JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.— In this writ petition under, Articles 226/ 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the order dated 8th January, 1993 of the Municipal Corporation, Shimla (In short the Corporation) whereby two shop Nos. 18 and 19 in Padam Dev Shopping Complex were allotted on lease in favour of M/s. V. K. Thapar Hosiery Mills (respondent No. 3). 2. The Corporation intended to construct a Shopping Complex known as Pt. Padam Dev Commercial Complex on the northern side of the Ridge at Shimla. According to the petitioner, the Corporation issued an advertisement during the year 1984 offering to allot shops in the said Complex at the rate of Rs. 20 per sq. ft. and invited those persons who were desirous to take these shops on rent on deposit of Rs. 45,000 as security. The said Shopping Complex was completed in 1992. The Corporation settled the matter by issuance of due publicity. On 6th December, 1991 and 7th December, 1991, an auction notice was published in two dailies, namely, The Tribune and Dainik Punjab Kesari newspapers The date of public auction was fixed for 21st December, 1991. In response to this auction, six shops including shop Nos. 18 and 19, the subject-matter of this petition, were allotted to the highest bidders. According to the petitioner, some of the shops which were still vacant were to be advertised and put to auction. Consequently, open bid was held and the remaining shops were allotted to the highest bidders in 1992. 3. The petitioner claims that on 6th January, 1993, he reliably learnt that two shops located in the first floor of the Complex were going to be vacated by the earlier allottee Dr. (Mrs.) Tara Kaundal and the Corporation was going to rent out the same to respondent No. 3 without advertising and inviting open offers from the interested persons. He claimed to have made two applications dated 6th January, 1993 (Annexure P-l and P-?) to the Commissioner and Mayor of the Corporation showing his willingness to take on lease shop Nos. 18 and 19 in the said Complex. Through these applications he offered to take the shops on lease at Rs. 31.25 per sq. ft. or 0.10 paise per sq. ft more than that offered by respondent No. 3. 18 and 19 in the said Complex. Through these applications he offered to take the shops on lease at Rs. 31.25 per sq. ft. or 0.10 paise per sq. ft more than that offered by respondent No. 3. The petitioner alleged that he had been visiting the office of the Corporation to make enquiries in this regard but no satisfactory reply was ever given to him. He, therefore, on 13th January, 1993 again submitted applications (copies Annexures P-3 and P-4) to the Commissioner and Mayor reiterating his previous offer to pay 0.10 paise per sq. ft. over and above the offer of any body else. He also requested to be called for negotiations, if considered necessary. The petitioners version is that inspite of all this, the Corporation maintained complete silence on the matter and kept the entire affair as a guarded secret. On 16th January, 1993, the petitioner again went to meet the Mayor for the purpose of making necessary enquiries about the matter, but to his surprise it was disclosed to him by the Mayor that the shops in dispute had already been allotted to respondent No. 3 at Rs. 32 per sq. ft. The petitioner specifically enquired from the Mayor as to how all this had been done, since he had very clearly offered 0.10 paise over and above what had been offered by respondent No. 3, for which the Mayor had no reasonable explanation to offer. 4. It is alleged in the petition that the Corporation while deciding the question of allotment/leasing out of two shops was dealing with public property and while doing so it was expected from respondent No. 2 to adopt a reasonable and fair criteria and could not be permitted to deal with any person to whom it liked in its absolute and unfettered discretion. According to the petitioner the Corporation had leased out the said shops in an arbitrary manner, adverse to the public interest, therefore, allotment suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. It is asserted that on earlier occasions respondent No. 2 had been resorting to the process of advertisement informing interested persons to avail opportunity by making open bid for the purpose of securing lease of such premises on rent. This practice was with the intention of securing more money to the exchequer of respondent No. 2 and also in consonance with the element of reasonableness. This practice was with the intention of securing more money to the exchequer of respondent No. 2 and also in consonance with the element of reasonableness. This established practice/procedure was completely ignored by respondent No. 2 in the present case and the premises in question were leased out to respondent No. 3, completely in a secret manner, arbitrarily and ignoring the higher offer of the petitioner. In this manner respondent No. 2 had sacrificed the financial interest of the public body. 5. The petitioner further alleged that since he clearly offered Rs. 0.10 paise per sq. ft. more than what was offered by respondent No. 3 it was reasonably expected from respondent No. 2 to have afforded an opportunity to him informing the reasons on account of which his offer was not accepted and also the reasons due to which lower rates of respondent No. 3 were being accepted. If respondent No. 2 had granted the lease in favour of respondent No. 3 after negotiating the rates with him, even in that eventuality the petitioner was also entitled to be called for negotiations. The action of respondent No. 2 clearly suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, legal malice and is bad in law. It is further submitted by the petitioner that he reasonably believes that respondent No. 2 had taken the decision to allot the shops in question in favour of respondent No. 3 much before the shops were vacated by Dr. (Mrs.) Tara Kaundal and the possession of the premises was handed over in a clandestine manner during dark hours of night, simultaneously, when the premises were being vacated by previous occupier. The petitioner claims that he made adequate arrangements for setting up his business by arranging finances. The petitioner has challenged that the action of respondent No. 2 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as power has been exercised in an uncontrolled and unfettered manner in dealing with public property for which the entire communitys interests have been sacrified and huge loss was caused to the public exchequer. 