S. P. RAJKHOWA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application is directed against the judgment and order dated 9-9-1991 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Third Court, Barasat in Misc. Appeal No. 148 of 1990, arising out of Order No. 16 dated 22/08/1990 passed by the learned Munsif, First Court, Barasat in Title Suit No. 91 of 1990. ( 2 ) BEFORE discussing the impugned order, I propose to make a discussion of the whole background which gave rise to the instant revisional application. ( 3 ) DHIREN Roy and Barindra Mitra who are opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 respectively in this revisional application filed on 14-5-1979 Title Suit No. 214 of 1979 in the Court of learned Munsif, Third Court at Sealdah, praying for a decree of ejectment of M/s. Premier Woodcrafts Pvt. Ltd. , who is the petitioner in this revisional application. In the first paragraph of the plaint it was stated that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of one Bungalow at the ground floor at Ganganagar, Jessore Road, Police Station Airport, District-24 Parganas. In the second paragraph it was stated that the suit property was situated outside the municipal area and, therefore, the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable to the instant case. The petitioner before me contested the suit by filing a written statement in which inter alia he averred in paragraph 6 that the statements contained in paragraph 1 of the plaint were substantially correct, but that the description of the suit premises had not been correctly described. The learned Munsif held that admittedly the defendant was inducted as tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises. He also found that the plaintiffs had adduced evidence that the suit premises fell outside the municipal area. The defendant did not adduce any evidence on that point. The defence also did not cross-examine the plaintiff (P. W. 1) on this point. So, he held that the suit premises was situated outside the municipal area and that the provisions of Transfer of Property Act were attracted. On the basis of his findings the learned Munsif decreed the suit on 8/04/1985. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved, the petitioner came up before the learned Assistant District Judge, Ninth Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 480 of 1985. On the basis of his findings the learned Munsif decreed the suit on 8/04/1985. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved, the petitioner came up before the learned Assistant District Judge, Ninth Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 480 of 1985. The petitioner appellant raised two points before the lower appellate court that the suit premises was located under the municipal area and it came under the purview of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and that the notice was not legal and valid as it was not duly served upon the defendants. During argument it was admitted that the defendant was a tenant in the suit premises under the plaintiffs. The learned Counsel for the appellant petitioner frankly admitted before the lower appellate court that he had no document to show that the suit premises was located within the municipal area. So, the learned lower appellate court decided that the suit premises was located outside any municipal area and that the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act were not attracted and that it would be governed by the Transfer of Property Act. On the point of notice, the learned lower appellate found that the notice was validly served upon the defendant. On the basis of his findings he dismissed the Appeal by his judgment and decree dated 28-11-86 and confirmed the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved thereby the petitioner filed the Second Appeal Tender No. 1252 of 1987 which was subsequently registered as S. A. 16 of 1989. I was told at the Bar that the said Appeal is still pending and the petitioner/appellant has not as, yet taken any steps for admission of the Appeal under O. 41, R. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 6 ) IN the meantime Ajoy Jhunjhunwala, son of late S. K. Jhunjhunwala, who was a Director of the defendant company, filed a petition on 26-10-88 under S. 144 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Executive Magistrate, Barrackpore and obtained an order in his favour to the effect that the Officer-in-Charge of the Airport Police Station would see that there should not be any disturbance in peaceful possession of the first party in his, tenanted premises (i. e. suit premises ). ( 7 ) THEREAFTER Ajoy Jhunjhunwala along with the defendant company came up before this Court in its Writ Jurisdiction in C. O. 11873 (W) of 1988 and obtained an order on 5-11-88 in their favour as the writ Court directed the police authorities to render an adequate police protection to the family members of the petitioner and the employees who were residing in the suit premises and restrained the plaintiffs/respondents from cutting down any tree from the garden appertaining to the suit premises. ( 8 ) THE plaintiffs/respondents then filed an appeal being F. M. A. T. No. 3332 of 1988 against the order dated 5/11/1988 passed by the Writ Court. A Division Bench of this Court hearing the said Appeal on 17-1-89 not only allowed the