G. B. PATNAIK J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has been treated as a ceiling surplus holder under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the At') and challenges the decision of the Member, Board of Revenue as well as the competent authority under the Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's case, in brief, is that his father late M. Suba Rao died leaving behind three sons and three daughters and in a family partition. The properties of the joint family consisting of M. Suba Rao and his children were divided. The family partition is of the year 1951 and the registered partition deed is dated 27-3-1951. But they had a piece of land in mouza Ramgarh measuring Ac. 4. 928 decimals which was kept joint. After the Act came into force on 17-2-1976, the petitioner submitted a return indicating therein that his residential land together with the building standing thereon in mouza Patapur measures ac. 0. 097 decimals and he had acquired another piece of vacant land adjacent to his house measuring Ac. 0. 299 decimals and he had 1/6th interest in the joint family property in mouza Ramgarh. The competent authority framed a draft statement indicating therein that is the joint family property which included the vacant land of Ac. 4. 920 decimals in mouza Ramgarh and Ac. 0. 097 decimals in mouza Patapur, the petitioner's 1/6th interest worked out at Ac. 0. 837 decimals and the petitioner's self acquisition in the said mouza Patapur, to the extent of Ac. 0. 299 decimals on being added, the total came to Ac. 1. 136 decimals. Since the petitioner is entitled to the maximum of 2000 sq. meters equivalent to Ac. 0. 504 decimals, the surplus land in his hand is Ac. 0. 632 decimals. The draft statement was prepared on 5-3-1990. The petitioner filed his objections on 2-4-1980 as per Annexure-1 but the competent authority rejected all the objections which were communicated to the petitioner on 27-8-1981. ( 3 ) THE petitioner carried the matter in appeal which was heard by the Member, Board of Revenue. The appellate authority by its order dated 19-7-1982 allowed the appeal in part and held the surplus in the hands of the petitioner to be Ac. O. 243 decimals. ( 3 ) THE petitioner carried the matter in appeal which was heard by the Member, Board of Revenue. The appellate authority by its order dated 19-7-1982 allowed the appeal in part and held the surplus in the hands of the petitioner to be Ac. O. 243 decimals. The petitioner assailed the said appellate order in a writ petition which was registered as O. J. C. 2207/82 and a batch of six writ petitions, four filed at the instance of the petitioner and his other claimants and two filed by the State, were heard together. The High Court remanded the matter to the Competent Authority being of the opinion that the surplus land had not been correctly computed and further being of the opinion that in view of Sub-Sec. (7) of S. 4 of the Act protecting the interest of the major sons of a Hindu undivided family, the same had not been borne in mind in computing the ceiling surplus. After remand the competent authority reheard the parties and the only claim raised by the petitioner was that he was entitled to two shares for his two major daughters on the date the Act came into force. That contention was rejected by the competent authority relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 234 (Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji; Anantalakhshmi Pathabi Ramasharma Yeturi etc. v. Union of India ). The petitioner carried the matter in appeal. Before the appellate authority, three contentions had been raised by the petitioner : (I) Each major son and daughter is entitled to a separate ceiling; (ii) The area in which no construction could take place has been taken into account and thereby the computation has been vitiated; (iii) The residential house of the appellant being a khasmahal land was outside the purview of the Act. The lower appellate court rejected all the contentions. The lower appellate court rejected all the contentions. So far as the first contention is concerned, the lower appellate court held that the petitioner had three minor sons and an unmarried daughter on the date the Act came into force and, therefore, all of them would constitute a family within the ambit of S. 2 (f) of the Act and so far as two major married daughters are concerned, as they were not coparceners and were not entitled to get any share by virtue of Sub-Sec. (7) of S. 4, the petitioner was entitled to only one ceiling unit. So far as the second contention is concerned, the appellate authority relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson, AIR 1983 SC 1303 : (1983 All LJ 1261) came to hold that for the purpose of computation the vacant land as well as the land on which the residential building stood should be taken into account and consequently no error had been committed. So far as the third question is concerned namely, the land belonging to the Khasmahal authority, it came to hold that the same would also be a vacant land within the definition of S. 2 (q) and, therefore, the computation has been properly made. The appeal having been dismissed, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. ( 4 ) MR. Ramdas appearing for the petitioner raises the following contentions in assailing the legality of the orders passed by the competent authority :- (I) Even though there had been a partition of the joint family property on 27-3-1951 but the land at Mouza Ramgarh measuring Ac. 4. 928 decimals has been kept joint, and, therefore the joint family property cannot come within the purview of the Act as was observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 234 (supra ). 4. 928 decimals has been kept joint, and, therefore the joint family property cannot come within the purview of the Act as was observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 234 (supra ). (ii) In view of definition of "family" in S. 2 (f) since a major child does not come within the purview of the said definition even though the petitioner and his minor children would be included in the notional definition of a family in S. 2 (f) but his two major married daughters were entitled to two different ceiling units and non-granting of two ceiling units to them vitiates the calculation made; (iii) So far as the joint family property in mouza Ramgarh is concerned, the petitioner's son having a share in the same by birth, it is only that portion of the property which would have fallen to the petitioner's share in the event of a partition between him and his children could be taken into account and the authority committed error by taking the entire 1/6th share of the petitioner's branch into account. (iv) In any view of the matter, the land together with the building standing thereon in mouza Patapur which is the residential house of the petitioner measuring Ac. O. 097 decimals would be excluded from the purview of computation in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mira Gupta's case, AIR 1992 SC 1567 : 