Judgment S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Vedic Higher Secondary School, Faizpur, Ninana district Meerut is an educational institution which is duly recognised under the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. This Institution receives grants-in aid from the State Government and is managed by a committee of management contemplated under a scheme of administration envisaged under the Regulations, which is duly approved by the competent authority. 2. The dispute raised by the respondent No. 2 with regard to the occurrence of casual vacancy in the office of the Manager in the aforesaid committee of management consequent upon the order dated 23-4-1992 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, granting recognition to the appellant No. 2 as Manager, who was alleged to have been elected filling up the said vacancy led to the passing of the order dated 14-8-92 whereunder the District Inspector of Schools coming to the conclusion that infact no casual vacancy had come into existence, cancelled his earlier order dated 23-4-1992 with a direction that the respondent No. 2 who had been recognised as Manager prior to the alleged accrual of vacancy shall continue as before. Feeling aggrieved, the present appellants, challenged the aforesaid order by means of a writ petition which has been dismissed by a learned Single Judge. The petitioner appellants have now come up in special appeal for redress seeking reversal of the impugned judgment. 3. Briefly put, the case of the appellants is that a casual vacancy in the office of the Manager of the Committee of Management running and managing the institution came into existence on 23-3-1992 on account of passing of the motion of no confidence against the respondent No. 2 which resulted in his ouster from the office of the Manager. The appellants further assert that the committee of management had passed another resolution on the same day recommending for holding the respondent No. 2 ineligible to retain his membership of the general body of the society which recommendation was accepted by the general body of the society under its resolution dated 13-4-1992 with the result that the respondent No. 2 automatically ceased to hold the office of the Manager at least from the said date rendering the said office vacant. The vacancy caused in the office of the Manager was filled up according to the appellants, by enacting the appellant No. 2 to hold the said post vide resolution No. 4 adopted on 23-3-1992. It is asserted that the District Inspector of Schools granted recognition to the appellant No. 2 as Manager vide his order dated 23-4-1992 and as such he was entitled to continue to hold the said office for the remainder of the term of the committee of management 4. The respondent No. 2 has however, claimed that no casual vacancy in the office of the Manager had come into existence as alleged and he is continuing to hold the said post uninterruptedly. His case is that infact no meeting of either the committee of management of the general body was ever held and the resolutions relied upon by the appellants were never passed or adopted as alleged resulting in either his ouster from the office of the Manager or Installation of appellant No. 2 in the said office. He asserts that on coming to know of the order dated 23-4-1992, he brought his grievances to the notice of the District Inspector of Schools who after examining the materials and evidence led before him felt satisfied about the non accrual of the vacancy in the office of the Manager and consequently cancelled his order dated 23-4-1992 restoring the status-quo ante which action was not only within competence but was fully justified and calls for no interference by this Court. We have heard Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Ashok Khare, learned counsel representing the respondent No. 2 as well as the learned Standing Counsel and have also carefully perused the record. 5. From the materials on the record, it is evident that on 2-6-1992, the respondent No. 2 had moved an application before the District Inspector of Schools asserting that even though he had been duly recognised as Manager with the attestation of his signatures as such on 10-9-1990 yet surprisingly, the salary bill for the month of April, 1992 which had been submitted by Sri Jaswant Singh had been passed which was illegal. In the said application the respondent No. 2 asserted that Adhyaksha of the Committee of Management acting in collusion with several persons had manufactured a fictitious resolution showing the acceptance/adoption of a motion of no confidence against him and the Adhyaksha appeared to have misled the District Inspector of Schools as no meeting of the Committee of Management had been held on 23-3-1992. It was asserted in the said application that the motion of no confidence said to have been passed against the respondent No. 2 was fictitious and it was requested by him that suitable orders be issued so that Jaswant Singh may not interfere in his functioning as the Manager. 