JUDGMENT V. Verma, Member.—The Director, Himachal Institute of Engineering and Technology, Kasumpti has come in appeal impugning the order of the District Forum, Shimla dated the 8th June, 1993. Against the same order an appeal has been filed by Sh. Anil Kumar Gupta, the complainant, before the Forum below Both the appeals we dispose of together through this order concentrating our attention first on the appeal filed by the Director. 2. During the year 1991, the above institute opened admission to 3 years Diploma Courses in Civil Engineering, Electronics and Communication Engineering and the Electrical Engineering. As per the brochure the said institute was represented to be affiliated to the State Board of Technical Education, Himachal Pradesh and recognised by the Himachal Government. Shri Anil Kumar, the respondent in the appeal applied for admission on the 24th September, 1991 and was admitted to the course of Electronics and Communication Engineering on the 7th October, 1992 on payment of admission fee of Rs. 5,075 besides Rs. 841 on account of one month tuition fee plus Rs. 200 as examination fee. In December 1991/ January 1992, the respondents discontinued his studies in the said institute. On these facts there is no controversy. What is disputed is the factum of recognition and affiliation of the said institute at the time the respondent was admitted. The appellants contention is that it was duly recognised by the Himachal Government when admission was made. After analysing the evidence led, the learned District Forum has held that the institute was not recognised by the All India Council of Technical Education and that without such recognition, the appellant institute was not entitled to make admission to the aforesaid courses. The approval for conducting the Diploma Courses during the Academic year 1991-92 was conveyed on the 9th April, 1992. It was still subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions specified therein. It has been held by the learned Forum that admission of Sh Anil Kumar Gupta in September 1991 tantamounted to deficiency in service and for this the respondent has been awarded an amount of Rs. 25,C00 by way of damages and costs for the loss suffered. 3. The principle challenge mounted by the learned Counsel for the appellant is on point of jurisdiction. 25,C00 by way of damages and costs for the loss suffered. 3. The principle challenge mounted by the learned Counsel for the appellant is on point of jurisdiction. According to him the subject of Education does not fall within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (the Act for short) and more specifically awarding of degrees is not a service contemplated by section 2 (1) (c) of the Act ; neither is a student a Consumer within the meaning of section 2 (1) (c) of the Act. The proposition he had advanced before the learned Forum also placing reliance on AIR (1922) Cal 95 He has argued that the said authority Smt N. Teneja and another v. Calcutta District Forum, AIR 1992 (Cal) 95, has been wrongly distinguished from the instant case. Advancing the same line of argument before us, the learned Counsel has invited our attention to Mohan Jains. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 (SC) 1858 and Unni Krishnan, J. P. and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, (II) 1993 (1) SCC 645. We are afraid the ratio of none of these two cases advances the cause of the appellant. The context was altogether different and in none of these judgments, the question as to whether imparting of education is or is not a service within the meaning of the Act was directly answered. 4. It is seen from the perusal of paras 19 and 20 of the single Judge order of Calcutta High Court in Smt. N. Teneja and another v Calcutta District Forum (supra) that the pronouncement to the effect that "Education does not come within the scope of Consumer Protection Act, 1986" has hem made in manifestly distinguishable background and altogether different context of relationship between a teacher and student of an educational institution. 5. On the other hand, it has been held authoritively on principle, precedent and the language of the Statute (the Act) that education comes within the arena of service under the Act. It is borne out from paragraph 15 of the above judgment of Haryana State Commission in Tilak Raj of Chandigarh v. Haryana School Education Board, (I) (1992) CPJ 76, from which we take liberty to reproduce verbatim : — "15 We regret out inability to agree with aforesaid submission. It is borne out from paragraph 15 of the above judgment of Haryana State Commission in Tilak Raj of Chandigarh v. Haryana School Education Board, (I) (1992) CPJ 76, from which we take liberty to reproduce verbatim : — "15 We regret out inability to agree with aforesaid submission. It is true that in the definition of Service in Clause (o) of subsection (1) of section 2 of the Act, education does not find mention in express terms like other activities which have been specifically so labelled. However, it deserves highlighting that the enumerated services arc only part of the inclusive definition and in no way constrict the essence and meaning of the word service for the purposes of the Act. That the same has been widely defined is manifest from the language employed which says that service moans service of any description which is made available to potential users. The Legislature has deliberately cast the net very wide to bring within its ambit the services of any description when rendered for a consideration barring those under contract of personal service. Whenever education is imparted for a consideration, it is obvious that there exists a quid pro quo for the provision of education and a monetary recompense therefore. On principle, there does not seem any logical reasons for excluding education from the ambit of the definition of service under the Act. However, that matter does not rest merely on principle or the language of the statute. In a way, this again is covered by precedent. In Bangalore Water Supply and Sowerage Boards case, AIR 1978 SC 548, the authoritative conclusion in para 116 is as under :— Para 116. We dissent, with utmost deference, these propositions and are inclined to hold, as the