1992 AIR SCW 1665 which has distinguished Johnson's case on which the authority below has relied upon and thereby there has been an error in the computation made. ( 5 ) SO far as the first contention of Mr. Ramdas is concerned, relying upon the observation of Justice Sen in the case of Maharao Saheb Shri Bhim Singhji-Anantalakhsmi Pathabi Ramasharma Yeturi v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 234 , Mr. Ramdas for the petitioner contends that a joint hindu family is excluded from the purview of the Act. Such a contention had been raised before us in the case of Nagendra Chandra Das v. State of Orissa O. J. C. 2358/85 disposed of on 8-2-1988 and we had rejected the same by observing that his Lordships had made the said observation in reply to an attack being to the validity of the Act on the ground that it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. But the observations cannot be construed to mean that the provisions of the Act will have no application where a Hindu Undivided Family is in possession of land in an Urban agglomeration in excess of the limit prescribed under the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the vary purpose for which the Act has been enacted. That apart, the joint Hindu family came to be disrupted by the partition in the family of the year 1951 and, therefore, the property after the separation and partition of the family which was allowed to be kept joint cannot be impressed with the character of a joint family property. In the aforesaid premises, we are of the considered opinion that the first contention of Mr. Ramdas appearing for the petitioner is devoid of any merit and the same is accordingly rejected. ( 6 ) SO far as the second contention of Mr. Ramdas is concerned, under the Act every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling unit at the commencement of the Act is required to file a statement before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying the location, extent, value and such other particulars, as may be prescribed of all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building. Under S. 4 of the Act, the ceiling unit in case of every person is five hundred square meters, where the land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category 'a' specified in Schedule I; one thousand square meters, where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category 'b'; one thousand five hundred square meters, where the land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category 'c'; and two thousand square meters where such land is situated in an urban agglomeration falling within category 'd'. The expression "person" has been defined in S. 2 (i) to include an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The expression "family" has been defined in S. 2 (f) to mean in relation to a person, the individual, the wife or husband as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor children. On the date the Act came into force admittedly the petitioner had no major married son. The expression "family" has been defined in S. 2 (f) to mean in relation to a person, the individual, the wife or husband as the case may be, of such individual and their unmarried minor children. On the date the Act came into force admittedly the petitioner had no major married son. The two major married daughters were not entitled to get any share in Ramgarh property and, therefore, question of giving them different ceiling units does not arise. In this view of the matter, the computation of ceiling in the hands of the petitioner in respect of the vacant land cannot be said to be vitiated. The second contention of Mr. Ramdas is accordingly devoid of any merit and the same is accordingly rejected. ( 7 ) SO far as the third contention is concerned, under Hindu Law a son by birth gets a share in the joint family ancestral property but by the time the Urban Ceiling Act came into force, there had been no joint family of Mr. M. S. Rao and there had been a complete separation in the family. That apart by the notional definition of "family" in the Act, the minor sons on the date being included in the definition of family, question of giving them a share in the Ramgarh property does not arise for the purpose of computing the ceiling surplus in the hands of the petitioner. We accordingly do not find any force in the third contention of Mr. Ramdas which is also accordingly rejected. ( 8 ) SO far as the fourth contention of Mr. Ramdas is concerned, we, however, find sufficient force in the same. The appellate authority has determined the ceiling by taking into account S. 4 (9) of the Act and relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Johnson's case (supra ). But the Johnson's case has been reconsidered in Mira Gupta's case, AIR 1992 SC 1567 : (1992 AIR SCW 1665) and it has been held in the said case that the expression "any other land" in S. 4 (9) would mean any other built-upon land except the one excluded from the expression "vacant land" on account of it being occupied by a building which stood constructed or was in the process of construction on the appointed day. Admittedly on the land at mouza Patapur measuring Ac. Admittedly on the land at mouza Patapur measuring Ac. O. 097 decimals the residential house of the petitioner stood and it was there much before the date, the Act came into force. Therefore, the said land is excluded from the definition of the vacant land in S. 2 (q) (ii ). The question that arises for consideration is whether while computing under S. 4 (9) of the Act, the said land will have to be excluded or not. There cannot be any manner of doubt that in view of the Law laid down by the Apex Court in Mira Gupta's case (supra), the said land has to be excluded from computation. We have recently dealt with this question in the case of Sri Bidheswar Sahoo v. Special Officer and Competent Authority (1992) 71 CLT 409. In the aforesaid premises, the residential building of the petitioner having stood at Patapur much prior to 28/01/1976, the date on which the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act came into force, the same has to be excluded from the computation of the vacant land in the hands of the surplus holder, namely, the petitioner. It may be noticed that u/s. 2 (q) (ii) the land occupied by any building and the land appurtenant thereto will have to be excluded. Therefore, the petitioner will have to establish as to what is the extent of the land occupied by the building and the land appurtenant thereto. In view of our conclusion, as aforesaid, on the fourth contention of Mr. Ramdas, the computation of ceiling made by the authorities cannot be sustained. We accordingly quash the order of the appellate authority as well as that of the original authority and remit the matter to the competent authority for re-determination of the ceiling bearing in mind the observations and directions contained in this judgement. The writ application is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. ( 9 ) S. K. MOHANTY, J. :- I agree. Order accordingly. .