6. In opposition to the writ petition, reply-affidavit was filed by Bhim Sen, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, on behalf of respondent No. 2. In its reply, it is admitted that on January 6, 1993, the petitioner had submitted his two applications to the Mayor and to the replying respondent for allotment of shops to be vacated by Dr. 6. In opposition to the writ petition, reply-affidavit was filed by Bhim Sen, Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, on behalf of respondent No. 2. In its reply, it is admitted that on January 6, 1993, the petitioner had submitted his two applications to the Mayor and to the replying respondent for allotment of shops to be vacated by Dr. (Mrs.) Tara Kaundal. It is also admitted that for the allotment of these shops, no advertisement was made nor any offer was invited from any quarter. The reason for not doing so is stated to be that matter of allotment pertaining to these shops was already in process and to give effect to this transaction a few meetings of Finance and Contract Committee were held. In the meeting held on December 26, 1992, the Committee resolved that the application of respondent No. 3 could be considered for the allotment of the shops in question, provided that Smt. Tara Kaundal would vacate these shops and in lieu of vacation by her, she was to be provided a complete floor in the third storey measuring an area of 1967 sq. ft. in the Complex. It is also stated that it was made clear in the said resolution that the allotment of these shops could be made to respondent No. 3 only in the event of vacating them by Smt. Tara Kaundal. The offer of respondent No. 3 was Rs. 31 per sq. ft. per month as rent. Respondent No. 2 has asserted that the offer of the petitioner by making an increase of 0.10 paise per sq. ft. over and above the offer made by respondent No. 3 indicates the offer being "vague and with the intention to put hurdles in the finalisation of the deal of allotment of said shops. There appeared to be no seriousness in this offer and there will be no end to such offer coming in from different persons at different stages. With such an offer it will be difficult for the Corporation to take any decision for the allotment of the shops belonging to the Municipal Corporation. Shimla" It is further asserted that the issue of allotment of these shops was finalised by the Finance and Contract Committee on January 8, 1993, when it was resolved that Shop Nos. With such an offer it will be difficult for the Corporation to take any decision for the allotment of the shops belonging to the Municipal Corporation. Shimla" It is further asserted that the issue of allotment of these shops was finalised by the Finance and Contract Committee on January 8, 1993, when it was resolved that Shop Nos. 18 and 19, situated in Padam Dev Complex be allotted to respondent No. 3, one of the applicants at the rate of Rs. 32 per sq. ft. per month. In the meeting held on January 8, 1993 Shri M. N. Shukhla, the representative of respondent No. 3, S/Shri Dalip Sharma and Swaran Dogra, Advocates, and Dr. N. L. Kaundal, the representative of Poly Clinic and Hospital were present. It is contended that the petitioner who had applied on January 6, 1993 for the allotment of these shops was not present despite the fact that he was verbally informed by the Mayor of respondent No. 2 regarding the meeting to be held on January 8, 1993 for the purpose of allotment of these shops. A note purported to have been put in by the Mayor is quoted as under: - "The applicant Sh, Suneel Mehra had visited nly office with applicationon 6-1-1993 evening. I had informed him that the next meeting regarding allotment of two shops vacated by Mrs Kaundal will be held on 8-1-1993." Adarsh Kumar Commissioner/LO 20-3-1991. 7. The averments made m the reply are that the note of the Mayor makes it sufficiently clear that the petitioner was informed about the meeting to be held on January 8, 1993 for the purpose of allotment of shops. The petitioner for the reasons best known to him intentionally evaded his presence from the meeting. It is also stated that had the petitioner associated in the meeting respondent No. 2 would have given adequate opportunity for making negotiations for the allotment of these shops. It is also admitted that neither the applicants, nor their representatives were informed in writing regarding the meeting to be held on January 8, 1993 for negotiations. They came to know about this meeting of their own or else they were knowing about the date of meeting as they were present on the earlier date of meeting. However, it is denied that the petitioner ever visited the office of respondent No. 2 to make inquiry in this regard. They came to know about this meeting of their own or else they were knowing about the date of meeting as they were present on the earlier date of meeting. However, it is denied that the petitioner ever visited the office of respondent No. 2 to make inquiry in this regard. The allegations of secret deal or any mala fide on the part of respondent No..2 are denied. It is asserted that the allotment of the shops was done after due considerations, negotiations and the premises were allotted in favour of respondent No. 3 who offered the maximum rent. It is also asserted that respondent No. 2 being the commercialised organisation was to see the maximum gain coming out of the transactions whether it could be by way of bid or negotiations and the allotment was made in favour of respondent No. 3, whose application was pending decision since September, 1992. 