Corporation of Nagpur AIR 1960 SC 675 held that education is industry, and Isaacs, J. held, in the Australian case, (1929) 41 CLR 569 (Aus) (supra) that education is pre-eminently service." "From the above, it would follow that if education is genetically and pre-eminently a service, then it would be more so within the expansive and large field of service spelt out in the definition of service under the Act. It must, therefore, be held that on principle, precedent, and the language of the statute, education would equarely come within the arena of "service under the Act." The same view we find reiterated again by the Haryana Commission in Kurushetra University v. Prakash Verma, (1993) CFC 182 To highlight the force of the said ration, we consider it pertinent to reproduce from paragraphs 17 and 18 ibid :— "17. We are afraid that the aforesaid submission cannot hold water within this jurisdiction any longer. The issue has been considered twice by this Commission with considerable exhaustive-ness which need not be repeated What calls for pointed notice is the fact that way back in Tilak Raj v Haryana School Education Board (supra) it was held in no uncertain terms that the imparting of education for a consideration would come squarely within the ambit of service’ under the Act. This case was carried before the Notional Commission and though the order was modified on the ground of limitation, the National Commission did not take a contrary view on this basic question. By way of analogy in 1991 CPC 41, Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak v. Shakuntla Choudhary, this Commission again held that a University imparting education and conducting examinations against charges is within the arena of Consumer Jurisdiction. The reasoned reiteration of this view has now been made in II (1092) CPJ 80, A. P. J. School v K. L Galhotra. Therein after an indepth discussion of principle of precedent and relying primarily on Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A Rajappa and others, AIR 1978 SC 548, it has been held as follows :— "To finally conclude on this aspect, the answer to the question posted at the outset has to be rendered in the affirmative. It must be held that on principle precedent and the language of the statute education would squarely come within the arena of service under the Act." "18. Apart from the consistent view taken under in this Commission, it is unnecessary to recall that the Orissa State Commission in II (1991) CPJ 373, Smt. Monisa Samal v Sambalpur University .and others, took a similar view. Apart from the consistent view taken under in this Commission, it is unnecessary to recall that the Orissa State Commission in II (1991) CPJ 373, Smt. Monisa Samal v Sambalpur University .and others, took a similar view. The said case apparently received tacit affirmance from the Nation Commission in an appeal against the said order in 1 (1992) CPJ 231 (NC)—(1992) CPC 150, Manisha Samal v Sambalpur University and others (supra)." Analogous, in fact is the decision of the State Commission, Delhi rendered in Apeejay School and another v. M K. Sangal and others, (1993) CPC 221, which in addition has held that a complaint against a school found deficient in rendering the service to the student is covered by the definition of complaint given in section 2 (1) (c) (iii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. (Head Note-D). In the light of the above cetena of authorities and tacit approval of that view by the National Commission, there is no doubt in our mind that the learned District Forum has rightly rejected the objection to its jurisdiction to adjudicate as also to the competence of the complaint before it to seek redressal under it. 6. The second limb of the argument on behalf of the appellant is that the District Forum has compounded its error by "relying upon the cases of Suchi Sumita s case, (1992) (1) CPR 766", in returning the finding of "deficiency in service". According to him the institute was duly recognised by the Himachal Pradesh Government vide their letter dated the 26th August, 1991 and the appellants institute was thus well within its right to make admission to various courses of study. The learned District Forum, however has repelled this contention and found that the institute could not have admitted any student for the courses till All India Councils approval was received. In coming to this conclusion, it has duly taken into consideration the aforementioned letter which incidental, is conditional in regard to admission, and the written statements and documents filed on behalf of the State and Director, Technical Education, respondents before it. The documents and affidavit placed on record on behalf of the appellant has been given due weightage. We have also seen for ourselves, the original record of the complaint and find no reason to discharge With the above findings. The documents and affidavit placed on record on behalf of the appellant has been given due weightage. We have also seen for ourselves, the original record of the complaint and find no reason to discharge With the above findings. We have not come across any record as would show that when the admissions started sometime during August—September 1991, the appellant institute had been affiliated to the Board of Technical Education, Himachal Pradesh, which, as claimed through the prospect was to conduct the examinations. Accordingly, the institute was neither unconditionally recognised nor affiliated with the Board of Technical Education, Himachal Pradesh, the day the respondent Shri Gupta was admitted to the institute. Again without affiliation the appellant could not have possibly assured, as represented, at the time of admission that the examinations would be con ducted by the Technical Education Board, no matter that subsequently such examinations might have actually come to be so held. In the circumstances, the ratio of Suchi Sumita has rightly been applied to hold the appellant deficient in performance of service. 