6. On the receipt of the aforesaid application, the District Inspector of Schools appears to have issued a notice dated 15-6-1992 addressed to the Adhyaksha informing him that the representation of Narsingh Arya, respondent No. 2 dated 2-6-1992 shall be heard on 20-6-1992. In this notice it had been specifically mentioned that the hearing shall be in the matter relating to the validity of the resolution concerning the motion of no confidence and that he should attend the hearing alongwlth all the evidence and materials sought to be relied upon in this connection. The District Inspector of Schools further required the Adhyaksha to submit his comments/report on the assertions made in the representation of Narsingh Arya, the respondent No. 2. A copy of this notice also appears to have been sent to the respondent No. 2 intimating him that he should attend the hearing on the date fixed alongwith the materials and evidence sought to be relied upon in support of his claim. It further appears that on 30-6-1992 Rajbir Singh, the Adhyaksha moved an application through the Principal of the institution raising certain preliminary objections in the matter, A copy of this application has been filed as Annexure-24 of the writ petition Further it also appears that the appellant No. 2 was present in the office of the District Inspector of Schools on 30- 6-1992 and as is apparent from his application dated 24-7-1992, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-25 of the writ petition. He same to know about the pendency of the proceedings on the said date. He same to know about the pendency of the proceedings on the said date. This application further discloses that the appellants orally sought for an opportunity to present his case on 30th June, 1992 in the aforesaid application, the appellant had categorically asserted that he came to know about the proceedings on 30.6-1992. 7. The District Inspector of Schools disposed of the representation dated 2-6-1992 vide the order dated 14-8-1992 where under it was held that the resolution leading to the motion of no confidence dated 23-3-1992 could not be deemed to a resolution contemplated under para 10(2) of the Scheme of Administration as it had not been passed by two third members of the committee of management and thus it could not result in the ouster of the respondent No. 2 from the office of the Manager. He further held that the approval of the general body to such an invalid resolution could not cure the defect and was of no consequence. On appraisal of evidence led before him the District Inspector of Schools recorded a finding that Rajbir Singh, Adhyaksha had obtained an earlier order dated 23-4-1992 on misrepresentation and suppression of material facts and on the basis of fictitious documents. Consequently the District Inspector of Schools cancelled his said order dated 23-4-1992 with a direction that Sri Narsingh Arya, the respondent No 2 shall continue as Manager. 8. The learned Single Judge has upheld the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools, holding that the finding recorded by him, which had been arrived at on an appraisal of evidence were not liable to be interfered with. THE learned Single Judge has further held that the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools was well within jurisdiction as this authority has ample Jurisdiction to prima facie determine as to who was the valid Manager. Learned Single Judge however, clarified that the determination by the District Inspector of Schools is only a prima facie determination and is subject to the decision of a regular civil suit. The learned Counsel for the appellant has, in support of this appeal urged that the District Inspector of Schools has no jurisdiction at all to recognise the respondent No. 2 as the Manager of the committee of management disregarding the resolution where under the motion of no confidence against him had been passed. The learned Counsel for the appellant has, in support of this appeal urged that the District Inspector of Schools has no jurisdiction at all to recognise the respondent No. 2 as the Manager of the committee of management disregarding the resolution where under the motion of no confidence against him had been passed. What has been asserted is that it was not open to the District Inspector of Schools to go Into the validity or otherwise of the proceedings where under the aforesaid resolution had been passed, which according to the learned Counsel, could be done only by a civil court of a competent jurisdiction The learned Counsel contends that the provisions contained in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, the Regulations framed thereunder or the provisions contained in U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries to Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971 (U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971) do not vest the District Inspector of Schools with any jurisdiction in this regard and that such an action on the part of District Inspector of Schools clearly had the effect of encroaching upon the internal management of the society which runs and manages the Institution in question and further amounted to interference with the institutional rights which was not permissible. 9. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 has however, urged that taking into consideration, the provisions contained in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act as well as U.P. Act. No. 24 of 1971 and the nature of statutory duties cast upon the District Inspector of Schools thereunder, the conferment of sufficient jurisdiction on him to go into the question in respect of continuance or discontinuance of an office bearer of a committee of management or a Manager is implicit and the impugned order had been passed by the District Inspector of Schools acting well within his jurisdiction. 