8. Separate reply was filed by respondent No. 3 on the affidavit of Kailash Thapar, partner of the firm.. In his reply he stated that he came to know in the month of September, 1992 that a Hall (Combined Shops) in the first floor of the Complex was lying vacant and replying respondent was interested in taking it on rent, therefore, he approached the Municipal Corporation for letting out this Hall and submitted his application on 15th September, 1992. However, it transpired later on that since these premises were in litigation, therefore, these could not be let out to the respondent. In the meantime he learnt that the occupant of Shop Nos, 18 and 19, situate in the second floor was interested in exchange of her two shops alongwith the third floor from the top in case respondent No. 2 agreed for such exchange. It is contended that he learnt that the matter was pending consideration with respondent No. 2. He submitted another application and requested respondent No. 2 to let out these shops to him in the event of the occupant of these shops being allowed and exchanged these shops with the third floor from the top. He supported the stand taken by respondent No. 2 in its reply. It is stated in his reply that his representative Sh. He submitted another application and requested respondent No. 2 to let out these shops to him in the event of the occupant of these shops being allowed and exchanged these shops with the third floor from the top. He supported the stand taken by respondent No. 2 in its reply. It is stated in his reply that his representative Sh. M. N. Shukla, Advocate and two other parties, namely, Smt. Tara Kaundal and S/Shri Dalip Sharma and Swaran Dogra, Advocates, were also present in the meeting held on January 8, 1993 by the Finance and Contract Committee of respondent No. 2. The matter was negotiated between the interested parties an 9. The petitioner has filed the rejoinder to the replies filed by the respondents. In his rejoinder, he has reiterated the averments made in the petition and denied the contrary stand taken in two sets of replies filed by the respondents. In his rejoinder, it is alleged that he was never invited for negotiations, nor the Mayor had ever informed him that the meeting of respondent No. 2 for the allotment of shops was to be held on 8th January, 1993. It is asserted that two more applications dated 13th January, 1993 (Annexures P-3 and P-4) were presented by the petitioner to the Commissioner and Mayor and no action appears to have been taken as the petitioner was never informed, nor he was asked by the Mayor to attend the meeting fixed for 8th January, 1993. It is also asserted by the petitioner that the note of the Mayor was written on 20th March, 1993 i. e. nearly two months after the filing of this writ petition and that the stand that the petitioner knew the date of the meeting held on 8th January, 1993 from the Mayor are all after thought. The petitioner has denied his acquaintance with respondent No. 3 and also his meeting on the evening of 7th January, 1993 with him. He has also denied that he is under liability to the Municipal Corporation New Delhi. He submitted that he has ceased to incur any liability to the payment of any rental to the New Delhi Municipal Corporation since long. 10. He has also denied that he is under liability to the Municipal Corporation New Delhi. He submitted that he has ceased to incur any liability to the payment of any rental to the New Delhi Municipal Corporation since long. 10. The petitioner has also filed rejoinder to the supplementary affidavit filed by respondent No. 3, in which he said that he had no knowledge about the recovery certificate issued by the Collector, Delhi to the Collector, Shimla, as he never received the same. He has stated that he had inducted Shri Jaspal Singh as his business partner in May, 1988 and had withdrawn himself from the said business and thereafter the liabilities of the shops were also taken over by Shri Jaspal Singh with effect from 15th September, 1988. He has filed a photocopy of the affidavit of Shri Jaspal Singh, to support his version. . 11. The petition was filed in this Court on 20th January, 1993, which came for motion on 22nd January, 1993 before the learned vacation Judge. The learned vacation Judge, passed order in the following terms: "Present : Shri M. S. Chandel, Advocate, for. the petitioner. Shri G. D. Verma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No. 1. CMP No. 209 of 93 Allowed. CWP No. 96 of93 Notice to show-cause why rule nisi be not issued returnable on 16th March, 1993. Notice is accepted on behalf of respondent No. 1 by Shri G. D. Verma, learned Additional Advocate General, who prays for and is allowed four weeks time to file reply. Rejoinder, if any, be filed within two weeks thereafter. CMP No. 208 o/93 Notice. Notice need not be issued to respondent No. 1 since the same has been accepted by G. D. Verma, learned Additional Advocate General, who prays for and is allowed four weeks time to file reply. Rejoinder, if any, within two weeks thereafter. Till further orders operation of the order of allotment of shop Nos. 18 and 19 in Padam Dev Marketing Complex on the north side of the Ridge at Shimla by respondent No. 2 in favour of respondent No. 3 is stayed. Respondent No. 3 is directed not to change the nature of the shops in question, in any manner, and respondent No. 2 shall ensure that the shops in question are not commissioned nor any business activities conducted therein by respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 3 is directed not to change the nature of the shops in question, in any manner, and respondent No. 2 shall ensure that the shops in question are not commissioned nor any business activities conducted therein by respondent No. 3. Dasti copy on usual terms." 