging question. 30. The deplorable state of affairs that prevailed in the branch apart from the admission made in the written statement can also be gathered from the evidence of Mr. Goyal who in answer to the question what was position of savings bank balancing, whether ledgers were balanced on months to months basis stated that the balancing was in arrears. Jottings were taken every month only partially and that the ledgers could be balanced finally somewhere in 1984. In answer to the specific question which was about that when the ledgers were finally balanced somewhere in 1984 quite a large number of staff accounts were found to be overdrawn and that whether any overdue interest was recovered from any or many of the staff members. Mr. Goyal admits that a few accounts were found over-drawn. 31. A similar admission is made by Mr. Neema that the balancing of ledgers were in arrears since two years and further specifically staff ledgers were not balanced since 1978 and other ledgers were also in arrears for one or two years. Shri C.D. Joshi P.W. 4 had categorically admitted that the balance in the branch was in arrears and team of the officers was put to balancing the arrears and he was one of the team. He further admits that irregularities were found in the staff ledger and these irregularities detected were due to non-posting of debits/ credits and misplacement of credits/ debits in the various accounts. It is in this state of things that the petitioner who was not in any way connected with the posting of ledgers has been found to be responsible on the opinion-evidence of Bank hand writing expert on its regular panel and not on employment. 32. It is in this state of things that the petitioner who was not in any way connected with the posting of ledgers has been found to be responsible on the opinion-evidence of Bank hand writing expert on its regular panel and not on employment. 32. It has come in the evidence that pass books were not given to the staff members in regard to their accounts. In such state of things drawing of accounts, that too on closure, would be done by account holder on the basis of balance appearing in his or her ledger and from the mere fact that she has made any such drawings on the closure of the accounts she has in accordance with the balance shown in the ledger. It could not therefore be said by any stretch of imagination that she had taken advantage of fictitious entries as alleged by the respondent. 33. It is not the respondent's case that the petitioner was shown her accounts while obtaining letter Ann. D but was informed that overdrawings were to the tune of Rs. 4900/-. When she offered to pay the amount she was asked to write the letter in question and as claimed with the draft letter prepared by the Bank authorities. It is also significant to note that the Bank officers themselves prepared the vouchers in respect of individual accounts providing the break-up of the amount of Rs. 4900/-and she was made to sign these vouchers. Shri Goyal P.W. 1 has admitted that this letter dated December 29, 1983 was written in the chamber of the Branch Manager and the vouchers p.5 to p.8 were also prepared in his presence. Strenuously enough they have been treated as an admission of guilt as noted above. The letter begins with "I am given to understand that there is some irregularities in my three S.B. A/cs to the tune of Rs. 4900/-" This sentence itself goes to show that the letter cannot be treated as an admission as has been erroneously done by the inquiry officer. 34. The letter begins with "I am given to understand that there is some irregularities in my three S.B. A/cs to the tune of Rs. 4900/-" This sentence itself goes to show that the letter cannot be treated as an admission as has been erroneously done by the inquiry officer. 34. There is total absence of evidence about petitioner's access to the relevant ledger, much-less handling the same; mere visit to Gwalior branch after transfer and particularly after her marriage can at best be a courtesy visit to meet her old employees, does not lead to the conclusion in absence of any evidence whatsoever that this visit was converted into an opportunity to pick up the ledgers and make spurious entries. 35. So far as second charge is concerned, in the first place the accounts were closed and on closure of accounts the petitioner had withdrawn the sum that were standing as credit balance. The petitioner deposited the amount on being given to understand of the overdrawings. 36. True it is as urged by the learned Counsel for the bank that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution this court does not function as a court of appeal over findings of disciplinary authorities; but where the findings are utterly perverse based on surmises and conjectures, the High Court can always interfere with the same. Proposition can well be referred to in Bhagatram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1983-II-LLJ-l) 37. The findings recorded by the inquiry officer are extremely unreasonable and as such liable to be quashed and are accordingly quashed. 38. So far as the appellate order is concerned, petitioner has raised in her appeal memo important grounds which ought to have been adverted to by the appellate authority. A mere glance at appeal memo would show that serious points have been raised by the petitioner, but none of them has been adverted to. The appellate order can by no stretch be said to meet the minimum requirement of law although it is an order affirming the order of dismissal. 39. A mere glance at appeal memo would show that serious points have been raised by the petitioner, but none of them has been adverted to. The appellate order can by no stretch be said to meet the minimum requirement of law although it is an order affirming the order of dismissal. 39. The Supreme Court after discussing a previous judgment in Tulsiram Patel's case (1985-II-LLJ-206) in Ram Chander v. Union of India (1986-II-LLJ-334) has pointed out the duty of the appellate authority in the following words (p. 343): "......Such being the legal position, it is of utmost importance after the Forty Second Amendment as interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel's case that the appellate authority must not only give a hearing to the Government servant concerned but also pass a reasoned order dealing with the contention raised by him in the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the present case, will promote public confidence in the administrative process. An objective consideration is possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a chance to satisfy the Authority regarding the final orders that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair-play and justice also require that such a personal hearing should be given...." A Full Bench decision of this Court in (AIR 1984 MP 123) Anil Kumar Ojha v. Appellate Authority, District Co-op. Land Development Bank Ltd. has also dealt with this question of the duty of the appellate authority. 40. Ann. 'J' in the reply to the show cause notice but going through the impugned order it would be seen that there is no application of mind. The appellate order cannot be said to be a speaking order passed with due application of mind to the point raised in the appeal memo by the petitioner. It is also liable to be quashed and is accordingly quashed. 41. As a result of the foregoing discussion this petition deserves to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed with costs. The impugned order of dismissal dated May 7, 1986 filed as Ann. 'H' to the petition as also appellate order dated July 20, 1986 affirming the same filed as Ann. 'J' to the petition are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service, with all the ancillary benefits and pay her full backwages. The impugned order of dismissal dated May 7, 1986 filed as Ann. 'H' to the petition as also appellate order dated July 20, 1986 affirming the same filed as Ann. 'J' to the petition are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service, with all the ancillary benefits and pay her full backwages. She will be deemed to be in continued service as if the impugned orders were not passed at all. Counsel fee Rs. 2500/- allowed. Security be refunded after verification.