10. The Society which runs the educational institution in question receives grants-in aid from the State. The affairs of an educational Institution must be conducted in accordance with law and it is of utmost importance that an atmosphere conducive to the development of education is ensured and maintained which is always the object that an institution receiving grants-in-aid from the State is supposed to serve. In a situation which gives rise to a conflict between institutional rights and public interest there always exists the Imperative need to balance the two requirements. In a situation which gives rise to a conflict between institutional rights and public interest there always exists the Imperative need to balance the two requirements. Under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act as well as in the High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries to teachers and other employees) Act, 1971 the District Inspector of Schools has to perform various administrative functions of statutory character in collaboration with the management of the High School and Intermediate Colleges. These duties cannot be discharged by the District Inspector of Schools unless he is in a position to find out on an administrative level as to who are the real office bearers of the college. As noticed by a Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Committee of Management v. District Inspector of Schools, 1978 AWC 124 , In view of section 10-A of the U.P. General Clauses Act, the District Inspector of Schools shall be deemed also to have been given all such powers as ere necessary to enable him to do or enforce the doing of the act which he is required to perform under the two Acts referred to above. It cannot be over looked that the term "Management' as defined In section 2 (b) of the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 in relation to any institution includes the Manager or other person vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The aforesaid circumstances, lead to an inescapable conclusion that the District Inspector of Schools stands vested with sufficient jurisdiction for the limited purposes as indicated above to satisfy himself as to who according to him is validly continuing as a Manager or representative of the Committee of Management if any party feels dissatisfied with such administrative decision, he is always at liberty to file a suit for adjudication of his right either as an office hearer of the committee of management or member of such a committee. The District Inspector of Schools has to alter his decision, if need be, so that it may be in conformity with the decision given by the court of competent jurisdiction and act accordingly. 11. We therefore, do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant in this regard which being devoid of merits deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 12. 11. We therefore, do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant in this regard which being devoid of merits deserves to be and is hereby rejected. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellant has next contended that the impugned order dated 14-8-1992, passed by the District Inspector of Schools stands vitiated in law as it was passed without affording any reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellants No. 2 the learned Counsel for the respondents has however, refuted the aforesaid submission pointing out that as observed by the District Inspector of Schools himself, the appellant No. 2 had notice of the proceedings and had actually appeared before the District Inspector of Schools on 30th June, 1992 which was the date fixed for hearing before him In these circumstances, it is urged that the appellant No. 2 can not be heard to say that the order in question has been passed behind his back and stands vitiated on this account. We have given our anxious consideration to this aspect of the case and have also perused in this connection the relevant material on the record. 13. The rules of natural justice can operate in areas not covered by any law validly made and are evolved to ensure fair adjudication whenever rights of an individual are affected. They are aimed to secure fair play in action and prevent miscarriage of justice. One of the first principles of natural Justice in that you must not permit one side to use means of influencing a decision which means are not known to the other side. It has to be emphasised that any person even if represented at any enquiry who Is to be adversely affected by any decision therein should not be left in the dark as to the risk of the finding being made depriving him any opportunity to adduce evidence or material of probative value which, had it been placed before the decision maker, might have deterred him front making the finding even though it cannot be predicated that it cannot inevitably have had that result. Observation to this effect occurring in the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd., 1984 (3) All E.R. 201 at 210, clearly indicate that mere knowledge of the enquiry proceedings or presence at the hearing is cot enough. Observation to this effect occurring in the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd., 1984 (3) All E.R. 201 at 210, clearly indicate that mere knowledge of the enquiry proceedings or presence at the hearing is cot enough. The person, who is going to be adversely affected must be informed of all the material which may be utilised against him so that he may have the opportunity to adduce the additional evidence or material of probative value which might deter the enquiring authority from making the finding as indicated above. As a matter of fact the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State Bank of India v. D.C. Aggarwal, JT 1992 (6) SC 673, has clearly held that taking action against a person on the basis of certain material or evidence without bringing the same to the notice of such person is violative of procedural safeguards and contrary to fair and Just enquiry. 