12. The parties exchanged their affidavits and ultimately the matter was finally heard on 26th July, 1993 at the admission stage itself. During the course of arguments, we directed Shri H. R. Thakur, learned Counsel) for the Corporation, to produce complete file of transaction in question for our perusal, which was produced by him at the time of final arguments, 13. The Corporation has constituted a Finance and Contracts Committee under section 41 (4) of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation Act) to exercise all the powers of the Corporation in relation to contracts to be entered into for and on its behalf and the purchases to be made by it. In terms of section 64 of the Corporation Act, regulations called The Shimla Municipal Corporation (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1984 have been made. Part II deals with Procedure and Conduct of Business of the Corporation. 14. We have examined file No. IVth Vol., which contain the procedure and mode adopted by the Corporation for the purpose of allotment of the shops in the Complex to the interested persons. The Corporation invited tenders for leasing six shops on annual lease basis to be renewed every year. On 6th December, 1991 and 7th December, 1991 an auction notification was published in dailies like The Tribune and Dainik Punjab Kesari newspapers. In response to the notification, 28 applicants applied for the allotment of the shops. Public auction was held on 21 st December, 1991. Out of the total number of shops, shop Nos. 18 and 19, subject-matter of this petition, were leased in favour of Smt. Tara Kaundal being the highest tenderer on monthly rent of Rs. 6,250 and Rs. 8,000, respectively. The register maintained by the Finance and Contracts Committee relating to its various meetings shows that in the meeting held on 26th December, 1992 the Committee resolved that the application of respondent No. 3 could be considered for the allotment of shop Nos. 18 and 19 provided that Smt. Tara Kaundal would vacate the shops. 6,250 and Rs. 8,000, respectively. The register maintained by the Finance and Contracts Committee relating to its various meetings shows that in the meeting held on 26th December, 1992 the Committee resolved that the application of respondent No. 3 could be considered for the allotment of shop Nos. 18 and 19 provided that Smt. Tara Kaundal would vacate the shops. The fact that the minimum amount which was disclosed by the petitioner in respect of these shops was Rs. 0.10 paise over and above the rate quoted by respondent No. 3, has remained admitted by the Corporation so also, the assertion that the rate was settled by the Corporation and respondent No. 3 for Rs. 32 per sq. ft. per month only. It is also admitted in the reply filed by Bhim Sen, Commissioner of the Corporation that on 6th January, 1993, the petitioner had submitted his two applications to him and the Mayor for the allotment of shops to be vacated by Dr (Mrs.) Tara Kaundal. It is also admitted that for the allotment of these shops no advertisement was made nor any offer was invited from any quarter. It is maintained by the Corporation-and respondent No. 3 that the petitioner with due diligence and reasonable care could have come and attended the negotiations meeting held on 8th January, 1993 by the Committee of the Corporation. He has not done so. He cannot, therefore, complain now. 15. The Corporation docs not aver that there is any statutory rules or principles laid down by which the shops could be allotted by negotiations. In its reply, the Corporation has not satisfactorily spelt out why the earlier practice/procedure in putting the shops to open auction through auction notice published in two vernacular newspapers was not adopted in this case. 16. The only question that arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances the Corporation was justified in leasing the premises in dispute by private negotiations in favour of respondent No. 3. The apex Court has, in catena of judgments, held that the State owned or public owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the Executive. The apex Court has, in catena of judgments, held that the State owned or public owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the Executive. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 at p; 1642, Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed: "Now, obviously where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would, in the exercise of its power or discretion, be subject to the same constitutional or public law limitations as Government. The rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government which we have discussed above must apply equally where such corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs of entering into contracts or otherwise, and it cannot act arbitrarily and enter into relationship with any person it likes as its sweet will, but its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14. It is now well settled as a result of decisions of this Court in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and 1 elevant principle which is non-discriminatory ; it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations, because that would be denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is protected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory." 17. In Kasturi Lai Lakshmi Reddy y. State ofj. The State cannot, therefore, act arbitrarily in entering into relationship, contractual or otherwise with a third party, but its action must conform to some standard or norm which is rational and non-discriminatory." 