7. Having got over the threshold question, we now consider the merits of the appeal mainly on two points which are primal to the outcome of this order. One point urged before the learned District Forum and against pressed before us is that by his own acts, conduct and deeds the complaint is stopped from maintaining the complaint. The second point is contained in item (XXVI) of the memorandum of appeal which reads :— "That Honble forum gravely failed to notice that in section 14 of the Consumer Protection Act the party to be awarded compensation has not only to show deficiency in service but also the negligence of the other party and without the finding of negligence there cannot be any award, whereas in the present case no such finding has been recorded against the present appellant making the whole award bad." 8. The first point has been found meritless by the learned District Forum, below. And in regard to the second, the impugned order is silent. The first point has been found meritless by the learned District Forum, below. And in regard to the second, the impugned order is silent. The contention of the appellant as depicted in reply to para 4 of the complaint is that "after getting the admission in the said institute the complainant did not attend his classes regularly which fact was also informed to the parents through the letter dated 17-12-1991 and also through various letters sent from time to time by the institute to his parents. Several warnings were also given to the complainant by the authorities of the institute. Neither the complainant nor his parents pay any attention to the letters and warnings and at last on 5-3-1992 his name was struck off which is according to the rule and regulations (copy of letters attached). "To this, the submission in rejoinder is to the effect that the respondent" left the college when he came to know that the institute is not recognised and replying respondent is playing with the career of the complainant". In evidence the respondent has failed on the averments made in his own affidavit to the effect that "he was attending classes regularly but when he come to know that institute is not recognised he left the classes". Averment of regular attendance, however, is belied by Annexure 3-A filed by the appellant in support of his evidence on his affidavit. It is observed therefrom that during the very first quarter ending 15th December, 1991, the attendance of the respondent in most of the classes was too poor to invite critical remarks with advice to make up the deficiency by the end of February 1992. The institute closed for vacation from the 15th December, 1991 and was to reapon on the 20th of 15th February, 1992. The respondent, however, did not resume attendance or joined the class despite the appellant offering more than one opportunity to seek regularisation of absence and to continue studies. Pertinent and important in this context is letter dated the 25th April, 1992, where by even after his name had been struck off the roll, the respondents father had been advised to complete formalities enabling him to write the 1st Semester examination. Pertinent and important in this context is letter dated the 25th April, 1992, where by even after his name had been struck off the roll, the respondents father had been advised to complete formalities enabling him to write the 1st Semester examination. There is no evidence such as any protest that the respondent might have lodged to the appellant or any representation that he might have made to the Director, Technical Education or State, respondent Nos 2 and 4, to show that abandonment of studies was solely because of non-recognition of the institute. In this background the only conclusion that can possibly be drawn is that the respondent was least interested in pursuing the studies and had given up studies on his own volition. His conduct, therefore, estopes him from maintaining the complaint. 9. To justify award of compensation under section 14 of the Act, proof of negligence on the part of opposite party in the buckle that binds deficiency in service with award of compensation. A finding to this effect on the part of the appellant, we find conspicuous by its absence in the impugned order In fact, there is no specific allegations in the complaint spelling out clearly in what manner the appellant had been negligent to cause the respondent loss and injury. So notwithstanding the fact that deficiency in service while granting admission has bet n established, discontinuance of studies and consequent purported loss or injury has not been proved as arising because of negligence on the part of the appellant. In this view of the matter, we draw strength from the order of the National Commission in Consumer Unity and Trust Society v. The Chairman and Managing Director, Bank of Baroda, (1991) CPR 262 (NC), which in terms states :— "Under this clauses "section 14 (1) (d)" Compensation can be awarded to a consumer only in respect of any loss or injury found to have been suffered by him due to the negligence of the opposite party. It is the essence of this provision that the loss or injury for which compensation is to be adjuged and awarded should be found to have been caused by the negligence of the opposite party. It is the essence of this provision that the loss or injury for which compensation is to be adjuged and awarded should be found to have been caused by the negligence of the opposite party. The complainant has, therefore, to establish that there was negligence on the part of the opposite party and that as a consequence thereof loss or injury was caused." (Emphasis supplied) The impugned order in these circumstances is not sustainable in law. 10. In the light of the above discussion the appeal is partly accepted and the order dated 8-6-1993 of the District Forum, Shimla in complaint No. 88/92 in so far as it awards in favour of the respondent a compensation/damages of Rs. 25,000 is set aside. 11. In view of the above findings we do not consider it worth-while to consider the various other points urged in the appeal. 12. For the reasons aforesaid cross appeal No. 334/93 filed by Shri Anil Kumar Gupta praying for the enhancement of amount of compensation from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 90,000 fails and is dismissed being devoid of any merit. 13. Parties are, however, left to bear their own cost. 14. After needful, be confined to record room. Announced today the 25th August, 1993. Appeal allowed. Cross appeal dismissed.