14. If we examine the facts and circumstances of the present case in the light of the above principle, it will be apparent that the entire controversy raised by the responded No. 3 in his letter dated 2-6-1992 was directed against the motion of no confidence in question. 14. If we examine the facts and circumstances of the present case in the light of the above principle, it will be apparent that the entire controversy raised by the responded No. 3 in his letter dated 2-6-1992 was directed against the motion of no confidence in question. On the basis of the aforesaid letter, the District Inspector of Schools had issued a notice to the Adhyaksha calling upon him alone to submit his comments/report on the assertions made in the letter dated 2-6-1992 and had fixed 30th June, 1992 for the hearing of the case, in which only the respondent No. 2 and the Adhyaksha were required to lead evidence in respect of the dispute relating to the motion of no confidence The resolution No 3 whereunder the committee of management had recommended for holding the respondent No 3 ineligible for retaining his membership of the general body of the society as well as the resolution of the general body dated 12-4-1992, whereunder accepting the aforesaid recommendation, the general body of the society had passed the resolution holding the respondent No, 2 as in-eligible to retain his membership of the general body of the society did not form the subject matter of the dispute in respect whereof hearing was going to be done on 30th June, 1992, Further the District Inspector of Schools acting upon the resolution passed by the committee of management on 23-4-1992 had granted a recognition to the appellant No 2 as Manager of the committee of management. In this view of the matter, it was incumbent upon the District Inspector of Schools to inform the appellant No. 2 also about the representation of the respondent No. 2 and the material or evidence sought to be relied upon by him in support of his claim so that the appellant No. 2 could lead evidence in rebuttal and bring such facts to the notice of the District Inspector of Schools which were of some probative value. What we find is that the District Inspector of Schools has taken into consideration various materials and evidence led by the respondent No. 2, in support of his claim without bringing them to the notice of the appellant No. 2 and without affording any opportunity to him to establish that infact a casual vacancy had come into existence and the respondent No. 2 had no claim left for the office in question In view of the legal position to which a reference has been made above, we are of clear opinion that the enquiry made by the District Inspector of Schools leading up to the passing of the impugned order dated 14-8-1992 could not be held to be fair and just, In this connection, it may also be noticed that as pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court In its decision in the case of Committee of Management. Inter College. Nonapar v. District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur, 1979 ALJ 33, even though the decision taken by the District Inspector of Schools in such matters is of a summary and administrative nature, but once such a decision has been taken and an order has been passed in favour of a person, that order cannot be recalled or reviewed by the District Inspector of Schools without giving an opportunity of hearing to the person in whose favour the order had been passed. This opportunity of hearing, we may add, must not fall short of the nature as indicated hereinabove. There is yet another aspect which cannot be lost sight of. A perusal of the duly approved scheme of administration referred to hereinbefore, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition indicates that as provided in paragraph 4(Cha) read with (4)(Ja) a member of the general body of the society who is held ineligible to retain membership of the general body automatically ceased to hold the officer of membership of the committee of management. The District Inspector of Schools has not applied his mind at all to this aspect of the case. It has been overlooked that the casual vacancy in the office of the Manager could also come into existence In case the respondent no. The District Inspector of Schools has not applied his mind at all to this aspect of the case. It has been overlooked that the casual vacancy in the office of the Manager could also come into existence In case the respondent no. 2 was held to have become ineligible to retain the membership of the general body of the society in accordance with the provisions contained is the approved scheme of administration. 15. In view of our conclusions indicated hereinbefore we find it impossible to approve the judgment passed by the learned Single, Judge, wherein the vital aspects going to the root of the controversy have been entirely overlooked. 16. In the result, this special appeal succeeds. Accordingly, setting aside the judgment under appeal passed by the learned Single Judge, we allow the writ petition in part and quash the order passed by the District Inspector of Schools dated 14-8 1992, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition with a directing to the District Inspector of Schools, Meerut, respondent No. 1 to reconsider the matter relating to the accrual of the vacancy in question in the office of Manager of Committee of Management of Vedik Higher Secondary School, Faizpur-Nainana, district Meerut in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.