17. In Kasturi Lai Lakshmi Reddy y. State ofj. and K., AIR 1980 SC 1992 at p. 1999, Bhagwati, J. again speaking for the Court reiterated what he said earlier in R. D. Shettys case (supra), it is further observed : "Every action taken by the Government must be in public interest, the Government cannot act arbitrarily and without reason and if it does, its action would be liable to be invalidated. If the Government awards a contract or leases out or otherwise deals with its property or grants any other largess, it would be liable to be tested for its validity on the touchstone of reasonableness and public interest and if fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid." 18. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1981 SC 344 at p. 350, Chandrachud, C. J., observed :— "We want to make it clear that we do not doubt the bona fides of the authorities, but as far as possible, sales of public property, when the intention is to get the best price ought to take place publicly. The vendors are not necessarily bound to accept the highest or any other offer, but the public at least get the satisfaction that the Government has put all its cards on the table. In the instant case, the officers who were concerned with the sale have inevitably, though unjustifiably attracted *he criticism that during the course of negotiations the original bid was reduced without a justifying cause. We had willingly to spend quite some valuable time in satisfying ourselves that the reduction in the price was a necessary and fair consequences of the reduction in the quantity of the goods later offered for sale on March 31, 1980. We had willingly to spend quite some valuable time in satisfying ourselves that the reduction in the price was a necessary and fair consequences of the reduction in the quantity of the goods later offered for sale on March 31, 1980. One cannot exclude the possibility that a better price might have been realised in a fresh public auction but such possibilities cannot vitiate the sale or justify the allegations of mala fides." In Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1987 SC 1109 at p. 1133, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. after considering almost all the decisions of the Court on the subject summarised the propositions in the following terms : "On a consideration of the relevant cases cited at the bar the following propositions may be taken as well established : State owned or public owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property is to sell the property by public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is an important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery 01 nepotism." 19. in Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corporation, AIR 1988 SC 157, Jagannatha Shetty, J. speaking for the Court in paragraph 14, observed: "The public property owned by the State or by any instrumentality of the State should be generally sold by public auction or by inviting tenders. This Court has been insisting upon that rule, not only to get the highest price for the property but also to ensure fairness in the activities of the State and public authorities. They should undoubtedly act fairly. Their actions should be legitimate. Their dealings should be above board. Their transactions should be without aversion or affection. Nothing should be suggestive of discrimination. Nothing should be done by them which gives an impression of bias, favouritism or nepotism. They should undoubtedly act fairly. Their actions should be legitimate. Their dealings should be above board. Their transactions should be without aversion or affection. Nothing should be suggestive of discrimination. Nothing should be done by them which gives an impression of bias, favouritism or nepotism. Ordinarily these factors would be absent if the matter is brought to public auction or sale by tenders. That is why the Court repeatedly stated and reiterated that the State owned properties are required to be disposed of publicly. But that is not the only rule. As O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed "that though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule". There may be situations necessitating departure from the rule, but then such instances must be justified by compulsions and not by compromise. It must be justified by compelling reasons and not by just convenience." 20. In Mahabir Auto Stores and others v. Indian Oil Corporation and others, AIR 1990 SC 1031, Sabyasachi Mukharji, C. J., in paragraphs 12 and 13, stated thus : "The State acts in its executive power under Article 298 of the Constitution in entering or not entering in contracts with individual parties. Article 14 of the Constitution would be applicable to those exercise of power. Therefore, the action of State organ can be checked under Article 14. Every action of the State executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason, So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, it should meet the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. If a Governmental action even in the matters of entering or not entering into contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable. Rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-dissemination. ft is well settled that there can be "malice in law". ft is well settled that there can be "malice in law". Existence of such "malice in law" is part of the critical apparatus of a particular action in administrative law. Indeed "malice in law" is part of the dimension of the rule of relevance and reason as well as the rule of fair play in action." 