appeal but also rejected the writ application on the ground that the dispute was a private one and that apart a Second Appeal was pending before this Court. ( 9 ) AFTER almost exhausting all the legal procedures the petitioner/judgment-debtor filed an application under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Title Execution Case No. 43 of 1985. The application was registered as Misc. Case No. 19 of 1989. In the said application it was contended that the decree obtained by the plaintiff/decree-holder/opposite party was not executable, as according to the petitioner, the Court passing the decree had no jurisdiction to pass the same, and that due to inadvertence, the question of jurisdiction could not be raised at the time of trial. It was further contended that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the decree-holder and the judgment debtor and that the judgment-debtor was a tenant under a concern named and styled as Darbari Udyog. The learned Executing Court by its order No. 37 dated 13-5-89 has held that except the point of territorial jurisdiction other points could not be agitated again which were finally settled by that Court and confirmed by the appellate court. So he took up for decision only the point whether the suit property was within the Barasat Police Station or within Dum Dum Airport Police Station. The learned Executing Court has pointed out that it was already decided by the Appellate Court that the suit premises were situated at Ganganagar under Dum Dum Airport Police Station which was not covered under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The learned Executing Court has pointed out that it was already decided by the Appellate Court that the suit premises were situated at Ganganagar under Dum Dum Airport Police Station which was not covered under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. He has further observed that this point of territorial jurisdiction was never agitated before and that the judgment-debtor should have availed of the earliest possible opportunity to raise this dispute which they did not and on the basis of his findings and observations dismissed the Misc. Case relating to the petition under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 10 ) YET, there is no end in sight. The petitioner judgment-debtor came up in revision in this Court in C. O. No. 3309 of 1989 and by order dated 12-12-89 a learned single Judge of this Court has observed that the "petitioner took several pleas to resist the execution in the court below. The executing court rightly found that he cannot enter into those points since he cannot go behind the decree. He investigated as to whether the trial court had territorial jurisdiction to decide the suit. One line answer that the executing court will not go behind the decree would suffice to dispose of the objection. In revision also the petitioner very much presses his objection as to the territorial jurisdiction. The positive finding of the two courts below as per the impugned judgment is that the disputed property is at Garrganagar under P. S. Dum Dum Airport in respect of which the trial court had jurisdiction. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be heard to say now that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to decide the suit". The learned Judge has further held that there is absolutely no substance in the revisional application and rejected the same and directed the executing court to execute the decree. ( 11 ) ONE would have thought the matter ended there, but we would be deceived if we think so. Perhaps acting on the principle that the attack is the best form of defence, the petitioner/judgment debtor has filed the Title Suit No. 91 of 1990 in the court of the learned Munsif, First Court at Barasat against Darbari Udyog as defendant No. 1 and the plaintiffs decree-holders, Dhiren Roy and Barindra Mitra, as defendants Nos. Perhaps acting on the principle that the attack is the best form of defence, the petitioner/judgment debtor has filed the Title Suit No. 91 of 1990 in the court of the learned Munsif, First Court at Barasat against Darbari Udyog as defendant No. 1 and the plaintiffs decree-holders, Dhiren Roy and Barindra Mitra, as defendants Nos. 2 and 3 along with others praying for a declaration that M/s. Premier Woodcrafts Pvt. Ltd. , is a monthly tenant under the defendant No. 1 and that the decree obtained by the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in Title Suit No. 214 of 1979 was fraudulently obtained and, therefore void ab initio. Along with the suit an application under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed. By Order No. 16 dated 22-8-90 the learned Munsif, First Court, Barasat dismissed that application on contest. The judgment-debtor/plaintiff/petitioner then moved before the learned Additional District Judge Third Court, Barasat in Misc. Appeal No. 148 of 1990. After thoroughly going through the pros and cons of the matter the learned Judge by his judgment dated 9-9-91 dismissed the Misc. Appeal. ( 12 ) THE game is not yet over. The judgment debtor-plaintiff-petitioner has come up before this Court in this revisional application in C. O. No. 3542 of 1991. ( 13 ) MR. Asok Kumar Banerjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Title Suit No. 91 of 1990 has been filed against Darbari Udyogs principal defendant No. 1 and the decree-holders of Title Suit No. 214 of 1979 as the other two principal defendants. The relief sought in the suit is for a declaration that the plaintiff is a tenant under defendant No. 1 and, therefore, the decree passed in Title Suit No. 214 of 1979 was obtained fraudulently and that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in Title Suit No. 91 of 1990. As such, the instant suit shall not come under S. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and that the said decree will not operate as a bar to the maintenance of the instant suit, and that unless the plaintiff's petition under O. 39, Rr. 2 and 3 in Title Suit No. 91 of 1990. As such, the instant suit shall not come under S. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code and that the said decree will not operate as a bar to the maintenance of the instant suit, and that unless the plaintiff's petition under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code is allowed till the disposal of the suit, the decree-holder will put the decree into execution and if he is evicted thereunder he will suffer irreparable loss and the whole purpose of filing the Title Suit No. 91 of 1990 will be frustrated. ( 14 ) AS against the submissions of Mr. Banerjee, Mr. S. P. Roy Chowdhury, learned counsel for the decree-holders/opposite parties has submitted that not only the application under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure but the instant suit as a whole is not maintainable in the eye of law. In support of his contentions he has relied upon various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. First, he has taken the provisions under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 47 (1) of the Code lays down as follows :"all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit". Mr. Roy Chowdhury has laid emphasis on the clause, not by a separate suit, and has submitted that the petitioner/judgment debtor had ample scope to raise all questions regarding the execution of the decree when he filed the petition under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Munsif after hearing both sides had rejected that application and the matter came to an end then and there. No relief can be claimed now by filing a separate suit on the self-same subject matter involving the same question already agitated in the application filed under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel has relied upon the provisions of S. 21 and section 21 (A) of the Code of Civil Procedure. No relief can be claimed now by filing a separate suit on the self-same subject matter involving the same question already agitated in the application filed under S. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel has relied upon the provisions of S. 21 and section 21 (A) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 21 (1) lays down that -"no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent Failure of justice". Section 21 (A) of the Code lays down that -"no suit shall lie challenging the validity of a decree passed in a former suit between the same parties, or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, or any ground based on an objection as to the place of suing". The learned counsel has referred to Order 41 rule 5 (1) of the Code. This rule lays down that -"an appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree". The learned counsel has referred to the Second Appeal No. 116 of 1989 filed by the petitioner in this Court which is still pending for admission under Order 41 rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. So in view of the provisions of rule 5 (1) of the Code, Title Execution Case No. 43 of 1985 pending before the Court of the learned Munsif, Third Court, Sealdah cannot be stayed. The learned counsel has further drawn my attention to explanation (iv) and explanation (vii) of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In my considered opinion, the subject matter of Title Suit No. 214 of 1979 and of Title Suit No. 91 of 1990 are substantially same and, therefore, I have been with no option but to accept the submissions of Mr. In my considered opinion, the subject matter of Title Suit No. 214 of 1979 and of Title Suit No. 91 of 1990 are substantially same and, therefore, I have been with no option but to accept the submissions of Mr. Roy Chowdhury and hold that this revisional application is without merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. ( 15 ) IN legal parlance we say use and abuse of judicial process. Judicial process is used by a person to enforce his legal right to stop interference by others to the exercise of such right. The process is abused if a person tries to frustrate the exercise of such right without any just cause. In this case I am convinced that the petitioner resorted to all means, fair or foul, to thwart the execution proceeding so as to deprive the decree-holders from getting the reliefs which they were legally entitled to. Every proceeding has a beginning, a middle and an end. But the judgment-debtor's target is the infinity. He may find pleasure in it, but I am not at all amused. ( 16 ) THE result is that the revisional application is dismissed with cost which I assess at 50 (fifty) gold mohurs to be paid by the petitioner to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Revision dismissed.