21. In the present case the petitioner submitted his application quoting higher rates than respondent No. 3... His application was not properly considered, nor he was called for negotiations. The Corporation in its reply has asserted that he was verbally informed by the Mayor about the meeting to be held on 8th January, 1993, and a note to this effect had been put by the Mayor on 20th March, 1993. This plea of the Corporation cannot be accepted for various reasons. Firstly, the minutes of the meeting of Finance and Contracts Committee held on 8th January 1993 contained at page 190 of the proceedings file, disclose that the Committee vide its Resolution No. 3 in its meeting held on 26th December 1992 decided that respondent No. 3 and Director of Poly Clinic and Hospital be directed to be present for negotiations in the next meeting. These two parties were already informed by the President (Estate) of the Corporation to be present in the meeting to be held on 2nd January, 1993 and the matter was again taken up in the meeting held on 8th January 1993 at 3 p. m. It is mentioned in those proceedings that the petitioners application was received on 6th January, 1993 and he was absent It was resolved in this meeting that Sh. M. N. Shukla, the representative of respondent No. 3 offered to take shop Nos. 18 and 19 and corridor in front of these shops on lease at the rate of Rs. 32 per sq. ft. per month and that offer was accepted by the Committee. The reasons incorporated by the Corporation in its reply are not found mentioned in this Resolution at the time of consideration of the petitioners claim, who admittedly offered 0 10 paise over and above the offer of respondent No. 3. Secondly, it has not been stated in this Resolution that the petitioner was informed by the Mayor verbally about the date of holding of the meeting as stated in the reply. Secondly, it has not been stated in this Resolution that the petitioner was informed by the Mayor verbally about the date of holding of the meeting as stated in the reply. It is pertinent to note that the Mayor was one of the member of the Committee in its meeting held on 8th January, 1993. The note was written by the Mayor on 20th March, 1993, nearly two months after the filing of the writ petition and after stay had been granted by this Court The third, reason is that there is no denial on affidavit of the Mayor of the petitioners stand that he was not informed of the date of negotiation by the Mayor, In the facts and circumstances it cannot be said that the petitioner was informed verbally about the date of the meeting and was called for negotiations in the said meeting by the Mayor. The stand of the Corporation cannot be accepted. It is apparent that decision, if any taken on the applications of the petitioner was never communicated to him by the Corporation. 22. Due publicity of the proposed leasing out of the two shops ought to have been made by the Corporation in such a manner so as to rule out any possibility of an allegation, like the one as made in the present case, that only a chosen person came to know about the settlement. In the absence of any pre-existing rule or guideline in the matter, it would appear quite reasonable to hold that the publicity should be given sufficiently in advance, of the proposed lease by publication of the notice at least in one vernacular newspaper having sufficient circulation in the area. Else, like in the present case an action, however, bona fide may attract criticism of the nature which has been levelled against the Corporation and respondent No. 3 in the present case. If publicity had been made by publication in a newspaper as done earlier also, many more persons might have been attracted to the site and might have offered higher amount, adding to the revenue of the Local Body. The petitioner has discharged his burden by showing proper and adequate material that the action taken by the Corporation is unreasonable or without public interest. 23. The petitioner has discharged his burden by showing proper and adequate material that the action taken by the Corporation is unreasonable or without public interest. 23. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the discussions made above, the decision of the Committee in allotting shop Nos. 18 and 19 in favour of respondent No. 3 deserves to be quashed and set aside and we accordingly, do so. We consider it expedient to direct respondent No. 2 to allot the two shops only after giving due publicity to the notice in at least one vernacular newspaper having wide circulation in the area apart from any other mode including distribution of hand bill etc. The Corporation is directed to take early steps in the light of what we have said above, for making allotment of two shops. We have been told by Mr. M. S. Chandel, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that petitioner will be prepared to offer minimum bid of Rs. 32.10 paise per sq. ft. per month for these shops. If the petitioner does so he may also participate in the auction to be held for these shops. The Corporation shall fix the minimum lease amount at the rate of Rs. 32.10 paise per sq. ft. per month. The Corporation is directed that it will commence and conclude the process for fresh allotment of these shops within a period of six weeks from today. 24. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Writ allowed. -